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Abstract 
Principally, Joint stock companies are governed by the principle of majority rule, which 
means that while they are formed and continue to work through participation of every 
shareholder, only those who hold a majority of voting shares can make decisions in 
companies. The principle relies on contract and is often supported by company law. In 
the main, it is advantageous to companies, the judiciary and the economy. It facilitates 
collective action, allows management to focus on the daily running of the company 
business and encourages corporate financing, which is decisively important for 
corporations. It also saves, by curbing minority actions, the courts' time and the public 
budget. In one sense, however, it can also be dangerous to the rights and interests of 
minority shareholders. Using the majority rule, majority shareholders may fix for 
themselves private benefits or adopt policies which are poor and consequently harmful 
to companies. Such danger could discourage likely investors from investing their 
capital in companies and might undermine one of the main purposes of the 
corporation as an institution introduced by law and business practice to solve 
problems encountered in raising substantial amounts of capital. This research seeks to 
study in the light of English and Iranian company laws difficulties deriving from 
application of the majority rule for minority shareholders and possible ways and 
mechanisms which can be used to sensibly curb the occurrence of such difficulties. To 
this objective, it identifies four factors which can explain how and why the rule is liable 
to abuse by majority shareholders and examines the mechanisms provided by 
company laws of England and Iran which attempt to strike a balance between the rule 
of majority and interests of minority shareholders. 
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Introduction 
Although its management makes most decisions within companies, almost any act of a 
company can be ratified by a resolution adopted by majority of its shareholders. Any 
such resolution would then be considered to be the decision of the whole company, 
and not merely a decision made by a specific group in the company. This is a 
fundamental principle known as the principle of majority rule. The rule is normally 
accepted by company members in their constitution and often prescribed by the 
company laws of most countries. ' It is generally seen as advantageous to companies, 
the judiciary and the economy at large. For companies, it facilitates collective action', 
allows management to focus on the daily running of the company business' and 
encourages corporate financing which is decisively important for corporations. 4 As 
regards the judiciary, it saves, by curbing n-dnority actions, the courts" time and the 
I Cooper v. Gordon, (1869), LR 8 Eq 249, Per Stuart V. C.; See Davies, P. L., "'Gower's Principles 
of Modern Company Law", (1997), 6th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, at pp 585-587,705. 
2 Hager Mark M., "Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational 'Real Entity' 
Theory", University of Pittsburgh Law Review, (1989), Vol. 50, Pittsburgh, at p 633. 
3 Griffin Stephen, "Company law: Fundamental Principles", (1996), 2nd ed., London, Pitman, at 
pp 299-300; Farrar John H., "Company Law", (1991), London, Butterworths, at pp 
318-319; 
Cheffins Brian R., "'Company Law: Theory Structure And Operation", (1997), Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, at pp 14-16. 
4 Black Bernard S., ""Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis", North- 
Western University Law Review, (1990), Vol. 84, No 2, Chicago, North-western University Law 
School, at p 552; Bebchuk Lucian Arye, "Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The 
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments", Harvard Law Review, (1989), Vol. 102, 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Law Review Publishing Association, at pp 1830-1. 
4 
public budget. ' To the economy, the rule helps companies to prosper and the more 
companies prosper, the better the economy and the society are served. ' 
Yet, in one sense the rule can also be unjust, since it requires a concentration of power 
in the hands of the majority, who may exercise it abusively. A majority decision can be 
ignorant of minority shareholders' interest and even taken honestly can involve poor 
strategies that are harmful to companies. ' The abuse possibility can increase when the 
rule is put together with certain company law principles which coordinate to isolate 
and trivialise minority shareholders in companies. The idea that company is a separate 
person in law and it is the company itself that can as a proper plaintiff take action in 
relation to any claim against individuals who have committed wrong against the 
company and that a shareholder would be barred from complaining before the courts 
in respect of corporate actions confer almost all the corporate power to the majority. 
The courts, on their part, have also shown reluctance to deal with claims where a 
shareholder is in dispute with the majority shareholders, generally taking the view that 
disputes of this kind should be settled in general meetings. They tend to note the 
separate personality principle and to emphasise that a minority shareholder is not 
entitled to exercise rights that inhere in the company itself. Such rights principally fall 
within the power of the majority shareholders who can exercise them freely. Even if the 
courts want to hear minority shareholder disputes, practical difficulties which exist on 
the path of the plaintiff will discourage him. Usually the suspected wrong involves 
5 Mac Dougall v. Gardiner (1875), 1 Ch. D. p 13 per Melish L. J.; Gray v. Lewis, (1873), 8 Ch App, 
1035, at p 1051 per James L. J.; See also Pettet Ben, "Company Law", (2001), Harlow, Longman, 
at pp 227-8; Griffin (above, note 3) at pp 301-2. 
6 MacNeil, lain, "Company Law Rules: An Assessment from the Perspective of Incomplete 
Contract Theory", Journal of Corporate Law Studies, (June 2001), Oxford, UK, Hart Pub, at p 117; 
Cheffins (above, note 3) at pp 18-19. 
5 
complex issues relating to company operations and its financial matters which are 
difficult to understand and where a shareholder is able to assess such matters, he can 
be denied access to the information needed. Directors can always refuse to give the 
required information, taking the argument that the demanded information involves 
commercial secrets. The costs of taking action contrast to its probable benefits can be 
disproportunate and thus can constitute a further disincentive for a minority plaintiff. ' 
If abuse of right by the majority is possible, then arguably, the law is deficient because 
it fails to ensure controllers will conu-nit no abuse. Such possibility could discourage 
likely investors from investing their capital in companies and might undermine one of 
the main purposes of a company as an institution, in that Posner9 and others" have 
suggested that a company is primarily a device introduced by law and business 
practice to solve problems encountered in raising substantial amounts of capital-" 
The possibility of abuse of rights by majority shareholders against rights and interests 
of minority shareholders in companies has focussed attention of the regulators on 
devising some mechanism which could sensibly and fairly resolve, in one way or 
another, the majority/ minority conflict and strike a desirable balance between the rule 
of majority, on the one hand, and protection of minority shareholders, on the other. 
However, those mechanisms have struggled to achieve optimum effect because of the 
7 Rajak Harry, "'Source Book of Company Law", (1995), Bristol, Jordans, at p 530. 
8 Farrar (above, note 3) at p 442; Parkinson J. E., "Corporate Power and Responsibility", (1993), 
Oxford, Clarendon Press; New York, Oxford University Press, at pp 241-6. 
9 Posner Richard A., "Economic Analysis of Law", (1992), Boston, London, Little, Brown, at p 
392. 
10 Farrar, John H., "Company Law", (1985), London, Butterworths, p 6. 
11 Cheffins, Brian R., "Minority Shareholders and Corporate Governance, ", The Company Lawyer, 
(2000), London, Oyez Publishing Limited, Vol. 21, No 2, p 41. 
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difficulty in reconciling two seemingly contrary goals. Either, they lay excessive 
emhasis on majority rule and give insufficient attention to the protection of minority 
shareholder rights which resulted in unjust enrichment by majority shareholders at the 
expense of minority shareholders. " Or conversely, they impose overly intrusive 
measures for the protection of minority rights which have led corporations to witness 
slowing down or cessation plus escape of substantial investors from company sector. 13 
Like elsewhere, English and Iranian corporation laws have noticed the conflict between 
majority and minority rights and have attempted to resolve it. While both regard the 
majority rule as a key principle, they have tried differently to resolve a possible conflict 
of the rule with minority shareholders' rights. As to the former, the law emphasises on 
the rule of majority which is found in the famous Foss case 14 and which has been 
15 
supported by subsequent cases , meanwhile, it also acknowledges that minority 
shareholders must have some voice so as to prevent the former making abuse of rights. 
Consequently, it confers on minority shareholders strong protection to address the 
issue of abuse of rights by the majority" and in doing so it is not particularly concerned 
about directors' involvement in the wrongdoing. " As to the latter, while the law 
supports govemance of majority shareholders, which is stated in the joint Stock 
12 The point was well explained by Sealy who speaks of the task of the lawmakers to strike a 
delicate balance in the relationship between the majority and minority shareholders. [Sealy L. S., 
"Cases and Materials", (2001), London, Butterworths, Chap 10 at p 4771. 
13 Parkinson (above, note 8) p 19. 
14 Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
15 Mac Dougall v. Gardiner (1875), 1 Ch. D. 13; Burland v. Earle (1902), AC 83, PC, p 93-94, per 
Lord Davey; Mozley v. Alston (1847) 1 Ph 790; Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co. Ltd. (1925), 
AC 619; Lee v. Lees'Air Farming Ltd. (1961), AC 12. 
16 These protections include 'bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole', derivative 
action, just and equitable winding up, and unfairly prejudicial remedy which will respectively 
be considered in Chapters three and five below. 
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Companies Act 1969, Sections 86-88", it tends to focus on the idea that executive rather 
than controlling power might involve abuse. " Hence, its solutions concern in great 
part to the shareholder /management conflict rather than that of the majority /minority. 
It only confronts the issue of majority abuse of rights against minority shareholders 
where a wrongdoer director/ shareholder wants to vote in the general meeting to ratify 
their own misconduct. 'O However, the possibility of abuse is not exclusive to directors 
as it is possible to imagine a case of abuse where a director is not involved. Majority 
shareholders may commit abuse through passing of unjust and discriminatory 
resolutions, thereby diverting the company"s assets and its profits to themselves. It is 
also possible that they relieve wrongdoer directors from liability on some personal and 
self-interested grounds at the expense of the company and its minority shareholders. In 
such cases, minority shareholders often have no internal or external recourse. The 
majority rules within the company and the courts tend not to entertain minority claims 
irrespective of their merits. Constitutions may further restrict a shareholder's choice to 
exit from inhospitable companies and there might even be no market for corporate 
shares where companies are private. 
This research seeks to study difficulties deriving from application of the majority rule 
for minority shareholders and the mechanisms introduced by the company laws of 
17 Though, in practice, it is often the case that a wrongdoer director involves in the 
wrongdoing. See Wedderburn K. W., "Shareholder's Rights and The Rule in Foss v. Harbottle", 
(1958), Cambridge Law Journal, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p 97. 
18 Corresponding to Persian calander year 1347. (Hereafter cited as JSCA). 
19 Section 51 Trade Code 1933, (corresponding to Persian calendar year 1311 - Hereafter is cited 
TQ Sections 614,615,631,663 and 667 Civil Code 1929, (corresponding to Persian calendar 
year 1307 - Hereafter is cited CQ Sections 129,130,131,133,142,143 JSCA. 
20 Section 129 JSCA. 
8 
England" and Iran which attempt to strike a balance between interests of minority and 
majority shareholders. It aims to carry out a three-fold job. First, it tries to show the 
wrongdoing opportunity that an inflexible and rigid understanding of the majority 
rule may yield in favour of the majority shareholders, which, in tum, will result in an 
appreciation of the problems that might arise for minority shareholders. Second, it 
examines the existing reconciliation mechanisms in the two company laws of England 
and Iran in order to identify their strengths /weaknesses hereby to provide 
recommendations to improve those mechanisms. Third, it highlights strengths of 
certain English company law measures regarding this relationship which might be of 
use to its Iranian counterpart in that they help the Iranian company law to establish not 
only efficient but also just working framework within which both the majority and 
minority groups are benefited. 
The research is divided into five Chapters; each addresses a question which is pertinent 
as to pursuing one of the above-mentioned objectives. As to the first objective, 
Chapters one to four are relevant, as they generally clarify and examine, from varying 
aspects, the very concept of the majority rule. The intention is to show how and under 
what circumstances majority shareholders could make opportunistic use of the 
majority rule against minoritry shareholders" interests in corporations. Chapter five 
and one section in Chapter three, which concerns limiting freedom of shareholder 
voting, seek to pursue the second objective. They generally concern demonstrating and 
21 By English company law, I refer to statutory law as well as common law relevant to 
companies which are in operation in England, as distinguished from the company laws of other 
three constituent countries of the United Kingdom; i. e. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
The main source of reference is, however, the Companies Act 1985 which applies (with certain 
reserves for Scotland) in all constituent countries excluding Northern Ireland. 
9 
examining the mechanisms which currently exist in English and Iranian company laws 
and which are meant to provide cerain minority protections that prevent abuse of 
power by majority shareholders. In the end and in pursuit of the third objective, the 
research will complete by: surnmarising the gist of issues discussed in each Chapter; 
displayin strengths and weakness of the two systems plus providing some W9 
recommendations; and highlighting the ideas, and mechanisms which exist in the 
English company law that could be useful to learn by the Iranian company law. 
To achieve the first objective, I shall discuss four issues. The first issue, to be 
considered, concerns justification of the majority rule in corporations. The rule, as we 
shall see, can act against the autonomy of dissident minority shareholders. Using the 
majority rule, majority shareholders can conspire against minority interest or they may 
simply adopt foolish policies that are prejudicial to the company and its shareholders. 
Company law theorists tend to support governance of majority rule, while being 
potentially liable to abuse. Why and how they do so can explain why minority 
shareholders should tolerate certain risks associated with control by the majority and 
in part sheds light on the question of what is the source of some of minority difficulties 
that stem from the majority/ minority conflict in corporations. The question of 
justifications for majority rule is discussed in Chapter one. The Chapter reviews three 
most influential theories (political, economic and doctrinal) developed by scholars of 
company law to appreciate the majority rule. Further, as the corporate governance 
structure can be relevant to explain how the majority rule is justified and what sort of 
problem minority shareholders face and because different structures may generate 
different justifications and in turn cause different minority problems, the Chapter 
compares corporate governance structures which exist in English and Iranian 
corporations. 
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The second issue, which is worth consideration, relates to scope of majority rule. The 
issue is important for the purpose of my first objective, as it demonstrates the field of 
application of majority rule. It also helps one to undersand where minority difficulties 
could stem from and where the help of law is more required. This is because the 
question of field concerns with determining areas and circumstances in which the rule 
of majority can apply. When the field is clear, one can easily judge whether or not an 
act of majority is forceful and binding against minority shareholders. As the rule has 
no application on areas which fall outside such field, it can generate little difficulties 
for minority shareholders. An abusive exercise of power by the majority shareholders 
in such areas can be responded adequately through a shareholder action. These aside, 
minority shareholders can be put into misery in areas and in respect of issues which 
fall within the powers of majority shareholders. The same may also occur when the 
field is not clear. The courts tend not to hear minority allegations, which are normally 
categorised as internal shareholder disputes. The question of field; i. e. determination 
of what powers majority shareholders enjoy, is something which must be answered in 
the light of corporate constitutions and laws relevant to companies. The question is 
subject of my consideration in Chapter two. The chapter is divided into two sections. 
Section one concerns legal rules and the intention is to explain relevance of such rules 
in making the framework within which the majority rule works. By legal rules, I refer 
in this section, to rules that derive from general laws which are binding on companies 
as a matter of public order and regulation rather than being a matter of minority 
protection. As the latter issue will be discussed later in Chapter five, I will avoid 
repeating that discussion here. Section two considers the relevance of corporate 
constitutions and specifically concerns examination of four constitutional mechanisms 
that coordinate to shape the nile of majority's field of application. These mechanisms 
include internal division of power, ultra vires issues, special majority requirement and 
personal rights. 
The third issue, to be considered, concerns nature of majority rule. It is, in fact, about 
demonstrating and examining the way in which the majority rule works. The intention 
is to show how majority shareholders can abuse the mechanism of majority rule in 
order to benefit themselves. Generally speaking, the rule works through the 
mechanism of voting. The mechanism allows shareholders to vote on matters which 
affect them collectively, but final decision is taken as a matter of principal by a majority 
resolution of the shareholders which relies on the 'one share, one vote' rule. This 
mechanism, which is considered as being a respect for capitalism, also allows 
shareholders to exert their voting rights freely. Once voting, a shareholder assumes no 
duty to regard interests of other shareholders and can cast their votes in a complete 
self-interested manner. The result is that shareholders who possess more shares can 
apply absolute control over corporations; a control which is often too dangerous to be 
tolerated by minority shareholders. The question of nature of the majority rule is 
discussed in Chaper three and has fivefold. The first fold demonstrates how private 
ordering can affect the voting mechanism. The second fold considers the question of 
whether the voting mechanism plays any controlling function. Assuming that the 
voting mechanism functions as a control device, the third fold concerns the question of 
whether shareholders who control corporations have any legal duty to consider 
minority interests. Given that majority control is quite often found in small rather than 
large companies and that majority and minority can comprise different groups as to 
different issues, the fourth fold relates to the question of whether the law is to relax in 
relation to the protection of minority shareholders in large companies. Finally, the fifth 
12 
fold considers the question of whether institutional shareholder voting can be relevant 
to reduce the majority /minority conflict in corporations. 
The fourth issue that requires consideration concerns corporate directors' role as to the 
majority/minority conflict. Directors who take most decisions in corporations can as an 
independent organ exercise the entrusted power impartiaHy, taking consideration of 
elements which best serve the interests of the corporations. Further, they, unlike 
shareholders, are under legal duties to take careful and disinterested decisions which 
benefit the company as a whole and which can be enforced by shareholders. At the 
same time, directors themselves can in varying ways be a source of abuse when certain 
conditions exist. Where one or few shareholders dominate a corporation, corporate 
directors can facilitate abuse of power by majority shareholders. Directors in such 
corporation are normally chosen and controlled by the dominating shareholders and 
often only majority shareholders can, as a matter of principle, enforce their duties. 
Hence, they are very unlikely to take side with a dissident minority shareholder. 
Where shareholders are dispersed, directors are likely to cause mismanagement. They 
may not want to pay proper attention to the companies' business and further can 
pursue policies that benefit not the company and its shareholders but rather directors 
themselves. Internal control in such companies is weak and the market may not 
discipline wayward directors adequately. Mismanagement affects shareholders equally 
and hence is not considered as a majority/ minority issue. It is important, however, for 
the purpose of my discussion, as it explains why the concept of shareholder control, 
while being liable to abuse by majority shareholders, can outweigh control by 
management m corporations. A proper analysis of directors' role and duties can help 
the reader undersand the importance of shareholder control in corporations and can 
uncover indirect factors, ways and circumstances through which such control can be 
13 
used opportunistically. It will further enable one to discover the source of some of 
minority difficulties and those of shareholders generally and it can also be useful to the 
lawmakers as they can learn and draft tailored laws in this matter. The question of 
directors' role is examined in Chapter four. 
As I mentioned earlier, Chapter five and one section in Chapter three pursue the 
second objective. They examine mechanisms existing in current English and Iranian 
company laws which provide special protection for minority shareholders and which 
are provided to shareholders with the intention to curb abuse of power by the majority 
shareholders. The intention is to see how successful the existing mechanisms have been 
as to implementing their mission; i. e. reconciling majority and minority interests. As to 
the English company law, four mechanisms, two, with common law origin, and two, 
statutory, are relevant. The common law mechanisms include the "bona fide for the 
benefit of company as a whole' rule which was introduced by the Allen case and which 
is discussed in Chapter three and the 'derivative action" which is the subject of my 
consideration along with the statutory mechanisms in Chapter five. As regards the 
former, the intention is to show how the common law, as distinguished from the 
statutory law, evolved in order to accommodate minority concerns into the voting 
mechanism. As regards the latter, the discussion seeks to demonstrate and examine 
how the common law has managed to specify and respond to circumstances within 
which certain abusive behaviours of majority shareholders are likely to occur. The 
statutory mechanisms which are exclusively discussed in Chapter five include the 'just 
and equitable winding up' and 'unfairly prejudicial" remedies. A number of questions 
which concern the remedies' natures, jurisdictions, conditions of availability, and 
utilities will be raised. As the latter remedy can have some clash with the 'no reflective 
loss' principle and with the derivative action, the discussion will consider the remedy's 
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relation with the two mentioned mechanisms too. The idea is twofold. First, it is meant 
to see what and how the Parliament has done to fill the gap which exist in common law 
as to preventing abuse of right by majority shareholders. Second, it seeks to determine 
whether the Parliament has been any successful to facilitate formation of a just and 
efficient reconciliation between the majority/ minority interests in joint stock 
companies. 
As to the Iranian company law, five mechanisms that provide either a general or 
special protection to minority shareholders against abuse of rights by majority 
shareholders will be examined. These include the "no abuse of rights' which is a 
constitutional principle and provides a general protection, right to convene a 
shareholder meeting, cumulative voting, disinterested ratification and commencing 
corporate actions by shareholders which are company law provisions and which offer 
special protection to minority shareholders. 
As this research involves consideration of the issue in the English and Iranian company 
laws and because the former, unlike the latter, enjoys strong minority protection which 
could be relevant to address the issue of abuse of rights by majority shareholders in 
Iranian corporations, I will follow a comparative approach in which the English 
company law is taken as the basic model. The intention is to take some lesson from the 
English company law that are useful to improve Iranian company law regarding its 
approach to the majority/ minority issue. To this end, I have divided each Chapter, 
excluding Chapter two, into two parts. Part one concerns examination of the law in 
England and part two while examines the same issue in the law of Iran does some 
comparisons between the laws in the two jurisdictions. As to the Chapter two, the 
same approach is pursued unless there will be no division into two parts. The 
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discussion and comparison in this Chapter are integrated. Much of the discussion in 
each Chapter goes to the English part, as it is the basic model and because otherwise 
could have hurt briefness of the research by covering many issues that were in fact 
similar. 
Two questions regarding the method of this study, which I need to address before the 
very study starts, are to see whether it is possible to extend English approach to its 
Iranian counterpart and, if the answer is positive, whether the English approach is 
worth learning from? As regards the first question, it is important to note that there are 
undeniable socio-economic as well as legal differences between England and Iran that 
n-dght blur the prospect of any extension. " England is a western country that follows a 
market economy based on capitalism. This means the commerce in England is 
considerably left to the private sector and the market is largely seen as a self-regulator 
of its activities. In this context, so far as commercial actors keep in line with complying 
with their contractual rights and duties and play fair, there will generally be no other 
limitation. Also, its legal system belongs to the common law family, which is generally 
described as a judge-made law system meaning that judges may create law by 
referring the earlier judges' decisions. " Although the superior source of law is statute, 
certain areas of law are essentially the creation of the judges and in areas where the law 
is not fully indicative there is also an important dimension of judicial creativity in the 
24 
task of statutory interpretation, which enables the courts to remedy statutory gaps. 
22 These differences will be discussed more in Chapter one. See below at 1.2. 
23 Mayson Stephan, French Derek and Ryan Christopher, "Mayson, French & Ryan on 
Company Law" (2001), 18th ed., London, Blackstone, p 22; Holborn Guy, "Legal Research 
Guide", (2001), London, Butterworths, p 161. 
24 Mayson Stephan, French Derek and Ryan Christopher, "Mayson, French & Ryan on 
Company Lax, ý, " (2003), 1911, ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, at 0.3.2.3. 
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In contrast, Iran is a developing country whose economy is partly government directed 
and partly market driven, adjusted in accordance with Islamic mandatory rules. This 
means the law concerning commercial activities in Iran is not that much facilitator. The 
government monopolizes many areas of commercial activities" and even supervises 
the private sector in the remaining areas that are not within its monopoly. 26 Legally, it 
relies on a system that most resembles systems in the civil law camp. Its law is mostly 
contained in codes enacted by the Parliament in the early twentieth century and since 
then amended from time to time. The code is the definitive source of law, and the 
courts have no power to fill in gaps in statutes on their own initiative or by reference to 
earlier decisions. That is for the Parliament to do. " Judges, however, are of power to 
interpret the existing code making use of general principles of law and rules of Islamic 
law in order to resolve a particular dispute in case of silence, obscurity or inconsistency 
in the statutes. " Albeit, judges can consult with the earlier judges" decisions and 
Islamic law jurists" opinions, but they cannot copy each other or earlier decisions or 
proceed by way of analogy. These are strongly prohibited by statutes" and Islamic law 
rules. 'o 
25 Activities in relation to these areas include all sorts of huge and mother industries, foreign 
trade, large mines, banking, insurance, power production and supply, dams, water supply 
channels network, radio and TV, post, telegraph and telephone, aeroplanes, vessels, air and sea 
industries, roads, rail roads. [Article 44 Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran 1980, 
(corresponding to Persian calendar year 1358 - hereafter cited as CIRI)]. 
26 Art 22 CIRI. 
27 This is principally to ensure separation of powers between the Legislative and the Judiciary. 
See Osooli Mohamad, ""Methods of Interpretation of the Codes in Private Law", (1973), Doctoral 
Thesis, University of Tehran. 
28 Section 3 Civil Procedure Act 2000, (corresponding to Persian calendar year 1378 - hereafter 
is cited CPA). 
29 Section 3 CPA. 
30 Islamic law rules (Shari'ah law) in this research refer to such rules as understood and defined 
by the Shari'ah scholars (jurists) in the Shiah camp; to be precise, Shiah Jafary School which is 
the prevailing creed among Iranians (see Chapter one below at 1.2); as distinguished from that 
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Taking these systematic differences as barrier, one may doubt the possibility of a likely 
extension. However this is to be rejected by looking at striking similarities between the 
two systems, especially in terms of social and economic needs. Both systems permit the 
use of company device and regard it as the responsibility of govenunent to exercise 
through company law a measure of control over the activities of companies. Most 
importantly, company laws in the two jurisdictions share similar concerns in relation to 
achieving balance between majority interests and those of the minority shareholders. " 
As regards the second question, there are sound reasons suggesting that English 
approach is worthy of consideration by the Iranian company law. While English 
approach gives power to majority shareholders, it acknowledges the possibility of 
majority abuse of right and offers corresponding devices to protect minority 
shareholders and this is suggestive to the Iranian company law. Second, English 
approach seems fit with areas such as Iran where companies tend to have a controlling 
shareholder. Most joint-stock companies in Iran are either small private companies or 
public companies substantially owned by the state and its dependant institutions. 32 
of the Sunni camp (with its four main Schools; i. e. Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi). While in 
the latter analogy (Qiyas) is a source to be used besides the other three sources (the Qur'an, the 
Sunna of the Prophet Mohammad, and the ljma or consensus of the community of scholars) to 
comprehend Shariah law, in the former, the use of analogy is strongly prohibited. See 
Mohammad Ebn Yazid Ghazvini "Sonan Ebn Majed" (787 A D), Vol. 2, Tehran, Amirkabir 
publication Para Judgment, p 776; MacMillen Michael J. T., "Islamic Capital Markets: 
Developments and Issues", (2006), Capital Markets Law journal, Vol. 1, No. 2,136 at 138, Oxford 
journals, Oxford University Press. 
31 See Lord Hoffmann's argument in the famous ONeill case. There he speakes of the ways in 
which common law as well as civil law systems work to curb abuse of right cases. He 
demonstrates that while common law workes on a fact specific and case by case basis, its civil 
law counterparts developed a general principle of 'abus de droit' to deal with abuse of rights 
cases. He then concludes that this is only a different way of doing the same thing. [O'Neill and 
Another v. Phillips and Others, (1999), 2 All ER 961 HL at 969 per Lord Hof fmann] . 
32 Sotoodeh Tehrani, Hasan, "'Trade Law", (1997), Tehran, Dehkhoda Publication, vol. 2, at p 3. 
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Third, the existence of strong minority protection measures with prospect of various 
remedies available to minority shareholders in the company law of England may help 
Iranian company law to improve its weak minority protection measures through which 
optimum corporate investment and the development of a strong corporate sector is 
encouraged. 
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Chapter I: Justifications for Majority Rule 
Why corporations work on the basis of majority rule and also why corporation laws 
often support the governance of majority shareholders have been matters of 
controversy among scholars of company law. Several theories have been developed to 
address those questions. Each theory has put emphasis on certain elements, but there 
has never been an agreement among them. How those theories emerged is a further 
interesting and pertinent issue which needs to be addressed. It is my intention in this 
Chapter to examine those theories and questions in the light of the English and Iranian 
corporation laws. 
To this end, I shall raise and examine the question in respect of each jurisdiction 
separately; hence, discussion in this Chapter is divided into two sections. One deals 
with the examination of the issue in the English company law and the other takes the 
case of Iran. In the English section, which covers much of the discussion, I will explain 
how and why majority rule emerged and survived in English corporations. This will be 
done through a three-fold study that examines the political, economic and doctrinal 
factors which have been most relevant to found the rule of majority in English 
corporations. In the Iranian section, I will explain why majority rule did not emerge in 
business vehicles and, instead, has been imported to Iranian company law from 
continental Europe. A related, and of course a key, issue is to find some explanations 
for the question of why Iranian company law at the time of its original adoption chose 
to learn from the continental European model of laws rather than the Anglo-American 
model. 
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One issue to be borne in mind is that the focus of discussion in this Chapter wiH be on 
reviewing justifications for the majority rule in the majority /minority shareholder 
relationship. To put it simply, the Chapter seeks to find some answers to the question 
of why of majority and minority shareholders, only the former should have the final 
say. Therefore, the Chapter will assume that shareholders play a controlling function 
within corporations. This is done irrespective of the issues which have recently been 
raised and discussed by company law theorists and which have challenged in various 
ways the idea of shareholder control. These issues are inclusive, on the one side, of 
theories that deny shareholder control', and on the other side theories that support 
participation of non-shareholder interest groups in control of corporations. ' These 
areas will be examined later in Chapters three and four and thus I do not intend, 
neither do I feel it necessary, to bring more into my discussion here. However, to the 
extent that it is pertinent, I need to remind the reader that the current company laws in 
both England and Iran have rejected such theories and persisted with the idea of 
shareholder control. ' 
1 These theories will be examined in Chapter three at 111.1.4 below. 
2 These theories will be examined in Chapter four at IV. 1.1.13.3 below. 
3 For England see section 309 (1) Companies Act 1985; Company Law Reform, "Modem 
Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework" (London, DTI, 1998), 
para 2.5; Company Law Reform, "'Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final 
Report" (London, DTI, 2001), URN/942 & URN/943, paras 1.52,1.56-1.57,3.51; Nolan RC, 
"Indirect Investors: A Greater Say in The Company? " (2003), 3 Journal of Corporate L-aw Studies, 
73, at pp 73-7; Gower L. C. B., ""Gower's Principles of Modem Company Law"', 4th ed., London 
(1979), Stevens, at pp 553-4; For Iran, see this Chapter, at 1.2 below. 
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1.1. The case of England 
What justifies application of the majority rule in companies forms an interesting 
question, bearing in mind that a company as a body corporate is normally composed of 
two member groups of majority and minority shareholders who may have differing 
interests. A number of theories have been developed to address the question. To begin 
with, there is a political theory which tries to extend certain political ideas to the 
apolitical sphere of companies, using analogies between companies and states. Another 
is the economic theory which supports majority rule for its economic advantages. And 
finally, there is the doctrinal justification which has been developed by the courts and 
legal scholars to explain governance of majority shareholders in corporations. I 
respectively examine these three theories in the following parts. 
1.1.1. Political approach 
The political approach is a theory developed by those who view corporations 
politically to explain the relationship between shareholders and directors. The theory 
normally relies on some analogies between states and corporations in order to extend 
principles of political democracy from the former to the latter. 4 By making analogy in 
4 See generally Hill Jennifer, "Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder", The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, (2000), Vol. 48, Berkeley, Ca., American Association for the Comparative Study 
of Law, at pp 52-53; Buxbaum Richard M., "The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate 
Governance"' (1985), California Law Review, No. 6, vol. 73, at p 1671, Berkeley, Calif., University 
of California, School of Jurisprudence; Selznick Philip, "'Law, Society, and Industrial justice", 
Russell Sage Foundation, (1969), at p 259. 
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respect of organisational structure and bureaucratic hierarchy', concepts of 
participation 6, membership /citizenship', organisational objective', division of powers, 
and decision-making machinery existing in both corporations and states9, this 
approach argues that a corporation requires some form of government, as does any 
entity composed of individuals. According to it, corporate citizens (shareholders) 
should be able to exercise control over decisions and conducts of corporate leaders 
(management) in the corporate community" in order to ensure that the latter pursue 
the shareholder interest objective. 11 However, as shareholders are often numerous in 
modem corporations and because they as autonomous persons may have varying 
interests over how to manage corporate affairs and how managers should be 
controlled, they can easily fall into disagreement. As a result, the idea of shareholder 
control over management which is seen by the theory as desirable and necessary 
would be lost if such disagreements were to persist. To ensure that shareholders will 
be able to exert control effectively, the theory proposes a representative democratic 
5 Latham Earl, ""The Body Politic of the Corporation", in The Corporation in Modern Society, 
edited by Edward Sagendorph Mason (ed. ) (1960), 5, Cambridge, Mass, pp 218-220; Bottomley 
Stephen, "'From Contractualism to Constitutionalism: A Framework for Corporate Governance" 
(1997), Sydney Law Review, vol. 19,277, Faculty of Law, University of Sydney, Sydney, at pp 
288-298. 
6 Buxbaum (above, note 4). 
7 Pound John, "'The Rise of The Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Control" (1993), New York University Law Review, vol. 68,1003 at pp 1007-1013, New York, New 
York University School of Law; Villiers Charlotte, "'European Company Law-Towards 
Democracy? ", European Business law Library, (1997), Aldershot, Ashgate, pp 197-205. 
8 Mason Edward S., "Introduction", in The Corporation in Modern Society, Edited by Edward 
Sagendorph Mason, (1960), Cambridge, Mass, at p 11. 
9 Brewster Kingman, "The Corporation and Economic Federalism"', in The Corporation in Modern 
Soclet 
, 
i/ edited by Edward Sagendorph Mason (ed. ) (1960), 5, Cambridge, Mass, at p 72. 
10 See generally Ferran Ellis, "'Company Law and Corporate Finance" (1999), Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, at p 246; Hill (above, note 4) at pp 52-53. 
11 Buxbaum (above, note 4); Selznick (above, note 4) at p 259; Brewster (above, note 9) at 72; 
Mason (above, note 8) at p 11; Villiers (above, note 7) at pp 197-205; Pound (above, note 7) at pp 
1007-1013; Latham (above, note 5) at pp 218-220; Bottomley (above, note 5) at pp 288-298. 
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form in which the rule of the majority is the applicable rule. " In such form, every 
shareholder irrespective of the size of their investment will have one vote to be cast in 
the shareholder meeting, just like the vote state citizens enjoy in political elections. 
Political approach views the rule of majority in corporations as an adoption from 
democratic ideas. Before, corporations were governed with a unanimity rule. Since 
then, however, they have been treated like political bodies, which can work through a 
majority decision, and where unanimous voting is no longer a requirement. 13 Political 
approach, therefore, justifies the rule of the majority, using the same arguments that 
are normally brought for majority rule in politics. Since the origin of arguments 
represented by this theory derives from the views developed by political thinkers, it 
seems helpful to consider the main arguments that have been brought for the principle 
of majority rule in politics. 
1.1.1.1. justifications for majority rule in politics 
In politics, majority rule is described as a mechanism developed by democratic theory 
to solve what is called the collective action problem. In the dictionary definition, 
democracy is a govemment in which the supreme power is vested in the people. 14 This 
suggests that the power of leaders, and their decisions and conduct, can only be 
justified so far as they reflect the popular wish. Clearly, the popular wish refers to all 
individuals and groups rather than a mere dominant group of individuals in the 
12 See generally Buxbaurn (above, note 4); Mason (above, note 8) at pI I; Pound 
(above, note 7) 
at pp 1007-1013; Latham (above, note 5) pp 218-220; Bottomley 
(above, note 5) at pp 288-291; 
Brewster (above, note 9) at 72; Villiers (above, note 7) at pp 197-205; Hill (above, note 4) at pp 
51-57. 
13 See Chater three (below, at 111.1.1). 
14 Chambers Concise Dictionary, Edited by Schwarz Catherine, Edinburgh, Chambers, 6993. 
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society. In practice, however, it is difficult to establish the popular wish because it is 
not a single wish. Opinions and interests may disagree from one group to another. If 
people disagree in their opinion and interests, then there should be a mechanism 
through which they can overcome disagreements and make an ultimate decision which 
reflects the popular wish. This mechanism in the view of the democratic theory is 
majority rule which authorises the majority of the people of each generation to make 
ultimate decisions in the name of the population. The democratic theory in this way 
rules out two possible alternatives to majority rule, unanimity rule and rule by the few. 
In its view, unanimity is unworkable due to the problem of size, and can lead the 
society to fall into anarchy. " Rule by the few, on the other hand, contradicts human 
reason for it requires assuming few people to have priority over the many. 16ThUS the 
rule of majority inevitably becomes the next best alternative. " 
number of arguments have been developed to justify the rule of majority in 
democratic societies. For one, majority rule, it is suggested, springs from equal 
treatment to individuals. For another, it leaves unaffected the freedom of the greater 
number of people and hence is the next best alternative after unanimity. Furthermore, 
majority rule, it is said, improves the quality of decisions taken by the government. In 
summary, it is possible to classify the arguments for the rule of the majority into two 
categories: 
15 See Locke, John, "Of Civil Government'" (1632-1704), Introduction by Carpenter W. F. (1943), 
London, Dent, at pp 180,181; Dahl Robert A., "Democracy and Its Critics"' (1989), New Haven, 
London, Yale University Press, pp 46,167; Gewirth Alan, "'Community of Rights" (1996), 
Chicago, London, University of Chicago Press, at pp 13,14. 
16 See Dahl lbid., at pp 75-77. 
17 Arblaster Anthony, "'Democracy" (1987), Open University Press, pp 65,67; Lively Jack, 
"Democracy" (1975), Oxford, Blackwell, pp 13,17,18; Dahl (above, note 15) at pp 49-51,153; 
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Quantitative argument 
The underlying idea of the quantitative argument is to prioritise the majority rule 
simply because it embraces more people who will then have more force. " This 
viewpoint considers the majority to be composed of aggregations of individuals, each 
with an equal amount of power, who, when combined, wield much greater power. The 
bigger the size of the group the more power it possesses and the more merits it will 
have in governing the society. A recent example of the quantitative justification can be 
found in the famous "'Social Contract"' theory which argues that early individuals, 
living in the state of nature, came together and agreed with each other to unite into 
society, which is governed by the majority rule for mutual self-protection. " 
The social contract theory, however, suffers from difficulties. Historically, the 
hierarchical societies in which social contract theorists lived, indicate that their 
members never actually convened to consent to a social contraCt. 20 Further, the theory 
is unable to provide any moral value as it simply relies on force. " Above all, the theory 
is incapable of preventing a likely majority injustice as it fails to consider the risks 
Commager Henry Steele, "Majority Rule and Minority Rights"' (1943), London, Oxford 
University Press, p 9. 
18 Smith T. V-, "Compromise, Its Context and Limits", Quoted in Spitz Elain, "Majority Rule" 
(1932), Chatham, N. J., Chatham House, at p 185. 
19 Hobbes Thomas, "Leviathan" (1651), Menston, Scholar Press, Chap. xviii, Secs. I and 3; 
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, Social Contract, Translated by Cole J. D. H. (1923), London, Dent, pp 
85-87; Locke John, "The Lock Reader: Selections From the Works of John Locke", with a general 
introduction and commentary by John W. Yolton, (1977), Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, p 245; Locke (above, note 15) at pp 180,181; For more detailed study of Hobbes', Locke's 
and Rousseau's thoughts see Mims Edwin, The Majority of the People (1941), Chap. I 
"Sovereignty", New York, Modem Age Books, at pp 10-47. 
20 Frug Gerald E., "The City as a Legal Concept", Harvard Law Review, (1980), Vol. 93, 
Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Law Review Publishing Association, p 1086. 
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associated with any absolute exercise of majority rule in societies (what is often termed 
as 'majority tyranny'). most contemporary political writers agree to say that the 
likelihood of tyranny is one associated with the nature of power no matter who holds 
the power, one man, a few people or the majority. " 
1.1.1.1.2. Qualitative argument 
The qualitative argument looks for a moral justification of the rule, something that 
could explain why one should feel a moral duty to obey the majority. It can, itself, be 
classified into two dimensions: substantive and procedural. 
A) Substantive 
Theorists in this category generally took the view that majority rule is desirable not 
only because it helps reach good results but also because it sufficiently comprises of 
good elements. They, however, viewed good elements differently. To Aristotle, who 
was perhaps the earliest theorist in this category, good elements meant collective 
wisdom. In his view, government by the majority is desirable because it benefits more 
than any other form of goverrtment from the collective wisdom of the people. " For 
Jeremy Bentham, it was a matter of interest maximisation. According to him, societies 
are composed of equal individuals who naturally tend to pursue their own happiness. 
A good form of government is the one that respects this natural desire in as many 
21 Kendall Willmore, John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule (1965), Urbana, University 
of Illinois Press, pp 113-119; Barker Ernest, Reflections on the Government (1942), Oxford 
University Press, at pp 35-36. 
22 Dahl Robert A., "A Preface to Economic Democracy" (1985), Berkeley, University of 
California, at p 18; Alexis de Tocqueville Democracy in America, Chapter XV, available at the 
following website: http: //xroads. virginia. edu/-HYPER/DETOC/l_chl5. htm; Villiers (above, 
note 7) at p 8. 
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people as possible, which is government by the majority of the people. 24 In the view of 
Hans Kelsen, freedom maximisation was the underlying good element. In his view, 
people naturally prefer to have the type of order that produces least restraints. A good 
order, thus, is the one that limits fewest people's freedom. " The good element in 
Barker"s view was unanimity. The formula he suggested was "'government by 
discussion", in which every citizen offers his opinion and through the exchange of 
opinions the final decision is made by the rule of the majority. Such a decision bears 
imprints from all the ideas proposed in the discussion process and hence becomes 
inherently right because it is not the decision of a mere majority, but is made by all for 
all. " For Hallowell, it was a simple matter of faith. In his view majority rule is justified 
simply because, and as far as, we believe in certain transcendental truths and common 
values on the basis of faith rather than reason. " 
B) Procedural 
The underlying idea for those who value majority rule procedurally is to deny any 
substantive goodness for majority rule. From this viewpoint, majority rule is simply a 
good device, using which is most likely to lead the community towards good ends. 
Majority rule is not inherently good. If we view it as a good rule, it is simply for it is the 
23 Aristotle's Ethics and Politics, Book VII, Vol. 2. Translated from the Greek by Gillies John, 
1797, London, at pp 185,189,323,284,285. 
24 Bentham Jeremy, "An Introduction to The Principles of Morals and Legislation", Oxford, 
1907, Ch. 1, para. 4. 
25 Kelsen Hans, Quoted in Spitz Elain, "Majority rule" (1932), Chatham, N. J., Chatham House, 
at p 159. 
26 Barker (above, note 21); A similar view has more recently been taken by Manin and Held, 
who argue that a legitimate decision is not one that necessarily follows from the will of all, but 
rather one that results from the involvement of all in the political process. [Manin Bernard, "On 
Legitimacy and Political Deliberation", Political Theory, Vol. 15, No. 3. (Aug., 1987), 338-368, 
Translated from French by Elly Stein and Jane Mansbridge, at p 352, Sage Publications Inc.; 
Held David, "Models of Democracy" (1996), Oxford, Polity, pp 301-3021. 
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only available device that can effectively help people reaching justice and good ends. 
Thomas Jefferson was the leading thinker in this dimension. " According to him, 
people derive their power from God and they have a natural right, given to them by 
God, to exercise that power through a majoritarian government, which is the next best 
device. To Jefferson, the governance of the majority is justified for it is hard to imagine 
a case in which the majority of the people fall into intentional wrongdoings and 
corruption against society, while these are much more likely to occur in other forms of 
governance. Nevertheless, the majority may conu-nit mistakes, but this is not a matter 
of much concem as it is impossible to eliminate human error completely. 
1.1.2. Economic approach 
Economists often support the majority rule for its efficiency-enhancing feature. Central 
to the most economic theories in analysing rules particularly rules concerning 
companies, is the concept of efficiency. " Rules matter only for and so far as they 
promote efficiency. As individuals naturally tend to pursue benefits rather than costs'O, 
they choose among alternatives a rule which is efficient; i. e. whose benefits exceed the 
costs. For example in the case of a simple two-sided contract, every party considers his 
personal interest, and when they are convinced after cost/benefit consideration that 
the contractual rule is going to maximize their joint gain, the agreement will be 
27 Hallowell John Hamilton, "'The Decline of Liberalism as An Ideology"" (1943), Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, University of California Press, at pp 53-54. 
28 See Jefferson (1743-1826) quoted in Spitz Elain, ""Majority Rule", (1932), Chatham, N. J., 
Chatham House, at p 159. 
29 An economist might define allocative efficiency as using resources in their best application 
with lowest possible cost. See generally Posner Richard A., "Economic Analysis of Law", (1992), 
Boston, London, Little, Brown, at p 3; Cheffins Brian R., Company Law: Theory Structure and 
Operation (1997), Oxford, Clarendon Press, at p 7; Maughan C. W. and Copp S. F., "Company 
Law Reform and Economic Methodology Revisited" (1999), The Company Lawyer, Vol. 21, No. 1, 
London, Ovez Publishing Limited at pp 20-21. 
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reached. In such case, the contract is efficient because every contract party is served by 
it. However in a more complex case there can be a contract between more than two 
persons who have an ongoing relationship and who must choose with a view to 
making profit a collective rule. In the latter case, the contractual rule may not at all 
times be beneficial for all persons involved. It may benefit some and hence be seen by 
those benefited as efficient, while harming some others who view it as being inefficient. 
There are two varying approaches among economists on how to evaluate a collective 
rule. One approach argues that a rule is efficient when it benefits some party without 
producing cost for anyone. This so-called "Pareto' efficiency model was introduced by 
Mr Vilfredo Pareto, a 19thcentury Italian economist. The other approach argues that a 
choice is efficient when it benefits only the greatest possible number of individuals. 
This is called 'Kaldor-Hicks-' and was developed by the two 20th century British 
economists, Professor Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks, who proclaimed that a 
particular change is efficient if, in aggregate, the benefits associated with the change 
exceed the costs. The latter which has attracted overwhehning support among 
economists rejects the former simply because, it argues, collective choices inevitably 
have adverse effects to the interests of some individuals and it is impossible to guard 
people against such effects. " 
Application of the majority rule in companies can be described as being one of the 
consequences of entertaining the Kaldor-Hicks model of efficiency. Shareholders in 
30 Bentham (above, note 24). 
31 See Cheffins (above, note 29) at pp 14-16; Posner (above, note 29) at p 14; Gower (above, note 
3) at p 554; Roe Mark J., "Corporate Law's Limits", Columbia University (2002), p 16 also 
30 
corporations adopt resolutions with a majority vote, which means such resolutions 
may leave only majority shareholders better off while allowing minority shareholders 
to feel worse off. Yet this is efficient because majority shareholders as persons who 
possess more shares in companies will be benefited more compared with those who 
have less investment. This extra financial motive will encourage substantial wealth- 
holders to appreciate the risk of investment in companies. " Any sub majority rule can 
place control of majority investment in the hands of minority shareholders who may 
not show adequate care for majority interests and this is not efficient. " Minority 
shareholders, too, appreciate the risk of control by the majority shareholders as a 
matter of contract because they wiR obtain in aggregate more benefits than harm. 34 
Any subsequent dissatisfaction on the part of minority shareholders will not cause a 
decline from the exercise of the majority rule in companies because with arrangements 
where one party is dissatisfied with how things have worked out, assets overall may 
available at Social Science Research Network Electronic Library at 
http: / /papers. ssrn-com/abstract=260582. 
32 Black Bernard S., "'Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis", North- 
Western University Law Review, (1990), Vol. 84, No 2, Chicago, Northwestern University Law 
School, at p 552; Bebchuk Lucian Arye, "Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The 
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments"", Harvard Law Review, (1989), Vol. 102, pp 1830- 
1; MacNeil lain, "'Company Law Rules: An Assessment from the Perspective of Incomplete 
Contract Theory", Journal of Corporate Law Studies (June 2001), Oxford, UK, Hart Pub, p 117; 
Jensen C. Michel and Meckling William H. "Corporate Governance and "Economic Democracy': 
An Attack on Freedom"', in Proceedings of Corporate Governance: A Definitive exploration of the 
Issues, edited by C. J. Huizenga, UCLA Extension (1983), at pp 1-6 available at Social Science 
Research Network (SSRN), Electronic Library at: http: //papers. ssrn. com/ABSTRACT 
ID=321521; Posner (above, note 29) at pp 91-6; See Cheffins (above, note 29) at pp 18-19]. 
33 Jensen & Meckling (above, note 32) at p 6; See also Easterbrook Frank H. and Fischel Daniel 
R., The Economic Structure of Corporate Law", (1991), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass. London, UK, Ch. 1 at p 409; Black (above, note 32) at pp 552,555-6; Bebchuk (above, note 
32) at pp 1830-1; Ferran (above, note 10) at p 246; Farrar John H., "'Company Law", (1991), 
London, Butterworths, at p 222; Lee Hazen Thomas, "Silencing the Shareholders' Voice", North 
Carolina Law Review, (2002), Vol. 80, at p 1917 available from the Social Science Research 
Network at http: //ssrn. com/absract - 
id=329800; Lowenstein Louis, "'Shareholder Voting 
Rights: A Response to Sec. Rule 19c-4 and to Professor Gilson"' (1989), Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
89, No. 5, New York, Columbia University Press, at pp 982-3. 
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still be transferred into more valuable uses. In such cases, other parties may gain more 
than what the disappointed individual has lost. Thus, contractual arrangements that 
favour majority rule ex ante will even ex post meet the Kalder-Hiks standard of 
efficiency. " 
Although economists confirm that original adoption of majority rule by corporations 
occurred with a view to democratic ideas, they emphasise, however, that the 
endurance of majority rule in corporations for so long has been caused by an efficiency 
consideration which resulted in the adaptation of the rule. Such adaptation is most 
manifested through a historical investigation of how the rule of the majority evolved in 
corporations. In a recent investigation, it has been shown that corporations have 
16 travelled three stages over time. At the very early period of their introduction 37 , they 
have been working with a rule of unanimous shareholder voting. Unanimous consent 
was, however, impractical because of its inability to allow progress and improvement 
and further, it was liable to abuse, as an individual member could opportunistically 
take advantage of the situation by withholding his consent in order to extract some 
34 Man-ne Henry, "'Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting in the Economics of Legal 
Relationships", Columbia Law Review, New York, Columbia University Press, (1964), Vol. 64, 
1427. 
35 See Posner (above, note 29) at p 14, Cheffins (above, note 29) at pp 15-16. 
36 Dunlavy Colleen A., "Corporate Governance in Late 19th Century Europe and the United 
States, The Case of Shareholder Voting Rights" in Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of 
the Art and Emerging Research edited by Hopt K. J., Kanada H., Roe M. j., Wymeersch E. and 
Prigge S. (eds. ), (1998), Oxford University Press, at pp 12-13; See also Carney William J., 
"'Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes" (1980), 
American Bar Foundation Research Journal, Chicago, American Bar Foundation, at pp 69,77-97; 
Hager Mark M., "Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational 'Real Entity' 
Theory", Univcrsity of Pittsburgh Law Review (1989), Vol. 50, Pittsburgh, at pp 633-4. 
37 The Russia Company was perhaps the earliest example; it was granted its charter in 1555, 
followed by the foundation of the English East India Company in 1600. [See Chaudhuri K. N., 
"The English East India Company" (1965), London, Cass, at pp 3,261. 
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extra benefit for himself . 
3' As companies grew in size and the need for changes become 
more common, companies and corporate laws replaced unanimity with majority rule. 
Yet, the new rule which worked on the basis of one vote for each shareholder", aimed 
at safeguarding individual shareholders as members of the corporation 4' rather than as 
owners of a portion of the corporate capital. In the eighteenth century a new practice 
emerged in Britain of giving the larger shareholders additional votes. Since then the 
general direction of change in the nineteenth century in Britain was from the more 
democratic alternative towards plutocratic power relations in which each share carried 
a vote. This practice is now widely accepted and normally is put in the form of a 
default rule in company laws of most countries. 
Why corporations have travelled from adoption to adaptation in respect of majority 
rule can be answered in the light of differing features which have existed in between 
corporations and states. A democratic state relied on public recognition and 
legitimisation rather than private contracts. Such a state often pursued for the good of 
the public objectives other than mere profit maximisation. The state's membership 
could include every individual and body corporate that resided in its jurisdiction, and 
normally required no especial qualification from members. On the other hand, a 
corporation as a business vehicle relied on private contracts with a view to making 
38 See Cheffins (above, note 29) at pp 17,238; Bebchuk (above, note 32) at pp 1830-31; Schwarts 
Alan and Scott Robert E., "Contract Theory and The Limits of Contract Law", Yale Law journal 
(2003), vol. 113, New Haven, Conn., Yale Law journal Co., Yale University, School of Law, at p 
3 also available at Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Electronic Library at: 
http: //papers. ssrn. com; Romano Roberta, ""Answering The Wrong Question: The Tenuous 
Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws", Columbia Law Review, No. 7 (1989), Vol. 89, New York, 
Columbia University Press, at pp 1559-1601. 
39 Ratner David L., "The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule 
of One Share, One Vote", Cornell Law Review (1970), Number 1, Vol. 56, Cornell University, 
Cornell Law School, at pp 3-5; Ferran (above, note 10) at pp 249-250. 
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41 profit for the contract parties, i. e. corporate members. In corporations, only 
shareholders were considered as members and other interested groups such as 
employees, customers, suppliers and directors were excluded. Also, corporations 
worked to maximise only their shareholders' wealth, as shareholders supplied them 
42 with the finance required for corporate operations. These differing features could 
have made the original adoption unworkable, ineffective and inefficient in the 
corporate context and hence they had to be addressed through adaptation which 
subsequently occurred most noticeably in respect of voting. Such adaptation 
distinguishably separated the majority rule that existed in democratic states and the 
majority rule that works in corporations. " 
40 Ratner (above, note 39) at p 6. 
41 Hill Jennifer, ""Public Beginnings, Private Ends: Should Corporate Law Privilege the Interests 
of Shareholders? "', in International Corporate Law, Edited by Fiona Macmillan Vol. 1 (2000) 
Oxford, Hart, at p 18 and Hill (above, note 4) at p 43; Mason (above, note 8) at pp 1,5; Selznick 
(above, note 4) at pp 47-48; Farrar John H., ""Company Law"', (1985), London, Butterworths, at p 
3; Hager (above note 36) at p 575; Cheffins (above note 29) at pp 17,238; Jensen C. Michel and 
Meckling William H, "'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure", (1976), 3, Journal of Financial Econnomics., Amsterdam, Holland, at 305; Easterbrook 
& Fischel (above, note 33) at Ch. 1; Easterbrook Frank H. and Fischel Daniel R., "Voting in 
Corporate Law", The Journal of Law and Economics (June 1983), Chicago, University of Chicago 
Law School, at p 401; Easterbrook Frank H. and Fischel Daniel R., "The Corporate Contract"', 
Columbia Law Review, No. 7 (1989), Vol. 89, New York, Columbia University Press, pp 1430-5. 
42 Roe Mark J., "'The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization" 
(2001), Harvard Law School, p 3, Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Electronic Library at 
www. ssrn. com (Working Paper No 019 ID 282703); Stout Lynn A., "Bad and Not-So-Bad 
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy", (2002), Southern California Law Review, Vol. 75,1189; 
Leader Sheldon, "Private Property and Corporate Governance: Part 1: Defining the Interests", 
edited by Fiona Macmillan Patfield (ed. ), Kluwer Law International, London, (1995), pp 94-96; 
Gower (above, note 3) p 554; Manne (above, note 34); Farrar (above, note 33) at p 319. 
43 Section 370(6) Companies Act 1985 and Art 54, Table A; See also Ferran (above, note 10) at p 
320; Birds John & Others (eds. ), "Boyle & Birds" Company Law" (1995), 3RD ed., Jordans, Bristol, 
p 210; Leader Sheldon & Dine Janet, "United Kingdom", in The Legal Basis of Corporate 
Governance in Publicly Held Corporations, (1998), 219 at p 233, Kluwer Law International. 
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1.1.3. Doctrinal approach 
Generally speaking, there are four lines of arguments in case law and between 
company law scholars to justify the majority rule in companies. These are: 1) the 
business judgment rule; 2) the proper plaintiff principle; 3) the fear of multiplicity of 
actions; and 4) the internal management principle, which will be examined respectively 
below. 
1.1.3.1. Business judgement rule 
According to the business judgement rule (BJR), directors will not be held responsible 
for errors of judgement when they make business decisions in good faith. The 
argument relies on the policy consideration that since directors often must necessarily 
make judgements in uncertain business circumstances and on the basis of incomplete 
information, it will not be fair to blame them for their errors of judgements and for 
taking decisions that subsequently turn out to be bad . 
44TbUS, 
the gist of the errors of 
judgements rule is to provide a safe harbour for directors of companies when they 
make honest business judgements, hereby further to stimulate directorial initiative and 
risk-taking in companies . 
4' A full examination of the BJR is to be discussed elsewhere. 
46 
44 Re City Equitable Fire and Insurance Co. Ltd (1925) Ch 407 at 408 per Romer June; see 
generally Eisenberg, Melvin Aron, "'The Duty of Care and The Business Judgement Rule in 
American Corporate Law" (1997), Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review, 185 Oxford, 
Mansfield Press, at p 195; Arsalidou, Demetra, "'Objectivity vs Flexibility in Civil Law 
jurisdictions and The Possible Introduction of The Business Judgement Rule in English Law" 
(2003), Company Lawyer, 24 (8), 228, London, Oyez Publishing Limited, at p 232; Davies P. L., 
"Gower and Davies' Principles of Modern Company Law", London, Sweet & Maxwell, (2003), 
7th ed., Chapter 16, at p 436; Stapledon G. P., "Mismanagement and The Unfair Prejudice 
Provision", Company Lawyer (1993), 14 (5), 94-97. 
45 Eisenberg (above, note 44) at p 191; Tunc, Andre, "The Judge and The Businessman" (1986), 
Law Qtiarterly Review, 102 (Oct), 549-554, London, Stevens and Sons; Arsht, Samuel S., "The 
Business Judgement Rule Revisited" (1979), Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 8,93, Hempstead, N. Y., 
Hofstra University School of Law, at p 99; Branson, Douglas M., "'The Rule That Is Not a Rule: 
The Business Judgement Rule" (2002), Valparaiso University Law Revicw, vol. 36,631, Valparaiso, 
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What I am going to suggest here is that this rule, contrary to what some might argue, 
does not really constitute a justification for the rule of majority in companies. The 
reason simply lies in the nature of the shareholder/ corporation relationship. 
Shareholders unlike directors do not act as agents of the corporation. They are more 
likely to be seen as owners of the corporation and because of that title they assume no 
duty of care and further they wiR not need the protection of the BJR. Therefore when 
shareholders decide, for example, to reappoint or dismiss a particular director, to ratify 
a director"s breach of duties, to alter articles of association, to merge the company, to 
sell all assets or to dissolve the company, they do not need to exercise care. 
Some company law scholars argued that the BJR is applicable not only to directors but 
also to shareholders where they make business decisions. For instance, Mayson, French 
and Ryan spoke of it as one of the reasons for the rule in Foss v. Harbottle 4' and in 
describing the current position of English company law on this issue proclaimed that 'a 
court will not review the merits of a lawful decision of members or directors of a 
company' . 
4' 
As examples from case law, they referred to cases like Shuttleworth v. Cox 
Brothers and Co. Ltd. 
49 
, Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. 
50 
, Carlen v. Drury 
51 
and 
the like" none of them were really pertinent. The Shuttleworth case was related to 
Ind., Valparaiso University School of Law, at pp 632,636; Parkinson J. E., "'Corporate Power and 
Responsibility", 1993, Oxford, Clarendon Press, at p 109. 
46 See Chapter III (below, at IV. 1.1. C). 
47 Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
48 Mayson Stephan, French Derek and Ryan Christopher, "Mayson, French & Ryan on 
Company Law"' (2003), 19th ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, at p 586. 
49 Shuttleworth v. Cox Bros & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd, and Others, (1927), 2 KB 9, pp 20-23 per 
Scrutton L. J. 
50 Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. (1974) AC 821. 
51 Carlen v. Drury (1812) 1 Ves &B 154. 
52 Lord v. Governor and Co. of Copper Miners (1848), 2 Ph 740; Inderwick v. Snell (1850), 2 Mac 
&G 216. 
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resolving a dispute arisen between majority and minority shareholders on the issue of 
alteration of the company articles and the court rejected the claim because the dispute 
was a matter of internal management rather than business judgement. The Howard 
case was not a case of shareholders making business judgements but rather was a good 
example of not holding directors responsible for errors of judgement. In the third case, 
too, the disputed issue was essentially one of the internal matters to be settled 
internally and had nothing to do with the BJR. 
Some American scholars have offered similar suggestions. " For example, Arsht took 
the view that "to the extent a majority or controlling stockholder usurps the function of 
the board of directors by influencing or directing the directors" decision, such 
stockholder may have the benefit of the business judgement rule'. " This view, 
however, may work only if the controlling shareholder acts as a shadow director. " Yet, 
a controlling shareholder's exemption from liabilitY in this case is not because he 
makes a qua member business decision, but rather for the fact that he makes the 
decision qua director. 
1.1.3.2. Proper plaintiff principle 
The procedural aspect of the majority rule is known as the proper plaintiff rule which 
was recognised by the courts through the famous Foss v. Harbottle case 
56 
- It can be 
described as "the elementary principle that A can not, as a general rule, bring an action 
53 Lee Hazen (above, note 33) at p 1916. 
54 Arsht (above, note 45) at p 111, para note 85. 
55 Sections 214 and 251 Insolvency Act 1986; See also section 741 (2) Companies Act 1985. 
56 Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
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against B to recover damages on behalf of C for an injury done by B to C. " The proper 
plaintiff principle is one of the most important consequences of the property right, 
whereby only the owner of a piece of property has right to initiate action in respect of 
that property. 5' However, application of this general principle in the company law 
context is not so straightforward because in that context shareholders may simply wish 
to represent themselves as owners of the corporate property and its incident right of 
action. To correct this illusionary picture, company law supplements the proper 
plaintiff rule with another general principle of separate corporate personality59, which 
recognises ownership right for the company itself rather than its shareholders. " The 
proper plaintiff rule has been maintained in many subsequent caseS61 and is 
conventionally seen, as a matter of technique, decisive for commencing corporate 
claims. 62 The Court of Appeal in the recent Prudential63 case regarded it as being 
fundamental to any rational system of jurisprudence, having a wider scope and 
applying to any association, for example a trade union64or a building society65 that can 
sue in its own name. 
57 Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (1997), Law Com, No 246, p 70; Hale, (above, note 
56) at p 219. 
58 Davies (above, note 44) at p 618; Sterling M. J., "'The Theory and Policy of Shareholder 
Actions in Tort", (1987), The Modern Law Review, Vol. 50,468, London, England, Stevens & Sons, 
at p 470; Hale, Christopher, "'What's Right With the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle? " (1997), Company 
Financial and Insolvency Law Review, Oxford, Mansfield Press, 219-221. 
59 Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd (1897), AC (HL) 22. 
60 Sealy L. S., "Problems of Standing, Pleading and Proof in Corporate Litigation"', in Company 
Law in Change edited by Pettet, (1987), London, Stevens, at p 7; Wedderburn K. W., 
"Shareholder's Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle", (1957), Cambridge Law journal, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, at p 196; Farrar (above, note 33) at p 444; Pettet Ben, 
"'Company Law" (2000), Harlow, Longman, at pp 227-8; Hale (above, note 58) at pp 219,221. 
61 Mozley v. Alston (1847) 1 Ph 790; Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co. Ltd. (1925), AC 619; 
Lee v. Lees' Air Farming Ltd. (1961), AC 12. 
62 "1 can not but think that ... the claims of justice would be found superior to any difficulties 
arising out of technical rules respecting the mode in which corporations are required to sue... " 
[Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 2 Hare 461 per Wigram VC]. 
63 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No 2) 1982, Ch, 204 p 210. 
64 Cotter v. National Union of Seamen (1929), 2 Ch 58. 
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However, the separate corporate personality principle is clearly not intended to 
separate the personality of the company only from that of a minority shareholder. It 
also works to separate a corporation"s personality from those of its majority 
shareholders. As a consequence, when we speak of the proper plaintiff principle as one 
of the foundations of the majority rule, we do not mean to take the majority 
shareholders as the proper plaintiffs who have the right of action. If that had been true, 
we would have denied the separate corporate personality of companies. As a legal 
person, a corporation acts through its representatives. Articles of association and 
company law prescribe the rules on which these representatives are elected, and 
determine the extents of their powers and the mechanisms on which they can make 
corporate decisions. Yet, majority rule and the separate personality and the proper 
plaintiff principles can coordinate to make commencement of any corporate action 
generally dependant on the wish of the majority who can influence corporate 
representatives indirectly. In that sense, the proper plaintiff principle can support the 
majority rule. 
1.1.3.3. Fear of multiplicity of actions 
The fear of multiplicity of actions is a policy-driven argument by which the courts 
support application of majority rule in companies. It generally reflects the fear of the 
judiciary of becoming involved in endless shareholder claims which take up the courts' 
time and waste public funds. The early manifestation of this fear can be found in the 
65 Farrow v. Registrar of Building Society (1991), 2 VR 589. 
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judgement of James L. J. in Gray v. Lewis where he declared that 'if personal actions by 
shareholders were allowed there might be as many bills as there are shareholders 
multiplied into the number of defendants. " The policy is to absolve the judiciary from 
having to take difficult decisions about matters of business and internal management 
of companies and thereby to save judicial resources. Yet, more benefits can derive from 
the policy. It is 'more convenient that the company should sue, instead of having any 
number of suits started and subsequently discontinued by individual shareholders 
/. 67 
Shareholder actions might be fruitless for the simple reason that the company would 
convene a meeting, and pass a resolution to ratify the act in question. They could 
further increase costs for companies by imposing on them unwanted consequences of 
being involved in endless time consuming and probably business disruptive 
litigations. " They might also be used to harass the company through constant 
litigation. These can all be avoided by the courts' refusal to hear shareholder actions, 
which saves companies' and their shareholders" time and money, and allows 
companies to operate and focus on ongoing business without unnecessary 
interruption. 69 
1.1.3.4. Internal management principle 
The internal management principle is another source of justification upon which the 
courts abdicate their jurisdiction in favour of corporate internal forums. 
'O It is, in fact, a 
consequence of enforcing company contracts, and generally means shareholder 
66 Gray v. Lewis (1873), 8 Ch App, 1035, p 1051. 
67 Farrar (above, note 41) at p 361. 
68 Mac Dougall v. Gardiner (1875), lCh. D. 13 at p 25. 
69 Farrar (above, note 41). 
70 Mayson Et. Al. (above, note 48) at p 576. 
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disputes should be settled on the basis of internal rules at the internal forum in the 
company. Internal rules are mainly found in constitutions, and every member by 
subscribing to the memorandum of association agrees to their applicability. 7' They 
regulate rules and methods by which shareholders" disagreements should be settled 
and provide an internal forum for such settlements, often in the form of a general 
meeting of shareholders. The development of the internal mangement principle as a 
legal principle can be seen as resulting from case law, where the courts, by their 
reluctance to hear disputes among shareholders, created the policy of non-intervention 
in favour of general meetings. Historically, it can be traced back to the old principle of 
internal settlement in partnerships that required partners to settle their disagreements 
internally. " Early conunon law courts developed the principle by stating laudly that a 
/ court is not to be required on every occasion to take the management of every play 
house and brew house in the kingdom'. " Subsequently, this principle of partnerships 
was by analogy extended by the courts to companies in the famous Foss case. 74 The Foss 
case which was infact the first judicial confirmation of the majority rule in companies 
concerned two company shareholders who brought action against directors of the 
company in order to compel them to make good loss suffered by the company on the 
ground that the defendants had sold their own land to the company at a price in excess 
of its value. Wigram V. C. rejected the action taking the view that the objected 
transaction is a wrong to the company and so far as the company itself through its 
governing body of proprietors retains its functions, there will be no recourse 
for 
71 Sections 14 (1) and 22 (1,2) Companies Act 1985. 
72 Wedderburn (above, note 60) at p 196. 
73 Carlen v. Drurv (1812), 1 Ves. &B 154 at p 158, per Lord Eldon. 
74 Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
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individual shareholders to take corporate actions. " The rule in Foss case was then 
supported by subsequent cases" and over time has become a fundamental principle of 
company law in England that requires settIlment of internal disputes among 
shareholders through internal rules and procedures. " Accordingly, the courts do not 
hear such disputes unless the plaintiff shareholders can show that they have tried all 
the internal mechanisms which have proved to be working inappropriately or 
unconstitutionally. 
78 
1.1.4. Comments 
Each of the three approaches involves some drawback. The political approach uses 
political arguments to explain governance of the majority in corporations which is 
meant to monitor activities of the corporate management. The use of political 
arguments is to mean that the approach relies on personality of corporate members 
rather than their capital. Why the majority should rule can be answered the same as is 
done in the politics. It should rule because allegedly it enjoys greater force, treats 
members as equal human beings, allows them to make maximum possible use of their 
freedom, and offers them with more benefits and better results. A criticism is that 
political arguments fail to work in any human association and group which do not rely 
on personality of group members. 79 In addition, as the approach relies on members 
75 Ibid. 
76 Mac Dougall v. Gardiner (1875), 1 Ch. D. 13; Burland v. Earle (1902), AC 83, PC, p 93-94, per 
Lord Davey. 
77 North West Transportation Co Ltd. v. Beatty (1887), 12 App CAS 589 per Richard Baggallay; 
Shuttleworth v. Cox Bros & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd, and Others, (1927), 2 KB 9, at pp 20-23 per 
Scrutton L. J. 
78 Mosteshar Said "Derivative Actions -A New Approach", New Law journal (1983), London, 
Butterworth, at p 992. 
79 Lowenstein (above, note 33) at pp 983-4; Jensen and Meckling (1983), (above, note 32) at pp 1- 
6; Black (1990), (above, note 32) at p 552; Bebchuk (1989), (above, note 32) at pp 1830-1. 
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a 
rather than their capital, it often provides excessive protection for minorities that can 
be inefficient in business corporations. 
The economic approach, on the other hand, justifies the majority rule, relying on the 
efficiency argument. According to it, majority rule is efficient because by granting 
corporate governance to those who supply a greater bulk of the corporate financial 
resource, it facilitates movement of capital towards corporations. Further, majority rule 
offers benefits to majority shareholders that outweigh any likely impairment of 
minority shareholders. The approach can be characterised by its complete reliance on 
private contracting and market mechanisms plus unwillingness in accommodating any 
legal intervention for the protection of minority shareholders. An important drawback 
with this approach is its capability to substitute interests of corporations with those of 
their majority shareholders, whereas a company as a legal person can have interests 
other than that of a mere majority. 80 Therefore, it is debatable that majority rule is 
desirable because it promotes efficiency in the company. In some circumstances it may 
act inefficiently especially where shareholders who sit in the majority camp seek to 
pursue self-interested policies. 81 A further drawback, which is pertinent to jurisdictions 
whose corporations rely on external finance, is its capability to discourage shareholder 
financing in corporations. Recent empirical research by comparing legal rules across 49 
countries has shown that there is a causal link between good legal protection for 
80 See Chapter three below, at 111.1.1-B. 
81 Mayson Stephan, French Derek and Ryan Christopher, "Mayson, French & Ryan on 
Company Law", (2001), 1811, ed., London, Blackstone, at pp 11-12; Maclntosh Jeffrey G., 
"Minority Shareholder Rights in Canada and England: 1860-1987", (1989), Osgoode Hall Law 
jourtial, vol. 27, No. 3, Toronto, Osgoode Hall Law School, at p 564. 
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investors and existing of a strong company sector with investors wishing to take the 
risk of financing in companies. 82 
The doctrinal approach justifies the rule using certain legal principles which are 
generally meant to benefit corporations and their shareholders, the judiciary and the 
society. The principles which all, in one way or another, support the governance of 
majority shareholders seek to encourage financing and risk-taking in corporations, 
save the public budget, facilitate private ordering in the interest of efficiency, and 
regulate the relationships between corporations, shareholders, and corporate directors. 
These are worthwhile objectives which are often achieved. Nonetheless, under certain 
circumstances operation of the principles can result in injustice to minority 
shareholders in corporations. This is mainly the case where 'the persons who control 
the company and the persons against whom the company has a cause of action are one 
and the sarne. 831n such cases a minority shareholder is not as a matter of principle able 
to pursue wrongdoers unless there is, not a simple disagreement, but the prospect of 
/an imminent disaster to the company observable by all, or at least, most reasonable 
people'84 that is, of course, very difficult to prove. 85The business judgement rule saves 
a majority shareholder/ director from liability for committing of mere negligence. 
When the alleged negligence constitutes a breach of either the duty of care or fiduciary, 
he/she will be safe from prosecution so far as the matter falls short of the concept of 
82 La Porta Rafael, Lopes-de-Silanes Florencio, Shleifer Andrei and Vishny Robert W. 
(Hereafter is cited LLSV), "Legal Determinants of External Finance"', (1997) 52 (3), Journal of 
Finance, New York, American Finance Association, pp 1131,1132,1149 and LLSV, "'Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance"' p 29 available at Social Science Research Network 
(SSRN), Electronic Library at www. ssm. com, (ID 183900 code 99092719). 
83 Hale (above, note 58) at p 219. 
84 Rajak Harry, "Sotirce Book of Company Law", (1995), Bristol, Jordans, at p 530. 
85 Sealy (1987) (above, note 60) at pp 4-7. 
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fraud. The internal management principle allows the wrongdoers to ratify their 
wrongs. When there is a dispute among shareholders, the principle goes no further 
than to solve the dispute in favour of the majority shareholders. The proper plaintiff 
principle too prevents any legal action to be taken as to corporate wrongs by minority 
shareholders. The judicial reluctance as to hearing of minority claims can further be a 
green light for controllers to do wrong in corporations. In summary, these principles 
when are put together can rigidly ignore minority shareholders" rights, making no 
distinction between fallacious and meritorious claims of theirs. 86 
86 Sealy (1987), (above, note 60) at p 7. 
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1.2. The case of Iran 
The issue of justification for majority rule is relatively new issue in Iranian company 
law and has rarely been discussed among company law scholars. " The existing 
literature on company law often either neglects to address the issue, or if at all, tends to 
describe the law as it stands rather than to analyse and explain it. Although it points to 
majority rule as a distinctive character of companies as against traditional contracts 
and partnerships, it hardly raises the question of why majority shareholders should 
rule in companies. This is a key question that has been addressed by scholars of the 
western economies since the 17th century. In fact in such economies, majority rule has 
been a key element in the development of modem companies, while in Iran, it did not 
matter that much, though adopted by company law. 
Speaking generally, the evolution of a rule of law in any legal system depends on social 
context and in particular on the underlying cultural, socio-economic and political 
elements of that system. Where the context is not apt for a particular rule to evolve, the 
rule will not emerge and as a consequence may not even matter. 
historical/ contextual examination of the development of Iranian modem law will 
show that Iranian society was not ready yet to generate an indigenous majority rule to 
be employed for its business vehicles. Before the Pahlavi period (1925-1978), the law in 
Iran was based on Islamic law" and it did not recognise companies that have separate 
personality and work with the majority rule. Islamic jurists and political theorists were 
reluctant to see business vehicles as separate persons. Such idea was capable to 
87 See Sotoodeh Tehrani Hasan, "Trade Law" (1997), Tehran, Dehkhoda Publication, vol. 2, pp 
175-6. 
88 Pasha-Saaleh Ali, "The History of Law" (1960), University of Tehran Publications. 
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threaten the ideal of undivided community advanced by Islam. " Further, democratic 
values which underlie evolution of modem companies in western economies, were yet 
unknown to the Islamic society of Iran. The idea that political power belongs to the 
people who can by majority rule make rules of their own for their collective affairs 
could sit uneasily with the teachings of Islam. 'O Islamic law required Muslims to 
conform the rules of Shariah that were already written by Allah. It denied legislative 
power from the ruler and only allowed him to make administrative regulations within 
the limits of Islam. Islamic rulers in Muslim societies viewed themselves as persons 
who have the mission and are entrusted with godly power to exercise the rules of 
Shariah as demonstrated in the holy Quran and other Islamic sources and as 
interpreted by qualified interpreters of the Islamic law. 
Historically also Iran had never experienced democracy. Political regimes were always 
authoritative in nature and monarchy was the most typical form of govemment. 
9' Pre- 
Islamic Iranian kings were centres of absolute power that treated the people like their 
servants. The same was true of post-Islamic Iranian kings; except in the latter period 
kings ruled often formally in the name of Allah and were called as Nayeb ol Imam, one 
89 "Hold fast, all of you together, to the cable of Allah, and do not separate, and remember 
Allah's favour unto you: how you were enemies and He made friendship between your 
hearts 
so that you became as brothers by his grace; and how you were upon the 
brink of an abyss of 
fire, and He saved you from it" [The Quran, 3: 1031. 
90 Gibb, H. A. R., "The Islamic Background of Ibn Khaldun's Political Theory", Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental Studies, University of London, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1933), 23-31 available at 
the 
following address: http: //Iinks. jstor. org/sici? sici=1356- 
1898%281933%297%3Al%3ATIBOIK%3E2.0. CO%3B2-%23- 
91 Keddie, Nikki R., "'Iran: Religion, Politics, and Society", Collected Essays, London, F. Cass, 
Totowa, N. J., Biblio Distribution Centre, (1980); Halliday, Fred, "Iran: Dictatorship and 
Development" Harmondsworth: Penguin, (1979); Lenczowski, George, "'Iran Under the 
Pahlavis" Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, (1978). 
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who, according to the Shiah Wary School", serves Shariah law on behalf of the 
Prophet Mohammad and his twelve grandchildren on their absence. " 
Further, the idea that collective decisions can be made by a majority of shareholders in 
companies was in contradiction with the individualist nature of the Islamic law that 
recognised rights and obligations only for natural persons and required for party 
consent in civil transactions and business activities. 94 A contract could come into force 
and continue only so far as it could carry the consent of each contractual party. The free 
contracting principle, which is recognised in Islam, was short of the capability to 
render separate personhood to collective business enterprises and as a consequence 
members in such enterprises were treated as co-owners. Unanimity that required the 
consent of each member for every collective decision was therefore the only applicable, 
but not necessarily workable, rule and contractual efficiency was to mean the efficiency 
of a transaction for parties as understood and agreed by every party to that transaction. 
Thus, the adoption of the law of modem corporations, that work through the majority 
rule, by Iranian Law could not follow a religious, cultural or political link, as these 
were not capable of allowing any gradual evolution of modem companies in Iran. In 
92 Shiah jafary School is the prevailing creed among Iranians which has also been officially 
adopted by the Iranian governments since the Safavids (907/1501); For a historical study see 
Alesandro Bausani, "Religion in Iran: From Zoroaster to Baha'ullah", Iranian Studies, Routledge, 
Volume 36, Number I/March (2003), 103-160; Savory, Roger Mervyn, "Iran Under the 
Safavids" Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, (1980); Nasr S. H., "Religion in Safavid 
Persia", Iranian Studies, Routledge, Volume 7, (1974), 271; Keddie (above, note 91). 
93 For further study of the School's thoughts see Ayatollah Ja"far Sobhani, "Doctrines of Shii 
Islam"', Translated and edited by Reza Shah-Kazemi, Qom, Imam Sadeq Institute, (2003). 
94 See generally Kuran Timur, "Why the Islamic Middle East Did not Generate an Indigenous 
Corporate Law"', (2004), University of Southern California, Department of Economics, Los 
Angeles, at pp 12-19, available from Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Electronic 
Library at: http: //ssrn. com/abstract=585687 and from the Berkeley Electronic Press at 
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the absence of such links one may wonder why Iran did experience such adoption. One 
possible (and of course good) answer is to say that the case for Iran was perhaps a 
simple westernisation of the law applicable to the traditional partnership towards a 
transplantation of the idea of modem company as existed in the western economies of 
the time. Such westernisation began under Reza Shah (the founder of the Pahlavy 
monarchy) in the nineteen- twenties and thirties. Under his monarchy a great deal of 
change in law and institutions, similar to that of Turkey, occurred in Iran. 95 Iranian 
economy was about to experience a sudden industrialisation on the European model 
and companies could speed up the process of such industrialisation, as they did in the 
European model. 96 Major adoption both in form and contents occurred in respect of the 
Trade code 97 that introduced a separate section on companies and allowed public to 
incorporate companies. " This code took the company laws of France and Belgium as 
models, but ensured that it remains consistent with Islamic principles. The code was 
subsequently replaced by another Trade code" that except for joint stock companies 
still remains the applicable Trade code in Iran. "' It divides companies into seven 
types'O' and particularly in Section 72 prescribes the rule of majority. Mohammad Reza 
Shah, the son of Reza Shah, continued this trend towards westemisation. In 1969, his 
http: / /law. bepress. com/usclwps/lewps/artl6; Schacht, Joseph, ""Islamic Law in 
Contemporary States'", The American Journal of comparative Law, 133 at p 138. 
95 But unlike the case of Turkey, Pahlavies' westernisation was in most cases subject to 
observation of the Islamic law, particularly the Shia Jafari School that survived by Art 2 of the 
1925 amendment to the Constitution. See generally Kuran (above, note 94) at pp 16-19; Zagday 
M. I., "Modern Trends in Islamic Law in the Near, Middle and Far East", in Current Legal 
Problems, edited by George W. Keeton et al. (1948), Vol 1 London, at p 209. 
96 See generally Kuran (above, note 94) at pp 10-12. 
97 Trade Code 1926 (corresponding to Persian calendar year 1304). 
98 Civil Code, which includes family law, the law of civil transactions and torts, was also 
adopted from the law of Europe. The adoption, however, was only in form rather than in 
contents which remained Islamic. 
99 Trade Code 1933 (corresponding to Persian calendar year 1311) (Hereafter is cited TC). 
100 Pasha-Saaleh (above, note 88) at p 278; Sotoodeh (above, note 87) at pp 11,12. 
101 Section 20 TC. 
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government proposed a new collection of 300 sections on the model of France to the 
Parliament in order to address deficiencies of the Trade code in respect of joint-stock 
companies. The new collection was passed'O', and at the moment is the primary source 
of law in relation to the joint-stock companies in Iran. It reconfirms the rule of 
majority" in such companies and provides few minority protections. 
104 
One can assume that Iranian law has justified the rule of majority in companies in the 
same way as done by scholars in western economies. There are therefore Iranian 
company law scholars who speak of an analogy between democratic states and 
business associations and who require the rule of majority in order to enable corporate 
members monitor activities of corporate executives. 'O' Likewise, it is said that the 
application of the rule is efficient because it ensures more benefits than harm to 
members. From a legal perspective also majority rule respects corporate autonomy' 06 , 
resolves shareholder disputes internally'O' and prevents shareholders from initiating 
corporate claims'" which all are in the economics of companies and save the judiciary 
time and money. '09 
102 joint Stock Companies Act 1969 (corresponding to Persian calander year 1347), (Hereafter 
cited JSCA). 
103 Sections 86-88 JSCA- 
104 Sections 129 and 276 JSCA. 
105 Sotoodeh (above, note 87) at pp 18,114-5. 
106 Sections 583 and 589 TC. 
107 Sections 88 and 103 JSCA. 
108 See sections 2 and 84 (10) Civil Procedure Act 2000 (hereafter is cited CPA). 
109 Sotoodeh (above, note 87) at pp 121,124; Hoseingoli Katebi, "'Trade Law" (1994), 6th ed., 
Vol. 2. Tehran, Ganjedanesh Publication, at p 79; Azami Zangeneh Abdolmajid, "Commercial 
Law" (1974), 4th ed., Tehran, University of Tehran Publication, at p 119; Erfani Mahmood, 
"Abuse of job and Power in the Law of Iran'", Comparative Law Institution Monthly (1981), No 7, 
University of Tehran Publication, Tehran, at pp 148-231; Seghari Mansoor, "Definition of 
Business Corporation", in Private Law Developments, Edited by Katoozian Naser (1993), Tehran 
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A related question is to see why amongst the existing models of corporate governance, 
the Iranian law adopted the continental Europe model rather than the Anglo-American 
model. A distinctive feature of the latter is the lack of a controlling shareholder. In this 
model, external finance is the main source of corporate capital and corporate 
shareholdings are widely dispersed among the public so that corporate managers can 
seize real control of corporations. As the name suggests, the model is mainly American 
and British. On the other hand, companies in the former model depend on internal 
financing and there are often one or a few shareholders who have shareholdings 
enough to control the corporation. This is the norm for the rest of the world. " 0 
Both models have advantages as well as disadvantages. As the latter relies more on 
market constraints rather than shareholder control, disclosure of information plays a 
decisive role in controlling mismanagement, but short-termism becomes the policy of 
shareholders and agency costs are increased. Instead, in the former, the effectiveness 
and efficiency of corporations depends on shareholder control which is to mean long- 
term shareholder performance in control of corporations and less agency costs but they 
suffer from lower disclosure standard and minority oppression-' 11 Most contemporary 
legal comparatists admit that none of the models are ideal and the choice between one 
University Publications, at p 199; Eskini Rabiaa, "'Trade Law: Business Corporations" (2000), 
Vol. 2, Samt Publication, Tehran, at p 78. 
110 Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W., "'A Survey of Corporate Governance", The Journal of 
Finance (June 1997), Vol. LII, No. 2, at p 754; MacNeil lain, "Adaptation and Convergence in 
Corporate Governance: The Case of Chinese Listed Companies" (2002), Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies, vol. 2, part 2,289, at pp 291-297, Hart Publishing; MacNeil lain, "'An Introduction to The 
Law on Financial Investment" (2005), Hart Publishing Co., Oxford, at pp 252-255; Cheffins Brian 
R., 'Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan via Toronto', Duke 
Journal of Comparative & International Law (1999), Vol. 10, No. 5, at p 7; Cheffins Brian R, 
"Corporate Law and Ownership Structure: A Darwinian Link? ", University of Cambridge 
(2002), available at Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Electronic Library at 
http: //ssrn-com/abstract=317661, at pp 30-37. 
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and another model for a host system is one of economic, political and cultural or a 
mixture of them. "' Economists suggest legal systems adopt a model of corporate 
governance that efficiency dictates to corporations working within them otherwise 
corporations which have inefficient corporate governance structure will not survive in 
the market. Efficiency, therefore, explains why the Anglo-American and the Continent 
Europe differ in the choice of their corporate governance models. "' Public regulation 
on political considerations is seen as determinant in development of corporate 
governance models too. On this view, Roe, for example, suggests that the Anglo- 
American model is a product of democratic movements towards social democracy 
which required prevention of concentration of power in hands of few people or 
institutions. ' 14 Path dependence theory at a wider view attributes evolution or 
adoption of a model of corporate governance in a legal system to matters of culture 
and the social values of a given society, and explains society's resistance to any 
subsequent change on efficiency considerations. "' Some evidence from empirical 
Ill MacNeil (2002), (above, note 110) at pp 292-3; Cheffins (2002), (above, note 110) at pp 23-44; 
Roe (2002), (above, note 31) at pp 1-10. 
112 Kamba, W. J., "Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework" (1974), International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 23,485, at pp 513-518; Orucu, Esin, "Law as Transplant" (2002), 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 51,505, at p 207; Bratton W. and McCahery, 
"Comparative Corporate Governance and The Theory of the Firm: The Case against Global 
Cross Refrence", (1999), 38 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 213; Cheffins (1999), (above, 
note 110) at p 11; Cheffins (2002), (above, note 110) at p 23. 
113 Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), (above, note 33); Cheffins Brian R., "Law, Economics and 
the UK'S System of Corporate Governance: Lessons from History"' (2001), Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies, vol. 1, part 1,71; Ogus, Anthony, ""Competition Between National Legal Systems: A 
contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law" (1999), International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, vol. 48,405, at p 406. 
114 Roe M. j., "'A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, ", (1991), 91 Columbia Law 
Remew 10; see also Shleifer and Vishny (above, note 110) at p 754. 
115 Bebchuk L. A. and Roe M. j., "A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance", Columbia Law School Centre for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 
131 available at www. ssrn. com; Licht A. N., "The Mother of All Path Dependencies, Towards a 
Cross Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems" (2001), 26 Delaware Journal of 
Corporate Law 147. 
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research has also recently shown that the formation of corporate governance structure 
can depend on how strongly a legal system protects its financial investors. "' 
Similar factors can explain why Iranian lawmakers at the time of initial adoption took 
the continental Europe as its model. From a political perspective, the model was apt to 
allow the government to seize control of the private sector. Iranian statesmen for 
different reasons have always wanted to have a weak and controlled private sector. ' 17 
They were suspicious about modem companies and considered them as a potential 
threat to stability of the Iranian society and government. Before the Iranian revolution 
of 1978, the authoritative structure of the governing regimes gave rise to the exercising 
of arbitrary interference by governments in private sector and especiaBy private 
property and ownership. "' After the Islamic revolution of 1978, the private sector was 
treated worse, as the new government viewed them rather suspiciously. Article 44"9 of 
the new constitution gave state protection to companies only to the extent that they 
contribute to the growth of the Iranian economy, and Article 22 authorised the 
government to take statutory measures in order to seize companies that fail to satisfy 
116 LLSV (above, note 82). 
117 jalali Naini, Ahmad R., "Capital Accumulation and Economic Growth in Iran: Past 
Experience and Future Prospects"", Iranian Studies, Volume 38, number 1,91, March 2005; Saeidi, 
Ali A., "'Charismatic Political Authority and Populist Economics in Post-Revolutionary Iran", 
Tlilrd World Quarterly, Vol 22, No 2,219-236, at pp 221-2; Ghani Nejad Moosa, "Brief Interview 
with Professor Moosa Ghani Nejad", 29 Aug 2006 available at http: //www. bbc. co. uk/persian/. 
118 Ashraf Ahmad, "Historical Obstacles to the Growth of Capitalism in Iran: Ghajarieh 
Period" (1980), Tehran, Zamineh Publication, p 61. 
119 "The economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to consist of three sectors: state, 
cooperative, and private ... ownership 
in each of these three sectors is protected by the laws of 
the Islamic Republic, in so far as this ownership is in conformity with the other articles of this 
chapter, does not go beyond the bounds of Islamic law, contributes to the economic growth and 
progress of the country, and does not harm society... " [Article 44 Constitution of 
Islamic 
Republic of Iran (1980/1358) hereafter cited as CIRIJ. 
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the public interest objective. "' The right to form companies, therefore, is seen not as 
deriving from freedom of association, but rather is treated as a state-granted 
concession which can be withdrawn when the public interest requires. As a further 
consequence of such viewing, the government has narrowed areas of economic activity 
in which companies could enter. Dividing the economy of Iran into three sectors, 
governmental, co-operative and private, Article 44 has allocated exclusively to 
government much of the room for economic activity, even activities that by their legal 
definition are regarded as private. Goverrunent, therefore, monopolises the business in 
most key sectors of the economy and further it applies control on companies in 
remaining areas. Besides, from a religious perspective, control of the government over 
companies could also address the factionalism concern of the Islan-Lic jurists. "' In 
addition to these, government control over the private sector could generate income, 
and its control over the proceeds obtained of oil production and export created 
financial independence which could save it from any likely inhospitality of the private 
sector. These factors resulted in the creation of many large corporations which are 
owned either totally or substantially (over 50 percent shareholding) by the state, and 
which control up to 80 percent of the economy of Iran. 
Economically observed, the continental European model could function more 
efficiently than the Anglo-American model in the Iranian context. To begin with, the 
Anglo-American model was not sufficiently popular around the world, or at least it 
was unknown to the Iranian lawmaker and businessmen on the time of adoption. By 
the nineteen- thirties it only prevailed in United States and its establishment in Britain 
120 "The dignity, life, property, rights, residence, and occupation of the individual are inviolate, 
except in cases sanctioned by law. " [Article 22 CIRIJ. 
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was only completed as late as 1979.122 Its adoption, therefore, could require extra costs 
of searching, learning, and practising. In contrast, Iran's vicinity and vast business 
relationship with continental Europe and the successes of European corporations made 
the continental model of corporate governance known, attractive and less expensive to 
adopt. The model was also closer to the traditional partnership concept which was 
popular in Iran in that it preserved the connection between ownership and control and 
therefore it was not as expensive to learn and practice as the Anglo-American model. 
Furthermore, it is now clear that the Anglo-American model"s performance is closely 
dependent on the existence of a market economy able to align companies through 
competitive constraints. 123 In a context like Iran in which business was mainly 
conducted through either closely-held firms or state-owned associations, and 
competitive constraints were to a great extent absent, and in which the financial market 
is yet under developed and share transactions relatively uncommon, adoption of the 
Anglo-American model could have generated hazardous consequences. 
121 See (above, note 89); also see generally Kuran (above, note 94) at pp 12-19. 
122 Cheffins (2001), (above, note 113) at pp 81-4; Cheffins (2002), (above, note 110) at pp 
3-10. 
123 Cheffins (1999), (above, note 110) at pp 11-17; MacNeil (2002), (above, note 
110) at pp 291- 
297; Bebchuk and Roe (above, note 115) at pp 11,22. 
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1.3. Conclusion 
This Chapter reviewed from the perspective of English and Iranian laws lines of 
arguments that have been developed in favour of application of the majority rule in 
companies. As to the English company law, it identified and examined three 
approaches which have been most influential in developing and justifying the rule of 
majority in corporations. The first approach (political), regards the majority rule as 
being a product of adoption from political ideas. It draws analogies between states and 
corporations and justifies the majority rule in the latter as it is justified in the former. In 
this approach, majority rule is desirable only because it facilitates control of corporate 
members over the corporate management. Most company lawyers would accept that 
democratic theory has been influential in the development of the current model of 
governance in corporations. Many of the structural and governance issues in 
corporations including the majority rule originally inspire from the democratic theory. 
Yet as the Economic theory explains, because of essensial differences wich exist 
between corporations and states a political justification could no longer work in the 
former. It pays little attention to the economic aspect of corporations and puts 
excessive emphasis on personality of corporate members. The political approach, thus, 
while supporting the majority rule offers disproportionate safeguards for shareholders 
which can be inefficient. The second approach (economic), which views endurance of 
the majority rule in corporations as being a consequence of adaptation, seeks to justify 
the majority rule using the efficiency argument. As corporations rely on 
finance which 
is decisively important for their business and because corporate decisions are taken 
collectively, they need a rule that can facilitate collective action and encourage 
shareholder financing and these can only be achieved through the majority rule. 
Since 
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a rule cannot be for all, it should inevitably be for the majority shareholders because 
otherwise would discourage financing in corporations. Majority control is the risk 
minority shareholders must take to obtain greater value. The approach, however, can 
facilitate majority abuse as it considers any minority involvement in the making of 
corporate decisions and control of companies entirely interruptive and troublesome. 
The political and economic approaches agree in the sense that they both support 
governance of the majority in corporations. They diverge, nevertheless, in that while in 
the former majority rule is a device which enables corporate members' participation in 
control over mangement, in the latter it facilitates financing rather than being a 
controlling device. ' 24 Finally, the third approach (doctrinal), which accommodates the 
rule within the corporate laws, seeks to justify the rule of majority, using certain legal 
reasoning and policy considerations. The doctrinal justification, in turn, if rigidly 
interpreted is liable to injustice. The BJR is liable to abuse particularly where the same 
people hold both majority of shares and managerial position. 12' The proper plaintiff 
rule is also capable of being diverted to serve the majority shareholders because under 
majority influence, directors may differentiate between corporate actions and initiate 
only those that benefit the controlling majority. 126 Too, the fear of multiplicity of actions 
argument is unable to assure that only fallacious claims of minority shareholders will 
124 See Chapter three below, at Ill. 1-4. 
125 It will be explained in Chapter four that Iranian company law does not know any 
systematic exemption from liability for corporate management as to their negligence. See 
Chapter four below, at IV. 2. 
126 Majority rule in Iranian company law is not to explain why company shareholders from a 
procedural standpoint are debarred from taking corporate claims. That is a consequence of an 
amalgamation of companies' separate personality and ownership rights and is recognised by 
procedural rules of taking actions generally. See section 2 Civil Procedure Act 2000 (hereafter is 
cited CPA) which provide: "'No court can hear a claim unless a person or persons having 
proprietary interest or a person or persons who are their agents (lawyer), successors or legal 
representatives initiate action and demand judicial trial according to the law". Also see section 
84 (10) CPA that states, "In following issues defendant when responds in substance can make a 
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be rejected. "' Lastly, the internal management principle which refers every dispute of 
shareholders to the meeting of shareholders relies on the assumption that internal rules 
are capable to offer autonomous solutions for every contingency. This is not correct 
because contractual solutions in the company context may not be fully autonomous as 
they are taken, and are changeable, by a majority decision. 128 
Similar approaches although borrowed from the western economies can be found in 
the Iranian company law too. It has been made clear that the society of Iran for a 
number of reasons was not ready to generate an indigenous company law and hence it 
did not need to justify the rule of the majority. Westernisation of the economy and 
adoption of law on the European model further relaxed such need. 
While the two countries share in how to justify the rule of majority, they diverge in 
their chosen model of corporate governance. English companies tend to have dispersed 
shareholders. Unless the company is small, no single or few persons can control the 
company. Iranian companies, on the other hand, most often have one (the state and its 
dependant organisations, as to large companies) or several controlling shareholders 
(families, in the case of small companies). Interestingly, such divergence was partially 
caused by one similar factor, i. e. efficiency. For England, a dispersed shareholding 
procedural objection to the claim initiated against him/her ... (10) Plaintiff is not of interest in 
the claim"'. 
127 Iranian law also does not recognise any policy that dictates abdication of judicial 
jurisdiction due to fear of multiplicity of shareholder actions. 
128 That, internal disputes must be setteled internally is also the applicable rule in Iranian 
company law. The only difference is perhaps one of the source. While it is a common law rule in 
England, internal management is a statutory rule in Iranian company law. See section 86 JSCA, 
"Ordinary general meeting is of discretion to decide on all issues relating to the company's 
affairs excluding issues which fall within the authority of Founders and Extra ordinary 
meetings". 
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structure was efficient because a concentrated structure could mean greater risks, on 
the one hand, for majority shareholders whose investment was liable to the risk of 
mismanagement and, on the other hand, for minority shareholders who were vicfims 
of abuse of power by the majority shareholders. In the case of Iran, on the other hand, 
the concentrated model could function efficiently as companies depend mostly on 
internal finance rather than external investment. In addition to the efficiency 
consideration, political and religious factors were also relevant in the case of Iran 
because a concentrated model could ensure control of the private sector by the Islamic 
government. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that recent signals from Iran indicate 
that the Iranian lawmaker currently seeks to pursue a gradual shift from a heavily 
government-directed economy towards privatisation and a market economy, which 
could, in the long term, mean development of a less concentrated pattern of 
shareholding in Iranian corporations and improvement of the law so as to 
accopmodate some more minority shareholder protection mechanisms in Iranian 
compony law. "' This is now noticeable in the Tehran Stock Exchange proclaimed 
policies which encourage dispersion of shareholding. "' 
129 The government has had a privatisation programme since the First Development Plan 
(1988-92) that has been carried onto the Second, Third and Fourth Development Plans. Further 
recently the parliament enacted the Securities Market Bill, proposed by the government in 16 
Oct 2005, which mandates a higher standard of disclosure of information and imposes criminal 
liability on those who trade shares using hidden information. More recently, Ayatollah 
Khamina'i, the supreme leader, has sought a huge reform in the article 44 of the Iranian 
Constitution so as to displace much of the government's monopolies in favour of greater private 
sector participation. See jalali Naini (above, note 117) at p 92; Ghani Nejad (above, note 117); 
Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) at http: //www. isna. ir (07/02/2006). 
130 According to TSE Listing Rules a public company's shares is not accepted for listing, even 
in the secondary table of the main Hall, if less than 10 shareholders possess 80 percent of the 
company's issued shares at the listing stage. The authorised maximum shareholding reduces to 
75 percent by the end of second year. And if the company wishes its shares is listed and 
displayed in the principal table of the main Hall, it needs to ensure that not less than 10 
shareholders possess 70 percent shareholding. See TSE Listing Rules available in Farsi at the 
following website: http: //,, %ýNv,, %,. irbourse. com/FForms/gavanin/Section4. aspx#B1. 
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Chapter II: Scope of majority rule 
In Chapter one, I examined three lines of arguments which are commonly used to 
found application of majority rule in companies. The intention was to show why and 
how the rule is justified hereby to demonstrate the source of some of minority 
problems. Justifications aside, another aspect of the majority rule, which needs to be 
considered, is its field of application. As this research concerns in great part 
examination of the rule of majority, its mission will not be completed unless it 
considers the field of application of the majority rule and I therefore dedicate this 
Chapter to such consideration. The Chapter concerns the question of scope and intends 
to show in which area in the relationship between majority and minority shareholders 
majority rule applies. Although principally shareholders are required to submit to 
resolutions adopted by a simple majority vote, this, however, does not follow that 
majority rule applies in every circumstance and on every issue. There are limitations in 
law that sensibly narrows the scope of applicability of the rule. ' In England, the 
common law traditionally had collected these limitations under the category of the so 
called "necessity" which meant minority shareholders could initiate derivative actions 
when such actions were the only way to remedy wrongdoings in companies. ' The 
necessity measure, however, overwhelmed the rule in practice, meaning that if a 
derivative action were open whenever the majority could block a minority then it 
1 Kaye v. Corydon Tramways (1898), 1 Ch. 348,377 per Vaughan Williams L. J.; See 
Wedderburn K. W., "Shareholder's Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle", (1957), Cambridge 
Law jotirnal, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, at p 199. 
2 "... to allow, under such circumstances, a bill to be filled by some shareholders on behalf of 
themselves and others, would be to admit a form of pleading which was originally introduced 
on the ground of necessity alone, to a case in which it is obvious that no such necessity 
exists... ", [Mozley v. Alston (1847), 1 Ph. 790 Per Cottenham L. C. ]. 
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would be open all the time. Subsequently, James L. J. in the Macdougall v. Gardiner case 
classified situations that fall beyond applicability of majority rule into the fraud upon 
3 
minority and ultra vires cases. A few years later, Pender v. Lushington added to this 
classification personal rights of corporate members. 4 In 1950, Edwards v. Halliweff, 
which was a case about a special majority reqirement, brought the mentioned 
limitations together classifying them under the following four headings: 1) Where the 
act complained of is ultra vires or illegal; 2) Where the matter could validly be done 
only by some special majority; 3) Where the personal rights of the claimant have been 
invaded; and 4) Where what has been done amounts to a fraud on the minority. 
Although, this classification has attracted considerable support in case law' and among 
many company law writers', it, however, seems to be more practical than academic, as 
it does not recognise any distinction between situations that fall beyond the ambit of 
majority rule and situations that are excluded in law from that ambit. ' While the first 
three headings primarily fall outside the scope of the rule, the fraud upon minority 
heading is about transactions which are prima facie within the power of the majority, 
but excluded in law for minority protection reasons. In any case which involves one of 
3 Mac Dougall v. Gardiner (1875), lCh D 13 per James L. J.; see also Burland v. Earl (1902), AC 
83 per Lord Davey. 
4 Pender v. Lushington (1877) 6 Ch D 70. 
5 (1950) 2 All ER 1064 per Jenkins L. J. 
6 Bamford v. Bamford (1970), Ch 212; Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries 
Ltd 
and others (No. 2) (1982) Ch 204; Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v. 
Greater London Council 
(1982) 1WLR 2. 
7 Wedderburn (1957), (above, note 1) at pp 203-4; Farrar John H., "'Company Law"', (1991), 
London, Butterworths, at p 445; Pettet Ben, "Company Law", (2000), Harlow, Longman, at pp 
230-1; Stedman Graham & Jones Janet, "'Shareholders' Agreement", (1998), 3rd Ed., London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, at p 76-80; Thorne James (ed. ), "'Butterworth's Company Law Guide", (1995), 
Butterworths, London, UK at p 186. 
8 Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v. Greater London Council (1982) 1WLR 2 per Megarry VC; 
Thorne (above, note 7); Pettet (above, note 7) at pp 230-1; Farrar (above, note 7) at p 449; Sealy 
L. S., "Cases and Materials", (2001), Chap 10, at p 489, London, Butterworths. 
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the first three headings, a shareholder is permitted in law to take action to stop 
application of the majority rule. In the case of the fraud exception, however, there 
would have been no such permission for a shareholder, if the law had not expressly 
granted its protection. 
For a better understanding of the scope of majority rule and in the interest of 
theorization of the existing practice, I prefer to follow a different type of classification 
which relies on issues that fall beyond applicability of majority rule, classifying such 
issues by considering their sources. Accordingly, limitations on the governance of 
majority rule in corporations can be classified into two categories; i. e. those imposed 
by the law and those arising from the constitution. 
Limitations imposed by the law whether enacted by the Parliament or developed by 
the courts are always put in a mandatory footing, as distinguished from defaults. The 
latter refers to rules that allow parties to an arrangement to escape from the scope of 
them. The former relates to rules that limit parties' freedom and that are not subject to 
change. 9 By legal limitations, only mandatory rules are aimed, as defaults have no 
intrusive feature and parties have always the option to waive them. 'O 
9 MacNeil lain, "Company Law Rules: An Assessment from the Perspective of Incomplete 
Contract Theory"", Journal of Corporate Law Studies, (June 2001), Oxford, UK, Hart Pub, at p 107. 
10 Default or presumptive rules apply to company affairs without the affected parties taking 
any sort of affirmative step. They apply unless those governed by them elect to opt out. Right 
attached to shares is an example of this. On the contrary, mandatory rules allow no option to 
affected parties to displace them. While defaults pursue facilitation of bargaining objective, 
mandatory rules seek to restrict and regulate market behaviour and to inhibit parties from 
exercising their personal and contractual preference in certain cercurnstances. [Cheffins Brian 
R., "Company Law: Theory Structure and Operation", (1997), Oxford, Clarendon Press, at pp 
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Such limitations contribute in two ways to draw the framework within which the 
majority rule works. Either, as a matter of public order and regulation, they impose 
limitations on private contracts and persons, wether natural or legal. Or, they 
specifically target the majority/ minority relationship and provide some protection to 
minority shareholders with the intention to prevent abuse of power by majority 
shareholders. The discussion here concerns only to the former. The latter that include 
the issue of fraud upon minority shareholders and derivative mechanism will be fully 
discussed later in Chapter five. 
Also, limitations imposed by the constitution affect the majority/ minority relationship 
in several ways. They divide corporate power between shareholders and directors 
through which a great deal of corporate powers is delegated to directors. By doing so, 
they limit the size Of power directly exercisable by the majority. They also determine 
the object for which the company is formed and should work and they hereby majority 
shareholders from authorising any ultra vires activity. They may further list certain 
issues that require a super majority vote, something which is beyond application of the 
majority rule. In addition to these, they confer on members some personal rights that 
fall outside the power of majority shareholders. 
As legal and constitutional rules play decisive role in the majority/ minority 
relationship, I must review and examine their relevance as to such relationship and I 
do so in this Chapter. The Chapter is divided into two sections. Section one considers 
the legal rules and section two concerns with the constitution and specifically exan-dnes 
217-219; Davies, Paul L., "'Gower and Davies' Principles of Modern Company Law, ", (2003), 71h 
ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, at pp 45-46. 
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four constitutional mechanisms; i. e. internal division of power, ultra vires issues, 
special majority requirement and personal rights; that coordinate to shape the majority 
rule's field of application. 
64 
11-1. General laws 
Shareholders once taking corporate decisions in meetings are required in both English 
and Iranian systems to observe legal rules since complying with the law is necessary 
for every person, whether natural or legal. When the lawmaker prohibits people from 
doing certain acts, it often aims to implement certain observations that are ranked prior 
to individual freedom. To permit individuals to act illegally contradicts the purpose for 
which the very Act is enacted and condones an attack on the law. Unlawful activities 
fall outside the power of companies and as a result cannot be authorised by majority 
shareholders. Acts are unlawful when they are prohibited in law in the sense of legally 
impossible for companies to engage such conducts. " The word unlawful covers any 
violation to the mandatory rules of company law" as well as any act, which is 
prohibited by the general law. " Where a company is engaged in unlawful issues, a 
minority shareholder can take action against the company and sue wrongdoers on 
behalf of the company for the simple reason that illegal acts are totally outside the 
power of a company and cannot be ratified even with the unanimous decision of 
shareholders. 14 In such cases, law interferes simply because it is vital to preserve 
interests of the public. Take the case of England, section 142 Companies Act 1985, for 
instance, requires public corporations to take steps to appropriately deal with major 
loss of assets. Similarly, section 143 Companies Act 1985 prohibits companies from 
purchasing their own shares at a discount. Similar manadatory rules can be found in 
Iranian law too. For example, majority shareholders cannot take decision on issues 
11 Wedderburn (1957), (above, note 1) at p 204. 
12 For instance, sections 142 and 143 Companies Act 1985; for case law examples see Bellerby v. 
Rowland & Marwood's (1902), 2, Ch. 14; Hope v. International Financial Society (1876), 4 Ch. D. 
327. 
13 Powell \% Kempton Park Racecourse Co. (1897), 2 Q. B., pp 242,260,268. 
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exercise of which constitutes crime. " Similarly, a shareholder meeting is not of power 
to exempt directors from their duty to set the statutory saving for the company, as the 
duty to set statutory saving is mandatory. " Any violation to mandatory rules of 
company law gives every shareholder right to take action against the company and 
those who are responsible for such violation, asking for a nullification order and 
damages, if any. " 
English and Iranian company laws have diverged on the issue of legal rules in the 
sense that the former recognises a distinction between threatened and past unlawful 
activities as it does so in respect of ultra vires activities", while the latter knows no such 
distinction. '9 
14 Pennington Robert R., "Company Law", (1990), 611, ed., London, Butterworths, at p 802. 
15 Sections 90,237-240 and 258 (1) JSCA- 
16 Section 140 JSCA- 
17 See sections 270 and 273 JSCA- 
18 Pettet (above, note 7) at pp 230-1; Thorne (above, note 7) at p 186; Farrar (above, note 7) at p 
446. 
19 This distinction will be discussed in more details in the following section. [See below, at 
11.2.21. 
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11.2. Constitution 
The majority/ minority relationship is often mainly regulated through constitution. 
Corporate members through the constitution determine the purpose of company, 
provide guidelines for corporate incumbents on things to do and things not to do, 
devise some checks over controllers, and enjoy some rights which subject discretion of 
corporate authorities. Constitutional rules can, therefore, be described as corporate 
self-regulation; i. e. regulations that parties to the company contract make to enable 
their corporate vehicle to be incorporated and work efficiently. The term 'constitution' 
refers either to the articles of association of corporations, as it does so in the case of 
Iran 20 , or in the case of England, to both the articles and the memorandum of 
associations. " Speaking generally, constitutional rules, which limit the scope of power 
held by majority shareholders, can be classified into four categories as shown below 
and I will examine them in the following parts in the light of both Iranian and English 
company laws: 
1. Internal division of powers 
Ultra vires issues 
Special majorit"Y requirement 
4. Personal rights. 
20 Sections 6,8,17,18, and 20 JSCA. 
21 Sections l(l), 2,7(l), 8(2), 10,13,14 Companies Act 1985. 
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11.2.1. Internal division of powers 
In modem companies, the exercise of corporate power is often divided between 
shareholders and directors. The common format is to vest the power to run the 
business of corporations on a day-to-day basis in directors who exercise it through 
borad decisions and to preserve for shareholders monitoring function which is 
exercised through shareholder meetings. Accordingly, shareholders delegate broadly 
their powers to directors" who run the company business and who take business 
decisions for it. 2' This division of powers between shareholders and directors relies on 
certain practical and functional logics. Practically, in the absence of such division, it 
appears almost impossible for dispersed shareholders especially in large companies to 
engage themselves with the day-to-day management of corporate business. 
Competition in the market, which underlies business activities, requires quick action, 
whereas shareholder action is normally slow. Either, shareholders do not have time for 
a day-to-day management of the corporate business or even if they have time, they 
must act collectively which is difficult and slow. When, for example, a business 
opportunity emerges in the market, business rivals never wait until a given company"s 
shareholders gather, discuss, take decision collectively and act. These difficulties are 
absent when management is vested in directors. Functionally, shareholders are not 
often very well experienced and informed of corporate business and, even if they are, 
they have no or little incentive to involve in running of the corporate business. Unlike 
22 Art 70, Table (A) Companies Act 1985. 
23 "'subject to the provisions of the Act (Companies Act 1985), the memorandum and the articles 
and to any directions given by special resolution, the business of the company shall be managed 
by the directors who may exercise all the powers of the company"'. [Art 70, Table (A) 
Companies Act 1985]; See also Pettet (above, note 7) at p 226; Parkinson J. E., "'Corporate Power 
and Responsibility"', (1993), Oxford, Clarendon Press, at p 237,9; Hale, Christopher, "'What's 
Right with the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle? " (1997), Company Financial and Insolvency Law 
Review, Oxford, Mansfield Press, 219 at p 2241. 
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shareholders, directors as competent persons who have expertise in business can 
undertake the management professionally. The practical and functional logics aside, 
there is also a third logic, which concerns the majority/ minority shareholder 
relationship in companies. Internal division of powers is capable to contribute to rein 
the majority rule in companies. The mechanism of division extracts some parts of 
corporate powers from majority shareholders and places them in the hands of directors 
who may seem better positioned as an independent authority in company to exercise 
them. 24 This might also seem more realistic when one notes that company law has 
designed viable ways to allow shareholders have directors aligned with the company 
best interest objective. Nonetheless, once closely examined, it will be soon realised that 
the division of power could offer no significant protection to minority shareholders. 
Any extensive delegation of power to directors can be dangerous to either minority 
shareholders or shareholders generally. Where a controlling shareholder is present, it 
can facilitate abuse of rights by the controllers. Where such control is absent, it would 
put directors in a position that they can easily pursue collateral objectives and continue 
office with impunity. " If this were the case, and as the case law" and many 
conu-nentatorS27 have emphasised it is often the case, then it would seem very 
24 Farrar (above, note 7) at pp 315-6,385; Ratner David L., ""The Government of Business 
Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of One Share, One Vote", Cornell Law Review, 
(1970), Number 1, Vol. 56,23 Cornell University, Cornell Law School, at pp 21,35-8. 
25 Farrar John H., "'Company Law"", (1985), London, Butterworths, at p 7; Parkinson (above, 
note 24) at p 246. 
26 Atwool v Merryweather (1867) 5 Eq. 464 n.; Daniels v. Daniels 
(1978) Ch 406; Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd (no 2) (1981) Ch 257, 
(1980) 2 All ER 841; 
Shuttleworth v. Cox Bros & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd, and Others, (1927), 
2 KB 9; Richard Brady 
Franks Ltd v. Price (1937), 58 CLR p 136; Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol 
Petroleum (1974), AC p 
832; Hogg v. Gramphorn Ltd. (1967), 1 Ch 254; Clemens v. Clemens 
Bros Ltd (1976), 2 All ER 
268; Re Smith and Fawcett, Limited (1942) 1 Ch 304. 
27 Wedderburn K. W., "Shareholder's Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle", 
(1958), 
Caiiibridge Law jotirnal, 97, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, at p 97; Parkinson 
(above, 
note 24) at pp 237-246; Pettet (above, note 7) at p 226. 
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unlikely" that a wronged company could take action against its wrongdoer directors. 
The power to take corporate actions rests in directors and in a case where directors 
themselves are the actual wrongdoers no action will commence. '9 The safer 
arrangements is perhaps to have a system of corporate governance in which 
shareholders overally control directors. Such arrangement can offer a two-sided 
guarantee for minority shareholders. On the one hand, in exercising their powers, 
directors owe fiduciary and care duties to companies which means they should act 
carefully and sould regard interests of all shareholders not simply the majority. On the 
other hand, in the exercise of their monitoring role, the majority helps to keep 
management in the line of shareholder wealth maximisation which benefits minority 
shareholders too. Yet, the overall control of the majority over directors is also 
dangerous, as majority shareholders can indirectly influence management so as to 
push them exercise their power only for the benefit of the majority. Thus, two issues 
must be addressed. One relates to examination of how corporate power is distributed 
between corporate organs and the other concerns consideration of directors' duties and 
the relevance of their role as to the majority/ minority shareholder conflict. I consider 
the first issue below but the second issue will be examined in Chapter four. 
In England, company law determines for modem corporations two internal organs, 
general meetings and boards. Companies Act 1985 provides guidelines in general 
terms about how power is distributed between the two mentioned organs. It requires 
28 Parkinson (above, note 23) at p 237; Farrar (above, note 7) at p 444; Pettet (above, note 7) at p 
226; Hale (above, note 23) at p 224. 
29 In some exceptional cases, directors may, in fact, bring proceedings to remedy wrongdoing 
committed by their fellow directors. One main case is where the control of the company passes 
to other persons such as a liquidator in liquidation or to a new board elected by a successful 
takeover bidder. [See Pettet (above, note 7) at p 226 and Parkinson (above, note 23) at pp 237-91. 
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that every company shall in each year hold a general meeting as its annual general 
meeting. " In addition to annual general meeting, a company may also from time to 
time hold other general meetings, which are called extraordinary general meetings. 
Certain important matters can only be decided by shareholders in extraordinary 
meetings. " Shareholders through meetings also control activities of directors and in 
particular they have power to reappoint directors to, or remove them from, the office. 32 
Companies Act 1985 also requires that every company must have a director or 
directors who manage company business" and whose acts bind the company even 
where shareholders fall in disagreement with them. " General guidelines aside, the Act 
rejects, perhaps intentionally, to list in details the sort of power each organ will have 
and to tell how precisely the affairs of companies are to be managed. These are left to 
shareholders who can determine them through articles of associations", which is, as a 
constitutional document, suitable for regulating corporate internal relationships and 
affairs. 36 In short of a shareholder drafted articles, shareholders are assumed in law to 
have accepted 37 default articles prescribed by the Table A Companies Act 1985 which 
provides in its Art 70: 
30 Section 366 Companies Act 1985. 
31 Some of these matters are: to alter the objects of the company (s 4); to alter the company's 
articles of association (s 9 (1)); to change the company's name (s 28 (1)); to ratify ultra vires acts 
of directors (s 35 (3)); to authorise directors to allot shares (s 80); to reduce share capital (s 135 
(1)) Companies Act 1985. 
32 Section 303 (1) Companies Act 1985. 
33 Section 282 Companies Act 1985. 
34 "... the power of the directors to bind the company is deemed to be free of any limitation 
under the memorandum or articles. " [section 35 (1) Companies Act 19851. 
35 Pennington (above, note 14) at p 765. 
36 Sections 7-9 Companies Act 1985; unlike articles, memorandum of associations governs the 
external transactions of the company. It is the public document from which those dealing with 
the company can establish significan features of the company, such as whether it is public or 
prix, ate, limited or unlimited and, for a limited company with share capital, the amount of the 
share capital. [Sections 1-6 Companies Act 1985]. 
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"'Subject to the provisions of the Act, the memorandum and the articles and to any directions given by special resolution, the business of the company shall be managed by the directors who may exercise all the powers of the company... " 
However, both a shareholder drafted and the Table A model articles, are inevitably 
incomplete failing to offer detailed prediction of every contingency. Filling up of this 
gap is the responsibility of the case law, which has given, from time to time, more 
guidelines in this respect. According to the case law, directors do not act as agents for 
majority shareholders. " Neither are they agents for all shareholders. " This follows that 
members cannot instruct directors about how they shaH exercise their powers. 
Similarly, it has been accepted that running the business is a managerial function that 
rests in directors. Shareholders only exercise control through general meetingS40 and 
they cannot interfere with the exercise of managerial powerS41 that can extend from 
mere business issues to financial incidents of the business. " Case law has also made it 
clear that acts of shareholders particularly in the exercise of their controlling function 
may affect directors in overall but that is not to be viewed as interference in the 
exercise of managerial powers . 
4' Likewise, case law prohibits directors from interfering 
in the exercise of shareholder powers. 
44 
Iranian company law, on the other hand, provides three internal organs for companies, 
board of directors, inspectors, and shareholder meetings. The board of directors, 
37 Section 8(2) Companies Act 1985. 
38 Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v. Cunninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 p 42-43 per 
Collins MR. 
39 Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd v. Stanley [1908] 2 KB 89 p 105-106 per Buckley L. J. 
40 Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd v. Stanley (1908), 2 K. B. 89 per Moulton L. J. 
41 John Shaw & Sons Ltd. v. Shaw (1935), 2 K B., 113 per Greer L. J. 
42 Scott v. Scott (1943) 1 All ER 582, per Lord Clauson. 
43 Isle of Wight v. Tahourdin (1883) 25 Ch D 320, Per Cotton L. J. 
44 Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd. (1967) 1 Ch 254, at pp 268-9 per Buckley J. 
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members of which are appointed among, and by, shareholderS45,, conducts a company"s 
business and manages its affairS46 which include representation of the company in its 
external relationships . 
4' Before the introduction of the JSCA, directors were treated as 
agents of, and having agency relationship with, shareholders and they owed their duty 
to shareholders as principal. 48 This was inconsistent with separate corporate 
personality" and was to mean that directors had no power unless what and to the 
extent that they were given either expressly or impliedly through articles or by 
shareholder resolutions in appropriate cases. Their acts could create no legal effect 
what so ever in cases where they exceeded their powers or breached their fiduciary 
duty. Transactions of this sort even in relation to third parties were always considered 
voidable and a wrongdoer director was also personally liable for committing tort both 
to the company and to third parties if his acts would entail damages. However, the 
position of the company law in relation to the power of directors has changed sharply 
with the enactment of the JSCA. By the new Act, directors are no longer agents of 
shareholders. They act for the company, owe their duties to it and excluding certain 
listed issues that fall within the powers of meetings, they have very extensive power to 
take every action, which is necessary for managing affairs of the company provided 
that their decisions and acts are in line with the object of the company. 50 Directors' 
extensive power is deemed in relation to third parties even where the rules of articles 
of association or any appropriate resolution of shareholders in meetings have no 
45 Section 107 JSCA. 
46 Section 108 JSCA- 
47 Section 118 JSCA provides that'except where making and implementing decision on an issue 
is within the authority of shareholder meetings, directors of a company possess all necessary 
powers in order to run company affairs. ' 
48 Section 56 TA. 
49 Sotoodeh Tehrani Hasan, "Trade Law", (1997), Tehran, Dehkhoda Publication, vol. 2, at pp 
151,185-186. 
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indication of that power, or even where they expressly limit the scope of such power 
and even if they do not consider the interests of the company for which they are 
transacting. " 
The second internal body that exercises certain corporate powers is inspectors. They 
investigate the company on behalf of shareholders. Their investigation is overall and 
includes taking every step which is necessary for the exercise of right of control by 
shareholders over corporate directors and their appointed management, and this, of 
course, must be exercised without interfering in the exercise of management's power to 
run the company business. They are under a statutory duty to the compan Y52 to 
exercise certain functions which cannot be stopped by a majority resolution. These 
functions are: to comment on directors' annual reportS53; to control truth and reliability 
of information given by directors to meetingS54; to make sure company treats 
shareholders equally"; to convene annual general meetings in case of directors' failure 
to convene 
56 
; to convene extraordinary meetings when they think it is necessary 
5,; 
and 
to report any fault" and probable crimes" of directors. " 
50 Section 118 JSCA. 
51 Such limitations are only operative in relation between company and its directors. [Section 
118 JSCAJ. 
52 See section 154 JSCA. 
53 Section 148 JSCA. 
54 Sections 148,150 and 151 JSCA- 
55 Section 148 JSCA. 
56 Section 91 JSCA- 
57 Section 92 JSCA- 
58 Section 117 JSCA- 
59 Sections 148-151 JSCA. 
60 Inspectors, therefore, perform quite different functions in Iranian corporations contrast to 
functions of auditors in English company law which are stated in sections 384-394 Companies 
Act 1985. The use of auditors as distinguished from inspectors has also been prescribed by 
Iranian company law in section 242 JSCA which imposes a statutory duty on directors in public 
companies to invite official auditors to check and, in case of reliability, certify the company's 
accounts and business books and balance sheets and other relevant financial documents. 
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General meetings constitute the third internal body that exercise corporate power. 
Company law prescribes three types of meetings. Founders meeting is the first 
corporate meeting which is convened before the company is legally formed. " All 
founders and share subscribers are entitled to attend in this meeting and each share 
will have one vote. 62 The function of this meeting is generaHy to review every 
preliminary step taken by founders in the company formation stage in order to ensure 
everything is done as accurately as the company law requires. Having checked all 
requirements, they will sign the articles and choose the first directors and inspectors 
and by doing this they complete formation of company and further finish the mission 
of founders meeting. " The second corporate meeting is the extraordinary meetings 
which are convened by directors to address matters of fundamental change such as 
alteration of articles of association, change in the size of the share capital, and pre-date 
dissolution of company. 64 To be formally valid, this meeting requires participation of at 
least half plus one of those shareholders who have voting rightS6' and when there is a 
valid meeting, resolutions are adopted by a two third majority. 66 
61 Section 82 JSCA exempts private companies of the requirement of founders meeting. 
62 Section 75 JSCA. 
63 To be formally valid, this meeting requires participation of subscribers who own at least half 
plus one of company shares. If this requirement was not met for the first time, the required 
amount of capital reduces to one third of such subscribers and in any case they reach decisions 
by a two third majority resolution. [Section 74 JSCA]. 
64 Sections 83,161,189 and 199 (4) JSCA; Also it has authority to allow directors to issue 
preference shares (sec. 42) and debentures (sec. 56). 
65 If this requirement was not met for the first time, the required number of voting right holders 
reduces to one third of such shareholders and in any case they reach decisions by a two third 
majority resolution. [Section 84 JSCA]. 
66 Section 85 JSCA. 
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Having aside funders and extraordinary meetings which are either single purposed or 
exceptional, ordinary general meetings are the third corporate meeting which regularly 
convened at the instance of board of directors at a constitutionally specified time and 
on a once-a-year basis and hence is called annual general meeting. " Directors and 
inspectors can also convene ordinary meetings extraordinarily. " Ordinary meetings 
have quite wide discretion to take decision on all issues in relation to the affairs of 
companies except those which fall within the powers of funders and extraordinary 
meetings. 69 They have authority in particular to appoint/ disappoint directors'O, to 
review balance sheets and annual report provided by directors", to check list of 
company assets, financial claims and debtS72, to verify and authorise distribution of 
profit shown by directorS73 and to ratify certain corporate transactions in which 
directors have personal interest. 74 To be formally valid, this meeting requires 
participation of those shareholders who own at least half plus one of company shares, 
having voting right. If this requirement was not met for the first time, a second call will 
initiate and this time participation Of whatever voting shares would suffice" and in 
any case decisions will be adopted by a simple majority of those present. 76 
67 Sections 89 and 138 JSCA. 
68 Section 92 JSCA. 
69 Section 86 JSCA. 
70 Section 88 JSCA; This is subject to the authority of the promoters' meeting in respect of 
appointing the first directors. [See above note 63]. 
71 Section 89 JSCA. 
72 Section 89 JSCA. 
73 Sections 90 and 240 JSCA. 
74 Sections 129-131 JSCA. 
75 Section 87 JSCA. 
76 Section 88 JSCA. 
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11.2.2. Ultra vires issues 
In the case of England, the ultra vires doctrine used to require companies to act in 
compliance with their object clause. A transaction made by a director on behalf of his 
company which was outside the object clause in memorandum of association was 
treated void having no effect what so ever and thus a third party was not able to 
enforce it. Such transaction was also irratifiable even with a unanimous consent of 
company shareholders. 77 However, the traditional connection between a company's 
objects and its capacity was abolished following the Companies Act 1985. " A company 
has now capacity to engage any legal act even though outside its stated power and the 
majority is now able to ratify such act and therefore bind the company and its 
members. Section 35(3) Companies Act 1985 and section 108 Companies Act 1989 have 
conferred such a capacity to the majority to ratify ultra vires acts. Thus ultra vires 
transactions no longer constitute a significant limitation on the rule of majority in 
English companies. An ultra vires act is now within the power of the company capable 
of being ratified by the majority. " The only statutory check imposed by company law 
is the requirement of a greater majority, i. e. a majority of three-quarters of the holders 
of voting rights. Yet, the object clause remains relevant for the purposes of preventing 
the company from engaging in any future ultra vires activities. A company member has 
right to bring proceeding in order to restrain the company of doing any future act or 
from the progressing any act which is beyond the company's capacity. " This right does 
not affect any act that is previously done by the company. It has also no effect on the 
77 Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co Ltd. v. Riche (1875) LR 7 HL 653. 
78 "The validity of an act done by a company shall not be called into question on the ground of 
lack of capacity by reason of anything in the company's memorandum"'. Section 35 (1). 
79 North West Transportation Co Ltd. v. Beatty, (1887), 12 App CAS 589. 
77 
fulfilment of obligations arisen from a previous act of the company. " Neither it is to 
restrain the company from doing acts or entering into transactions that are incidental 
to the stated powers of the company, as these are not considered ultra vires. " In 
addition to this, in respect of acts that fall within the capacity of the company but are 
outside the powers of its directors", a member has right to bring proceedings in order 
to restrain directors from doing of such acts. 84 However, again the right has no effect 
on acts, which are previously done, or on fulfilment of obligations which arise from a 
previous corporate act. 85 Although ultra vires transactions are now presumed valid in 
favour of persons who deal with company, this presumption does not relieve directors 
from personal liability before the wronged company. As Companies Act states any 
special resolution that ratifies such acts shall not affect directors' liability unless a 
separate special resolution actually relieves them from the liability. 86 
Although the law is clear in respect of when a shareholder can take action in respect of 
ultra vires transactions, arguments have been brought to challenge the law and to give 
right of personal recovery to shareholders in such cases. The touchstone argument is 
the one that suggests ultra vires acts can constitute not only a wrong to the company 
but also a wrong to the membership rights of every member. In other words, since 
such acts are unconstitutional, a shareholder can complain that any departure from the 
80 "A member of a company may bring proceedings to restrain the doing of an act which but 
for subsection (1) would be beyond the company's capacity. "' [Section 35(2) Companies Act 
19851. 
81 See section 35(2) Companies Act 1985. 
82 A-G v. Great Eastern Rly Co (1880) 5 App Cas 473 (House of Lords). 
83 "In favour of a person dealing with a company in good faith, the power of the board of 
directors to bind the company, or authorise others to do so, shall be deemed to be free of any 
limitation under the company's constitution. " [section 35A (1) Companies Act 1985]. 
84 Section 35A(4) Companies Act 1985. 
85 Section 35A(4) Companies Act 1985. 
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constitution is a departure from the terms of his contract and as a qonsequence he 
should have a choice between taking derivative and personal actions. " However, for a 
number of reasons, this approach does not seem correct and can bring about 
undesirable consequences. For one, it allows dual actions (one, by a member in his 
personal capacity, and the other, by a member in the capacity of the representative of 
the company) to be taken, both for remedying the same wrong. This increases the 
existing level of overlap between personal and corporate rights and in its extreme 
application helps to defunct the majority rule. For another, it seems conflicting with the 
nature of the relationships between members and directors with companies. As a 
matter of company/members relationship, an ultra vires act is not attributed to the 
company unless ratified by it. Without a proper ratification the act is considered as 
being only the act of company directors who are not a party to the company contract. " 
There are rules that separate acts of companies from those of persons who work for 
companies. These are usually labeled as the rules of attribution that can be found in 
case law. '9 One of those rules is the agency rules that refer to the situations in which a 
director acts as agent of the company and therefore his actions are attributed to the 
86 Sec. 35(3) and sec. 35 A (5) Companies Act 1985. 
87 Baxter Colin, "'The True Spirit of Foss v. Harbottle", (1987), Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1, Belfast, Stevens & Sons, at p 10; Thorne (above, note 7) at p 188; Farrar 
(above, note 7) at pp 445-8; Pettet (above, note 7) at pp 230-1; Pennington, Robert R., "'Company 
law", (2001), 8th ed., London, Butterworths, at pp 800-1; Wedderburn (1957) (above, note 1) at p 
206. 
88 The concept of statutory contract referred to by section 14 Companies Act 1985 only speaks 
of two contracts, one, between company members inter se and the other, between members and 
company. Directors are parties to neither of them. They have a separate contract with the 
company to provide service to it. As a result they are under contractual duty to the company 
rather than its shareholders. 
89 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd. v. Securities Commission (1995) 2 AC 500 per 
Lord Hoffman at p 506; Trevor Ivory v. Anderson, (1992), 2 N. Z. L. R. 517; Tesco supermarkets 
Ltd x,. Nattrass, (1977), A. C. 153; Lennard's Carying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Ltd. (1915), 
A. C. 705; Alder v. Dickson (1955), 1 Q. B. 158. 
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company through the normal rules of agency. 'O These rules exclude ultra vires activities 
from being attributed to the company unless the company ratifies them" and once 
ratified, they can constitute a breach of the articles (though not illegal) by the company 
for which a personal remedy can be obtained. If the company does not ratify the ultra 
vires act, then, it is not considered the act of the company even though a third party can 
92 hold the company bound to that act. That, a third party can hold a company to 
assume responsibility for ultra vires acts of its directors, is only an exception from the 
general principle in favour of third parties acting in good faith. Therefore, there cannot 
be a breach of membership rights as the act is not that of company and as a 
consequence no personal remedy would be conferred. The director remains 
responsible for this act9' but any action taken by a shareholder would have to be 
through the derivative form, assuming that the company failed to act. 
The recogniation. of personal right for shareholders in respect of ultra vires issues after 
ratification can be advantageous as well as disadvantageous. It is advantageous 
because it can eliminate overlap between corporate and personal rights in ultra vires 
cases. According to it, where a case involves ultra vires activity only two altenate 
contingencies can be imagined. Either, it involves a violation to personal right that is 
where the act is ratified. Or, it involves a violation to corporate right that is where it is 
not ratified. It is disadvantegous because any such reading can fall inconsistent with 
the logic of section 35(3) Companies Act 1985 and section 108 Companies Act 1989 that 
90 Fairline Shipping Corp. v. Adamson (1974), 2 All E. R. 967; Williams v. Natural Life Health 
Foods Ltd., (1997), 1 BCLC 131; Kirby v. National Coal Board (1958), SC 514; Hedley Byrne & 
Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., (1964), A. C. 465. 
91 See also section 35 (3) Companies Act 1985. 
92 Section 35A (1) Companies Act 1985. 
93 Section 35A (5) Companies Act 1985. 
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allow ratification of ultra vires acts by companies. As Lord Dave Y94 and Knox J'5 put it a 
minority plaintiff cannot have a larger right to relief than the company itself would 
have if it were plaintiff. As a result, a minority shareholder cannot complain of acts, 
which are capable of being confirmed by a special majority unless it is shown that the 
majority in ratification has committed fraud upon the minority. 96 When an ultra vires 
act is threatened a shareholder has a personal right to apply to the court to restrain 
such proposed act. The reason, as Knox J explained lays in the fact that "neither of the 
two bases for the rule (in Foss v. Harbottle) is applicable, that is to say the matter is not, 
by definition, a mere question of internal management nor is the transaction capable of 
ratification by or on behalf of the company". 97 However, when the case relates to a past 
ultra vires transaction involving a compensation demand for the loss to the company, 
only the wronged company can initiate action and any action by minority shareholders 
must be in a derivative form, which must also be subject to observation of section 35 (2, 
Companies Act 1985. 
In the case of Iran, the ultra vires doctrine still persists in company law. 9' Legal persons 
can perform only functions that conform the object for which they are formed. 99 This is 
94 Burland v. Earl (1902), AC 83. 
95 Smith v. Croft (No. 2) (1988) Ch 114 at 167, (1987) 3 All ER 909 at 943. 
96 Smith v. Croft (No. 2) (1988) Ch 114 at 170, (1987) 3 All ER 909 at 945; See also Farrar 
(above, 
note 7) at p 446; Thorne (above, note 7) at pp 186,230-1; Pennington (above, note 
87) at pp 800-1; 
Conway Mark, "'Minority Shareholder Protection and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle: Increasingly 
a Foss about Nothing" in Companies in the 1990s, edited by Gary 
Slapper, (1995), London, 
Cavendish, at pp 3-4. 
97 Smith v. Croft (No. 2) (1988) Ch 114 at 170, (1987) 3 All ER 909 at 945. 
98 "except where making and implementing decision on an issue is within the authority of 
shareholder meetings, directors of a company possesses all necessary powers 
in order to run the 
company affairs providing that their conducts and decisions are within the scope of stated 
object of that company... ' [Section 118 JSCAJ. 
99 As well as object clause restriction, corporate capacity is also restricted 
by natural limitations, 
which separates them from individuals. [Section 588 TC]; 
See generally Motamani Tabatabaii 
Manoochehr, "Legal Personality", in Developments of Private Law, (1992/1372), Edited by 
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to prevent such persons from irrelevant activities and to allow them to save their 
resources to be used efficiently. Also in the interest of the society, this facilitates 
specialization and functional order, as with it not every legal person would be able to 
perform every function. '00 Obviously companies as clear instances of legal persons and 
in conformity with the law have certain objects specified in their articles. These objects 
draw the framework within which companies can take decisions. If the object clause 
limits the object of a company to, for instance, producing carpet and to take every 
measure in that respect, the company cannot switch to the production of, and 
transactions in relation to, ceramic unless it first alters its objects in order to include 
new objects. Inconsistent transactions are basically void and produce no effect. Equally 
true, a transaction that a company cannot engage, its internal organs (meetings, and 
board of directors) cannot engage too'O' and a third party who is a contractual party to 
such transaction will not be able to enforce it against the company. " Such transactions 
give every shareholder right to commence personal actions against the wrongdoer 
company and its controHers and in the exercise of such right it makes no difference 
whether the ultra vires transaction is threatened or is already completed, though, a 
possible order of the court may differ. 
Katoozian Naser, Tehran, University of Tehran Publication, pp 242-3; Sotoodeh Tehrani Hasan, 
"Trade Law", (1996), Tehran, Dadgostar Publication, vol. 1 at p 144; Eskini Rabiaa, ""Trade Law: 
Business Corporations", (2000), Vol. 2, Samt Publication, Tehran, at p 149. 
100 For example, a registered society for the protection of animal rights is not of capacity to take 
a claim to the courts for the protection of human rights. 
101 Section 8 JSCA requires companies to mention expressly the object of the company as a 
clause in their articles of association and submit the articles to the public registrar for the 
purpose of registration. Also see section 118 JSCA (cited above, note 98). 
102 Motamani Tabatabaii (above, note 99) at pp 225,243; Sotoodeh (above, note 99) at p 149. 
82 
11-2-3. Special majority 
The constitution often requires a greater majority vote for making a collective decision 
on certain important issues that touch more or less the core basis of a shareholder's 
agreement with company and its other members. This occurs when controllers try to 
change terms of original articles through later constitutional amendments. However, 
not every change is considered opportunistic. When circumstances change, 
constitutional rules may need to change in order to become updated. Nonetheless, 
controllers can also change them even though there is no or little change of 
circumstances. The latter is often the case where the controllers attempt to engage in 
opportunistic constitutional amendments. Therefore, a balance should be made 
between the changability of constitution and the consideration that minority rights 
need to be protected from opportunistic changes to the constitution which can be made 
by a simple majority resolution. The greater majority requirement can offer some 
safeguards to individual shareholders against any likely attempts of majority 
shareholders to change original articles opportunistically. In the absence of it, a 
majority shareholder could easily circumvent important elements of constitution 
through changing terms of the original contract. Its functioning is simply to require a 
controlling majority to obtain minority consent in certain issues. If the majority fails to 
do so, every dissatisfied shareholder will have the right to commence legal action for 
an order of the court, which nullifies majority action. Case law confirms the right of a 
minority shareholder to protect him/herself in such cases. It is clear in case law that 
majority rule does not prevent an individual member from suing if the transaction in 
question is one which could validly be done or sanctioned only by a special majority 
resolution otherwise, a company would be allowed to act in breach of its articles 
by 
83 
passing an ordinary resolution instead of a special one in matters that could only be 
done or sanctioned by the latter. "' 
The size of a higher majority vote requirement often depends on shareholder consent 
although a three quarters majority seems to be the most frequently used size. 
Companies Act 1985 illustrates the range of issues that require special majority vote. 
For instance, section 4 prescribes a special majority requirement for altering the objects 
of company and section 9 (1) requires such majority for altering corporate articles. 
Also, section 28 (1) necessitates a special majority for changing company name and 
sections 35 (3), 80 and 135 (1) prescribe such majority respectively for ratifying ultra 
vires acts of directors, authorising directors to allot shares and reducing corporate share 
capital. 
Special majority exception in this context includes not only a greater level of votes but 
also all formalities and processes associated with it as prescribed by the constitution 
and company law. 104 In James v. Buena Ventura Nitrate Grounds Syndicate Ltd'O', for 
example, corporate articles prescribed a specified method for issuing new shares. 
Although, this method was principally alterable through altering the very articles of 
association with a special majority resolution, but shareholders adopted a different 
method by a special resolution without having the articles altered first. Although this 
resolution was passed by the votes of a greater majority, the court construed it to be an 
attempt to alter articles of association in an inappropriate way. 'O' Similarly, when 
103 Cotter v. National Union of Seamen (1929), 2 Ch 58 per Romer J. 
104 Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa, Limited, (1900) 1 Ch 656 at 671 per Lindley MR. 
105 James v. Buena Ventura Nitrate Grounds Syndicate Ltd. (1896), 1 Ch. 456. 
106 Ibid. See also Farrar (above, note 7) at pp 446-7. 
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removal of a director required alteration of articles, it would seem inappropriate for 
shareholders to pass simply a special resolution without having articles altered first. "' 
Similar safeguards that subjects application of majority rule to a greater majority 
requirement can be found in Iranian company law. In particular, issues that fall within 
the power of extraordinary and founder meetings can be taken as most clear 
examples. 'O' In addition to these, shareholders in ordinary meetings are required to 
pass with a two-third-majority of votes cast any resolution that seek to change 
shareholder rights. "' 
11.2.4. Personal rights 
Personal rights refer to the rights that are personal in the sense that they fall into the 
personal pocket of every shareholder. A shareholder, needless to act with other 
shareholders, is theoretically able to enforce such rights. Personal rights in its wide 
application can constitute a major limitation on the scope of majority rule because they 
generally allow shareholders to take action in order to enforce company contract 
against controllers. Nonetheless, the impact of personal rights has become rather trivial 
as they are not all enforceable by a shareholder and even those that are enforceable 
might become subject to the majority rule. To explain why this is so, one needs to grasp 
a clear understanding of the nature of personal rights and the relationship which exists 
between shareholders and companies under the company contract. This itself depends 
on making distinction between company contracts and other contracts. Unlike 
107 Shuttleworth v. Cox Bros & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd, and Others, (1927), 2 KB 9 at p 21 per 
Scrutton L. J.; see also for a similar case Bushell v. Faith (1970), 1 All ER 53. 
108 See above, notes 61-66. 
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traditional contracts, company contracts do not allow parties to enforce outsider 
rights. "O This means that a company is entitled as against its members to enforce and 
restrain breaches of its regulations... and that shareholders as against their company 
can enforce and restrain breaches of such regulations"' and that shareholders can 
enforce the contracts made inter se as members of the company. "' However, 
shareholders can only enforce rights which are obtained in the capacity as members. "' 
To enjoy such capacity one needs to enter into contract with company and its members 
in which he undertakes with respect to most rights, which his membership carries, to 
accept as binding upon him the exercise of his corporate rights by the company. "' A 
company member, therefore, obtains two types of rights, which arise out of the 
company contract, those of personal and corporate. ' 16 Corporate rights are those that 
belong to shareholders as a body corporate' 17 and its attribution to shareholders is only 
for the reason that shareholders are given power to apply either direct or indirect 
control on the exercise of them and for the fact that they (shareholders) enjoy, as 
residual right holders, the consequences of such exercise either positively (annual 
profits given to shares and increase in their market value) or negatively (loss suffered 
by the company that reduces the share price or expected profits). Internal organs, 
109 See section 93 JSCA. 
110 Wood v. Odessa Waterworks Co., (1889), 42 Ch. D 636; Ray field v. Hands and Others, 
(1960), Ch. 1; Hickman v. Kent or Romney Marsh Sheepbreeders' Association, (1915), 1 Ch. 881; 
Re Saul D Harrison & Sons pIc (1995), 1 BCLC 14 at 17. 
111 Borland's Trustees v. Steel Bros. Ltd., (1901), 1 Ch 279. 
112 Wood v. Odessa Waterworks Co., (1889), 42 Ch. D 636; Johnson v. Lyttle's Iron Agency, 
(1877), 5 Ch. D. 687. 
113 Ray field v. Hands and Others, (1960), Ch. 1. 
114 Hickman v. Kent or Romney Marsh Sheepbreeders' Association, (1915), 1 Ch. 881; 
Shuttleworth v. Cox Bros & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd, and Others, (1927), 2 KB 9 at p 21 per 
Scrutton L. J.; Swabey v. Port Darwin Gold Mining Co. 1 Megone 385 Cited in Allen v. Gold 
Reefs of West Africa, Limited, (1900) 1 Ch 656. 
115 Section 14 Companies Act 1985. 
116 Palmer Francis Beaufort, "Palmer's Company Law"', (1976), 22nd ed., Editted by 
Schmitthoff C. M., London, Stevens, at pp 597-603; Pennington (above, note 87) at p 795. 
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board of directors and general meetings of shareholders as the case might be, represent 
the company in the exercise of them. "' Clear examples of such rights are right to enter 
into transactions, the right to bring proceedings, the right to make resolutions, the right 
to alter articles and the right to ratify a wrong done to the company. 
By contrast, personal rights belong to individual shareholders and fall outside the 
powers of majority shareholders. As personal rights originate from constitution, they 
are also often liable to change through procedures prescribed by the constitution. It is 
hardly possible to enumerate them, but familiar instances include the right to have 
information, the right to attend at meetings and vote, "9 pre-emption rights"', the right 
to transfer shares"', the right to share in profits, and the right to share in capital in case 
of dissolution. 
Personal rights may derive also from other sources such as statutes 
122 
and separate 
shareholder agreement. "' If company law in a mandatory fashion confers personal 
rights, majority rule will have no application on them and they will not be liable to 
change through contract. Similarly, if a member acquires his personal rights from a 
separate agreement, his rights will become inviolable and will be safe from change 
through contractual mechanisms and, therefore, such rights sit out of the ambit of the 
117 Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd (1950), All ELR vol. 2,1120, per Evershed MR. 
118 Hale (above, note 23) at p 224. 
119 Pender v. Lushington (1877), 6 Ch. D. 70. 
120 Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd (1950), All ELR vol. 2 1120. 
121 Moffat v. Farquhar (1878), 7 Ch. D 591. 
122 For example, a member has a right to restrain the company from doing ultra vires acts [Sec. 
35 (2) Companies Act 1985]; He has right not to have his financial obligations to the company 
increased without his consent [Sec 16(l) Companies Act 19851; And he has also right to have 
company operation fairly conducted. [Sec. 459 Companies Act 1985]. 
123 Pennington (above, note 87) at p 794. 
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majority rule. 124 Such rights must be distinguished from personal rights which 
originate from company contract in the sense that while the former is regarded 
absolute the latter is seen changeable through majority decision. This means, it is not 
always possible for a shareholder to enforce his personal rights which is obtained 
under company contract. Sometimes, he may be able to enforce his personal rights, but 
most of the times he will be debarred from enforcing his constitutional right because it 
is possible for an appropriate majority to change them. As Dixon J observed 'prima 
facie rights altogether dependent upon articles of association are not enduring and 
indefeasible but are liable to modification or destruction: that is, if and when it is 
resolved by a three-fourths majority that the articles should be altered. 12' The company 
contract is designed to work over a long period of time and parties to it 'are bound up 
in the same enterprise, and thus have to do business with each other over a long period 
of time" 126 . Therefore, they are interested more in keeping this long-term relationship 
than to put an end to it. However, in the long run, their interests and needs may 
change with a change of circumstances and this requires rights of shareholders to be 
relative rather than absolute. This further follows that company contract should 
provide some reasonable level of flexibility so that it can adjust and modernise itself to 
changes. Relativity of rights under company contracts means that a shareholder" s 
personal rights cannot be seen in isolation but only in relation to the rights enjoyed by 
124 Swabey v. Port Darwin Gold Mining Co. 1 Megone 385 Cited in Allen v. Gold Reefs of West 
Africa, Limited, (1900) 1 Ch 656; Allen case Ibid. at p 688 per Vaughan Williams and at pp 673-4 
per Lindeley MR; Shuttleworth v. Cox Bros & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd, and Others, (1927), 2 KB 9 
at pp 21-22 per Scrutton Lj- 
125 Peter's American Delicacy Co Ltd v. Heath, (1939), 61 CLR 457 (High Court of Australia). 
126 Drury R. R., "The Relative Nature of A Shareholder's Right to Enforce The Company 
Contract", (1986), The Cambridge Law journal, 42(2), 219, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, at p 222. 
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other members 
127 
regarding ratification of violations to the contract 
128 
. regularising 
trivial breaches of contracts 12' and altering company contract by a special majority. "' 
Although, a shareholder has rights in respect of all regulations expressed by the 
constitution, he can enforce them only after observation of other members' parallel 
rights. "' In sum, the principle is constitutional rights are enforceable by a member as 
far as they are not changed subject to observation of rights enjoyed by other members. 
It is, however, not very certain in which circumstances other members have such 
parallel right. Farrar indicated the point very well in saying "it is primarily with rights 
arising from articles that we are concerned, for that is the grey area where the conflict 
between shareholder protection and the majority rule is most acute'. 132 While a 
shareholder may wish to pursue the company for ignoring certain terms of the 
company constitution, the company itself through the mechanism of majority rule may 
want to ratify such unconstitutionality. Therefore, in deciding whether or not to pursue 
the company in order to enforce a regulation of constitution, a shareholder needs to see 
if the alleged breach is the one which can be ratified or regularised by other members 
who decide through majority rule in shareholder meetings and this unfortunately is 
127 Drury lbid at p 224. 
128 Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd., (1967), 1 Ch 254 at p 271-2; North West Transportation Ltd v. 
Beatty (1887) 12 App Cas 589 (Privy Council). 
129 Burland v. Earle (1902), AC 83, PC, p 93-94; Mac Dougall v. Gardiner (1875), 1 Ch. D. 13. 
130 Andrews v. Gas Meter Co. (1897) 1 Ch. 361; Pepe v. City and Suburban Permanent Building 
Society (1893), Ch. 311; Botten v. City and Suburban Permanent Building Society (1895), 2 Ch. 
441; Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa, Limited, (1900) 1 Ch 656 at 671 per Lindley MR; Peter's 
American Delicacy Co Ltd v. Heath, (1939), 61 CLR 457 (High Court of Australia). 
131 Maclntosh Jeffrey G, "Minority Shareholder Rights in Canada and England: 1860-1987", 
(1989), Osgoode Hall Law Journal, vol. 27, No. 3, Toronto, Osgoode Hall Law School, at p 604; 
Pennington (above, note 87) at p 795; Sealy Len, ""Shareholders" Remedies in the Common Law 
World", (1997), Company, Financial and Insolvency Law Review, 173, Oxford, Mansfield Press at p 
181. 
132 Farrar (above, note 7) at p 447. 
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not very certain under the current company law. 
133 The common law has developed an 
irregularity rule which authorises ratification of any breach of trivial terms in 
constitution. 
134 It was first developed by Melish L. J. in Mac Dougall v. Gardiner 
135 
and 
was subsequently followed by Lord Davey in Burland v. Earle. 
136 What constitutes a 
trivial breach cannot be answered in definite. There is not a statutory guideline to 
separate trivial and non-trivial matters. 137 The courts tend to interpreat triviality in the 
sense of any unconstitutional act which does not violate shareholders' membership 
rights"', rights that offer property to individual shareholders. "' They say where there 
is not a clear violation to such rights, any breach of constitutional rights will not be 
personally recoverable. 
140 This probably was the main reason why Russell L. J. in 
133 Company Law Reform, ""Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing 
the Structure, ", (London, DTI, 2000), paras 5.64 and 5.73. 
134 Griffin Stephen, "Company law: Fundamental Principles", (1996), 2nd ed., London, Pitman, 
at p 300; Drury (above, note 126) at pp 224,237-244; The irregularity rule has also recently been 
confirmed by the Company Law Reform Committee. [Modem Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy: Final Report, (London, DTI, 2001), URN/942 & URN/943, para 7.34]. 
135 Mac Dougall v. Gardiner (1875), 1 Ch. D. 13 per Melish L. J. 
136 Burland v. Earle (1902), AC 83, PC, p 93-94 per Lord Davey. 
137 Sealy L. S., "'Problems of Standing, Pleading and Proof in Corporate Litigation", in Company 
Law in Change, Editted by Ben Pettet, (1987), London, Stevens, at p 8; Sealy L. S., "'Company Law 
and Commercial Reality"', (1984), London, Sweet & Maxwell, at p5 and Sealy Len (1997) (above, 
note 131) at p 181. 
138 See instances in case law like: the right of a member to have his vote recorded [Pender v. 
Lushington (1877), 6 Ch. D. 701; to have a dividend paid in cash if the articles so specify [Wood 
v. Odessa Waterworks Co (1889) 42 Ch D 636]; to enforce a declared dividend as a legal debt 
[Mosely v. Koffyfontein Mines Ltd (1904) 2 Ch 108, CAJ; to have the articles observed if they 
specify a particular procedure to be followed in particular instance [Edwards v. Halliwell (1950) 
2 All ER 10641; See also Pennington (2001), (above, note 87) at p 794; Thorne (above, note 7) at p 
188. 
139 Pender v. Lushington (1877), 6 Ch. D. 70 jessel MR. 
140 For example, a member does not have a right to have a poll taken [Mac Dougall v. Gardiner 
(1875), 1 Ch. D. 131; nor to have accounts prepared in accordance with the requirements of 
Companies Act [Devlin v. Slough Estates Ltd (1983) BCLC 497]; nor to have directors retire in 
accordance with the articles [Mozley v. Alston (1847) 1 Ph 790]; See also Pennington (2001), 
(above, note 87) at p 794; Thome (above, note 7) at p 188. 
90 
Bamford v. Bamford left an improperly motivated issue of shares by directors for the 
majority to decide. 
141 
Yet, there are cases in common law which can hardly be reconciled with the prevailing 
understanding of the triviality measure. For instance, in Edwards v. Halliwell the 
primary purpose of the petitioners (two shareholders) was to invalidate an ordinary 
resolution that was taken in substitute of a special resolution, something which seemed 
more to be a matter of procedure rather than property rights, and Jenkins L. J. 
dellivered his judgement in favour of the petitioners arguing that 'it seems to me the 
rule in Foss v. Harbottle has no application at all for the individual members who are 
suing, not in the right of the union but in their own right to protect from invasion their 
,, 142 own individual rights as members... In other cases where a denial of a particular 
constitutional procedure could entail intervention in the exercise of members' voting 
right, which is considered as a clear example of property right, the courts rejected to 
view such denial as touching any element of property. "' In sum, the measure of 
irregularity is not very clear. "' While some constitutional procedures were seen as 
non-trivial 145 , some others were considered as 
being simply trivial matters that fall 
within the arnbit of the majority rule. 
146 
141 Bamford v. Bamford (1970), Ch 212, (1969), 1 All ER 969; See also Hogg v. Gramphorn Ltd. 
(1967), 1 Ch 254. 
142 Edwards v. Halliwell (1950) 2 All ER 1064. 
143 See Mac Dougall v. Gardiner (1875), 1 Ch. D-13. 
144 Sealy Len (1997) (above, note 131) at p 181; Davies (above, note 10) at pp 449-45. 
145 Pender v. Lushington (1877), 6 Ch D 70; James v. Buena Ventura Nitrate Grounds Syndicate 
Ltd. (1896), 1 Ch. 456; Edwards v. Halliwell (1950), 2 All ER 1064 per Jenkins L. J.; Cotter v. 
National Union of Seamen (1929), 2 Ch 58. 
146 Mac Dougall v. Gardiner (1875), 1 Ch-D. 13; Australian Coal & Shale Employees' Federation 
v. Smith (1938) 38 SR (N. S. W. ); See also Griffin (above, note 134) at p 300. 
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There has been proposal from academics of English company law who by implication 
speak of elimination of the irregularity rule. They say it ought to be the rule that every 
unconstitutional act could give personal right of action to shareholders. 
14' 
An 
unconstitutional act, according to them, is not simply a corporate wrong but rather is a 
violation to individual shareholders" personal right because it is a breach of terms of 
the consttution which is the source of his membership contract with company and 
other shareholders. 148 Some company law scholars, too, have attempted to circumvent 
the irregularity rule. The latter took the view that where a case involves 
unconstitutional acts, shareholders can pursue not the company but its directors for a 
breach of contractual duty. According to this theory, a contract with its terms found in 
the corporate constitution exists between members and directors. By accepting his post, 
a director assumes an express duty to the company and an implied duty in favour of 
individual shareholders to comply with the rules of the constitution. 149Likewise, when 
a shareholder consents to the constitution, he, in fact, consents to controllers to act 
according to the rules of the constitution and further when he votes in meetings to 
appoint a director, his vote is impliedly subject to a duty of the prospective director in 
complying with constitutional rules. Therefore, directors' self-interested"' as well as 
147 Wedderburn (1957), (above, note 1) at p 206; See also Sealy (above, note 8) at pp 483,493, 
498; Rajak Harry, "Source Book of Company Law", (1995), Bristol, Jordans, at pp 533-4; Davies, 
P. L., "'Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law", (1997) 6th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
at pp 660-665,737. 
148 Sealy (1987), (above, note 137) at p 8; Sealy (1984), (above, note 137) at p 5; Pennington 
(above, note 14), at pp 55-56; Following cases in common law may support this view too: 
Edwards v. Halliwell (1950), 2 All ER 1064 per Jenkins L. J.; James v. Buena 
Ventura Nitrate 
Grounds Syndicate Ltd., (1896), 1 Ch. 456; Mac Dougall v. Gardiner, (1875), 1 Ch. D. 13. 
149 Sterling M. J., "'The Theory and Policy of Shareholder Actions in Tort", 1987, The Modern 
Law Review, Vol. 50,468, London, England, Stevens & Sons, at 474. 
1,50 Re a Company (1987), BCLC 82 at 84; see also Beck Stanley M., "The 
Shareholders' 
Derivative Action", (1974), 52, Canadian Bar Review, 159, Toronto, Carswell for the Canadian Bar 
Association, at pp 171-2. 
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unconstitutional transactions... could be seen as violation to the rights of both the 
company and its shareholders. 
These proposals are advantageous in that they diminish the controversy in relation to 
the nature and scope of personal rights and enable minority shareholders to insist on 
compliance by controllers with their personal rights. Nonetheless, they cause difficulty 
in that they can widely open the gate for shareholder actions, conferring a veto power 
to every shareholder against the rule of majority. They further, allow dual actions to 
proceed, increase the level of overlap between personal and corporate rights and 
enable every unhappy shareholder to initiate opportunistic and disruptive 
litigations. "' 
The law relating to the personal rights has recently been reviewed by the Company 
Law Reform Committee too. The Committee confirmed that the law in this area is 
uncertain especially because it fails to determine what rights were enjoyed by members 
personally under the constitution. It proposed that the current uncertainty could be 
resolved through a new Act that states all constitutional obligations are enforceable by 
individual members unless the contrary is provided in the constitution or the alleged 
breach concerns "trivial or fruitless' matters. "' Taking into consideration the "trivial or 
fruitless' exception and the "no reflective loss rule" 154 , it also regarded as immaterial 
151 Cotter v. National Union of Seamen (1929), 2 Ch 58; Pender v. Lushington (1877), 6 Ch. D. 
70. 
152 Drury (above, note 126) at p 237; Sterling (above, note 149) at pp 482-9. 
153 Company Law Reform, "'Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing 
the Structure", (London, DTI, 2000), para 5.73. 
154 Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (HL), 481. 
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concerns about increase in the number of shareholder opportunistic actions and the 
possibility of double recovery which can result from this proposal. "' 
This proposal, however, does not seem to be capable of making the situation in respect 
of members" personal rights very better, as it mainly reflects the current state of the law 
and further seems to be rejected by the British government because it is not included in 
the governments newly proposed Companies Bill. 
156 
As in English company law, shareholder rights can be personal or corporate in Iranian 
company law. "' Personal rights refer to the rights that fall into personal pocket of 
every shareholder. They may derive either from company law or from the company 
contract. To enforce such rights, a shareholder, needless to act with other shareholders, 
is able to take personal action against the company. Corporate rights, on the other 
hand, refer to those that primarily belong to the company itself and its attribution to 
shareholders is only for the reason that shareholders are given power to apply either 
direct or indirect control on the exercise of them and for the fact that they 
(shareholders) enjoy, as residual right holders, the consequences of such exercise either 
positively (annual profits given to shares and increase in their market value) or 
negatively (loss suffered by the company that reduces the share price or expected 
profits). Since these belong to the company, the company itself through its internal 
organs make relevant decisions and exercise them. These rights might relate to external 
affairs of the company, which is normally conducted by the board of directors. 
155 Company Law Reform, "Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report", 
(London, DTI, 2001), URN/942 & URN/943, paras 7.34,7.51, and its note 113. 
156 The Companies Bill, (218-20 Jul 2006), available from the DTI website at the following 
address: http: //www. publications-parliament. uk/pa/pabills/200506/companies. 
htm. 
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Examples of such rights are right to own property, right to conduct its own business, 
right to enter into transactions, right to ratify voidable transactions, right to employ 
employees and right to take legal actions to the courts or respond to actions taken 
against it. They may also relate to internal affairs of the company for exercising of 
which either the board or the meetings (depending on how articles and company law 
divide powers between meetings and board of directors) will have the corresponding 
authority. For example, it is within the authority of shareholders' meetings to exercise 
the right of the company to make resolutions, to change its articles, to empower 
directors to issue new shares, preference shares and debentures, to increase or decrease 
the companys capital, to appoint or dismiss directors and to relieve faulty directors 
from personal liability. "' Equally, it is within the authority of the board of directors to 
exercise a company's right to convene meetings"', to reject a purported transfer of 
shares in private companies"O, and to ask payment in respect of any unpaid amount of 
shares against shareholders in the manner and within the period prescribed by the 
articles. "' When a right is identified as corporate, a shareholder is not allowed to 
enforce it on his own initiative and he is subject to the authority of the relevant internal 
organs in the company. It, however, does not mean that a shareholder is disinterested 
in respect of it. He is personally and indirectly interested, but this personal indirect 
interest is subject to the interests of other shareholders that are reflected through 
application of the majority rule in meetings where shareholders are required to act 
collectively and in accord with the company's constitution and the company law. "' 
157 Eskini (above, note 99) at p 78. 
158 See sections 42,56,83,86,88,107/ 108,116,157,161,164,185,188,189 JSCA. 
159 Sections 89,95 and 138 JSCA. 
160 Section 41 JSCA. 
161 See sections 6,7(6), 8 (7), 9 (8 and 11), 13 (4 and 7), 33 JSCA. 
162 Section 86 JSCA. 
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However in certain exceptional circumstances company law permits shareholders to 
enforce corporate rights on behalf and for the benefit of the company. Two examples of 
such statutory permission are: first, the right of shareholders to call shareholders" 
meeting where directors and inspectors respectively fail to convene meetings"'; and 
second, the right of shareholders to take corporate action to the courts in order to ask 
recovery of any loss suffered by the company due to commission of fault on the part of 
directors. 164 
For a number of reasons, personal rights in the Iranian company law can offer more 
protection to minority shareholders compared with the case in English company law. 
For one, certain personal rights can be absolute which means they cannot be ignored 
by a majority vote of shareholders. This is explained by making distinction between 
personal rights that are absolute and personal rights that are relative. Most personal 
rights are relative in the sense that they are changeable within the framework provided 
by company contract. Yet, they are enforceable so far as they are not changed. Except 
for rights that are linked with the essence of the company contract and certain 
statutory rights that are mandatory"', every rights deriving from shares are subject to 
change through the mechanism of majority decision and company law prescribes two 
different procedures' 66 for changing rights attached to ordinary and preference shares. 
163 Section 95 JSCA- 
164 Section 276 JSCA- 
165 For example, right to have information (sections 139 and 220 JSCA), right to 
have the 
company's nationality unchanged and right not to be obliged to increase one's obligation 
without his consent (section 94), and right to start corporate action against 
faulty directors 
(sections 276 and 277 JSCA). [See generally Ktoozian Naser, "'An Introduction to The 
Law", 
(1993), Tehran, University of Tehran Publication, at No. 112; Jafari Langroodi Mohamed Jafar, 
"The Force of Intent in Civil Law", (1975), Doctoral Thesis, Tehran, University of Tehran 
Publication, No. 6481. 
166 Sections 42,83 and 93 JSCA- 
96 
Personal rights can be absolute when they are linked with the essence of the company 
contract which means they are to be observed not only by the company but also by its 
members and, therefore, it is not even possible for shareholders to contract out of them. 
Iranian law provides no list of absolute rights, however, it offers the test of "link with 
essential requirements of the contract"", which can be used to distinguish absolute 
rights from those of relative. According to this test when personal rights are direct 
consequence or principal objective of creating company contracts they most be treated 
as absolute. 
168 Clear examples are membership rightl 
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, right to share in profits"' and 
right to share in return of the capital when the company is dissolved. "' However, there 
are also controversial matters, like the right to vote, which seem difficult to be covered 
by the mentioned test. Some company law scholars in Iran took the view that a 
statutory listing of personal rights will solve the controversy. 172 This view is correct 
subject to its plausibility, as in practice the lawmakers often cannot list every fact 
which can be taken as being under the realm of shareholder rights. In the absence of a 
statutory list, it will be the responsibility of the courts to provide clear guidelines in 
order to resolve the matter. 
For another, Iranian company law offer no irregularity rule and from this perspective 
there has not been made any distinction between trivial and non-trivial irregularities. 
Articles of association with its particular features constitutes the essential contract 
167 Section 233 CA. 
168 Katoozian Naser "Civil Code in its Modern Order", (1999), 2nd ed., Tehran, Dadgostar 
Publication, at p 227. 
169 This is so until there is a legal cause that justifies eviction of a member 
from the company. 
For example, in circumstances prescribed in sections 35 and 45 JSCA a shareholder who 
fails to 
perform his duty to the company can be evicted. [See Eskini 
(above, note 99) at pp 81-821. 
170 Sections 90,239 and 240 JSCA. 
171 Sections 223 and 224 JSCA. 
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between the company and its shareholders and in the case of a violation by the former, 
the latter will be entitled to take action to the courts in order to restore the situation or 
to demand damages if any. Constitutional rules even conferring relative rights must be 
respected so far as they remain unchanged. 
172 Eskini (above, note 99) at pp 78,206. 
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Conclusion 
This Chapter examined the rule of majority from the perspective of its field of 
application. It considered two factors; i. e. legal and constitutional rules. The former 
concerned rules which derive from general law and which limit companies and their 
majority shareholders' power as a matter of public order and regulation rather than 
being a matter of minority protection. It was made clear that the law may want to 
regulate corporate activities, as such activities may affect not only corporate members 
but also third parties, the economy and the society. The latter concerned rules which 
derive from the corporate constitution, and which regulate, through private 
contracting, corporate members' relationship. Some constitutional rules divide 
corporate power between shareholders and directors thereby extracting certain powers 
from the ambit of the majority rule, vesting them in directors. This can benefit the 
relationship generally, as directors are often equipped with the required skills and 
knowledge and are well prepared to run the corporate affairs and business, in contrast 
with shareholders. Also, it can benefit minority shareholders specially, as directors are 
required in law to exercise their power carefully, disinterestedly, independently and 
impartially. Some constitutional rules which accommodate the object clause into the 
constitution can prohibit corporations and their controllers from engaging in ultra vires 
activities. This can benefit minority shareholders, as it ensures that a controlling 
majority will not use corporate resources for activities which are irrelevant and 
unothorised. Some constitutional rules subject a majority resolution to a super majority 
vote. A super majority vote requirement can considerably reduce the likelihood of 
opportunistic constitutional amendments. Lastly constitutional rules confer on every 
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corporate member personal rights which can be enforced against the rule of majority in 
corporations. 
These rules are important, as they help to reduce the possibility of abuse of right by 
controlling shareholders. They do so by drawing the framework within which the rule 
of majority works. It follows that a majority decision could, as a matter of principle, 
bind minority shareholders only if it is taken within such framework. For any decision 
of majority shareholders which otherwise is taken, a minority shareholder will have 
the right to resist against it and to take action to the courts. Nonetheless, a major 
criticism is that they have limited capacity to curb abuse of right by controllers. They 
only concern cases of abuse in which the right is exercised outside its field whereas an 
abuse of right can also occur where it is exercised within its field. Take, for example, 
the case of discriminatory as well as self-interested resolutions of majority shareholders 
on issues which fall both constitutionally and in law within the power of majority 
shareholders. Also the same is true where the controlling majority excert indirect 
control (through management) over company affairs. General laws and constitutions 
rarely address such abusive behaviour. Another criticism is that even with such limited 
capacity the importance of such rules can further reduce where they fail to provide a 
clear framework for the majority rule and where they authorise out of field exercise of 
rights. Take for example the case of personal rights particularly where they derive from 
the constitution. Such rights are considered relative which means they are changeable 
by an appropriate majority vote. Further a violation to some of them is considered in 
the light of the irregularity rule ratifiable by a majority decision, while there is no clear 
test that could be used to determine precisely violation to which is, or violation to 
which is not, ratifiable. Likewise, the object clause no longer constitutes a significant 
limitation on the nile of majority. Ultra vires transactions following the Companies Act 
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1985 have fallen within the power of corporations and can now be ratified by a three- 
quarters majority vote. A ratification of an ultra vires activity can further cause overlap 
between corporate and personal rights because such issues once ratified can constitute 
a violation by the company to the constitution and hereby to the personal rights of each 
shareholder. 
The latter criticism seems irrelevant as to the Iranian company law. Under the current 
Iranian laws, all constitutional rules are considered as conferring personal rights to 
shareholders and there is no irregularity rule. Furthermore, the ultra vires doctrine that 
imposes a major limitation on the power of controllers still persists in the Iranian 
company law. 
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Chapter III: Nature of majority rule 
Earlier Chapters considered the rule of majority from two varying aspects. Chapter one 
concerned the question of justification and sought to show how and why the majority 
rule is justified. Chapter two examined two factors that limit the rule of majority's field 
of application. It sought, on the one hand, to show the source of some of minority 
shareholders' problems with the majority rule and, on the other hand, to uncover areas 
and circumstances within which an abusive exercise of right by majority shareholders 
can occur. This Chapter examines another aspect of the rule of majority; i. e. the one 
that demonstrates the way in which the rule of majority works. This aspect, which is 
linked with the shareholder voting, explains how majority shareholders apply control 
over corporations. The right to vote determines whether a shareholder is in the 
majority camp and hence holds control of the corporation or else falls in the minority 
group who is subject of the majority control. ' The objective is to show how the 
mechanism of majority rule can generate opportunity for majority shareholders to 
abuse their rights. In pursuit of such objective, I raise a number of issues. The first issue 
to be considered is that of different share structures and most importantly division 
between ordinary and preference shares. ' Here, the gist of my consideration is to 
explain that possessing more shares does not necessarily follow control of companies 
and hence a shareholder's control can vary depending on the sort of shares they 
I Section 736 Companies Act (1985) implies that if one or few shareholders can control the 
composition of the board of directors, or hold more than half in nominal value of the equity 
share capital they can be considered as having majority control. See also sections 4,9,14,16, 
125,127 198,303,368,370,378 Companies Act 1985. 
2 Buxbaum Richard M., "'The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance", (1985), 
California Law Review, No. 6, vol. 73, Berkeley, Calif., University of California, School of 
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possess. Although as a matter of principle one"s control pursues their shareholdings, 
however, this is only a default principle that can be displaced by contracting. ' The 
second issue, which will be considered, is that the components of majority and 
minority may also vary depending on different issues that come up for decision- 
making in shareholder meetings. While a shareholder may in one matter be in the 
majority, he can be in the minority group when voting in another matter and this can 
provide some protection for minority shareholders. The third issue is to see what role 
shareholder voting can play in corporations; i. e. determining whether it is only a 
device used for filling contractual gaps or besides it facilitate control of corporations by 
shareholders too. The fourth issue to be copnsidered is determing whether 
shareholders have any responsibility once voting to consider interests of their fellow 
minority shareholders and finally the last issue is whether or not institutional 
shareholders have been of any assistance to minority shareholders. 
The Chapter intends to examine the mentioned issues in the light of English and 
Iranian company laws and to do so, thus, it divides discussions into two parts. Much of 
the discussions are covered in the English part as they relate to issues which are 
considered indigenous to the English company law. In relation to the Iranian part, 
because the law as a consequence of adoption resembles the English law, it will avoid 
discussing issues which are similar and covered in the English part. A brief restatement 
of similarities and a relatively longer discussion on dissimilarities that exist in between 
the two systems form my focal endeavour in this part. 
jurisprudence at p 1684; Ferran Eilis, "Company Law and Corporate Finance", (1999), Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, at p 125. 
3 Section 370 (1,6) Companies Act 1985; See also Ferran (above, note 2) at pp 125,320; Birds John 
Et. Al. (eds. ), "Boyle & Birds'Company Law", (1995), 3rd ed., Jordans, Bristol, p 210. 
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111.1. The case of England 
111.1-1. History of voting rights 
The history of evolution of voting rights in companies can be traced back to the 
sixteenth century when the early joint-stock companies in England were granted their 
corporate charters. 4 Before, companies were usually small, fan-dly-based and were 
considered as ordinary partnership which worked with the unanimity rule. ' They were 
adequate for domestic sectors of business where the amount of capital needed 
remained small and environmental changes were few. As companies grew in size and 
the corporate environment and industry changed', the need for a device, and use, of a 
new business vehicle that was able to serve globally and could draw its needed capital 
from remarkably wider sources became urgent. Joint stock companies which enjoyed 
separate personality, and which offered limited liability and worked on the basis of 
majority rule emerged in the business sector to address the needs of the time and as a 
result the existing laws had to change. The reform in laws occurred to accommodate 
the new vehicle. The law recognised replacement of the unlimited liability of investors 
4 The Russia Company was perhaps the earliest example which was granted its charter in 1555 
followed by foundation of the English East India Company in 1600. [See Chaudhuri K. N., "The 
English East India Company, ", (1965), London, Cass, at pp 3,261 See also Ratner David L., "The 
Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of One Share, One Vote", 
Cornell Law Review, (1970), Number 1, Vol. 56, Cornell University, Cornell Law School, at p 1; 
Dunlavy Colleen A. "'Corporate Governance in Late 19th Century Europe and the United States, 
The Case of Shareholder Voting Rights" in Comparative Corporate Governance- The 
State of 
the Art and emerging Research edited by Hopt K. J., Kanada H, Roe M. J., Wymeersch 
E. and 
Prigge S. (eds. ), (1998), Oxford University Press, at pp 12-13. 
5 Dunlavy lbid; Carney William J., "'Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, 
and Business Purposes", (1980), American Bar Foundation Research 
Journal, Chicago, American 
Bar Foundation, at pp 69,77-97 
6 Mason Edward S., "'Introduction", in The Corporation in Modem Society, Editted by Edward 
Sagendorph Mason, (1960), Cambridge, Mass, at p 1; Minett Steve, "'Power, Politics, and 
Participation in the Firm", (1992), Aldershot, Avebury, at pp186-7; Roe Mark J., "Strong 
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with a new limited liability principle that restricted shareholder liability to the value of 
their shares! Reform in the corporate decision-making machinery was the next step 
which was taken through replacing the unanimity rule with a principle of the so-called 
majority rule that worked on the basis of 'one share, one vote-. ' These replacements 
occurred gradually and until the time that general laws allowed public to incorporate 
companies by the method of registration, it took almost three centuries for them to 
become well established. ' 
As to the majority rule, there was no established rule with respect to how members 
will vote in the laws relating to the early companies. The rules applicable to voting 
were differently determined by the source that had granted the charters. " However, 
the prevailing practice was often one vote for every shareholder disregarding the size 
of his/her investment. Shareholders could not use proxies and they were entitled to 
one vote each in the absence of explicit arrangements to the contrary in the company"s 
charter or by-laws. " This was a consequence of political restrictions which were often 
written into corporate charters. The practice aimed at safeguarding individual 
Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance", (1994), Princeton 
University Press, at pp 3-4. 
7 Limited Liability was already known among, and used by, businessmen through inserting 
clauses in the charters in eighteenth century. This business custom was subsequently confirmed 
in the 1911, century by the first regulatory Limited Liability Act 1855. [See Freedeman Charles E., 
"Joint-Stock Enterprise in France: From Privileged Company to Modem Corporation", (1979), 
Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, at p5; Posner Richard A., "'Economic Analysis 
of Law"', (1992), Boston, London, Little, Brown, at p 392; Farrar John H., "'Company Law", 
(1985), London, Butterworths, at p 6; Cheffins Brian R., "Minority Shareholders and Corporate 
Governance, ", The Company Lawyer, (2000), Vol. 21, No 2, London, Oyez Publishing Limited, at 
p 4]. 
8 Hager Mark M., "Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational 'Real Entity' 
Theory", University of Pittsburgh Law Review, (1989), Vol. 50, Pittsburgh, at pp 633-4. 
9 Ratner (above, note 4) at pp 7-9. 
10 Ratner (above, note 4) at pp 3-5; Ferran (above, note 2) at pp 249-250. 
11 Ratner (above, note 4) at pp 3-5; Dunlavy (above, note 4) at pp 12-13. 
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shareholders as members of corporation" rather than as owners of a portion of the 
corporate capital and was well supported by the Anglo-American law. As shareholder 
voting evolved in England, a new practice emerged in the eighteenth century of giving 
the larger shareholders additional votes. This development towards the rule of "one 
share, one vote", as Dunlavy explained, was put to use in the late 18thcentury in the 
U. S., Germany and France too. Since then the general direction of change in the 
nineteenth century in all the four countries was from the more democratic alternative 
in the political sense, towards plutocratic power relations in which each share carried a 
vote. " This practice is now widely accepted and normally is put in the form of a 
default rule in company laws of most countries. 
14 
111.1.2. Share structures and voting rights 
It is said that the division of share caPital into different classes of shares first occurred 
in the 17th century England. " Even with such background, it was not common for 
companies to issue different classes. Early joint-stock companies usually issued only 
one class of shares. From the middle 19thcentury onwards and in the light of general 
laws regarding incorporation by registration, the rise of small investors who merely 
had financial motive without being interested in control increased the use of different 
class of shares. However, from the early 20th century there has 
been a counter-trend 
12 Ratner (above, note 4) at p 6. 
13 Dunlavy (above, note 4) at pp 12-21; Ratner (above, note 4) at pp 44-46. 
14 Lowenstein Louis, "Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to 
Sec. Rule 19c-4 and to 
Professor Gilson", (1989), Columbia Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 
5, New York, Columbia 
University Press, at p 982-3. 
15 Farrar John H., "Company Law", (1991), London, Butterworths, at p 
221. 
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towards greater simplicity and as a result shares tended to get one form with the same 
liabilities and rights attached. 16 
111.1.2.1. Ordinary shares and the 'one share, one vote' rule 
Although companies, as a matter of contract, may now have two or more classes of 
shares 17 with different rights attached, 18 they usually issue only one class of shares with 
the same value, rights or limitations regarding voting right. This type of share is called 
ordinary 19 and a holder of it has principally one vote for each share. 'O As ordinary 
shares are treated equally, they can encourage corporate financing. In the abcense of it, 
investors may choose not to take their capital to companies where there is too much 
potential for risks. The equal rights attached to ordinary shares, however, is just a 
default rule meaning that they are principally given equal rights and limitations except 
particular rights are given to or limitations are imposed on some of them in the 
constitution, or through terms of issue at the time of their issuance, or at any later time 
by a subsequent alteration. " This default rule has two main limitations, that of 
preference shares and that of conditioned shares. Preference shares are considered as 
16 Farrar lbid, at pp 221-222. 
th 17 See Morse Geoffrey & Others (eds. ), "Charlesworth & Morse Company Law",, (1999), 16 
ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, at pp 177-8. 
18 There may be different justifications to issue different classes of shares such as to retain 
control of the company, to induce outsider investment and to raise the capital. [See Pennington, 
Robert R., "'Company law", (2001), 8th ed., London, Butterworths, p 239]. 
19 One unique feature of the ordinary shares is that they offer no fixed return to their holders. 
[See Ferran (above, note 2) at p 3201. 
20 Section 370(6) Companies Act 1985 and Art 54 Table A; See also MacNeil lain, ""An 
Introduction to The Law on Financial Investment", (2005), Hart Publishing Co., Oxford, at p 
259; Ferran (above, note 2) at p 320; Birds Et. Al. (above, note 2) at p 210; Leader Sheldon & Dine 
Janet, "United Kingdom", in The Legal Basis of Corporate Governance in Publicly Held Corporations, 
Kluwer Law International, (1998), 219 at p 233. 
21 Ferran (above, note 2) at pp 139,330; Birds Et. Al. (above, note 2) at p 210. 
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exception to the default rule of equality of shares. 22 Unlike ordinary shares, this type of 
shares is usually given fixed financial returns. "A holder of such shares does not have 
to be very watchful of company operation. 24 However, in exchange for having such 
financial privilege, preferred shareholders have no right to vote 25 except in certain 
circumstances. 26 If a company seeks to issue preference shares, its power to issue must 
be expressed in its articles of association otherwise any existing shareholder has right 
to prevent the company by taking action to the courts. " Conditioned shares, on the 
other hand, are in fact ordinary shares with certain previliges or limitations. " They are 
issued mostly in the form of weighted or enhanced", restricted" and non-voting 
shares. " The first; namely, shares with enhanced voting rights"; may be issued to 
attract investment or to induce persons with good business ideas to enter into 
companies. It is also used to preserve control of the company in the hands of a few 
persons who may not have sufficient investment in order to obtain or keep control of 
22 Andrews v. Gas Meter Co. (1897), 1 Ch. 361, CA; Campbell v. Rofe (1933), AC 98; British and 
American Trustee and Finance Corporation v. Couper (1894) AC 399, HL, 416 per lord 
Macanghten; See also Ferran (above, note 2) at pp 319-320. 
23 Ferran (above, note 2) at p 320; Farrar (above, note 15) at pp 225-6; Morse & Others (above, 
note 17) at p 178. 
24 Preference shares have this feature as well as certain other features in common with 
debentures. They both normally carry a fixed rate of financial returns and prioretise their 
holders over ordinary shareholders. Also they both offer restricted voting rights though 
debentures normally lack voting rights. [See Farrar (above, note 15) at p 226; Birds Et. Al. 
(above, note 2) at p 219]. 
25 Buxbaum (above, note 3) at p 1684. 
26 For example, when decision is made regarding rights attached to preference shares and 
when financial return in respect of such shares is overdue and outstanding, holders of such 
shares will have voting right. [See Ferran (above, note 2) at p 245,330; Birds Et. Al. 
(above, note 
3) at p 214; Morse Et. Al. (above, note 17) at p 178]. 
27 Section 35(2,3) Companies Act 1985 and section 108 Companies Act 1989. [See also North 
West Transportation Co Ltd. v. Beatty, (1887), 12 App CAS 589; generally see Morse & Others 
(above, note 17) at p 178. 
28 Birds Et. Al. (above, note 3) at p 210; Buxbaum (above, note 2) at p 1693-4; Leader & Dine 
(above, note 20) at p 232. 
29 Art (2), Table A, Companies Act 1985. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Section 454 Companies Act 1985. 
32 Art 2 and 54 Table A, Companies Act 1985. 
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the company. " It is, however, not very popular among companies, as it often serve to 
displace the normal majority rule which is based on the 'one share, one vote' principle. 
The second; i. e. shares with restricted voting rights; is normaRy intended to confine 
the role of large investors in companies. Using this method, companies issue shares 
with voting rights of either certain shares, or even all shares, being restricted to a 
maximum level. " The method is, however, uncommon among companies. There are 
instances in case law that show corporate investors tend to resist against such 
restrictions, by making formal share transfers to their nominees and dummies. " It can 
also discourage investment in companies because potential investors may simply 
decide not to invest in a company that gives inadequate weight to the investment. 36 
The third; namely, non-voting shares; is uncommon too for the same reason. " It 
usually offers interest a few percentages above the market rate aiming to attract 
outsider investors who may be interested more in financial aspect of investment than 
in control. " It affects application of the majority rule and is often considered as a 
negative factor especially for public companies that seek to find a good position in the 
stock exchange markets. Although the London Stock Exchange allows listing of non- 
voting shares, it never recommends such shares and requires that they must be clearly 
33 Bushell v. Faith (1970), 1 All ER 53, per Thomas J. 
34 Articles of association may confine voting rights of shares, for example, to one vote per 10 
shares and according to Table (A) Art (2) Companies Act 1985 companies may by ordinary 
resolution issue restricted or enhanced voting shares. 
35 Moffat v. Farquhar [(1878), 7 Ch. D 591, per Malins V C; Pender v. Lushington, (1877), 6 Ch D 
70. 
36 Ferran (above, note 2) at p 246; Lee Hazen Thomas, "Silencing the Shareholders' Voice", 
North Carolina Law Review, (2002), Vol. 80, Chapel Hill, North Carolina Law Review Association, 
at p 1917; Lowenstein (above, note 14) at p 982. 
37 Buxbaum (above, note 3) at p 1716. 
38 Pennington (above, note 18) at p 239; Morse & Others (above, note 17) at p 184. 
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designated as voteless share. '9 Non-voting shares also limit the exercise of 
shareholders' participatory rights in companies", an outcome which is not only 
dangerous in the relationship between company members and controllers but also is 
detrimental to the company sector and the economy at large. Voting right is 
importantly designed for ensuring that controllers are not abusing their powers and it 
is important, too, for the society that controllers are answerable not simply to 
thernselves. Shareholders with full voting power can help the industry to work 
41 
efficiently while non- voting shares act quite the opposite. Some company law 
41 
scholars have recently sought for their legal eradication. 
111.1.2.2. Challenge to the "one share, one vote' rule 
Political thinkers have recently chalanged the 'one share, one vote" rule for its 
capability to encourage inequality among corporate members and for its propensity to 
subject implementation of any influence in companies to the size of members" 
financing. 43 Seen from political viewpoint, the "one share, one vote' rule, unlike its 
44 
egalitarian face, is liable to encourage inequality among corporate memebers. The 
view seeks for replacing the 'one share, one vote' rule, which allegedly is the source of 
39 Listing Rules, Chapter 13, Appendix 1, para. 2; See also Ferran (above, note 2) at p 246; Farrar 
(above, note 15) at p 225; Birds Et. Al. (above, note 3) at p 213; Morse & Others (above, note 17) 
at p 1841. 
40 Buxbaum (above, note 3) at p 1684; Lee Hazen (above, note 36) at p 1919-23. 
41 Lowenstein (above, note 14) at pp 1004-8. 
42 Leader & Dine (above, note 20) at p 233. 
43 Ratner (above, note 4) at pp 33-38. 
44 Dahl Robert A., "A Preface to Economic Democracy", (1985), Berkeley, University of 
California, at pp 75-82; Walzer Michael, "Spheres of justice: a Defence of Pluralism and 
Equality", (1983), Oxford, Robertson, at pp 293-4; Gewirth Alan, "Community of Rights", 
(1996), Chicago, London, University of Chicago Press, at pp 262,266,285; Ratner (above, note 4) 
at pp 45-46. 
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inequality, with the original democratic rule of "one man, one vote/. 45 This will not 
sustain, it argues, any harm to substantial investors since they will still receive more 
profit for their larger investment. 46 The "one share, one vote' rule, it further argues, can 
cause fractions in companies which could mean disintegration of shareholders and 
formation of groups with varying interests, something which is not efficient. In the 
absence of it, companies can work much better to achieve their goals. " 
The economists and contractarians' response to the challenge is two fold. One takes 
consideration of the purpose that caused evolution of voting in companies and 
suggests that the political viewpoint falls largely in contradiction with historical facts. 
Lowenstein, for example, upholds the "one share, one vote' rule arguing that 'not only 
did it survive for three generations, but almost no one tried to fiddle with 
itt. 48 The 
other takes the efficiency argument and maintains that any departure from the "one 
share, one vote' rule will result in discrimination between shareholders based on the 
size of their investment which is further to discourage the flow of the public financing 
in companies and this is not efficient. 
49 
45 Dahl Ibid at pp 75-82; Walzer Ibid at pp 293-4; Gewirth Ibid at pp 262,266,285; Ratner 
(above, note 4) at pp 45-46. 
46 Dahl (above, note 44) at pp 75-82; Walzer (above, note 44) at pp 293-4; Gewirth (above, note 
44) at pp 262,266,285. 
47 See Ratner (above, note 4) at pp 35-38. 
48 Lowenstein (above, note 14) at pp 983-4; see also Jensen C. Michel and Meckling William H. 
"Corporate Governance and Economic Democracy: An Attack on Freedom", in Proceedings of 
Corporate Governance: A Difinitive Exploration of Issues Edited by C. J. Huizenga, UCLA 
Extension, (1983), at pp 1-6 available at Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Electronic 
Library at: http: //papers. ssrn-com/ABSTRACT ID= 321521. 
49 See Posner (above, note 7) at pp 3,392; Cheffins Brian R, "'Company Law: Theory Structure 
And Operation", (1997), Oxford, Clarendon Press, at pp 7,41; Schwarts Alan and Scott Robert 
E., "Contract Theory and The Limits of Contract Law", Yale Law journal, (2003), vol. 113, New 
Haven, Conn., Yale Law journal Co., Yale University, School of Law, at pp 3-6; Farrar (above, 
note 15) at pp 6-7. 
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No doubt the 'one share, one vote' is not a perfect rule. Most people would accept that 
the rule is capable in the strict political sense of encouraging inequality among 
corporate members. However, they would also accept that this is simply an inevitable 
incident of the "one share, one vote' rule which primarily evolved in companies to 
enable them act effectively and efficiently. 'o Further, it is not equality among members 
based on their personality, but rather equality among members based on the size of 
their investment that matters very much in companies. The solution to remedy its 
imperfection cannot, therefore, be to replace it with rules that give vote to all 
shareholders equally or permit application of graduate voting mechanism. " Instead, a 
device should be designed to prevent controlling members from abuse. 
111.1.3. Variable nature of majority and minority 
Of the implications of the exercise of voting right in meetings is that the nature of 
majority and minority may vary depending on different issues which come up for 
decision-making in shareholder meeting. A shareholder may in one case be in the 
majority camp meanwhile he may fall within the minority camp when voting in 
another case. If votes were always given honestly in the best interest of the company 
and companies had only large size, the variable nature could have ensured rights and 
interests of every shareholder in companies. However, current company law allows 
shareholders to pursue their personal interests and permits companies to be 
incorporated with different size. These bring about consequences. When companies are 
small, nature of majority and minority groups almost always remain the same. Using 
50 See Ratner (above, note 4) at p 23. 
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his voting power, a majority shareholder can control the company no matter what 
issue is going to be decided by shareholders in general meetings. In such context, a 
dissenting minority may have no choice except to continue in a long-term relationship 
with the controlling shareholders without hoping that his position may change 
through the normal democratic way of voice. Likely limitations on share transfers that 
prevent minority shareholders from selling their shares plus outsiders' reluctance to 
buy such shares can make the way of exit too costly and prejudicial. 
The issue in large companies differs very much. Large companies often raise their 
needed capital from small investment of a remarkably large number of investors who 
may have invested, in sum, a quite large amount of money in different companies. But 
in a given company, the amount of their investment is often very little. Hence, such 
companies often lack a permanent and stable majority who provide substantial part of 
the company's financial resource and who can control the company. Instead, the nature 
of majority and minority will change depending on the varying issues coming up for 
collective decision-making in shareholders' meetings. Although this variable nature 
may reduce the possibility of majority abuse to some extent, it never eliminates it. 
Dispersion of the shareholdings in large companies sometimes only reduces the 
number of votes required of shareholders in order to seize corporate control. Given the 
collective action problem and the apathetic attitude of widely dispersed shareholders", 
a shareholder who possesses, let's say, fifteen percent shareholding in a large 
51 A method of voting mostly exercised in 18th and 19th centuries in which every share 
primarily gave one vote, but there was a maximum limit in the articles of association that 
limited number of votes attached to shares [See Dunlavy (above, note 4) at pp 20-301. 
52 Gower L. C. B., Gower's Principles of Modem Company Law", 4th ed., London, (1979), 
Stevens, at pp 553-4; Posner (above, note 7) at pp 409-411. 
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corporation is perhaps able to exercise effective control over the variable issues. 53 
Furthermore, institutional shareholders which possess substantial investment in large 
companies can now reorganise dispersed shareholdingS54 and overcome the collective 
action problem which further means the nature of majority and minority can become 
stabilised even in large companies. 55 These observations raise the question of abuse of 
power not only in private but also in public companies to which company law should 
offer response. 
111.1.4. The role of voting in corporate context 
Whether or not the shareholder voting plays any controlling role in the Anglo- 
American model corporations has been a matter of interesting controversy among 
company law scholars. The controversy stems from the fact that while in theory 
shareholders as owners of corporate shares can control such corporations, they have 
been in practice for a number of reasons unable to do so. This caused development of a 
theory that denies the idea of shareholder control and views the right to vote as being a 
mechanism merely suitable for filling contractual gaps. A reduced version of this 
53 Cubbin John and Leech Denis, ""The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the Degree of 
Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement", The Economic journal, (1983), Vol. 
93,351-369, London, New York, Macmillan, at p 363. 
54 Black Bernard S., "Shareholder Passivity Re-Examined", (Dec-1990), Michigan Law Review, 
Vol. 89,520 Ann Arbor, Mich., University of Michigan, Department of Law, at p 567. 
55 In an empirical research carried out in 1984, it became evident that owing to the increasing 
volume of the contractual savings mainly in the hands of insurance companies and pension 
funds since 1945, there has been a sharp increase in the percentage of shares held by 
institutional shareholders and a sharp decrease in the level of individual holdings in listed 
companies in the United Kingdom. [See Farrar John H. and Russell Mark, "The Impact of 
Institutional Investment on Company Law", (1984), The Company Lawyer, No. 5, London, 
Oyez Publishing Limited, at p 1071; The findings of this research was also confirmed by the 
Hampel Committee's investigation for the review of company law which found institutions 
during the 1980s and 1990s as holding approximately 80 percent of shares in the listed UK 
companies. [Hampel Committee, "The Combined Code: A Practical Guide", (October 1999), 
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theory views shareholder voting as a device primarily designed to allow shareholder 
control, but it also adds that current corporate context has made this function 
impossible. The conventional view, on the other hand, regards shareholder control as 
being the most important attribute of the right to vote and seeks to defeat through a 
number of ways shareholder inactivism which currently exists in English large 
corporations. Although this controversy concerns the most the 
shareholder /management relationship, it can be pertinent as to the majority/ minority 
conflict too, as it is the claim of the first theory that the abcense of shareholder control 
is to mean elimination of majority abuse which forms a great protection to minority 
shareholders. In sum, there are two main theories: 
111.1.4.1. Contractarian theory 
Contractarian. theory is charactrised by its focus on managerial control. A leading 
example is the theory of separation of ownership and control which was developed by 
the two American professors, Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C Means, in the early 20th 
century, and which views shareholders as beneficiaries for whom managerial powers 
are held in trust. 56 The origin of the theory, which is sometimes named as the 'trust 
theory", goes back into the middle nineteenth century when common law judges 
started to hear minority allegations against corporate directors using the 
beneficiary/ trustee relationship argument. 57 In this analysis, although shareholder 
London, UK]; see also Ferran (above, note 2) at p 241; similar trend can be found in the US too. 
[Black (above, note 54) at p 570; Ratner (above, note 4) at p 26]. 
56 Berle Adolf A. and Means Gardiner C., "The Modem Corporation and Private Property", 
Revised edition, (1968), New York, Macmillan, at p 245; Berle Adolf A., "Corporate Powers as 
Powers in Trust", (1931), 44, Harvard Law Review, 1049 Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Law 
Review Association, at 1073. 
57 Smith D. Gordon, "The Shareholder Primacy Norm", (1998), The Journal of Corporation Law, 
Iowa City, University of Iowa, College of Law, at pp 303-306. 
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voting is primarily a device to be used for controlling managerial misbehaviours, 
however, the proxy mechanism and the collective action problem make it useless and 
impossible. " Shareholder control no longer functions in large corporations. Instead, 
professional managers, as a neutral technocracy, would run the corporation better and 
would make important corporate decisions benefiting all interested groups and the 
society not merely shareholders. " Two factors contributed to make this theory very 
influential. Firstly, in the light of the real entity theory, companies have been 
recognised as having separate corporate personality, a major development that caused 
an extensive realization that possessing shares in a company does not follow 
possession of the company. 'O Secondly, industrialisation of the economy" plus a rapid 
rise of small investors who were more interested in financial return than contro162 
caused a gradual separation of shareholder ownership right from control and a 
relocation of the latter in hands of managers. " 
In this category sits also the new contractual theory 64 which was developed in the late 
20th century and which argues that shareholder control is impossible because of the 
collective action problem. Shareholders have lost their controlling power not only 
58 Berle & Means (above, note 56) at pp 71-82,129-131. 
59 Berle & Means (above, note 56) at pp 301,312-312. 
60 Hager (above, note 8) at pp 633-4; See also Hill, "Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder", 
The American Journal of Comparative Law, (2000), Vol. 48, Berkeley, Ca., American Association for 
the Comparative Study of Law, at p 44. 
61 Minett (above, note 6) at pp 186-187. 
62 Farrar (above, note 15) at pp 221-2. 
63 Berle and Means (above, note 56) at p 245. 
64 Also known as Chicago School, Contractarians, the Law and Economic Theory; Neo-Classic 
Theory and Nexus of Contracts Theory. [See generally Mayson Stephan, French Derek and 
Ryan Christopher, "Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law"', (2001), 18til ed., London, 
Blackstone, at pp 371. 
116 
because it is impossible 6' but also because it is unnecessary and perhaps sometimes 
problematiC66 , as shareholders do not have necessary managerial skills to control 
corporations . 
6' The main role for shareholder voting is to fill gaps in company 
contracts . 
6' The theory differs slightly from the separation of ownership and control 
theory in that the latter views controlling function necessary but impossible. 
One of the important properties of the contractarian theories, it is claimed, is the 
elimination of any likelihood of majority abuse against minority shareholders. Since 
shareholders are no longer able to control companies there will be no more minority 
oppression. 69 In the abcense of shareholder control, professional managers who can 
strike a fair balance between majority/ minority interests will control corporations. 
Managerial control may make corporations liable to mismanagement but, as the theory 
argues, this should not cause much concern because mismanagement is incurred by all 
shareholders equally and further because market forces can effectively control it. In a 
market economy, market forces especially through market for securities, managerial 
services and corporate control, prevent management from abuse. " Moreover the 
65 Easterbrook Frank H. and Fischel Daniel R., "Voting in Corporate Law"", The Journal of Law 
and Economics, (1983), Chicago, University of Chicago Law School, at pp 401-2; see also Posner 
(above, note 7) at pp 409-411; Farrar (above, note 15) at p 318. 
66 "Shareholders' participation in control of the company may expose the firm to an 
uncompensated risk of making inconsistent or illogical decisions". [Easterbrook and Fischel 
(above, note 65) at pp 404-5,408-101; See also Manne Henry, "'Some Theoretical Aspects of Share 
Voting in the Economics of Legal Relationships", Columbia Law Review, New York, Columbia 
University Press, (1964), Vol. 64,1427. 
67 Manne Ibid.; See also Farrar (above, note 15) at pp 3-7; Posner (above, note 7) at pp 14,409- 
411; Easterbrook and Fischel (above, note 65) at p 401. 
68 Farrar (above, note 15) at p 318; Easterbrook & Fischel (above, note 65) at pp 401-3; Posner 
(above, note 7) at pp 409-411. 
69 See generally Hill (above, note 60) at pp 57-8 and also Hill Jenniffer, "Public Beginnings, 
Private Ends-Should Corporate Law Privilege the Interests of Shareholders? ", in International 
Corporate Law, Edited by Fiona Macmillan, Vol. 1, (2000) Oxford, Hart, at p 22. 
70 Schwarts & Scott (above, note 49) at pp 11-16; Stedman Graham & Jones Janet, 
"Shareholders' Agreement", (1998), 3rd Ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, at p 1; Keenan Denis & 
117 
plenitude of firms makes it possible for investors to diversify their portfolios, obtaining 
returns at lower total risk. " After all, the way of exit is always open to a dissatisfied 
shareholder who can rationally choose to disinvest. " 
The contractarian theories can be criticised on two grounds. Firstly, exiting from the 
company either through a share sale in the market or through a buy out order granted 
by the courts may not always be a result of rational reaction of shareholders to 
managerial abuse, particularly for those who wish to stay in the company and fight to 
clear corruptions up. " Further, these theories, which much rely on exit rather than 
voice, can encourage short-termism among corporate investors, something that is not 
efficient. 74 Secondly, the mismanagement problem which is pretended to be trivial in 
these theories can cause very much more serious problems. Market forces can act 
imperfectly when market conditions are incompetitive. Where a company dominates a 
market which is difficult to enter it can survive even performing inefficient. This 
follows that an uncompetitive market will not quickly convert inefficiency into 
insolvency and consequently corporate management in such conditions would be able 
Bisacre Josephine, - Company Law", (1999), 1111, ed., London, Financial Times/Pitman 
Publishing, at p 255; Easterbrook & Fischel (above, note 65) at 396-7, Ferran (above, note 2) at p 
244. 
71 Easterbrook & Fischel (above, note 65) at p 401. 
72 Easterbrook & Fischel (above, note 65) at p 420; Manne H. G., "Mergers and the Market for 
Corporate Control", (1965), 73, The Journal of Political Economy, 110, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press and Manne H. G., "'Our Two Corporation Systems", (1967), 53, Virginia Law 
Review, 259, Charlottesville, Va., Virginia Law Review Association; Gilson Ronald J., "'A 
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers", 
(1980-1) 33 Stanford Law Review, 819, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University, School of Law; Fischel 
Daniel R, "Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control and the 
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers", (1978), 57, Texas Law Review, 1, Austin, Texas Law Review 
Association Quoted in Mitchell Charles, "Shareholders' Claims for Reflective Loss", (2004), The 
Law Quarterly Reviczv, Vol. 120,457 London, Stevens and Sons, at 483-4. 
73 Deakin Simon, Ferran Eilis and Nolan Richard, "Shareholders' Rights and Remedies: An 
Overview", (1997), Company, Financial and Insolvency Law Review, 162, Oxford, Mansfield Press, 
at p 164. 
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to serve for their own interests. 75 Market forces also provide most of the times a costly 
and imperfect way to discipline wayward managers. The reason as Black explained is 
that they often work through the takeover mechanism which usually involve kicking 
out old managers while for companies with competent managers who just need closer 
oversight, this is disproportionate to the problem and adds large disruption and 
transaction CoStS. 76 Further, managerial control cannot guarantee the use of corporate 
resources only for meeting the shareholder interest objective in corporations and the 
company law has often limited capacity to curb managerial misbehaviours. " 
Mismanagement, however, is largely reduced through shareholder control which is 
exerted by voting in corporate meetings. 78 
111.1.4.2. The conventional theory 
The conventional theory which is the common approach among scholars of law and 
political theorists suggests that significance of the right to vote encompasses two 
functions of filling contractual gaps as well as control. It is true that shareholders 
74 Ferran (above, note 2) at p 241. 
75 See Parkinson J. E., "'Corporate Power and Responsibility", (1993), Oxford, Clarendon Press; 
New York, Oxford University Press, at p 114; See also Bebchuk Lucian Arye, "The Case for 
Empowering Shareholders", (Last revision: Apr-2003), pp 14-16,50,63, recently titled as "The 
Case for Increasing Shareholder Power", (2005), Harvard Law Review, Vol. 118, at pp 833-917, 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Law Review Publishing Association. 
76 See Black (above, note 54) at p 522. 
77 Cheffins Brian R., "Corporate Law and Ownership Structure: A Darwinian Link? ", 
University of Cambridge, (2002), available at Social Science Research Network (SSRN), 
Electronic Library at http: //ssrn. com/abstract=317661, at pp 27-37; Bebchuk (above, note 75) at 
p 63; Roe Mark J., "'Corporate Law's Limits"', Columbia University, (2002), at p 10 also available 
at Social Science Research Network Electronic Library http: //papers. ssrn. com/abstract=260582; 
Roe Mark J., "The Shareholder Wealth Maximisation. Norm and Industrial Organization", 
(2001), Harvard Law School, p 3, Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Electronic Library at 
www. ssrn. com (Working Paper No 019 ID 282703); Stout Lynn A., "'Bad and Not-So-Bad 
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy"", (2002), Southern California Law Review, Vol. 75,1189, also 
available in Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Electronic Library at www. ssrn. com, 
(Research paper No. 25 ID 331464) at p 1199; Bebchuk (2003), (above, note 75) at pp 14-16,50,63. 
78 Cheffins (above, note 77); Roe (2002), (above, note 77) at pp 10-17. 
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through the mechanism of voting make rules for unexpected and unpredicted 
circumstances, but this is only one of the functions of the right to vote. The other 
function which is perhaps more significant is the one by which shareholders control 
their companies. A number of arguments have been brought for this theory. Scholars 
who view corporations politically argue that voting is a way by which citizens 
(shareholders) exercise control over decisions and conducts of leaders (management) in 
the corporate cornmunity. " Shareholders should be able to control corporate 
management in order to ensure that managers pursue the shareholder interest 
objective. 'O These scholars go along with ideas advanced by the contractarian theory in 
that they both generally see the majority of shareholders as Persons whose interests are 
pre-eminent in companies. " However they fall apart in that political theorists unlike 
the latter know controlling function for shareholder voting. Those who view 
corporations from legal perspective argue that shareholder control is in fact a non- 
separable part of every relationship which involves a person who entrusts his money 
to the care of another person. " They add that market forces may not adequately 
prevent managerial misbehaviours and company law is deficient too.. 83 Therefore, 
79 See generally Ferran (above, note 2) at p 246; Hill (2000), (above, note 60) at pp 52-53. 
80 Buxbaurn (above, note 3) at p 1671; Selznick Philip, "Law, Society, and Industrial Justice", 
Russell Sage Foundation, (1969), at p 259; Brewster Kigman, "The Corporation and Economic 
Federalism", in The Corporation in Modern Society, edited by Edward Sagendorph Mason (ed. ), 
(1960), 5, Cambridge, Mass at 72; Mason (above, note 7) at p1l; Villiers Charlotte, "'European 
Company Law-Towards Democracy? ", European Business law Library, (1997), Aldershot, 
Ashgate, pp 197-205; Pound John, "'The Rise of The Political Model of Corporate Governance 
and Corporate Control", (1993), New York University Law Review, vol. 68,1003 at pp 1007-1013, 
New York, New York University School of Law; See Latham Earl, "The Body Politic of The 
Corporation"", in Thc Corporation in Modern Society, edited by Edward Sagendorph Mason (ed. ), 
(1960), 5, Cambridge, Mass, pp 218-220; Bottomley Stephen, "From Contractualism to 
Constitutionalism: A Framework for Corporate Governance", (1997), Sydney Law Review, vol. 19, 
277, Faculty of Law, University of Sydney, Sydney, at pp 288-298. 
81 See Hill, "Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder", (above, note 60) at p 54. 
82 Lowenstein (above, note 14) at pp 983-4; Ferran (above, note 2) at p 239. 
83 Parkinson (above, note 75) at p 114; Bebchuk (above, note 75) at pp 14-16,50,63; Black 
(above, note 54) at p 522; Ferran (above, note 2) at p 241; Cheffins (above, note 77) at pp 27-37. 
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there should be a monitoring mechanism inside the company to allow members watch 
activities of directorS84 and shareholder voting functions to that effect. " In addition to 
these, they also say even from the perspective of contractarians the main mechanism 
by which market forces discipline management is through market for control and 
takeover mechanism which heavily rely on the idea of shareholder control. 86 they also 
add that shareholder control is not impossible because apathy is not a natural 
automatic reaction of shareholders and might be defeated by the growth in the size of 
ones' shareholding. 87 Shareholder control can encourage public financing in 
corporations because it signals the potential investors that they will be given control 
based on the size of their investment. " 
111.1.4.3. Comment 
No doubt, it is fundamental to any principal/agent relationship that the former must 
have power to control activities of the latter. In the absence of such control, agents 
could engage in self serving activities which impose costs on principal. This is also true 
about corporations in which management in the absence of shareholder control could 
easily engage themselves in activities which are either poor or self-serving. However, 
84 See Black (above, note 54) at pp 523,531,532,566; Buxbaum (above, note 3) at p 1683; 
Roe 
(2001), (above, note 77) at p 10; See also Bebchuk (above, note 75) at p 63; Cheffins 
(above, note 
77) at pp 27-37. 
85 Arguments for shareholder control may differ. Some argue that shareholders 
have 
controlling right because they are owners. [See Birds Et. Al. 
(above, note 2) at pp 209,214,368; 
Lee Hazen (above, note 36) at pp 1900,1910; From Case Law see also Burland v. 
Earle, (1902), 
AC 83; North West Transportation Co Ltd. v. Beatty, (1887), 12 App CAS 589; Pender v. 
Lushington, (1877), 6 Ch. D. 70; Some, on the other hand, argue that a share is only an 
instrument by which a holder participates in determining what forms general 
interests of the 
company. [See Leader & Dine (above, note 20) at p 
2301. From Case Law see also Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v. Newman Industries LTD. and others (No. 2) (1981), Ch 257. 
86 Buxbaum (above, note 3) at p 1672. 
87 Black (above, note 54) at p 585. 
88 See Lowenstein (above, note 14) at pp 983,1008; Lee Hazen (above, note 36) at p 
1917-23; 
Ferran (above, note 2) at p 246. 
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when a relationship involves not the principal/agent but rather groups of 
shareholders, one can remain sceptical about the benefits of the shareholder control 
because it is possible that one group, often the one that have majority of votes, abuses 
its discretional power to prioretise systematically its interests over that of the other 
groups. This possibility which associates with the shareholder control along with the 
collective action problem have brought the contractarians into the view that 
shareholder control is generally problematic and should be replaced by managerial 
control. 89 Yet, there are good reasons that indicate the advantages of exercising control 
by majority shareholders even with the possibility of abuse of rights can outweigh 
those of taking control away from shareholders. If shareholder control is lost, the right 
to participate in the debate and discussions in meetings will be lost too, which could 
further mean a complete lack of information for shareholders. This provides 
opportunity for dishonest and negligent management to extract easily for themselves 
corporate gains. With the majority control, however, not only management would be 
monitored, but also minority shareholders through attending at meetings will find 
opportunity to have access to information needed in order to assess controllers' 
behaviours. Oppression by the majority which can arise from shareholder control 
causes little concern compared with the likelihood of mismanagement which associates 
with managerial control and might, to a great extent, be overcome by the unfairly 
prejudicial remedy provided by s 459 Companies Act 1985-'0 
89 'mismanagement is less serious than unfairly conduct to shareholders. Mismanagement is 
not in the managers self interest. It is in fact very much contrary with their self interest, as it will 
lead eventually to the bankruptcy of the firm and the managers' future employment prospects, 
as a result of the competition of better managed rivals'. [Posner (above, note 7) at p 410]. 
90 Black (1990), (above, note 54) at p 552; Roe (2002), (above, note 77) at p 10; Roe (2001), (above, 
note 77) at p 3; Bebchuk Lucian Arye, "Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The 
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments"', Harvard Law Review, (1989), Vol. 102, 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Law Review Publishing Association, at pp 1830-1; Jensen & 
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111.1.5. Freedom of voting and imposition of legal duty 
Traditionally speaking, a share was seen as a piece of property and the voting right 
attached to it was also considered as an incident to such property right which allowed 
shareholders to exercise it free of duty. 9' Once voting, corporate shareholders could 
expect personal benefits and further could consult with their personal interests. " There 
was no obligation on a shareholder of company to give his vote with a view to what 
other persons may consider to be for the interests of the company. As a result, a 
shareholder who possessed majority of shares was able to make whatever decision he 
pleased even though those decisions were quite incompatible with minority 
shareholders" interest or even harmful to it. Thus, voting right was capable to provide 
controlling members abusive opportunities. " 
This fashion gradually changed with increasing concern on the part of the courts and 
legislators for the protection of minority shareholders and, as a consequence, the 
exercise of voting right was transformed slowly over time from being a simple matter 
of right into a rather complicated mixture of right and duty. The first step was taken by 
Lindley M. R. who developed in Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Limited a rule that 
Meckling (above, note 48) at pp 1-6; Cheffins (above, note 77) at pp 30-37; Stout (above, note 77) 
at p 1199. 
91 Burland v. Earle, (1902), AC 83; Northwest Transportation Co Ltd. v. Beatty, (1887), 12 App 
CAS 589; Pender v. Lushington, (1877), 6 Ch. D. 70; See also generally Maclntosh for a review of 
the courts' view. [Maclntosh Jeffrey G., "Minority Shareholder Rights in Canada and England: 
1860-1987", (1989), Osgoode Hall Law journal, vol. 27, No. 3, Toronto, Osgoode Hall Law School, 
at p 602]. 
92 Burland v. Earle, (1902), AC 83; North West Transportation Co Ltd. v. Beatty, (1887), 12 App 
CAS 589. 
93 The ownership approach has attracted supports from current company law scholars too. See 
Ferran (1999), (above, note 2) at p 247; Birds Et. Al. (above, note 3) at pp 209,214,368; Lee 
Hazen (above, note 36) at pp 1900,1910; Bebchuk (2003), (above, note 75) at p 15. 
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subjected the exercise of voting right to consideration of interests of the company as a 
whole. As he put it: 
... the power conferred to the majority shareholders must, like all other powers, be 
exercised subject to those general principles of law and equity which are applicable to 
all powers conferred on majorities and enabling them to bind minorities. It must be 
exercised, not only in the manner required by law, but also bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole and it must not be exceeded. //94 
Fifty years later, Evershed M. R in Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas" interpreated the 
measure of 'the interests of the company as a whole' introduced by the Allen case as 
being the interests of company shareholders generally. He further offered the famous 
'an individual hypothetical mernber' formula that required taking the case of such 
member and asking 'whether what is proposed is, in the honest opinion of those who 
voted in its favour, for that person's benefit. 96 However, the new rule had two not very 
compatible elements of "bona fide" and "benefit of the company as a whole". While the 
element of 'bona fide' was a subjective measure9', the "benefit of the company as a 
whole' was seen objectively and this could mean misapplication of the new rule by the 
courts. " It could also mean while a decision of majority may in fact be for the benefit of 
shareholders, it may be set aside merely because it is taken by the majority who voted 
mala fide. Also, it could cover only formal discriminations. In other words, a decision 
that affected every shareholder formally equal but treated them informally unequal 
could remain untouched. In Allen case, for example, though the court was persuaded 
94 Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa, Limited (1900), 1 Ch. 656 per Lindley M. R. at p 671. 
95 (1950) 2 All E. R. 1120 per Evershed M. R. at 1126. 
96 Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas LTD, (1950) 2 All E. R. 1120 per Evershed M. R. at 1126. 
97 Shuttleworth v. Cox Bros & Co (Maidenhead) Ltd, and Others, (1927), 2 KB 9 at pp 20-23 per 
Scrutton LJ. This decision has been latter supported by Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas LTD, 
(1950) 2 All E. R. 1120; For a contrary judgement see Dafen Tinplate Co. Ltd. v. Lianelly Steel 
Co., (1920), 2 Ch. 124 which viewed the test in Allen case as objective one. 
98 Maclntosh (above, note 91) at pp 612-4; MacNeil 2005 (above, note 20) at p 261. 
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that the amendment to the articles was aimed at and actually affected only a single 
shareholder, it dismissed the case on the ground that the amendment treated all 
shareholders formally equal. '9 Considering the fact that majority and minority interests 
can differ largely and that different classes of shareholders may exist in corporations, 
the test of "an individual hypothetical member' could not help the courts because it 
was difficult, if not impossible, to isolate such a member and ask if the change was for 
that member's benefit. 'Oo 
Later developments, to some extent, remedied the above said difficulties. The Ebrahitiii 
v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd. case observed equitable considerations in substitute of legal 
rights of company members and allowed an oppressed minority shareholder to free 
himself of a closed and unfair company relationship by asking a winding up remedy. 'O' 
A shareholder was no longer required to surrender to a majority decision which was 
taken honestly for the benefit of the company but ignoring at the same time his 
legitimate expectations. The Ebrahimi case, therefore, extended the scope of the duty of 
majority shareholders from mere consideration of interests of the company to the 
legitimate expectations of individual shareholders inside the company and to the cases 
involving informal discrimination. The introduction of section 459 Companies Act 1985 
strengthened this trend towards imposing duty on majority shareholders and extended 
99 See Lindley MR arguing that "the altered articles applied to all holders of fully paid shares, 
and made no distinction between them. The directors cannot be charged with 
bad faith'. [Allen 
v. Gold Reefs of West Africa, Limited (1900), 1 Ch. 656 per Lindley 
M. R. at p 675]; See also 
generally Maclntosh (above, note 91) at pp 608-614. 
100 "the very subject matter involves a conflict of interests and advantages. 
To say the 
shareholders forming the majority must consider the advantages of the company as a whole 
in 
relation to such a question seems inappropriate, in net meaningless, and at all events starts an 
impossible inquiry". [Peters American Delicacy Co Ltd v. Heath, (1939), 61 CLR 457 at 4811. 
101 Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd. (1973), AC 360; See also Clemens v. Clemens, (1976), 
2 All ER 268, and Insolvency Act 1986, s 122 (1). 
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the scope of available remedies from winding up to a range of alternatives listed in 
section 461 Companies Act 1985. These remedies will fully be discussed later in 
Chapter five and thus I wiR avoid bringing any more discussion of them here. 
111-1.6. Relevance of institutional shareholders 
The central argument I have taken about shareholder/ management relationship has 
been to defend shareholder control which can effectively function to align wayward 
management. I also explained that control by shareholders even with the possibility of 
majority abuse is yet advantegous to minority shareholders. However, as shareholders 
in English large corporations have tended to be small and unorganised, control by 
shareholders could have served little use. "' Potentially, the growing size of 
institutional investment made it possible for the shareholder control to function 
effectively. "' Institutional shareholders could have direct influence on management 
preventing them from shirking responsibilities and manipulating company assets. 104 
Nonetheless, things did not go as expected. 'O' Institutional shareholders" response to 
the controlling capacity they had was odd, unpredictable and disappointing 
particularly for those who hoped a quick change in the current corporate governance 
arrangement. As empirical research suggested and many writers indicated, 
institutional shareholders have tended in practice to influence the management 
102 MacNeil (2005), (above, note 20) at p 268. 
103 See above, at note 55. 
104 Black (above, note 54) at pp 570-575,585-594; Ferran (above, note 2) at pp 241-244; Birds Et. 
Al. (above, note 2) at pp 345-246; Mayson Et. Al. (above, note 64) at p 440. 
105 For an opposing view see Farrar who took the view that institutions' capability to control 
companies might change nothing for minority shareholders because institutions may merely 
provide another example of a power bloc within a company and this is nothing remarkable. 
[Farrar (above, note 15) at p 5991. 
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through informal dialogue instead of formal exercising of voting rights. 106 Although 
they often have sufficient votes to control companies, they have rarely used their 
votes. 'O' Instead, they have tended to influence the management through behind scene 
negotiation'" and once negotiation is found unworking, they often want to sell their 
shares and relocate their funds elsewhere which is more profitable and hospitable. "' 
Institutional shareholders, it is suggested, only seek to obtain financial return on their 
financing and as a natural reaction they do not care about control. Most of these 
institutions are formed with a financial motive only. 'They do not consider themselves 
as managers in the business world. They view themselves (and it appears they actually 
are), as financial institutions that invest and manage funds for the benefit of smaller 
passive investors". "O They also do not want to "damage the company's share price that 
could result from a head to head public confrontation between them and the 
management'. "' The prime duty of institutional shareholders is to pursue the benefits 
of their own beneficiaries who simply want the highest returns and that may require 
them to avoid risk. Therefore, neither institutional shareholders nor their investors and 
beneficiaries care about ups and falls of their investee company. In addition to these, 
106 Ferran (above, note 2) at pp 241-245,248; Birds Et. Al. (above, note 2) at pp 345-346; Farrar 
(above, note 15) at p 594; Black (above, note 54) at pp 591-594; Ratner (above, note 4) at p 26. 
107 As Boyle and Birds pointed out "'... it is much more common for a prestigious institution to 
raise a matter "behind the scenes' by approaching the chairman of the board or other senior 
executive directly. " [Birds Et. Al. (above, note 2) at pp 347,3881. 
108 This behaviour is analogous to the democratic strategy that influence on the government 
may be exerted more by discussion and lobbying than by general election. [Pound (above, note 
81) at 1003; Mayson Et. Al. (above, note 64) at p 440]. 
109 Cubbin and Leech (above, note 53) at p 363. 
110 Birds Et. Al. (above, note 2) at pp 345-7; See also Mayson Et. Al. (above, note 64) at p 440; 
Easterbrook & Fischel (above, note 65) at pp 425-426; Miles Lilian and Proctor Giles, 
"Unresponsive Shareholders in Public Companies: Dial "'M" for Motivate? ", The Company 
Lawyer, (2000), Vol. 21, No. 5, London, Oyez Publishing Limited, at p 143. 
111 Ferran (above, note 2) at p 245. 
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they have no duty to exert any active involvement in control of their investee 
companies. "' 
As institutional shareholders have been passive, some political and economic theorists 
have taken the view that the prevailing passivity of institutions that makes either the 
very exercise of shareholder control obsolete or the proper functioning of it faulty 
cannot be cured. They both emphasise on the elimination of institutions" right to vote. 
Nonetheless, while political thinkers want this in the interest of the proper functioning 
of the shareholder control mechanism' 13 , economists' intention is to allow the specialist 
management seize control of companies. ' 14 These proposals have attracted little 
support in the current English company law and among legal scholars. "' Considering 
the significant benefits which associate with the shareholder control and looking at the 
potential ability of institutions to exercise control, they have taken the view that 
institutional passivity can be cured with policies taken by regulators that encourage 
activism among institutions. These policies can take one of the following two forms: 
112 Mayson Et. Al. (above, note 64) at p 440; Smith T. A., ""Institutions and Entrepreneurs in 
American Corporate Finance, "', (1997), 85 Calif. L Rev. 1, Berkeley, Calif., University of California, 
School of Jurisprudence; Birds Et. Al. (above, note 2) at pp 345-6; Ratner (above, note 4) at p 26. 
113 For example, Ratner argues that institutional shareholders' passivity has caused a gap in the 
market for managerial services because with passive functioning of institutions managers 
would be able to be re-elected with the opposition of dispersed individual shareholders. [Ratner 
lbid]. 
114 Easterbrook & Fischel (above, note 65) at pp 403,426; For a detailed discussion about 
different sorts of proposals for limiting or abolishing voting rights of institutional shareholders 
see Farrar (above, note 15) at pp 603-4. 
115 Company Law Reform, "'Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report", 
(London, DTI, 2001), URN/942 & URN/943, paras 1.52,1.56-1-57,3.51; Nolan RC, "'Indirect 
Invetors: A Greater Say in The Company? ", (2003), 3 Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 73, at pp 
73-7. 
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111.1.6.1. Imposition of legal duty 
Some company law scholars proposed that the law should increase responsibilities of 
institutional shareholders and in particular make them use their voting power on an 
informed basis. Proponents of this view believe that institutional participation will add 
value to companies because it may positively influence the management by suggesting 
efficiency enhancing proposals. "' Also, institutional participation can encourage 
accountability among managers helping achievement of efficiency in companies which 
further improves market competitiveness for managerial services. "' 
While the very issue of the increased responsibility is a commonplace matter, in 
determining what source supply such responsibility views differ among the 
proponents of this view. To some, it is a matter of the relationship between 
institutional shareholders, other interested groups, and investee companies. By buying 
shares, institutional shareholders assume duty to show active participation in control 
of their investee company because their conduct may have impact on other interest 
groups. 118 To some others, it is a matter of the relationship between institutional 
shareholders and their beneficiaries as indirect investors. ' According to this 
argument, voting rights of institutional shareholders originally belong to their 
116 See Bebchuk (above, note 75) at pp 47-63. 
117 See generally Ferran (above, note 2) at pp 248-9. 
118 "... Given that the arrival or departure of an institution as shareholder may substantially 
affect share prices, It is not surprising that it has been argued that the institutions have a duty 
not to sell their holdings if dissatisfaction with management arise, but to stay on and work to 
remedy any wrongs. A controlling shareholder has responsibility to the other shareholders, 
employees and even consumers... " [Farrar (above, note 15) at pp 599-600]; See also Black 
(above, note 54) at p 572; Moody P. E., "A More Active Role for Institutional Investors", (1979), 
Vic Barker, February 1979, at p 49. 
119 Nolan (above, note 115) at p 73; MacNeil 2005 (above, note 20) at pp 259-260. 
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beneficiaries to whom institutional shareholders have duty to exercise actively rather 
than to stay passive or simply exit from the company. "' 
Company law currently knows no duty of the sort suggested by the two above- 
mentioned propositions. On the one hand, it is now a setteled issue that shareholder 
voting is a free mechanism 121 that allows shareholders to choose between voting and 
failing to vote absolutely free of duty. "' Shares and their attached voting rights are 
seen as property of shareholders. There is no obligation on corporate shareholders to 
vote with a view to what other persons may consider to be in the interests of the 
company. 
12' Although, the Allen case' 
24 imposes some duty on majority shareholders, it 
never compels the majority to participate and vote. Nor, it requires the majority to 
disregard of their personal interests. "' Furthermore, Imposition of any legal duty on 
institutional shareholders "would constitute an unwarranted fetter on the institution-s 
freedom to manoeuvre' 
126 
and, as Ferran observed, it is very likely that as a result of 
such duty imposition, institutional shareholders adopt a "box-ficking' behaviour 
because a discharge of any such duty requires institutions to be informed when they 
are voting and this might be very difficult and costly to ask them search for 
information. 127 On the other hand, although institutional shareholders have duty to act 
120 Curzan Myron P. & Pelesh Mark L., ""Revitalizing Corporate Democracy: Control of 
Investment Managers' Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues", (1980), Harvard Law 
Review, 670, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Law Review Publishing Association, at p 694; MacNeil 
2005 (above, note 20) at pp 259-261. 
121 Burland v. Earle, (1902), A. C. 83; North West Transportation Co Ltd. v. Beatty, (1887), 12 
App. CAS. 589. 
122 See Burland v. Earle, (1902), AC 83; Northwest Transportation Co Ltd. v. Beatty, (1887), 12 
App CAS. 589; Pender v. Lushington, (1877), 6 Ch. D. 70. 
123 Pender v. Lushington, (1877), 6 Ch. D. 70. 
124 Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa, Limited (1900), 1 Ch. 656 per Lindley M. R. at p 671. 
125 See above, at IV. 1.5. 
126 Farrar (above, note 15) at p 599. 
127 Ferran (above, note 2) at pp 248-9. 
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for the benefit of their beneficiaries, but this is a duty to be exercised in a general sense 
without prescribing the ways in which this duty might be discharged and yet 
institutional shareholders remain the final judge of their preferred way of conduct in 
their investee companies. Also, 'the person entitled to vote is the registered owner of a 
share and company law prohibits the interests of any other persons being recorded in a 
company's register of shareholders'. "' Company law, therefore, clearly rejects the idea 
that institutions act as intermediary and hence their right to vote should be passed to 
their beneficiaries as indirect investors. 129 
The debate over whether or not to impose a statutory duty on institutional 
shareholders is also manifested in recent attempts of the British government to refonn 
company law. In 1999, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) which was 
authorised to review company law took the view that it is probably better to impose a 
statutory duty on institutional shareholders and proposed that 'it may take legislative 
steps to oblige the institutions to make use of their votes'. "O The view was later put by 
the government in the form of a clause in the proposed Companies Bill which 
conferred a reserve power to the Treasury or the Secretary of State to mandate 
disclosure of voting by institutional investors. "' Subsequently, however, the 
mentioned clause was eliminated from the Bill and now the Companies Act 2006 
includes only a much more relaxed duty which generally requires persons who hold 
128 MacNeil (2005), (above, note 20) at p 260; see also Nolan (above, note 115) at pp 73-80. 
129 Section 360, Companies Act 1985 and Regulation 5 Table A in the Companies (Tables A-F), 
(Sl 1985/805). 
130 DTI, Consultation Paper, "'Company General Meetings and Shareholders Communication", 
(1999) at 13.23. 
131 The Companies Bill (108-16 May 2006) Volume 11, Clause 876, available from the DTI 
website at the following address: 
http: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/pabills/200506/companies. htm. 
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shares on behalf of others to inform companies of the way they have exercised their 
voting rights. "' 
111.1.6.2. Self-regulation 
Successive review committees of the Combined Code on corporate governance and 
their supporters argue that institutional passivity is best remedied through adoption of 
some non-statutory regulations and self-regulatory rules of conduct rather than by 
imposing some legal duty. From this perspective, Combined Code and regulations of 
the like are products of shortcomings of the existing market-directed and company law 
developed control mechanisms on managerial misbehaviours. By drafting some non- 
statutory but standardized regulations in respect of corporate governance issues, the 
drafters focused attention to raise the corporate governance culture in the hope that 
companies, shareholders and directors will gradually adopt the proposed models at 
Wiii. 
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The Combined Code in particular targets public listed companies exclusively and is 
generally divided into two sections. The first section relates to companies as it seeks to 
propose companies certain solutions to publicly expressed concerns about the role of 
directors, their remuneration, reappointment and accountability and the issue of audit. 
In particular, it requires company boards to ensure that their companies listen to 
shareholders' views and concerns. 134 The second section relates to the institutional 
shareholders and very gently recommends them to "enter into a dialogue with 
132 Companies Act 2006, sections 152-153. 
133 The Combined Code, (2003), preamble, Para 5. 
134 The Combined Code, (2003), Section 1, Para D 1. 
132 
companies based on the mutual understanding of objectives". "' In this section, the 
policy of the Combined Code is to encourage activism among the institutional 
shareholders, aiming importantly to improve managerial behaviour through 
persuading institutional shareholders to use their voting power responsibly. "' The 
Code has deliberately chosen institutional shareholders as it is sufficiently clear from 
its background that the majority of 80 percent of shareholders in listed companies 
including overseas companies are institutional in nature and hence any discussion of 
the role of shareholders must focus on the institutions"' (pension funds, insurance 
companies, and investment trusts and other collective investment vehicles as defined 
by the Institutional Shareholders Committee' 38). 
While regulations of the first section are sanctioned by the Listing Rules"9, no statutory 
rule mandates regulations of the second section. Listing rules only govern the conduct 
of companies that wish their shares to be listed in the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
They are not concerned with the way shareholders of such companies conduct in their 
135 The Combined Code, (2003), Section 2, Para E 1. 
136 The Combined Code, (2003), Section 2, Para E 3; the same was also stated in the Hampel 
Committee's report: "they (institutional shareholders) have a responsibility to make considered 
use of their votes that they should be ready to enter into a dialogue with companies based on 
the mutual understanding of objectives and they should give due weight to all relevant factors". 
[Hampel Committee, "'The Combined Code: A Practical Guide", (October 1999)]. 
137 Dignam Alan, "'A Principled Approach to Self-Regulation? The report of The Hampel 
Committee on Corporate Governance"', (1998), The Company Lawyer, 19 (5) 140, London, Oyez 
Publishing Limited, at pp 147-148; see also above, at note 55. 
138 The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents - Statements of Principles, 
available at the following website: www. Investmentuk. org. uk /press. 
139 Although adoption of the proposed solutions of the Code is entirely voluntary, compliance 
of regulations of this part is given some level of command through the mechanism of the so- 
called 'comply or explain' in the Listing Rules. [see The Combined Code, (2003), preamble Para 
4 and 9; Draper Michael G, Partner, Brown Turner Kenneth, "'Corporate Governance", Law 
Socicty's Gazette, (1992), vol. 89, No 26, p 25] As this research is primarily concerned to the 
second section, any further discussion in relation to the first part of the Code goes beyond the 
patience of the research and has to be traced elsewhere. 
133 
portfolio company. 140 Such conduct principally and as far as it does not go beyond the 
limits of the company law is considered to be forming part of shareholders' right of 
property and freedom. However, it is always possible for shareholders to regulate the 
way they conduct. This is the case for institutional shareholders as their conduct is 
governed on a self-regulatory basis by the regulations designed by the Institutional 
Shareholders Committee, which is comprised of representatives from Association of 
British Insurers, Association of Investment Trust Companies, National Association of 
Pension Funds and Investment Management Association. In pursuance to the 
Combined Code, it sets out principles of best practice for institutional shareholders in 
relation to their responsibilities in respect of investee companies and generally requires 
such institutions to adopt the policy of activism and provide a clear and publicly 
accessible statement on such policy and on how they will discharge their 
responsibilities. 
141 
140 MacNeil, lain, "Competition and Convergence in Corporate Regulation: 
The Case of 
Overseas Listed Companies", available at The Social Science Research 
Network website in the 
following address: www. ssm. com, Corporate Law & 
Governance Working Paper Series, 
autumn 2001 (SSRN ID 278508 code 
010812600. pdo. 
141 The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents, 
(above, note 138). 
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111.2. The case of Iran 
This part is about, from the Iranian company law viewpoint, examination of how the 
rule of majority works in joint stock companies. The examination, as we have earlier 
seen, concerns the mechanism of shareholder voting and my intention is to show how 
opportunistically it can be used by the majority against minority shareholders. One 
important point to consider is that Iranian company law on this matter is considerably 
similar to the English company law. It was submitted in Chapter one that the idea of 
modem company which enjoys separate personality and works with the majority rule 
was imported from the European model to the Iranian trade law. Iranian context was 
not ready to allow evolution of the majority rule based on voting mechanism and 
hence no effort on the part of academics was made in order to theorise and 
institutionalize such idea in business vehicles. In the early twentieth century, however, 
the Iranian government rapidly decided to westernise the economy and law by 
referring to the European countries' eonomies and laws and such westernisation 
included business vehicles and company law too. As a result, company law was 
adopted on the model of European countries' laws. Adoption allowed Iranian 
company law to assimilate, in great part, many of the ideas and mechanisms which 
existed in the English company law and, thus, many of the issues about voting 
mechanism that I have discussed earlier in the English part can be raised and answered 
similarly. These aside, there are also some divergence between the two company laws 
on this matter. To avoid unnecessary repetition of discussion, my intention in this part 
is to entinciate similarities and dissimilarities of the two systems. 
135 
There are inevitable similarities between Iranian and English company laws about 
shares and voting mechanism. For one, corporate shares can be classified into two 
categories of ordinary and preference shares"', as can be divided so in English 
company law. For another, Iranian companies, like their English counterparts enjoy the 
rule of majority"' that works on the basis of 'one share, one vote. 
144 Further, both the 
majority rule and the rule of 'one share, one vote" are like the English model default 
rules and have contractual nature. 145 Similarly, nature of majority and minority can in 
theory and in law compose of varying elements depending on different issues which 
come up for collectiove decision-making in shareholder meetings. In addition to these, 
Iranian and English company laws have approached similarly on the shareholder 
voting and its limits. It is now a setteled issue in Iranian law, as it is in its English 
counterpart, that voting is right and not duty and hence shareholders have discretion 
to exercise it freely. 146 At the same time, they commonly put similar limitation on 
controlling shareholders when they take corporate decisions. As the exercise of 
majority right in English company law is subject to observation of the equal treatment 
142 Section 24 JSCA and its note 2. 
143 Sections 86,87,88 and 103 JSCA. 
144 Sotoodeh Tehrani Hasan, ""Trade Law", (1997), Tehran, Dehkhoda Publication, vol. 2, at pp 
121,124; Hoseingoli Katebi, "Trade Law"' (1994), 6th ed., Vol. 2, Tehran, Ganjedanesh 
Publication, at p 79; Azami Zangeneh Abdolmajid, "'Commercial Law" (1974), 4th ed., Tehran, 
University of Tehran Publication, at p 119; Erfani Mahmood, "Abuse of Job and Power in the 
Law of Iran", Comparative Law Institution Monthly (1981), No 7, University of Tehran 
Publication, 
Tehran, at pp 148-231; Seghari Mansoor, "'Definition of Business Corporation", 
in Private Law 
Developments, Edited by Katoozian Naser (1993), Tehran University Publications, at p 199; 
Eskini Rabiaa, "Trade Law: Business Corporations" (2000), Vol. 2, Samt Publication, Tehran, at 
p 78. 
145 "Shareholders' meetings are formed by gathering of shareholders. Rules relevant to quorum 
and required votes for taking collective decisions are 
determined in the company's articles of 
association unless where the Act prescribes a particular method" 
[Section 72 JSCAJ; Ebadi 
Mohammad Ali, "Trade Law", (1972), Chehr Publication Co., Tehran, at pp 96-99; Sotoodeh 
(above, note 144) at p 119; Eskini (above, note 144) at p 83. 
146 Sotoodeh (above, note 144) at pp 117-118. 
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141 rule established in the Allen case , Iranian company law offers an equality principle 
which compels controllers to treat shareholders equally. The principle which works in 
default of a contrary shareholder agreement is understood by implication from the 
meaning of a number of sections in the JSCA. 
14' Lastly, in both systems voting 
functions the same; to fill contractual gaps and to control companies. 
Similarities aside, Iranian company law has diverged from the English model in certain 
areas. To begin with, while decisively important for financing English companies, 
private institutions in the English sense; i. e. institutional shareholders; do not exist in 
Iran, as most financial institutions including banks and insurance companies are state 
controlled. Few private institutions, which have succeeded to obtain licence from the 
state in order to offer financial services, play little role in Iranian corporations. They 
often either do not want to invest in large corporations or even if they want they will 
face prohibition. Financing large corporations, which are often dominated by the state 
and its dependant organisations, can politically and economically be too risky. Large 
scale projects and main industries too most of the times fall within the state 
monopoly. 149 As a result, institutional shareholders are almost absent in the Iranian 
corporate sector. Unlike institutions, individual investors seem interested to invest 
147 See this Chapter (above, para 111.1.5). 
148 See sections 32,33,42,75,93,99,148,166,168,189, and 264 (1) JSCA. 
149 Large corporations which are under state control suffer from unsuccessful management 
while enjoying rent from their monopolies. Private sector, on the other 
hand, is liable to risks 
caused by political instability which emerged after the Iranian revolution of 
1979, in particular 
the risks of nationalisation and confiscation. [See Jalah Naini, Ahmad R., 
"Capital Accumulation 
and Economic Growth in Iran: Past Experience and Future Prospects", 
Iranian Studies, Volume 
38, number 1,91, March (2005); Saeidi, Ali A., "Charismatic Political Authority and 
Populist 
Economics in Post-Revolutionary Iran", Third World Quarterly, (2001), Vol 22, No 2,219-236, at 
pp 221-21. 
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money in large corporations which are controlled by the government, as such 
companies are liable to less political and economic risks. "' 
Corporations in Iran and England have also diverged on the issue of 
variability /stability of the nature of majority rule. While large companies in England 
may have majority rule made up of varying elements, Iranian companies whether large 
or small are normally controlled by one or few dominant shareholders who can stablise 
the majority nature in every issue that comes up for appropriate majority resolution in 
shareholder meetings. This divergence is a consequence of differing governance 
structures which exist in Iranian and English companies. "' 
Another divergence is that the issue of shareholder control has never been 
controversial in the Iranian company law. As Iranian corporations enjoy a concentrated 
shareholding structure, shareholder control has always been relevant both in theory 
and in practice. As a consequence, most difficulties which stem from the collective 
action in the English large companies have been absent in the Iranian corporations. 
As a further source of divergence, Iranian company law, unlike its English counterpart, 
seems to be unfriendly as to non-voting shares or insertion of a clause 
in the corporate 
articles which deny voting right for a group of shares. Although company statutes 
especially the JSCA stipulate no clear prohibition, it is a conventional view among 
150 Such corporations were often backed up by the governmental support which could 
largely 
minimize economical and political risks to 
individual financing. 
151 See Chapter one (above, para 1.2). 
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Iranian scholars that non-voting shares has no place in Iranian companies. 152 Using the 
logic of section 75 JSCA, which states in a mandatory fashion that every share must 
have at least one vote 153 , they maintain that right to vote is fundamental to the essence 
of company contract and any violation of it makes the very contract void. The reason as 
they say is that non-voting share is to mean separation of ownership from control, 
something which makes the contract too risky and which is undesirable in law and 
prohibited in Islam. They also argue that non-voting share is in nature debentures, as 
they both do not allow holders to participate in control of companies. 
154 
They, 
however, add that while it is not possible to issue non-voting shares, exercise of voting 
right can be subjected through limitations inserted in articles.. and it is further 
possible to a shareholder to transact their right in return for consideration. 
156 
As I 
explained earlier in Chapter one, of the main reasons upon which Iranian law adopted 
the European model rather than the Anglo-Americn model was the formers capability 
for being adjusted as to accommodate traditional contracts which focused on 
concentration of ownership and control. 
157 
Yet, for a number of good reasons one can remain sceptical as to the force of the 
conventional view. For one, the invoked provision is only relevant to the founders 
meeting and cannot be used to establish such conclusion in respect of other meetings. 
152 Sotoodeh (above, note 144) at pp 114-119; Erfani Mahmood, ""Trade Law", (1999), Jehade 
Daneshgahi Institute Publication (Majed), Tehran, Vol. 2, at p 68; Ebadi (above note 159) at pp 
96-99. 
153 "... In founders' meeting, every subscriber and founder has right to attend and every share 
will have one vote. " [Note under Section 75 JSCAJ. 
154 Sotoodeh (above, note 144) at p 118. 
155 Ebadi (above note 145) at pp 96-99; Rastiin Mansoor, "Commercial Law", (1975), University 
of Tehran Publications, Tehran, 3rd ed., at p 118. 
156 Eskini (above, note 144) at p 85. 
157 See Chapter one, (above, para 1.2). 
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For another, the language and wording of the relevant statutes in respect of 
extraordinary and ordinary meetings imply that a company may issue non-voting 
shares. 158 Further, regulatory rules which exist in Tehran Stock Exchnge (TSE) listings 
suggest that it is possible for companies to issue non-voting shares. 15' Also non-voting 
shares diverge from debenture, as they enjoy participatory right and for example allow 
their holders to attend meetings and get access to the information in relation to the 
affairs of the company. Too, while it is possible to transact voting right, it is not very 
certain why it is not possible to allow such transaction to take place at the very 
beginning where an issuing company seeks to issue non-voting shares. In addition to 
these, a non-voting shareholder will always have power to transfer its shares to likely 
buyers and more importantly such shareholder is able to enforce corporate rights 
against faulty directors, as are voting shareholders. "' 
158 For example sections 84 and 87 (JSCA) while providing the requirement of quorum for a 
formally valid meeting of ordinary and extra ordinary indicate that for such meetings 
participation of those shareholders who have voting rights is necessary. This language connotes 
two meanings. The direct meaning is the one, which is understood by the literal wording. And 
the indirect one that suggests participation of those who lack voting right is not necessary for 
such meetings. 
159 One of the requirements for shares of public companies to be allowed for listing in the 
Tehran Stock Exchange is to bear voting right. If it were legally impossible to issue non-voting 
shares, providing such requirement would seem absurd. [See TSE Listing Rules available in 
Farsi at the following website: http: //www. irbourse. com/FForms/gavanin/Section4. aspx#Bl]. 
160 Section 276 JSCA. 
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111-3. Conclusion 
This Chapter considered the nature of the majority rule. It concerned reviewing the 
relevance of voting mechanism in the majority/ minority shareholder relationship. It 
sought to demonstrate and examine the mechanism through which the majority rule 
works whereby to show how the rule can opportunistically be used by the controlling 
shareholders and how effective company laws or other elements in the two systems 
have curbed such abusive behaviour. It was made clear that the majority rule, which 
allows majority shareholders to exert control in corporations, works through the 
mechanism of voting. As shareholders vote in shareholder meetings, they apply 
control over corporate affairs too. Nonetheless, not every shareholder holds and exerts 
the same control. The degree of shareholder control can differ depending on the 
number of votes a shareholder may have. Thus, voting can affect the nature of the 
majority rule. As the principle of majority rule in corporations relies on the 'one share, 
one vote" rule, the resault is those who possess more shares will have more control. 
This is to mean as much as control depends on voting, voting itself depends on share 
ownership. In the normal course of arrangements every share endows one vote to its 
holder and this is to mean that principally it is the size of shareholder investment that 
determines how much control a shareholder might have and exercise although this is a 
default rule that can be displaced through contract. 
Voting can also affect the nature of majority rule where shareholders vote in respect of 
differing issues. A change of the subject issue which is to be decided in shareholder 
meeting may give rise to a former majority composed of certain shareholders becomes 
subsequently substituted by a new majority with different components. In other 
words, the nature of majority rule is variable. Nevertheless, in reality the nature of the 
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rule can often vary in companies which rely on external financing and which lack 
presence of one or few controlling shareholders. In such companies, the variable nature 
of majority rule can offer some safeguard to small shareholders, as no shareholder 
possesses corporate shares enough to exerct control over different affairs. Where 
corporations have a majority group, which can be made up of the same elements for 
every issue raised at shareholder meetings, such safeguard is absent. For such 
corporations, the nature of the rule remains almost always stable. A corollary is that 
while corporations of the first category are exposed to less majority/ minority conflict, 
their counterparts in the second category can be liable to that conflict more. Yet, the 
variable nature of majority rule, which occurs in corporations of the former category, 
can never eliminate the conflict. Sometimes one or few active but relatively small 
shareholders can yet control companies not because they have sufficient fifty percent 
shareholding but rather because in such cases dispersed shareholding plus collective 
action problem contribute to reduce the degree and amount of shareholding one needs 
to exert de facto control. 
The mere fact that one or few shareholders exert control in corporations, using the 
majority rule is not bad at all. In fact, such control, as we have earlier seen, is desirable 
and necessay. " What raises concern is only abuse of control which can occur where 
those who possess majority of shares and exert de jure control, or else where those who 
control companies de facto, use their voting rights opportunistically. In pursuit of 
private benefits, such persons may sacrifice minority interests when voting in 
shareholder meetings. Voting is principally regarded in law as right that leaves 
161 See this Chapter above at 111.1 . 4.3 and Chapter one above. 
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shareholders with freedom in the exercise of it. It carries no duty which could instruct 
shareholders in respect of how to vote and this could mean every shareholder while 
voting can consult with their personal interests and can further ignore interests of their 
fellow shareholders. Thus, it is the shareholder control plus absolute freedom in the 
exercise of it that can generate risk and raise concern for minority protection. To 
address such concern, both private contracting and company law could be relevant. As 
to the former, it was made clear that contract parties have always the choice to displace 
the rule or put on it some limitation that deviates the 'one share, one vote rule'. 
Nonetheless, as any such limitation can affect majority shareholders sharply, they are 
in practice uncommon among shareholders. As to the latter, both English and Iranian 
company laws impose legal duty on controlling shareholders which requires them 
exercise rights non-discriminatory. Nonetheless, the function of such duty as to 
preserving minority interests is limited as it currently covers only obvious 
discriminations and, as a result, many cases which involve informal discrimination can 
escape prosecution. 
As institutional shareholders have been substantial investors in English corporations, I 
considered in this Chapter the relevance of their financing as to the majority/ minority 
conflict. I wanted to see whether the potential controlling power, which is held by such 
shareholders, could do anything remarkable as to protecting minority rights. No 
doubt, they are important as to the shareholder/ management conflict. As shareholder 
control is often lost and mismanagement persists in English large corporations, they 
could serve to enable shareholder control hereby to curb mismanagement. My 
investigation, however, showed that they have been passive in practice. This means 
they actually changed nothing important in the shareholder/ management conflict, 
because they tended not to use their voting rights against management. As to the 
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majority/ minority conflict, too, they have done nothing because they do not want to 
get involved in control of corporations. Even if they wanted to get some involvement, 
they could have changed nothing in the interest of minority shareholders, as they 
could only form another example of a power bloc in corporations. 
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Chapter IV: Relevance of directors' role 
Chapters one to three concerned reviewing the majority rule as being a direct control 
device. They sought to show how majority shareholders could make a direct use of the 
rule in order to take self-interested and opportunistic resolutions against minority 
shareholders. This aside, another aspect of the majority rule which requires 
consideration is the one that allows majority shareholders to exert indirect control over 
corporations. Such control is often exerted through corporate directors who are 
principally appointed and monitored by majority shareholders. While being under 
such control, directors are required in law to take impartial decisions and regard 
matters which best benefit the company as a whole rather than only the majority 
shareholders. They therefore can be a device which empowers majority control or else 
a device which reduces the likelihood of abuse by majority shareholders. Thus, 
directors' role is important for the purpose of my discussion as it shows how directors 
can be either a hinder or a help as to minority protection. This Chapter seeks to 
demonstrate and examine from such aspect the corporate directors' role as to the 
majority/ minority conflict. It concerns, in particular, consideration of directors" duties 
both on matters of substance and enforcement. Corporate directors, it is said, can play 
some role in n-d-nimising the possibility Of majority abuse. They exercise certain key 
corporate powers which otherwise would have fallen within the authority of majority 
shareholders. Unlike shareholders, they assume duties imposed by law which require 
them to act carefully, impartially and loyally when they exercise such powers. ' 
I Section 309(2) Companies Act 1985 provides that directors' duty is owed only to the company 
and not its shareholders or any other interested groups, though the matters to which they are to 
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Company law also offer internal mechanisms of control which enable shareholders to 
enforce these legally imposed duties of directors. Thus, they are much more likely, 
contrast to majority shareholders, to exercise corporate power in a manner which is for 
the benefit of the company and its shareholders generally. However, there are reasons 
both in respect of the contents of director duties and about the currently existing 
enforcement mechanisms that suggest their role is not very remarkable as to resolving 
majority/ minority conflicts and can sometimes be problematic. I say problematic 
because an amalgamation of malfunctioning which stems from substance and 
enforcement of directors' duties has enabled directors to commit, in different ways and 
varying degrees, mismanagement in both English and Iranian companies. To address 
maters of substance, I must examine law relevant to liability of directors which is most 
reflected in directors' legally imposed duties of fiduciary and care and which I examine 
them first. Then, I will address matters of enforcement, which concern internal control 
mechanisms that currently exist in company laws of England and Iran. Divergence in 
corporate governance structures and the role of market in aligning wayward directors 
are also pertinent issues which will be discussed afterwards. 
have regard in the performance of their functions include the interests of the companies' 
employees in general, as well as the interests of its members. 
[See section 309(l) Companies Act 
19851. 
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IV. 1. The case of England 
IV. 1.1. Matters of substance 
The touchstone argument here is that while on the one hand exercise of corporate 
power by directors can be beneficial to minority shareholders, it can, on the other hand, 
be disadvantageous especially because directors are liable to mismanagement, 
something that affects every shareholder. The absence of mismanagement is efficient 
and desirable because it allows companies to attract more investment and to allocate 
those investments to their optimum use with minimum possible costs. However, 
mismanagement can reduce the extent to which companies can work efficiently both ex 
ante and ex post. At the initial financing stage, it reduces the extent to which investors 
are ready to provide finance for the use of corporations. When financing is complete, it 
reduces the size of corporate funds that otherwise would be available to corporations 
to put into business and to make profit. Mismanagement has recently been an issue of 
public concern in the England. In the early 1990s, millions of pounds of investors' 
money were lost in unsuccessful public companies that went insolvent unexpectedly. 
In most cases that were investigated, mismanagement (managerial indirect stealing 
and poor performance) was identified as a prime cause of these 
failures. ' Several 
review committees emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s in the 
England to address the 
2 See generally Smerdon, Richard, "A Practical Guide to 
Corporate Governance", (1998), Sweet 
& Maxwell, London, at pp 37,52; Cheffins, Brian R., "Current Trends in Corporate 
Governance: 
Going from London to Milan via Toronto", Duke Journal of Comparative & International 
Law, 
(1999), Vol. 10, No. 5, at pp 16-17. 
3 Cheffins, Ibid. 
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issue of mismanagement in public listed companies. 4 Yet they did not succeed in 
solving the problem and thus mismanagement continues to survive in corporations. 
Mismanagement is a matter of principal/agent relationship. Managers, as agents, are 
employed by companies to direct the business of the principal. Companies and their 
investors need managements" specialised skills to produce returns on their investment. 
Managers, on the other hand, need investors' funds since they either do not have 
enough money of their own or want to cash out their investment and exit. This 
principal/agent relationship is normally put in the form of a service contract whose 
rules as well as the rules of company constitutions determine the purpose and extent of 
power conferred to management. But contracts cannot be completely certain, 
addressing every existing and future contingency ex ante. Many important governance 
and business issues may thus occur all the way through the life of companies that 
require ex post decision-making. Company investors may often find it impractical or 
unprofessional to take such decisions and may want to vest discretion to make such 
decisions in management. Thus, they often prefer to draft their contract with some 
degree of uncertainty in the hope that future events will go right with loyal and careful 
management and that the law will be able to address likely future deviations of 
management. This hope, however, is sometimes disappointed. Once in power, 
management may want either to pursue self-interested projects or may simply pay 
inadequate attention to the affairs and business of their companies. 
4 See the successive reports of The Cadbury and Hampel committees in 1990s (Cadbury 
Committee, "Internal control and financial reporting: draft guidance for directors of listed 
companies developed in response to the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee", 1994, 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, London; Hampel Committee, "The 
Combined Code: A Practical Guide", October-1999, London, UK) and the latest report of Mr 
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Mismanagement often occurs when managers run the affairs and business of their 
company poorly or self-interestedly. It can be defined as a decision taken or 
misconduct implemented by directors that involves negligence. Broadly defined 
nusmanagement can cover any negligent behaviour. In a narrow sense and seen from 
the perspective of possible recovery, however, it only covers negligent behaviours of 
directors that constitute breach of duty. A negligent act is not necessarily a source of 
liability. That is to say, not any negligence is pursuable in law. While serious 
mismanagement confers on the affected company the right to hold the negligent 
director liable, mere mismanagement though involving negligence has no such effect. 
Two divisions, therefore, can be identified: one, between fine management and 
mismanagement generally, and the other, between serious and mere mismanagement. 
The first division is commonly used in civil and common-law jurisdictions when 
dealing with matters of liability of corporate directors for negligence. However, the 
second seems to be unique to the common law. 
The division between serious mismanagement, on the one hand, and mere 
mismanagement, on the other hand, has been repeatedly recognised by the English 
courts. ' A company director is held liable for the former, while he is seen free from 
liability for the latter. ' In response to a bad business decision, either there is a breach of 
Derek Higgs and Mr Robert Smith (The Combined Code on Corporate Governance" published 
on January 2003). 
5 Thomas Giblin v. John Franklin McMullen (1868), LR 2PC 317; Re City Equitable Fire and 
Insurance Co. Ltd (1925) Ch 407; Lagunas Nitrate Company v. Lagunas Syndicate (1899) 2 Ch 
392; The Overend & Gurney Company v. Thomas Jones Gibb and John Darby Gibb (1872) LR 5 
HL 480. 
6 See generally Trebilcock, M. J., "Liability of Company Directors for Negligence", Modern Law 
Review, (1969), 32,499, London, Stevens & Sons; Finch, Vanessa, "'Company Directors: Who 
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duty giving the company the right to pursue its negligent director for the recovery of 
loss suffered, 7 or there is a mere mismanagement for which the law offers no response 
and, as a result, for which the courts abdicate their jurisdiction in favour of the 
companies' own internal forum. ' 
Serious mismanagement, therefore, involves either a breach of duty of care or a breach 
of fiduciary duty and I examine each in the following discussions. 
W. M. A. Duty of care 
The duty of care of corporate directors is a mechanism devised by company law to 
address the issue of liability of corporate directors for honest n-dsmanagement. It is in 
fact an example of the duty of care imposed through the tort law under the general 
heading of negligence-9 This duty builds on moral and policy considerations. These 
considerations suggest that 'if a person undertakes a role whose performance involves 
Cares About Skill and Care? ", (1992), 55: 2, Modern Law Review, 179, at p 187-9; Griffin, Stephen, 
"'Negligent Mismanagement as Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct"', (1992), The Law Quarterly Review, 
Vol. 108,389, London, Stevens and Sons, at pp 390-392; Arsalidou, Demetra, "Objectivity vs 
Flexibility in Civil Law jurisdictions and The Possible Introduction of The Business Judgement 
Rule in English Law"', (2003), Company Lawyer, 24 (8), 228, London, Oyez Publishing Limited, at 
p 230; Wedderbum, "Minority Shareholders and Directors" Duties", (1978), 41 Modern Law 
Review 569; Hagland Gary, "Company Law - Turnbull in FSA Perspective", 2001, Informa 
Publishing Group Ltd., CM 13.8 368. 
7 Re City Equitable Fire and Insurance Co. Ltd (1925) Ch 407; Lagunas Nitrate Company v. 
Lagunas Syndicate (1899) 2 Ch 392; Bamford v. Bamford, (1970), LR Ch P 212; Re Cardiff 
Savings Bank (1892) 2 Ch 100; Norman & Anor v. Theodore Goddard & Others (1992), BCC, p 
14 per Hoffman J; Atwool v. Merryweather (1867), LR 5 Eq 464n; Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph 
Works (1874), 9 Ch App 350; Dafn Tinplate Co. Ltd. v. Llanelly Steel Co. (1920) 2 Ch. 124; 
Edwards v. Halliwell (1950), 2 All ER 1064; Daniels v. Daniels, (1978), Ch 406; Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2), (1981), Ch 257; Estmanco (Kilner House) 
Ltd v. Greater London Council (1982) 1WLR 2. 
8 Pavlides v. Jensen, (1956), Ch 565; Turquand v. Marshall, (1868-69), (L R), 4 Ch App 376 at p 
386. 
9 Worthington, Sarah, "Reforming Directors' Duties", 64: 3, Modern Law Review, 439 (2001), 
Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, at p 449. 
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the risk of injury to others, he is under a duty to perform functions of that role 
carefully'. 10 
In company law, contents of the duty of care may differ from that imposed under the 
general law on other persons. While tort law may require persons to take as much care 
as can be reasonably expected of them, company law allows directors to take risks. The 
roots of this difference go back to traditional case law where judges often emphasised 
that different classes of persons may assume substantively different duties of care. As 
Romer J, for example, emphasized, people may assume different degree of duty of care 
depending on their class. " It follows that there is not one and the same duty for all 
people. A traditional example is the case for directors and trustees. While a trustee is 
required to avoid risks, " directors are encouraged to take risks, as taking commercial 
risks in corporations is seen not only desirable but also necessary. " Yet, it is not very 
certain where the line is to be drawn between the degree of care required for a director 
and that required for a trustee, given that there are also some authorities that require 
the same degree of duty from both directors and trustees. 14 
10 Eisenberg, Melvin Aron, "'The Duty of Care and The Business judgement Rule in American 
Corporate Law", (1997), Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review, 185 Oxford, Mansfield 
Press, at p 186. 
11 Lagunas Nitrate Company v. Lagunas Syndicate (1899), 2 Ch 392 at 394 per Romer J. 
12 In Sheffield and South Yorkshire Permanent Building Society v Aizlewood (1890) 44 Ch D 
412, for example, it was held that directors are not trustees in the ordinary sense of the word but 
are "commercial men managing a business for the benefit of themselves and the other 
members"; See also Re City Equitable Fire and Insurance Co. Ltd (1925) Ch 407. 
13 it is desirable because that is very likely to enhance corporate gains. It is also necessary 
because business circumstances are not entirely certain and as a result managing affairs of a 
business corporation often involves dealing with great commercial risks. 
14 Charitable Corporation v. Sutton, (1742), 2 Atk. 400 at p 405-406 per Lord Hardwicke. 
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The question of how successful company law has been in addressing the issue of 
honest mismanagement is to be considered in the light of its favoured standard of duty 
of care. To explain, it is possible, for example, to have a negligent director exempted 
from liability if in a given case the judge takes as a standard someone with the same 
competence as that of the defendant. A similar director in like circumstances may 
assume liability for the same sort of negligence if the judge takes as a standard a 
hypothetical reasonable person with a minimum level of competence. Sometimes the 
judges might simply want to consider themselves as the model of practice for the 
assessment of a defendant directors performance and that may clearly produce 
different results. 
15 
IV. 1.1. A. l. Subjective standard 
The subjective standard emerged more than a century ago when certain judges decided 
not to hold negligent directors responsible for what was beyond the directors' own 
capabilities. 16 The argument was simple. As supporters claimed, it is the purpose of 
law to require directors to do their best when they manage affairs of companies. If this 
is true, then the law should be drafted in a fashion that requires exemption of a 
director from liability when his behaviour matches his own potentials. Imposition of 
liability on directors beyond their own potential is both unfair and useless. 'If the 
defendant was incapable of doing more than she did, then the threat of liability cannot 
15 This third possibility was soon rejected by the case law for obvious reasons. It would require 
the courts to take the management of companies which obviously falls in serious contradiction 
to the traditional attitude of the courts and the logic behind it that suggests the courts should 
not take the management of companies. [The Overend & Gurney Company v. Thomas Jones 
Gibb and John Darby Gibb (1872) LR 5 HL 480 per Lord Hatherley; Turquand v. Marshall (1968- 
69), L. R. Ch. App. Vol. 4, p 386. 
16 Lagunas Nitrate Company v. Lagunas Syndicate (1899) 2 Ch. 392,435. 
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change that". " Moreover, a subjective measure could seem to appropriate mostly with 
the picture of corporate directors" positions under the traditional company law that 
regards it as a non-professional post. " The roots of such an attitude lie in the treatment 
of directors by the early courts as trustees. " Like trustees, directors were expected to 
show no more than that reasonably expected of non-professionals and ordinary 
persons. 'O An early example in British case law can be found in the case of Lagunas 
Nitrate Co. v. Lagunas Syndicate. " This attitude was followed by later decisions that 
constitute the basis of modem law on directors' duty of care. " 
The subjective measure was graded very poorly by many commentators" and was 
later reconsidered by the case law. Critics highlighted several shortfalls. It was thought 
to be too liberal in the sense that it makes it too easy for negligent directors to escape 
liability. The measure further was very likely to increase uncertainty associated with 
rules relating to liability of directors. It could create no bottom line below which a 
17 It would be unfair because it would simply ignore individuals' potentials and entail blaming 
directors for behaviours which they were unable to avoid. [See Riley C. A., "The Company 
Director's Duty of care and Skill: The Case for an Onerous But Subjective Standard"', (Sep-1999), 
The Modern Law Review, vol. 62,697, London, England, Stevens & Sons, at p 7111. 
18 As the Law Commission pointed out 'directors do not require particular skills to discharge 
their duties. A company might appoint a person as a director for some attribute he possesses, 
knowing that he lacks skill in business matters. The Law Commission (LAW COM No 261) and 
The Scottish Law Commission (SCOT LAW COM No 173), "Company Directors: Regulating 
Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties", September 1999, Part 5, at p 481. 
19 See Lord Hardwicke in Charitable Corporation v. Sutton who opined that "(directors) may be 
guilty of acts of commission or omission, of malfeasance or non-feasance ... By accepting a trust 
of this sort, a person is obliged to execute it with fidelity and reasonable diligence; and it is no 
excuse to say that they had no benefit from it, but that it was merely honorary; and therefore, 
they are within the case of common trustees'. [(1742) 2 Atk. 400 at p 405-406 per Lord 
Hardwicke]. 
20 Finch (above, note 6) at p 200. 
21 Lagunas Nitrate Company v. Lagunas Syndicate (1899) 2 Ch. 392,435 per Lindley M. R. 
22 Re City Equitable Fire and Insurance Co. Ltd (1925) Ch 407. 
23 Trebilcock (above, note 6) at pp 97-112; Hemraj, Mohammed B., "'The Business Judgement 
Rule in Corporate Law", (2004), International Company and Commercial Law Review, 15 (6), 192, 
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particular behaviour could definitely be identified as negligent. With it, one could no 
longer use a single rule of liability. Instead, there would be thousands of individual 
rules of liability relative to the number of existing and future directors, 'arguably no 
14 
standard at all". It also would probably encourage professionals to leave the field to 
be occupied by amateurs. " Moreover, 'a subjective standard would be out of line with 
the duties generally imposed on persons who agree to provide services and would also 
be out of step with many other jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada, Germany and 
the USA that require directors to act as reasonable, competent businessmen'. 26 
Yet, one may defend a subjective measure taking the argument that it is very likely to 
increase the number of persons who are ready to accept directorial office and take the 
risk of making business decisions in companies. But this is to be rejected too since the 
mentioned increase could hardly count as value where mainly incompetent individuals 
would be encouraged. 
IV. 1.1. A. 2. Objective standard 
The objective standard was in fact a product of inadequacies associated with the 
subjective measure. " According to this standard, directors" performance should be 
assessed using the likely performance of an ordinary man. This was first recognised by 
London, UK, Sweet & Maxwell, at pp 195-6,207; Bourne, Nicholas, "Directors' Duty of Care and 
Skill", (June-1999), Business Law Review, London, Butterworths, 154-155. 
24 Mackenzie, Allan L., ""A Company Director's Obligations of Care and Skill"', (1982), Journal of 
Business Law, 460, at p 461. 
25 This is because, supposedly, the idea advanced by such a measure is to treat professionals 
more tightly since they are more competent and have more qualifications and experiences. 
By 
contrast, a director who is less competent is also less likely to face 
liability. [Mackenzie Ibid at p 
4691. 
26 The Law Commission (above, note 18) at p 48. 
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Foster J in the case of Dorchester Finance Co. v Stebbing. 2' Foster J was ignorant of the 
nature of the duties undertaken by directors in a given case and limited the application 
of the objective measure to the duty of care as distinguished from the duty of skill. 
Later decisions rejected the attempted distinction and took consideration of the very 
duties undertaken by an alleged negligent director. A clear illustrative case in this 
respect is the Norman & Anor v. Theodore Goddard & Others in which Hoffman J opined 
that a judge should take consideration of the type and nature of duties undertaken by 
him/her and compare their performance with that expected of a reasonable person. " 
However, the proposed objective measure was criticised from two dimensions. One 
concerned the charge that while management of modem corporations is a profession 
with more vigorous obligations attached, the objective standard simply treats them as 
amateurs . 
30 'Many areas of business do require specialized skills and knowledge 
beyond those possessed by the layman'. " Public expectation now requires corporate 
directors not only to meet a minimum degree of relevant knowledge, skills and 
experience, but also to possess a greater degree of competence and to act 
professionally. 32 This charge, although correct in its premise, fails to regard the fact that 
not every director performs the same function. In fact, a single objective standard that 
27 For arguments against an objective test and in favour of having a subjective one, see Riley 
(above, note 17) at pp, 709-720. 
28 Dorchester Finance Co. v Stebbing (1989), BCLC, 498. 
29 Norman & Anor v. Theodore Goddard & Others (1992), BCC, p 14 per Hoffman J. 
Subsequently followed by Hart J. in Re Landhurst Leasing pIc, Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry v. Ball and Others (1999) 1 BCLC 286,344; See also The Law Commission, (above, note 
18), at p 48. 
30 The Company Law Review Steering Group, "'Modem Company Law: Final Report", (2001), 
Vol. 1, pp 31,33. 
31 The Law Commission, (above, note 18), at p 48. 
32 See generally Parkinson, J. E., "'Corporate Power and Responsibility", 1993, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press; New York, Oxford University Press, at pp 101-6,248; Deakin, Simon and 
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is common to every corporate director may be impractical and may raise unfair 
consequences. " 
The other criticism argues that an objective measure does not aHow the courts to assess 
managerial performance in the light of their actual competence. "It would ignore the 
special qualifications that a director has, even if they were the reason why the company 
appointed him". " This was problematic especially in cases where managerial 
competence exceeded the minimum required by the objective measure, in the sense 
that highly competent and professional but negligent directors could escape liability 
simply because they could meet the minimum requirement prescribed by the objective 
measure. 
35 
Instead of a single objective standard, some suggested a number of different standards, 
each applying to directors of the same area of expertise. 36 'Thus, within the area of 
professed or inferred competence of each director, an objective standard of care would 
Ferran, Ellis and Nolan, Richard, "Shareholders' Rights and Remedies: An Overview", (1997), 
Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review, 163, Oxford, Mansfield Press, at pp 165-166. 
33 It is too hard, if not impossible, to design a comprehensive measure that could cover all 
directors and require them to meet the same minimum standard of behaviour. Even if that 
could practically be overcome, it would seem unfair to expect every director to have equal 
knowledge and experience of every aspect of the company's operations. [See generally 
Mackenzie (above, note 24) at p 468; Sealy, Len, ""Reforming the Law on Directors' Duties", 
(1991), The Company Lawyer, vol. 12, No. 9,177; Trebilcock (above, note 6) at pp 509-10; Davies 
P. L., Gower and Davies' Principles of Modern Company Law, Chapter 16, at p 435, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, (2003), 7th ed., at p 435; Worthington (above, note 9) at p 449; The Law 
Commission, (above, note 18), at p 48]. 
34 The Law Commission, (above, note 18), at p 50. 
35 In cases where managerial competence falls below the minimum required by the objective 
measure, the problem is less serious because the British lawmaker deliberately sought to level 
tip managerial accountability in companies. [See The Law Commission, (above, note 18), at p 
50]. 
36 See Trebilcock, (above, note 6), at 511; Mackenzie, (above, note 24), at p 470. 
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be applied'. 37 But this, too, might fail, as there might sometimes not be a match 
between a professed or inferred area and the actual role that a particular director plays 
in a given company. "The mere fact that an individual possesses knowledge, experience 
or qualifications would not be relevant where these are not reasonably to be expected 
in their directorial role'. " A better formula is, perhaps, the one that regards reasonable 
skill and care to be expected of directors who perform within the same functional 
class. 
'9 
IV. 1.1. A. 3. Objective/subjective standard 
The downsides associated with both a single objective standard and a single subjective 
standard led the Parliament to formulate a new measure of assessment of directorial 
performance in 1986. The formula sets out the standard on an objective /subjective 
combination basis. It is reflected in the section 214 Insolvency Act 1986 40 that is 
primarily concerned with liability of negligent directors for wrongful trading in 
insolvency proceedings but can be extended to their liability in other negligent cases 
through analogy. 
41 
The new formula enabled the courts to discover the level of reasonable care and skill 
expected of a given director using the functions assigned to them as guideline. This 
37 Trebilcock, (above, note 6), at 511. 
38 Finch (above, note 6) at p 203; As Finch put it, a director must show the skill and care that 
can be expected of a reasonable director doing "their kind of role in their 
kind of company' 
[Finch, lbid]; See also Davies (above, note 5) at p 435; Boyle (1992) (above, note 13) at p 7. 
39 Finch, (above, note 6), at p 203; Davies (above, note 33) at p 435; Boyle, Anthony, "The 
Common Law Duty of Care and Enforcement under S. 459", (1996), Company Lawyer, 17 (3), 83, 
at p 7. 
40 Section 214 (4) Insolvency Act 1986. 
41 Finch (above, note 6) at p 201; Davies (above, note 33) at pp 432-3; Boyle (1996) (above, note 
39); The Law Commission, (above, note 18), at pp 48-9. 
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guideline can help the standard to more closely approach the factual situation of each 
defendant director. However, the wording of the section suggested that a negligent 
director, whose skill and experience sits below the minimum required by the objective 
measure, can escape liability because, to establish liability for negligent directors, it 
was equally a requirement that the courts should consider their knowledge and skill. '2 
In the light of case law, observations made by critics and recommendations delivered 
by the Law Commission, " the government is now seeking to address the above- 
mentioned shortfall. 
44 
Yet one may object to the proposed formulation, taking the view that such formulation 
would put directors in a dilemma. How could directors, he asks, be motivated to serve 
their companies, while they are always liable to attribution of liability for behaviours 
they have had no control over theM? 4' However, the objection must be rejected for a 
number of good reasons. For one, the law wants to encourage competent persons who 
are most likely to take reasonable commercial risks rather than every ambitious and 
incompetent, but opportunist, person who may either want to shirk duties or gamble 
with shareholders money in corporations . 
4' For another, personal competence of a 
given director is not something completely beyond his/her control. A director is often 
42 Bourne (above, note 23) at pp 154-155. 
43 The Law Commission, (above, note 18), at p 49. 
44 Part B section 5, Company Law Reform, White Paper, March 2005, CM6456 available at the 
Department of Trade and Industry's website in the following address: 
http: //www. dti-gov. uk/cld/4. pdf. 
45 Riley, (above, note 17), at pp 709-12. 
46 This mixture formulation is a deliberative choice made by the English company law that was 
concerned about the dramatic rise in the number of mismanagement cases and hence sought to 
discourage incompetent persons and to level up "with greater awareness, the responsibilities of 
directors'. [The Law Commission, (above, note 18), at p 49]. Besides, the existence of a market in 
directors & officers liability insurance can eliminate or at least reduce the threat of being 
personally responsible for taking negligent corporate decisions. [The Law Commission, Ibid. 
]. 
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aware of his capabilities at the very beginning of his selection, and can choose not to 
nominate himself for the post if he finds himself unfit for it. When he irresponsibly 
insists on taking the post by asserting that he has the expertise the company is seeking 
and takes, or assists the board to take, some bad business decision, the argument that 
the alleged behaviour was beyond his control does seem rather unsatisfactory. " 
W. M. B. Fiduciary duty 
IV. 1.1. B. 1. Background 
Directors, as agents, are employed by companies to direct their business. Once in 
power, they may want either to pursue self-interested projects or may simply pay 
inadequate attention to the affairs and business of their companies. They normally 
assume directorial posts for reasons of personal benefit rather than for some 
philanthropic purposes. Thus, in cases of conflict of interests, they might prioritise 
their own benefits over those of their companies. By imposition of fiduciary duty, 
company law wants directors to act with good faith and in the honest belief that they 
are acting in the best interest of their companies rather than their owns . 
48 It is 
necessary, however, as Davies pointed out, to bear in mind that "a person who is 
fiduciary and who acts negligently does not, without more, commit a breach of 
47 Davies, (above, note 33), at pp 433-4; Lord Hope of Craighead, "The Duties of a Director", 
Company Lawyer, (2000), 21(2), 49-50. 
48 For fiduciary duty see Re Smith & Fawcett (1942), Ch 302, at 304 per Lord Green MR; see also 
Aberdeen Railway Co v. Blaikie Bros. (1854), 1 Macq. H. L. 461 at 471 per Lord Granworth; Regal 
(Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver (1942), All ER 378; Cook v. Deeks (1916), 1 AC 554; 
Percival v. 
Wright (1902), Ch 421; Hogg v. Cramphorn (1967), Ch 254; Isle of Wight v. Tahourdin, (1883), 
25, Ch D, 320; Haward Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Ltd. (1974), AC 821; Multinational 
Gas and 
Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd., (1983), Ch 258; Lonrho 
Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd., (1980), 1 WLR 627 at p 
634, (1980) QB 358; West Mercia Safety 
Wear Ltd. v. Dodd, (1988), BCLC 250; Also see Companies Act 1985 ss 309,317,346,72"/. 
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fiduciary duty" 
. 
49For that to occur, the alleged act must have not only the attribute of 
negligence, but also that of bad faith and disloyalty. However, directors" duty is only to 
act according to what they, themselves, regard as being the best interest of company. it 
follows that their duty is assessed subjectively. In other words, they will not be held 
responsible for a mal-identification of the best interest of the company if they honestly 
believed it to enhance company interests. 
As well as preventing directors from self-interested behaviours, fiduciary duty requires 
directors to avoid pursuing interests of any specific interested group but shareholders 
within the corporate constituency. Company law is traditionally described as 
'shareholder-centred' or based on a norm of shareholder primacy. 50 This means that 
companies are incorporated and work to further only shareholders' wealth. The most 
direct manifestation of the norm is the law relating to fiduciary duty. " Directors as 
people who make most decisions in companies have a fiduciary duty to make decisions 
that are in the best interests of their company" and for a business company this means 
only the financial interests of the company shareholders. " In practice, the norm was 
tended to be construed by the case law rather narrowly only to cover the interests of 
49 Davies, (above, note 33), at p 435. 
50 Mayson Stephan, French Derek and Ryan Christopher, "Mayson, French & Ryan on 
Company Law"' (2001), 18th ed., London, Blackstone, at p 13; Roe, Mark J., "The Shareholder 
Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organisation"", 'Harvard Law School', (2001), 
available at Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Electronic Library at: 
http: / /papers - ssrn. com 
/ abstractid =282703, at p 3; Smith D. Gordon, "'The Shareholder 
Primacy Norm", (1998), The journal of Corporation Law, Iowa City, University of Iowa, College 
of Law, at pp 297-303; See also Hill Jeniffer, "Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder", The 
American journal of Comparative Law, (2000), Vol. 48, Berkeley, Ca., American Association for 
the Comparative Study of Law, at p 43; Hill Jenniffer, "'Public Beginnings, Private Ends-Should 
Corporate Law Privilege the Interests of Shareholders? ", International Corporate Law, Edited 
by Fiona Macmillan, Vol. 1, (2000) Oxford, Hart, at p 20. 
51 Smith (above, note 50) at p 278; Ferran Eilis, "Company Law and Corporate Finance"', (1999), 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, at p 134. 
52 Companies Act 1985 Sec. 309(2). 
160 
the majority shareholders as against minority shareholders as well as other non- 
shareholder participants in corporate commonwealth . 
54 MS traditional tendency was 
also recognised by many of the company law scholars. 
55 
Traditional tendency aside, modern English company law also tends towards 
appreciation of the shareholder primacy norm. For example, company law reviewers in 
their report ruled out any task for company law which requires redistribution and 
reallocation of corporate benefits between different participants in the economy on 
grounds of fairness, social justice or any similar criteria. " This shareholder centred 
focus can also be traced in statutory provisions regarding directors' duties in 
Companies Act 1985. For example, section 309(l) requires directors of companies to 
regard employee as well as shareholder interests. " Although, a company director has a 
duty to consider interests of employees, nonetheless, the mentioned duty does not give 
employees legal right to enforce it against directors. Employees' interest is seen as a 
matter of general concern" and as Goddard explained it signals that in company law 
the stakeholder debate is viewed as being an aspect of directorial decision-making 
rather than something that can provide certain protection or voice for non-shareholder 
53 Ferran (above, note 51) at pp 125-6. 
54 Leader, Sheldon, "'Private Property and Corporate Governance: Part 1: Defining the Interests" 
in Kluwer Law International, Editted by Fiona Macmillan, (1995), 94, Patfield, London at p 94- 
96; Smith (above, note 50) at p 279. 
55 Gower L. C. B., "'Gower's Principles of Modem Company Law", 4th ed., London, (1979), 
Stevens, at pp 553-4; See also Manne Henry, "'Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting in the 
Economics of Legal Relationships", Columbia Law Review, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1964, Vol. 64,1427; Farrar John H., "Company Law", 1985, London, Butterworths, at p 
266. 
56 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework, (London, DTI, 
1998), para 2.5; See also Mayson Et Al. (above, note 50) at p 12. 
57 Section 3090) Companies Act 1985. 
58 Mayson Et Al. (above, note 50) at p 13. 
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constituencies. '9 Unlike employees, shareholders whose interest must be regarded by 
corporate directors receive full protection in law. They have legal right to enforce 
directors' duty. 60 In addition to this, only shareholders have right to dismiss directors 
from the office 6' and further only they can take petition to the court for a relief under s 
62 459 if the conduct of the company affairs is unfairly prejudicial to their interests. In 
one exceptional occasion where the company is insolvent, however, law allows 
directors to disregard shareholder interest in favour of creditors. In such case directors 
must prioritise interests of company creditors over those of shareholders. 63 
However, companies can affect not only a number of shareholder and non-shareholder 
groupS64 but also nearly every aspect of people"s life . 
6' They produce food and supply 
energy, fuel, light, shelter and many other products on which the lives of most citizens 
59 Goddard Robert, "Modernising Company Law"": The Government's White Paper", Modern 
Law Review, (2003) 66 (3), London, Stevens & Sons, at p 415. 
60 Section 309(2) Companies Act 1985. 
61 Section 303, CA 1985. 
62 Section 459, CA 1985; See also generally Mayson Et Al. (above, note 50) at p 13; Roe (above, 
note 50) at p3. 
63 Section 214 Insolvency Act 1986. This duty towards creditors' interests has recently been 
extended by common law from actual insolvency cases to cases where director could 
reasonably knew or should have known that the company will face insolvency. See 
Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd., 
(1983), Ch 258; Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd., (1980), 1 WLR 627 at p 634; West Mercia 
Safety Wear Ltd. v. Dodd, (1988), BCLC 250; Yukong Ltd. v. Rendsburg Investments 
Corporation, (No. 2), 1998,1 WLR 249; See generally Mayson Et Al. (above, note 50) at pp 514- 
516,744; Ferran (above, note 51) at pp 481-4. 
64 Lee Hazen Thomas, "'Silencing the Shareholders' Voice", North Carolina Law Review, (2002), 
Vol. 80, Chapel Hill, North Carolina Law Review Association, at p 1899; Ratner David L., "The 
Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of One Share, One Vote", 
Cornell Law Review, (1970), Number 1, Vol. 56, Cornell University, Cornell Law School, at p 1. 
65 "Our style of life is largely determined by the activities and style of business; and the style of 
business is largely determined by the activities and style of our companies". [Confederation of 
British Industry, "The Responsibilities of the British Public Company: Final Report of the 
Companv Affairs Committee of the Confederation of British Industry", London, Confederation 
of British lndustrv, 1973, at p 8]. 
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66 depend. They can also affect the government through influencing important issues 
like production, investment and employment that are matters of public concern and 
that are subject of governmental policies. 67 The public, the government and many 
interest groups that are affected by, or have interest in, corporations could be 
disappointed and perhaps injured if corporations only focussed on maximizing 
majority shareholder wealth. Hence, overtime the traditional view of the shareholder 
primacy norm has gradually evolved into a subsequent recognition by the courts that 
the concept of shareholder interest includes those of majority as well as minority 
shareholders. Upon such evolution, the courts required directors to act in the interest 
of all shareholders not just the majority. 68 This was, in fact, a product of gradual 
rethinking about corporate existence and objective. On the one hand, evolution of the 
real entity theory, which recognised separate personality and interest for corporations, 
helped the courts to see companies as entities that are separated from their component 
shareholders. " On the other hand, expansion of the idea of democracy in companies, 
which extended the concept of constituency, plus a raise of doubts that undermined 
traditional justifications for legitimacy of private power 70 contributed to question about 
accuracy of the traditional theory. The main question, from this perspective, for many 
scholars in company law arena became whose interest must be paramount in 
66 Mason Edward S., "Introduction". in The Corporation in Modern Society, Editted by Edward 
Sagendorph Mason, 1960, Cambridge, Mass, at pI 
67 Parkinson (above, note 32) at pp 8-9,19. 
68 Smith (above, note 50) at p 279; Hale Christopher, "'What's Right With the Rule in Foss v 
Harbottle? ", (1997), Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review, 219, Oxford, Mansfield 
Press. 
69 Hager Mark M., "'Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational 'Real Entity' 
Theory"', University of Pittsburgh Law Review, (1989), Vol. 50, Pittsburgh, at p 633-4; Ferran 
(above, note 51) at p 134. 
70 Parkinson (above, note 32) at pp 1,9; Norwits T. S., "The Metaphysics of Time: a Radical 
Corporate Vision", Greens Business Law Bulletin, 1991,46,377, Edinbourgh, W. Green & Son 
Ltd., at p 387. 
163 
companies? Generally speaking, law, economic, and political scholars on this question 
have been grouped into two main camps, the shareholder primacy camp and the 
stakeholder camp. 
IV. 1.1. B. 2. Shareholder primacy theories 
To justify shareholder primacy norm, scholars in this camp often support a 
contractarian view in which shareholders are seen as either owners of or beneficiaries 
in or residual claimants in companies. Hence, three different contract-based theories 
can be characterized a major common feature of them is the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm. According to these theories restricting company management to 
the single objective of maximizing shareholder wealth is the most efficient means of 
using companies to increase the wealth of society as a whole. 71 
The first, the "shareholder-owner' theory, which was the prevailing theory in 19th 
century" and which was based on the concept of agency, assumed a principal/agent 
relationship between shareholders as owner and directors as agents. 73 according to it, 
directors were required to perform the will of shareholders and to further their 
74 
interests and shareholders had a formal right to control the directors. A recent 
example for this is the Noble Prize-wining economist, Milton Friedman, who argued 
71 Easterbrook Frank H. and Fischel Daniel R., "'The Economic Structure of Corporate Law", 
(1991), Cambridge, Mass. London, Harvard University Press, at p 38. 
72 Hill, "Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder", (above, note 50) at p 42. 
73 Lee Hazen (above, note 64) at p 1900. 
74 See Hill "Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder", (above, note 50) at p 42; Hill, "Public 
Beginnings, Pri\, ate Ends", (above, note 50) at p 21. 
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that because shareholders of corporations are "'the owners of the business" the only 
"social responsibility of business is to increase its profits". " 
The second, the -shareholder-beneficiary' theory which was introduced in the early 20th 
century and which relied on the concept of trust, assumed that shareholders are not 
owner but beneficiaries for whom managerial powers are held in truSt. 76 Recognition of 
corporations as separated bodies 77 / on the one hand, and a gradual separation of 
shareholders' right of ownership from their controlling power 7' and a relocation of the 
latter in hands of managers 79 which occurred due to the industrialisation of the 
economy, " on the other hand, contributed to make the traditional view of ownership- 
based shareholder primacy defunct. Nonetheless, shareholder primacy norm itself has 
never been abolished. In fact it has been redecorated by the theory in a new form of a 
beneficiary-based analysis. " In this analysis, although shareholders had already 
abandoned their controlling power in favour of directors, they remained the only 
financial beneficiaries of the company's activities. 
75 See Milton Friedman, "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits", New 
York Times Magazine, Sept. 13,1970, at 32-33,122-126, quoted in Stout Lynn A., "Bad and Not- 
So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy"', (2002), Southern California Law Review, Vol. 75, 
1189, at p 1190-1. 
76 Berle Adolf A., "'Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust"", (1931), 44, Harvard Law Review, 
1049, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Law Review Association, at 1073. 
77 Hager (above, note 69) at pp 633-4; Hill ""Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder"', (above, 
note 50) at p 44. 
78 Berle Adolf A. and Means Gardiner C., "The Modern Corporation and Private Property", 
(Revised edition, 1968), New York, Macmillan, at p 245. 
79 This was allagedly a consequence of collective action problem and the use of proxy 
machinery by managers. [Berle & Means Ibid, at pp 71-82,129-131 J. 
80 Minett Ste\'e, "Power, Politics, and Participation in the Firm", (1992), Aldershot, Avebury, at 
pp 186-187. 
81 Hill, "Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder"', (above, note 50) at p 44. 
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The third, the new contractual theory, which was developed in the late 20th century, 
sees a company as a larger container for a nexus of contracts among the resource 
providers (employees, directors, engineers, shareholders, suppliers, etc. ) in the 
company. " A famous example of this theory is the argument presented by Easterbrook 
and Fischel who claim while shareholders may not be the owners of the corporation, 
they are at least its sole residual claimants. In contrast to other interest groups in the 
company, shareholders rely on an implicit contract that entitles them to whatever 
remains after the firm has met its explicit obligations and paid its fixed claims. Hence, a 
company has to be directed in a manner, which maxin-dzes shareholders" interests, but 
it is not for they are the owners or beneficiaries. It is for they are the residual claimants. 
As shareholders are the sole residual risk and profit bearers, firms should be run with 
an eye towards maximizing their wealth. " Although directors' duty is to shareholders, 
the latter almost ceases his controlling power because it is seen as not only impossible 
but also unnecessary and perhaps sometimes problematic. 
Shareholder primacy theories have substantive deficiencies. To begin with, 
shareholders do not, in fact, own the corporation. Rather, they only own a type of 
corporate security which is called stock. Therefore, it is misleading to use the language 
of ownership to explain the relationship between a company and its shareholders. 
Likewise, shareholders are not simply beneficiaries in a trust analysis. They own shares 
in the company which gives them rights and power to have the corporation directed in 
82 Easterbrook Frank H. and Fischel Daniel R., ""Voting in Corporate Law"', The journal of Law 
and Economics, (1983), Chicago, University of Chicago Law 
School, at p 401; Farrar (above, note 
55) at pp 3-6; Posner Richard A., "Economic Analysis of Law", 
(1992), Boston, London, Little, 
Brown, at pp 14,409-411; Cheffins Brian R, "Company Law: Theory 
Structure And Operation", 
(1997), Oxford, Clarendon Press, at p 41. 
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their interests. Shareholders further do not appear to be the only residual claimants M 
the company. In reality, they are only one of several groups that can be described as 
residual claimants. 84 Also from corporate finance perspective, share capital no longer 
play a unique role in contemporary large corporations given that many companies 
now prefer to afford their needed capital through intra group loans and debt sources. 
Besides, concepts of debt and equity have become increasingly ambiguous considering 
that preference shares, while classified as equity, are often functionally equivalent to 
debt. " 
In addition to these, shareholder primacy theories seem deficient on the basis that they 
ignore the decisive role that other participants can play in the success of companies. If 
corporations are viewed as teamwork vehicles, then it must be accepted that corporate 
directors should give regards to interests of all participants. " 
IV. 1.1. B. 3. Stakeholder theories 
Stakeholder theories can be seen as a product of viewing corporations from a political 
perspective 87 According to them, a corporation like any entity composed of individuals 
83 Easterbrook & Fischel (above, note 82) at p 403; Farrar John H., "'Company Law", (1991), 
London, Butterworths, at pp 224-5. 
84 "When the firm is doing well, for example, employees receive raises and enjoy greater job 
security, managers get use of a company jet, and bondholders enjoy increased protection from 
corporate insolvency. Conversely these groups suffer along with shareholders when times are 
bad, as employees face reductions in force, managers are told to fly coach, and debt holders face 
increased risk"'. [Stout (above, note 75) at pp 1190-11951. 
85 Hill, "Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder", (above, note 50) at pp 22-23. 
86 See Blair Margaret M. and Stout Lynn A., "A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law", 
(1999), Virginia Law Review, 85,247, Charlottesville, Va., Virginia Law Review Association, at p 
247; Stout (above, note 75) at p 1195. 
87 Buxbaum Richard M., "The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance", (1985), 
California Law Review, No. 6, vol. 73, Berkeley, Calif., University of California, School of 
jurisprudence at p 1671; Selznick Philip, "'Law, Society, and Industrial justice", Russell Sage 
Foundation, (1969), at p 259. 
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should be governed by a democratic majority rule. " They, however, vary depending 
either upon whom they count to be citizens in corporate constituency or in whose 
interest corporate power is to serve. " Both variables suggest a two-sided 
categorisation. On the one side, there are theories that emphasise on the application of 
the idea of democracy in order to: activate shareholder participatory right; impose 
some checks on the power of controllers, increase the level of accountability of 
managers; and strike balance in decision-making. They all argue against expansion of 
the corporate constituency and do not recognise any duty for companies to give regard 
to the interests of the community at large. 'O They differ not very much from contractual 
theories as they see only a single constituency of shareholders whose interests are pre- 
eminent. 9' On the other side, there are theories that want to extend groups whose 
interest must be observed by the company management. Only these latter theories can 
be named as stakeholder theories because only they consider interests of other affected 
groups and they do so in two ways. They either assume a duty for companies to 
consider interests of the community at large" or extend the concept of citizenship 
within the corporate constituency. 
93 
88 See generally Buxbaum Ibid; Mason (above, note 66) at p 1-5; Pound John, ""The Rise of The 
Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control", (1993), New York University 
Law Review, vol. 68,1003 at pp 1007-1013, New York, New York University School of Law; 
Latham Earl, "The Body Politic of The Corporation", in The Corporation in Modem Society 
edited by Edward Sagendorph Mason (ed. ), (1960), 5, Cambridge, Mass, pp 218-220; 
Bottomley 
Stephen, "From Contractualism to Constitutionalism: A Framework for Corporate 
Governance"', (1997), Sydney Law Review, vol. 19,277, Faculty of Law, University of Sydney, 
Sydney, at pp 288-291; Brewster Kigman, "'The Corporation and Economic Federalism", 
in The 
Corporation in Modern Society edited by Edward Sagendorph Mason (ed. ), (1960), 5, 
Cambridge, Mass at 72; Villiers Charlotte, "'European Company Law-Towards Democracy? 
", 
European Business law Library, (1997), Aldershot, Ashgate, pp 197-205; Hill, "'Visions and 
Revisions of the Shareholder"', (above, note 50) at pp 51-57. 
89 Hill Ibid. at p 54; Mason (above, note 66). 
90 Buxbaum (above, note 87); Pound (above, note 88); Bottomley (above, note 88) at p 277. 
91 Hill, "Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder", (above, note 50) at p 54. 
92 Norwits (above, note 70) at p 387; Dodd Merrick E., "For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees"', (1932), 45, Harvard Law Review, 1145 Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Law Review 
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The stakeholder theory can itself be categorised into two sub-branches depending on 
the extent to which they expand constituency. One that is known as the Industrial 
Democracy only seeks to include employee interests. This is not for employees have 
some sort of ownership right, but for they are subjects of authority and that in 
democracy collective decisions should be based on and conducted in accordance with 
the interests of those who are affected, in particular, those who are the subject of the 
authority. 94 Employee involvement was also defended using the ownership argument. 
In this view, corporate constituency includes persons who have contributed inputs in 
the company coffer and such input may be either human or finance capital. As both 
shareholders and employees bear the risk of investment in companies, they should be 
given equal weight. " 
The other makes further extension and takes into account interests of wider 
constituency including consumers, suppliers, creditors, directors, environmental 
groups, local communities, and the society at large. It views corporations as entities 
that have social responsibility to regard interests of other stakeholders. As citizens 
Association, at pp 1148,1149; Mason (above, note 66) at pp 4 -5; Selznick (above, note 87) at p 
259; Parkinson (above, note 32 at pp 1,9. 
93 See Villiers (above, note 88) at pp 197-205; Brewster (above, note 88) at p 72; Hill, "Visions 
and Revisions of the Shareholder"" (above, note 50) at p 54. 
94 Villiers (above, note 88) at pp 197-223; Stone Kathrine Van Wezel, ""Labour Markets, 
Employment Contracts, and Corporate Change", in McCahery Joseph, Picciotto Sol and Scott 
Colin (ed. ), Clarendon Press, Oxford, (1993), p 61 at 92-93; Dahl Robert A., "A Preface to 
Economic Democracy", (1985), Berkeley, University of California, at pp 75-82; Walzer Michael, 
"Spheres of justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality", 1983, Oxford, Robertson, at pp 293-4; 
Gewirth Alan, "Community of Rights", (1996), Chicago, London, University of Chicago Press, 
at p 262,266,285; Ratner (above, note 64) at pp 260-285; Pateman Carol, ""Participation and 
Democratic Theory", (1970), London, Cambridge U-P, at pp 42-45; Macpherson C. B., "The Life 
and Time of Liberal Democracy", (1977), Oxford, Oxford University Press, at pp 93-100. 
95 Blair Margaret M., "Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the 
Twentv First Century", Washington Brooking Institute, (1995), at p 239. 
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enjoy rights against abuse of power by public bodies, they also have such rights against 
ý11 96 abuse of power by private institutions. 
Stakeholder theories have also been defended using the so-called 'team production 
argument. According to this argument, stakeholder involvement will promote 
efficiency by encouraging all interested groups to participate actively in the corporate 
field. Shareholders alone cannot make a firm work. Corporate production is dependant 
on inputs from a number of different groups. Suppliers, creditors, employees, 
managers, and even local community often must make contributions in order for an 
enterprise to succeed. Therefore, from an efficiency perspective, the ideal rule of 
corporate governance is to require corporate directors to regard the interests of all 
groups participating in the process of production which is in the long run beneficial to 
shareholders too. 
97 
Stakeholder theories suffer from major difficulties too. For one, they are not very 
compatible with the apolitical sphere of companies whose main objective is suggested 
to be maximising shareholder wealth rather than distribution of fairness and social 
justice. While citizens in societies "have diverse values and objectives which have to be 
96 Sheikh Saleem and Chatterjee S. K., "'Perspective on Corporate Governance", in 'Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control' edited by Sheikh Saleem and Rees William (ed. ), 
Cavendish Publishing Ltd., London, (1995), pp 36-37,55-56; Sheikh Saleem and Rees William, 
"Corporate Governance and Corporate Control-Self-Regulation or Statutory Codification? ", in 
'Corporate Governance and Corporate Control' edited by Sheikh Saleem and Rees William 
(ed. ), Cavendish Publishing Ltd., London, (1995), pp 365-366; Tromans Stephen, "Directors' 
Responsibilities and Shareholders' Wishes-2", (Jan 1998), 148(l), 21, New Law journal 
Practitioner, London, Butterworths, at pp 21-22. 
97 See Blair & Stout (above, note 86) at 247; Stout (above, note 75) at p 1195; See also Bowels and 
Gintis, "'A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic Enterprise" in The Idea of 
Democracy edited by David Copp, Jean Hampton and John E. Roemer (eds. ), (1993), 375, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, at pp 390-392; Villiers (above, note 88) at p 203. 
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balanced against one another, an association is a group in which all members pursue 
one or more of the same objectives, the objectives which state the association's reason 
for existence'. " Restricting company managements to the single objective of 
maximizing shareholder wealth can serve as the most efficient means of using 
companies to increase the welfare and wealth of people in societies. " For another, 
stakeholder theories can impose on companies too much agency costs. Through 
recognising an excessive role of balancer for directors and by eliminating the 
monitoring role of shareholders", they allow corporate directors to pursue their 
personal interests under the shelter of the corporate or stakeholder interest. Thus, even 
though stakeholder theories offer some benefits, the risks associated with them often 
outweigh those of its benefits even for a minority shareholder. "' 
IV. 1.1. B. 4. Recent developments 
The goverrunent recently took the view that both the shareholder and stakeholder 
theories are important and influential to corporate success and they should be in some 
way reconciled. 'O' One way to do such reconciliation, it states, is to see corporate 
interests objectively rather than from the angle of its shareholders and that requires 
98 Leader Sheldon, "'Participation and Property Rights", (1999), 21, journal of Business Ethics, 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, at p 102-7; See also Hager (above, note 69) at pp 650-653. 
99 Easterbrook and Fischel (above, note 71) at p 38; Jensen C. Michel and Meckling William H. 
"Corporate Governance and 'Economic Democracy: An Attack on Freedom", in Proceedings of 
Corporate Governance: A Definitive Exploration of the Issues edited by Huizenga C. J., UCLA 
Extension, (1983), at pp 8-9 available at Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Electronic 
Library at: http: //papers. ssrn. com/ABSTRACT ID= 321521; Mayson Et. Al. (2001), (above, 
note 50) at pp 13-14. 
100 Roe, Mark J., "Corporate Law's Limits", Columbia University, (2002), at pp 10-17 available 
at Social Science Research Network Electronic Library at 
http: //papers-ssrn. com/abstract=260582. 
10 1 Stou t (above, note 75), at p 1199; Roe (above, note 50) at p 3; Ferran (above, note 51) at p 125. 
102 Modernising Company Law: White Paper, (London, DTI, 2002), Cm 5553, Volume 1, para 
3.3; See also Companies Bill, Schedule 2 (2) in Modernising Company Law: White Paper, 
(London, DTI, 2002), Cm 5553, Volume 11 at p 112. 
companies to operate with a wider view to the collective interests of shareholders 
which may include fostering the relationships with employees, customers and 
suppliers, maintaining corporate business reputation and observing impacts on the 
community and working envirorurnent. 10' This, nevertheless, is not to mean that 
companies should consider a wider constituency or make moral or political judgement 
about how just or fair allocation of benefits might be. It is rather to confirm that 
directors should manage corporate resources with a view to maximize shareholder 
wealth and welfare which may require consideration of interests of minority 
shareholders as well as those of many non-shareholder groups. 104 This approach can 
offer a double advantage. On the one hand, by preserving the shareholder primacy 
norm it reduces the agency cost, which can otherwise arise. On the other hand, by 
looking objectively at the very company interests, it allows interests of minority 
shareholders and other non-member groups to be heard within the scope of directors' 
fiduciary duty in companies. 
W. M. C. Impunity for mere mismanagement 
Principally, negligent directors are granted exemption when their alleged negligence 
falls within the category of mere mismanagement. The term "mere mismanagement' 
refers to situations in which a company director acts negligently and the company 
suffers loss due to it, but the amount of negligence associated with his action does not 
reach the level of liability, i. e. breach of duty of care and fiduciary. Authorities suggest 
103 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report, (London, DTI, 2001), 
URN/942 & URN/943, para 3.8 and Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Developing the Framework (London, DTI, 2000), paras 2.19-2-20 and 3.18-3.28; see also Leader 
(above, note 98) at pp 102-7; Goddard (above, note 59) at p 402. 
104 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy, "The Strategic Framework", (London, 
DTI, 1999), at 2.4; Goddard (above, note 59) at pp 405,415. 
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two lines of arguments for not making directors liable for committing of mere 
negligence. The first line lays emphasis on the consideration that there is no merit for 
the courts to review quality of management in companies. The second line rests on the 
assumption that it is not possible to guard directors from falling into errors of 
judgements. A mixture of these two has caused the courts to feel reluctant to deal with 
cases involving committing of mismanagement by directors unless the alleged 
negligence is serious enough to constitute breach of duty. "' 
W. M. C. 1. Poor quality management 
British courts have repeatedly declared that it is not for the courts to take the 
management of business in corporations and they will not review the quality of 
management in companies. 'O' They have taken the view that it would be wrong "to 
substitute [their] opinion for that of the management, or indeed to question the 
correctness of the management's decision ... if bona fide arrived at". 
107 They have 
emphasised that "mere imprudence or want of judgment would not in itself make a 
director liable-. 'O' Instead, they put the blame on the shareholders of such companies 
and argue that because directors are not required to qualify for the office, it will not be 
fair to hold them responsible for what they did without having particular expertise. '09 
They do not need to possess special qualifications to be appointed and given 
105 Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. [1974] AC 821,832 (PQ Re Smith & Fawcett 
Ltd [1942] Ch. 304; Re Tottenham Hotspur p1c. [1994], BCLC 655,660; Runciman v. Walter 
Runciman p1c. [1992] BCLC 1084; and Devlin v. Slough Estates Ltd. and Others [1983] BCLC 
497,504 per Dillon June; See also generally Cheffins (above, note 82) at p 644. 
106 See generally Mackenzie (above, note 24) at pp 460-3; Trebilcock (above, note 6) at pp 502-4. 
107 Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd. [1974] AC 821,832 (PC). 
108 Lagunas Nitrate Company v. Lagunas Syndicate (1899), 2 Ch 392 at 394 per Romer J.; see 
also Marzetti's Case 1880 28 WR 541,543 per Brett L. J. 
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responsibility as director of business corporations. This is a matter of shareholder 
concern only. The only thing that the law requires of a corporate director is to have "the 
general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of him. "' 
A director, further, is allowed not to fully allocate his time to managing affairs of the 
company unless otherwise is expressly stated in the company constitution or, in the 
case of an executive director, in his contract for service. "' A corollary of not being 
required to have special expertise and being allowed to show low personal 
involvement is that directors are seen as people who can delegate matters to one of the 
company's employees. Likewise, a director can extensively trust to the information, 
advice and performance provided by the delegates and other company officials. While 
so trusting, a director can leave the company in order to accept other roles elsewhere, 
even a directorship in a competing company, 112 and he will not be responsible for the 
mistakes that other officials commit. "' To make things worse, the law imposes little 
limitation on directors as to their ability to delegate responsibilities. Case law has 
109 Turquand v. Marshall (1968-69), L. R. Ch. App. Vol. 4, p 386 per Hatherley LC; Re Elgindata 
Ltd. (1991), BCLC 959 at 994; Re Forest of Dean Coal Mining Co. (1878) 10 Ch D 450,451-455 per 
Jessel MR. 
110 Section 214 (4a) Insolvency Act 1986; In Re Denham & Co, plaintiffs took action against a 
negligent director on the ground that he had failed to detect manipulation of the company's 
accounts by the chairman of directors and Chitty J relieved the alleged director from liability 
because 'he (director) was a country gentleman and not a skilled accountant'. [Re Denham & Co 
(1884), 25 Ch D 752 at 767] See also Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd., (1911) 1 Ch 
425 at 437. 
Ill Re Forest of Dean Coal Mining Co. (1878) 10 Ch D 450,452 per Jessel MR.; Re Brazilian 
Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd., (1911) 1 Ch 425; Re Denham & Co (1884), 25 Ch D 752 at 767; 
Re Marquise of Bute (1892) 2 Ch 100; Re City Equitable Fire and Insurance Co. Ltd (1925) Ch 
407at p 423; However, recent authorities tend to construe this statement as relevant only in 
respect of non-executive directors. [See for example Re Cardiff Savings Bank (1892) 2 Ch 100 at 
pp 105-71. 
112 Bell v. Lever Bros. (1932) AC 161. 
113 Dovey v. Cory 1901 AC 477,486; Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v. Maxwell (No 
2) (1993) BCLC 1282; Re Denham, & Co (1884), 25 Ch D 752; Re City Equitable Fire and 
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drawn the bottom line at the level of total abrogation of responsibility. It follows that 
while delegation and reliance on others are widely seen as acceptable, the only 
limitation is that overall responsibility of a director is not delegable. "' The Law 
Conunission in its recent review of directors" duties confirmed this too. "' 
However, this line of argument fails to consider that there is no such link to connect the 
issue of liability for negligence and the issue of shareholders' choice. On the one hand, 
a choice of poor quality directors by shareholders could mean that an appointed 
director will commit mistakes. On the other, their choice of good quality directors 
could mean that directors will never commit mistakes. Further, the question of whether 
a nominee director is in truth competent enough to take the office is not often clear at 
the very outset and is seen to be one of asymmetric information. As Riley pointed out, 
/a company likely knows much less about a prospective director"s competence than 
does that director himself. This makes it difficult for the company to discriminate 
between good and bad directors'. 116 Also the fact that, in law, possession of general 
knowledge, skill and experience is required of directors ought not to mean that 
unskilled directors can take decisions on issues that require special knowledge and 
expertise. A director who accepts the office undertakes implicitly also to take informed 
decisions even where his contract permits him not to attend regularly or where he 
lacks ffie required expertise. 
117 
Insurance Co. Ltd (1925) Ch 407at p 423; Norman & Anor v. Theodore Goddard & Others, 
(1992), BCC, p 14. 
114 Unreported, applied by Jonathan Parker J. in Re Barings p1c. (No 5) [199911 BCLC 433, at p 
487; See also Re Westmid Packing Services Ltd v. Griffiths [1998] 2 All ER 124, per Lord Woolf 
MR. 
115 The Law Commission (above, note 18) at p 55. 
116 See Riley (above, note 17) at pp 712-3; Davies (above, note 33) at pp 433-4. 
117 Lord Hope of Craighead (above, note 47). 
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IV. 1.1. C. 2. Errors of judgements 
The second line of argument seeks to free directors from liability for any committing of 
errors of judgement. According to it, directors will not be held responsible for errors of 
judgement when they make business decisions in good faith. The argument relies on 
the policy consideration that since directors often must necessarily make judgements in 
uncertain business circumstances and on the basis of incomplete information, it will 
not be fair to blame them for their errors of judgement and for taking decisions that 
subsequently turn out to be bad. Although decision-making in such circumstances is 
risky, taking risky decisions is seen as desirable because they are likely to produce 
greater value for companies and it is upon such considerations that shareholders 
choose to invest in companies. "' English courts have also made it clear that they will 
not hold directors liable simply because directors' activities have resulted in loss to the 
company. "9 Directors are not "guarantors of a company's success' and hence they 'are 
not liable for mere errors of judgements'. "O Thus, the gist of the errors of judgements 
shelter, which is sometimes described as being a 'necessary recognition of human 
fallibility', 121 is to provide a safe harbour for directors of companies when they make 
honest business judgements, hereby further to stimulate directorial initiative and risk- 
taking in companies. "' 
118 Eisenberg (above, note 10) at p 195; Arsalidou (above, note 6) at p 232. 
119 Davies (above, note 33) at p 436; Hagland (above, note 6); Stapledon G P, "Mismanagement 
and The Unfair Prejudice Provision", Company Lawyer, (1993), 14 (5), 94-97. 
120 Re City Equitable Fire and Insurance Co. Ltd (1925) Ch 407 at 408 per Romer J. 
121 Arsht, Samuel S., "The Business Judgement Rule Revisited"', (1979), Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 
8,93, Hempstead, N. Y., Hofstra University School of Law, at p 99. 
122 Eisenberg (above, note 10) at p 191; Tunc, Andre, "The Judge and The Businessman", (1986), 
Law Qtiarterly Review, 102 (Oct), 549-554, London, Stevens and Sons; Arsht (above, note 121) at p 
99; Branson, Douglas M., "The Rule That Is Not a Rule-The Business Judgement Rule"', (2002), 
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The rules relevant to the errors of judgement are found in case law. "' The courts have 
frequently taken the view that it is not for the judges to take the place of directors and 
make business judgements in companies. A court determines questions of law, not 
matters of business judgement. "' As Lord Greene MR in Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. 
observed, 'they (directors) must exercise their discretion bona fide in what they 
consider - not what a court may consider - to be in the interests of the company... """ 
Similarly in Richard Brady Franks Ltd v. Price, Latham Lj in relation to a person 
challenging an action of directors said that "(The plaintiff) must show that they (the 
directors) did not honestly act for what they regarded as the benefit of the company ... it 
is not for a court to determine whether or not the action of directors was wise". "' 
This non-interventionist attitude of the courts has led the judges to become excessively 
unhelpful in respect of mismanagement cases. "' How bad, stupid and harmful a 
director's business judgement has been does not matter before the courts where the 
judgement complained of constitutes no breach of duty, though involving 
negligence. "' 
Valparaiso University Law Review, vol. 36,631, Valparaiso, Ind., Valparaiso University School of 
Law, at pp 632,636; Parkinson (above, note 32) at p 109. 
123 Hemraj (above, note 23) at p 192; Tunc (above, note 122) at pp 549-554. 
124 Carlen v. Drury, (1812), 1 Ves. &B 154 p 158 per Lord Eldon. 
125 Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. (1942) 1 All ER 542 at 543-4. 
126 Richard Brady Franks Ltd v. Price (1937), 58 CLR p 136; See also Howard Smith Ltd v. 
Ampol Petroleum (1974), AC 832. 
127 Sealy, L. S., "Problems of Standing, Pleading and Proof in Corporate Litigation", in Company 
Law in Change, Edited by Ben Pettet, (1987), London, Stevens, at p 4. 
128 Worthington (above, note 9) at p 450. 
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Other common law jurisdictions also offer protection in cases of errors of judgment to 
their corporate directors. In the United States and Australia, for example, there is either 
a common law rule or a statutory provision serving as a presumption that in making a 
bad business decision, directors assume no responsibility unless the plaintiff shows 
that they acted either with mala fide in what was not in the best interest of the 
company or they acted on an uninformed basis without seeking further enquiry. "' 
When "conditions of the business judgement rule are satisfied then the quality of a 
director's or officer's decision will be reviewed, not to determine whether the decision 
was reasonable, but only under a much more limited standard ... (which) is that the 
decision must be rational, or must have a rational basis, or the like' 130 and the measure 
of irrationality is often taken to mean gross negligence. "' As a result, a director is 
entitled to make unreasonable or even stupid decisions as long as his judgement is not 
wholly irrational. "' 
Using the American and Australian experience, 133 some English company law scholars 
have suggested that it seems good for English company law to develop a statutory 
129 To reduce the likelihood that directors escape liability unjustifiably, they make a clear 
distinction between the process of decision taking and the substance of managerial decisions, 
suggesting that directors will be given protection only on the latter ground. [See generally 
references cited below, note 1331 
130 Eisenberg (above, note 10) at pp 188-9; American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate 
Governance, para 4.01 (c) (3). 
131 See, for example, in Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp., judge Berger held that for an 
uninformed decision of the board to go outside the protection of the business judgement rule, it 
requires lack of information to be so extreme as to reflect gross negligence on the part of 
directors. [Del. Ch. Civil Actions Nos. 10,075 and 10,079, January 6,19891. 
132 Tunc (above, note 122); Duesenberg Richard W, "Duty of Care, Duty of Loyalty and the 
Business judgement Rule in American Courts", (1997), Company Financial and Insolvency Law 
Review, Oxford, Mansfield Press, 201-202; Hemraj Mohammad B, "Company Directors: The 
Defence of Business Judgement Rule", (2003), Company Lawyer, 24 (7), 218-219, London, Oyez 
Publishing Limited; Hemraj (2004), (above, note 23) at p 196. 
133 For further study of American and Australian corporate laws on business judgement rule 
see generallN, Eisenberg (above, note 10) at p 185; Stout Lynn A., "In Prise of Procedure: An 
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business judgement rule similar to that existing in the US and Australia. 134 The Law 
Commission rejected this proposition, taking the view that English company law 
enjoys an already existing implied business judgement rule to be found in the courts 
reluctance to review management decisions which were made bona fide for the best 
interest of the company, and that this explains why there is no need to codify it, as this 
rule 'is best left to be developed by the courts. "' Further, there might also be a danger 
that such a presumptive rule might unduly disable the courts from imposition of 
liability on negligent directors where, considering every circumstance, they should 
have been found liable. 136 
IV. 1.2. Matters of enforcement: internal control 
Speaking generally, company law offers two mechanisms to help shareholders bring 
back in line wayward directors. One is the enforcement by majority mechanism which 
empowers majority shareholders to apply indirect control over activities of directors. 
The other is the enforcement by minority mechanism that allows in certain exceptional 
cases minority shareholders to outflank the rule of majority and to bring allegations 
against wrongdoer directors. 
Economic and Behavioural Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgement 
Rule"', (2001) at pp 2,11 [Research Paper No 01-21 available on the Social Science Research 
Network Electronic Paper Collection at http: //papers. ssm. com/abstract= 2909381; Arsht 
(above, note 121) at p 93; Hemraj (2003), (above, note 132) at p 218; Hemraj (2004), (above, note 
23) at p 192; Tunc (above, note 122) at pp 549-554; Kearney, Mark A., "'The Evolving Standard of 
Scrutiny Applied to Directors" Decisions", (1995), Butterworths Journal of International Banking & 
Financial Law, 10 (1), 30, London, Butterworths. 
134 See Parkinson (above, note 32) at pp 110-113; Deakin, Ferran and Nolan (above, note 32) at 
pp 165-166; Finch (above, note 6) at p 189. 
135 Law Commission (above, note 18) p 53; The Government has also confirmed this view and 
therefore no statutory business judgment rule has been drafted in the proposed white paper. 
[Companv Law Reform, White Paper, March 2005, CM6456 available at the Department of 
Trade and Industry's website in the following address: http: //www. dti. gov. uk/cld/4. pdfl. 
136 Da,,,, ies (above, note 33) at p 437; Arsalidou (above, note 6) at pp 232-3. 
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IV. 1.2.1. Enforcement by majority shareholders 
As a general principle enforcement of directors' duties rests on majority shareholders. 
They enforce directors" duties mainly through pursuing negligent directors and 
through rejecting ratification of their breach of duties. Under the current case law, 
breach of directors' duties except in few situations where the wrongdoing amounts to 
fraud is seen as ratifiable. "' This means a wronged company through majority decision 
in shareholder meeting can choose not to pursue wrongdoer directors in breach of duty 
cases. This enforcement machinery, which relies on shareholder democracy, works on 
the assumption that shareholders have the ability to exercise their powers in general 
meetings. If they find directors guilty of breach of duties, they will have ability to 
resolve to prosecute negligent directors for the recovery of every loss suffered by the 
company. They also have power to appoint directors to or remove them from office 
and can limit or reshape directors' powers into a narrowly prescribed scope. In reality, 
however, this mechanism of internal control has evidenced to be unreliable. In small 
companies, often the same people play both controlling and directorial roles. They 
usually share the running of the business as well as controlling its affairs and this 
makes it quite unlikely that they pursue themselves. Even if some of them (normally a 
minority shareholder) want to pursue, the existence of a concentrated shareholding 
pattern, which gives the wrongdoer director/ majority almost absolute right to help 
himself through ratification would ensure that except in very clear cases of fraud no 
action would commence against wrongdoer directors. "' In the case of large companies, 
as they tend to have publicly dispersed shareholders there is little incentive for 
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shareholders to attend in meetings and vote. Each individual shareholder's vote is 
unlikely to carry sufficient weight and collective action is difficult when shareholders 
are dispersed. "' The collective action problem would give wrongdoer directors 
protection against any probable attack by shareholders. 140 Even if there were no 
collective action problem directors would still often be able to retain control of large 
corporations because they have control over information and agenda of meetings and 
the proxy mechanism and because they are clever and prudent enough to propose 
motions that will be accepted by the shareholders. "' The growing size of institutional 
investment in English large companies made it possible for institutional shareholders 
to control enough shares in order to overcome the collective action problem and to 
exercise effective control on management. Nonetheless, such shareholders have 
evidenced in practice to be rather passive having no or little interest to fight with 
management. 142 In such context, therefore, enforcement by majority will often be 
ineffective unless dispersed shareholders are well informed, closely knit and well 
organised. 143 That is why some opined that "what is necessary in the interests of 
shareholders is not participatory shareholder democracy, but machinery for 
discouraging management from deflecting too much of the firms' net income from the 
shareholders to itself'. 144 
137 Bamford & Others v. Bamford & Others (1970), L. R. Ch., 212; Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd. & 
Others, (1967), LR Ch, 254. 
138 Farrar (1991), (above, note 83) at p 442; Parkinson (above note 32) at p 248. 
139 Birds John Et. Al. (eds. ), "'Boyle & Birds' Company Law", (1995), 3rd ed., jordans, Bristol, at 
p 347. 
140 Parkinson (above, note 32) at pp 240,248; Farrar (1991), ( above note 83) at p 442. 
141 Cubbin John and Leech Denis, ""The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the Degree of 
Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement", The Economic Journal, (1983), Vol. 
93,351-369, London, New York, Macmillan, at p 363; Farrar (1985) (above, note 55) at p 266; 
Parkinson (above, note 32) at pp 160,165,237. 
142 See below, Chapter three at 111.1.6. 
143 Gower (above, note 55) at p 554. 
144 Posner (above, note 82) at p 41. 
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IV. 1.2.2. Enforcement by minority shareholders 
As a matter of exception minority shareholders can enforce directors' duties in few 
cases. English company law has devised the machinery of derivative action which 
empowers minority shareholders to enforce directors' duties in appropriate 
circumstances where "fraud on minority shareholder' is involved. Such machinery 
which faRs beyond the majority power can, to some degree, protect minority rights and 
discourage mismanagement. The derivative machinery will be examined in details in 
Chapter five and I do not intend to repeat that examination. For the purpose of my 
discussion here it seems sufficient only to clarify briefly reasons which can convince a 
minority shareholder not to use the machinery in practice. To begin with, although 
collective action problem is absent, a minority shareholder may have no incentive to 
commence the action considering his trivial investment. Further, the costs of taking 
action can outweigh the probable benefits which may ensue from a successful 
derivative action for a minority shareholder. 145 In addition to these, lack of information 
and prospect of sharing the benefits achieved by a minority shareholders efforts with 
non-active shareholders can ensure that no derivative action will be taken to the 
courts. 
146 After all, even if a minority shareholder decides to pursue negligent directors, 
technical obstacles which the rule in Foss v. Harbottle creates in his path plus legal 
uncertainty which associates with the definition of fraud discourage him. 
145 Reisberg Arad, "'Derivative Actions and The Funding Problem: The Way Forward", 
Forthcoming Journal of Business Law, (2006), Working Paper Presented at the Society of Legal 
Scholars Annual Conference (Strathclyde /Sep 2005), at pp 1-4. 
146 Parkinson (above, note 32) at pp 241-3; Farrar (1991), (above, note 83) at p 442; Pettet Ben, 
"Company Law"', (2000), Harlow, Longman, at pp 235,240. 
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IV-1-3. External control: market constraints 
As English corporations 
147 
tend to lack presence of a controlling shareholder 
148 
, they 
rely more on market constraints than shareholder control in controlling 
nusmanagement. Market constraints can discourage mismanagement in various ways. 
One is the way of market for capital. As controllers do not have enough money of their 
own or want to cash out their investment and exit, they, therefore, have to search for 
external financing to cover their financial shortfall. They may not, however, be 
successful, unless they accept finance from expensive sources because agency costs 
signal to finance providers that financing in such corporation will be very risky. 
Another way is the market for products. Expensive finance will mean a rise in 
production costs and is normally reflected in the price of goods and services that a 
company produces. As a result, the company may lose the market for its products, as 
costumers will buy elsewhere at a less expensive rate, and if things continue this way, 
the company is very likely to face insolvency. A further way is market for corporate 
control, which is also called 'take over' mechanism. Inefficient management is quite 
likely to result in loss to the company that may further result in shareholders to opt for 
selling their shares with the effect of reducing the market value of company's shares on 
the one hand and a lack of desire on the part of finance providers to buy such shares on 
the other hand. Yet, a possible scenario is the case of one or more large finance 
providers who might want to buy the company's shares hereby to obtain its control 
147 See Chapter I (above, at 1.2. ) 
148 See generally Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W., ""A Survey of 
Corporate 
Governance", The journal of Finance, (June 1997), Vol. Lll, No. 2, at p 754; MacNeil lain, 
""Adaptation and Convergence in Corporate Governance: The Case of Chinese Listed 
Companies", (2002), journal of Corporate Law Studies, vol. 2, part 2,289, at pp 291-297, Hart 
Publishing; Cheffins (above, note 2) at p 7; Cheffins Brian R., "Corporate Law and Ownership 
Structure: A Darwinian Link? ", University of Cambridge, (2002), Cambridge, UK, available at 
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and to replace the management with a new team of managers who run the company 
more efficiently. Lastly, market for managerial services will serve to discourage 
mismanagement because if managers act dishonestly or negligently, they will be 
replaced by those who can perform more efficiently, as companies will reject to employ 
bad managers or if in office will remove bad incumbent managers. 
Yet, market constraints do not eliminate mismanagement for a number of reasons, 
though they reduce it. For one, the control of market forces relies on a presupposition 
that there exists perfect competition in the market. If that is taken away, they do not 
function properly. Individuals may not always have full knowledge of all relevant 
facts. In fact, some may enjoy informational advantages over others due to many 
reasons including possession of control of substantial means of production, wealth, key 
posts and private relation with politicians. This may mean corporate manager can 
work inefficiently while misrepresenting affairs of their corporations. This further 
means they can attract external finance, as finance providers may not be able to realise 
the truth about the company"s real financial and business position, and they can 
continue office as shareholders may simply be unable to control them due to their lack 
of information or organisation. For another, market for products effectively 
discourages n-dsmanagement where production capital is floating because supposedly 
managers must obtain their needed production capital at a competitive rate from the 
market every minute and thus there will remain nothing for them to appropriate 
personally. But, where production capital is sunk, it might not affect so and managers 
Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Electronic Library at 
http: //ssrn. com/abstract=317661; See also Chapter one (above, at 1.2). 
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would be able to extract private benefits from the corporate funds, as they would no 
longer need to search for production capital. 
185 
IV. 2. The case of Iran 
Unlike its English counterpart, Iranian law, as other civil law jurisdictions 14', does not 
recognise the division between serious and mere mismanagement and hence the 
Iranian courts hear allegations which involve mere mismanagement. The company law 
makes directors liable for conu-nitting any fault in the management of the company. 
The concept of fault is very wide, covering any mistake or error either in respect of 
procedures necessary for making business decisions or in relation to the very decisions 
and, principally, every fault, which causes damage, is a source of liability. It covers 
both intentional and non-intentional violation to the rules of law, articles of association, 
and appropriate resolutions of meetings. "O It is further inclusive of honest/careless 
behaviours and any dishonest disregard of the company interests, which can expose 
directors to civil liability and even sometimes, when conditions subsist, to criminal 
liability. 
Although Iranian company law Goint Stock Companies Act and Trade Act) includes no 
statute law which either expressly or by implication imposes a duty on directors to 
regard the best interest of the company, assumption of such duty by directors can by 
analogy inferred from general principles of agency law which are most manifested 
in 
section 667 of the Iranian Civil Code. According to the section 667 "a representative 
149 For French company law position on the issue of mismanagement see Tunc 
(above, note 
122) at pp 554-5; Arsalidou (above, note 6) at p 228; For the same position 
in Iranian company 
law see section 51 Trade Code 1931 (hereafter is cited 
TC), sections 614,615,631,663,667,951 
and 953 Civil Code 1925 (hereafter is cited 
CC) and in particular section 276 Joint-Stock 
Companies Act 1967 (hereafter is cited JSCA) which hold directors liable for breach of statutes 
and articles and for committing any 
fault which entails damages to the company. 
150 Sections 142 and 276 JSCA. 
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must consider the best interests of the principal and in the exercise of his/her powers 
must not exceed of what has been expressly delegated by contract or deemed to have 
been conferred by implication of the custom". Nonetheless, it is necessary to bear in 
mind that not any disregard of company interest makes directors personally liable. To 
hold a director liable for failing to regard company interests/ the wronged company 
should principally show that such director's failure has entailed to fault. The principle 
aside, company law lists certain examples of such disregard by directors which are by 
expression considered fault. Sections 129,130,131 JSCA, for instance, refer to 
circumstances in which a wrongdoer director is personally interested in corporate 
transactions or sets up his/her personal business through which he/she competes with 
the business of the corporation. 
Principally, Iranian law regards corporate directors as agents whose activities are 
deemed for the account of their principal corporations and hence such activities create 
no effect either positively (rights) or negatively (duties) for directors personally. 
However, in the exercise of powers which the company entrusts to him a director 
might assume personal liability when he conu-nits fault. For that to occur, a director 
must do something which can reasonably attribute causation of damages incurred by 
the company to his conducts and that thing is fault. "' As defined by the CA, fault 
exists where a person commits an act or acts to which he, either by contract"' or by 
151 Sections 666 and 331 CC. 
152 Section 220 CC provides that: "'A contract binds the parties to perform duties not only in 
respect of what mentioned by the parties expressly in the contract 
but also in respect of what 
derives from the custom and the statutes as a result of that contract. " This has been further 
emphasised by sections 225,344 and 356 CC. 
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standards Of CUStOMI 
53 
, is forbidden to do and also where such person forbears to act 
where he is either by contract or by standards of custom, under a duty to act in order to 
protect, manage or take care in relation to someone else's rights and property. 
154 The 
test for measuring such person's conduct is to compare his conduct with that of a 
hypothetical reasonable person who does the same sort of functions and which is 
viewed by the courts in the light of the same external circumstances in which he 
acted. 155 A director's discretion to make business decisions forms only one factor 
among factors the courts wiH take into account when deciding whether a director has 
acted negligently or not. "' Another important factor is to view the nature of directors' 
duty in relation to managing affairs of the company. A director's contract normally 
consists of duties both to ensure certain results and to try to achieve certain goals. 
Directors' duty to obey rules of articles, resolutions of meetings and rules of law in 
managing company affairs forms clear examples as to the former. In such matters, they 
are required to ensure that they will comply with legal as well as constitutional rules 
all the times and it would not be accepted from them as an excuse to say that we tried 
not to violate these rules but we could not avoid. Directors' duty to manage the 
business of the company successfully constitutes a clear example for the latter. 
Directors owe duty to the company to manage the company business with reasonable 
diligence and they discharge such duty if they make their honest effort which meets 
153 In tort context, where there is no contractual relationship between the wrongdoer and the 
wronged person, a person is held responsible if he damages rights and property of another 
person either directly or through indirect causation. [Sections 301-337 CC]. 
154 Sections 951,952 and 953 CC. 
155 See Katoozian Naser, "Liability in Torts and Civil Liability", (1997), Tehran, University of 
Tehran Publication, at No. 105; Katoozian Naser "Civil Code in its Modem Law Order", (1999), 
2nd ed., Tehran, Dadgostar Publication, at p 575. 
156 For German company law position see Hopt Klaus J., "Shareholder Rights and Remedies: A 
View From Germany and The Continent", (1998), Company Financial and Insolvency Law 
Review, 261, Oxford, Mansfield Press, at 265-266; Arsalidou (above, note 6) at p 228. 
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standards Of CuStOM. 
157 Accordingly, once managing the corporate business a director 
does not guarantee good results. Instead, his duty is to apply reasonable effort to 
secure good results for the company and, therefore, he will not be held liable if he took 
a honest decision and complied with the necessary care which can be expected from a 
reasonable director in the same circumstances. 158 
Under the current Iranian law, enforcement of directors' duties falls principally within 
the power of shareholders who act through meetings. If directors commit fault, it is up 
to shareholders to decide through majority resolution to prosecute the wrongdoer 
director or to ratify the wrongdoing and relieve him/her from liability. This power of 
meeting can be inferred by implication from the meaning of a number of sections in the 
JSCA which suggest that shareholders in the ordinary meeting control directors" 
activities. "' Shareholders' discretion to decide between prosecution and ratification in 
respect of a negligent director is considered absolute and, unlike English shareholders" 
ratification power, this discretion has not been subjected to any exception. 160 
Considering the share ownership pattern which prevails among Iranian corporations, 
this controlling power is capable of preventing directors effectively from 
mismanagement, as most companies, whether large or small, have one or few 
shareholders who are able to control the corporation. 
161 
157 Katoozian (1997), (above, note 155) at Nos. 43,164 and 165; Jafaritabar Hasan "Civil 
Liability of Physicians", (2004), available at http: / /www. dadgostary-tehran. ir/ main. asp. 
158 Katoozian (1999), (above, note 155) at pp 441-2; Katoozian Naser "Specific Contracts", vol. 4., 
1994, Tehran, Behnashr Publication, at p 103; Katoozian Naser, "'General Principles of 
Contracts"', Vol. 1, (1995), Tehran, Dadgostar Publication, at p 327. 
159 Sections 86,89,106 (2), 116,138,148,149,151,152,232 JSCA. 
160 Under the English company law transactions that constitute fraud upon the minority cannot 
be ratified by a majority resolution. 
189 
Yet, the reality suggest otherwise. In small companies, this controlling power can be 
unsafe for the purpose of minority rights. Normally in such companies both the 
wrongdoer directors and the controlling shareholders are the same and as a result it 
seems very unlikely that the majority shareholders commence any action against 
wrongdoer directors. As to large companies, the controlling power, which rests in the 
dominant shareholder who is often the government, is not utilised effectively and 
therefore mismanagement persists for a number of reasons. For one, managerial team 
which is appointed by the government is not often very familiar with matters of 
business. As employees of the government, they have little incentive and required 
skills to run the business in such corporations. For another, because of its bureaucratic 
nature, the government is often unable to exercise effective control in such 
corporations. 
As a matter of exception, Iranian company law empowers minority shareholders in 
certain circumstances in which managements" activities constitute fault to initiate 
corporate action against wrongdoer directors. "' Shareholders who own at least one 
fifth of the corporate shares are given statutory right to pursue wrongdoer directors 
who cause damage to the company. I will study this power in details later in Chapter 
five where derivative action will be examined. For the purpose of my discussion here it 
is useful only to know that the power does not form a very remarkable protection for 
minority shareholders as company law allows majority shareholders to block minority 
actions through ratification of managements faults. "' 
161 See Chapter one (above, at 1-2). 
162 Section 276 JSCA. 
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Internal controls aside, mismanagement can further persist in Iranian corporations 
because of the weak and deficient functioning of the market constraints. As 
corporations rely more on internal finance, the existence of an unresponsive market for 
capital will not constitute a threat to inefficient corporations. Market for products too 
has little impact on such corporations, as they often enjoy monopolies. Finally, the 
government which is often a dominant shareholder in Iranian large corporations is 
very unlikely to refer to the market for managerial services. In such corporations, 
managerial team is often composed of persons who are employees of the government 
and who are disciplined, in case of failure, through administrative regulations and 
sometimes when conditions exist through law relevant to civil and criminal liability 
rather than market. In a context like Iran in which business is mainly conducted 
through either closely held firms or state-owned associations, and competitive 
constraints are to a great extent absent, and financial market is yet under developed, 
and share transactions are relatively uncon-Lmon, management will have more free 
room to commit mismanagement. 
163 See Chapter five (below, at V. 2.2.4) 
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IV. 3. Conclusion 
In this Chapter I considered the role of corporate directors in the majority /minority 
relationship. In this consideration, I challenged the claim that states directors play a 
remarkable role in reducing the majority/ minority conflict. Accordingly, the merit of 
the claim, it is suggested, should be subjected to directors" accountability before 
companies and shareholders. Strong but unaccountable directors can commit 
mismanagement which is perhaps more problematic compared with dangers 
associated with the majority rule for minority shareholders. It was also explained that 
such accountability would not be reached unless three conditions are met. First, 
company law should ensure that its designed mechanisms of directors" duties are 
sufficiently inclusive in respect of directors" negligence so that mismanagement is 
discouraged. Second, company law should also ensure that suitable and practicable 
mechanisms of internal control which enable principally majority shareholders and, in 
appropriate circumstances, minority shareholders to enforce directors' duties exist in 
corporations. Third, the law and policy makers should design relevant regulations that 
enable the market to serve through its competitive constraints in order to curb 
mismanagement effectively. 
English company law has not met the first condition yet. As regards the duty of care, 
there are good reasons to believe that the rules of liability and those of exemption from 
liability for corporate directors are not sufficiently certain and are improperly 
balanced. For one, the law fails to provide guidelines to determine what sort of conduct 
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associated with negligence should count as reasonable or unreasonable. 
164 Decided 
cases that only reflect the intuition of particular judges also have a limited capacity to 
make this clear. In fact, from established cases of breach of duties to clear cases of mere 
negligence there is a very large grey area of disagreement among the courts in 
understanding, and upon such understanding in the discovery, of managerial 
negligence in companies"'; this makes the division hard to exercise and largely 
susceptible to misunderstanding, disagreement and misapplication. 166 Where the law 
offers a not very clear guideline to allow people to make an appropriate distinction, 
uncertainty may serve to further the position of negligent directors, as they are often 
able to make commercial excuses to justify their actions in doubtful areas, and even 
when they have no such ability and as a consequence shareholders may want to choose 
to take action, the uncertainty of the law, the threat of reputational damage to the 
company and the prospect of the costs of pursuing the wrongdoer director wiR 
disappoint them in doing so. For another, the question of whether the law has struck a 
good balance can be answered in the negative, when one takes into consideration the 
tendency of current company law to favour managers excessively. The law permits any 
negligence short of breach of duty, no matter how foolish and damaging, to occur. The 
law also allows incompetent persons to take management of corporations. In addition, 
the law assesses negligent directors' activities with a general standard of behaviour 
that requires simple compliance with the standard of performance of ordinary persons 
164 Worthington (above, note 9) at p 449. 
165 Law formulates the measure of duty of care in a generalised fashion in the hope that the 
courts would apply it coherently. However, since the courts" judgements are always fact- 
specific, it is always possible that they may fall into disagreement when dealing with similar 
facts and they can further differentiate even between cases that share most of their facts. A 
further difficulty is that it is hardly possible, if not impossible, to classify corporate directors 
into one and the same class with uniform code of practice. 
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rather than professionals. Of course, this arrangement would tend to greatly encourage 
many persons, no matter how inexperienced, to accept office and take business risks 
and attracts complete support from existing English directors. "' But, such arrangement 
would also seem no longer desirable for companies and their shareholders, as it fails to 
deter directors from mismanagement and allows them to shirk their responsibilities or 
to negligently cause companies to suffer considerable loss. "' 
As regards the fiduciary duty, the mechanism is not very reliable as the duty enjoys a 
subjective standard which requires directors only to act according to what they, 
themselves, regard it to be the best interest of companies. Furthermore, recent attempts 
that have been made in order to accommodate non-shareholder groups' interest within 
the scope of fiduciary duty of corporate directors have the potential that negligent 
directors under the label of corporate interests pursue self-interested objectives more. 
In contrast, Iranian company law imposes stricter as well as higher levels of liability on 
corporate directors. It does not know any division between different sorts of negligence 
and as the concept of fault is inclusive of any negligent behaviour, it offers no 
systematic exemption from liability to corporate directors for mere mismanagement. 
Also, it does not know any division between duties of care and fiduciary of corporate 
directors and the concept of fault, which is assessed objectively, can include both. 
166 Griffin, Stephen, "Negligent Mismanagement as Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct", (1992), The 
Law Qtiarterly Review, Vol. 108,389, London, Stevens and Sons, at pp 390-392. 
167 Directors have evidenced that they are happy with the scheme of the current law on 
directors' liability. This is implicitly understood from the reasoning of the Law Commission in 
refusing to recommend a statutory business judgement rule. [The Law Commission (above, 
note 18) at p 531. 
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Further, directors' duty only accommodates interests of company shareholders as 
against non-shareholder groups and, therefore, there is no or little possibility that 
directors could pursue interests other than those of the company. 
As regards the second condition, both the English and Iranian company law allow the 
use of the two internal control mechanisms (i. e. enforcement by majority shareholders 
and enforcement by minority shareholders) in respect of directors' duties. Yet, as a 
consequence of the varying models of corporate governance which exist in the two 
systems each has been strong only in one of the two existing mechanisms. In the case of 
England, as company shares tend to be publicly dispersed in large companies, 
enforcement by majority shareholders serves little function. Here, company law should 
probably adopt policies which encourage shareholder organisation and activism. "' 
Instead, enforcement by minority shareholder mechanism functions more effectively as 
majority shareholders have no power to stop it. Nonetheless, certain practical obstacles 
plus some level of information asymmetry and heavy costs of legal proceeding 
associate with this mechanism which require the English lawmaker to review law in 
this respect. For Iran, the converse is true. Companies rely more on enforcement by 
majority than by minority shareholders because company shares tend to be 
concentrated and further because majority shareholders have always had power to 
stop minority action when the case involves fault of directors. Yet enforcement by 
majority has been either problematic in the case of small companies or weak in the case 
of large companies because in the former case often the controlling majority and the 
168 Arsalidou, Demetra, "The Impact of Modem Influences on The Traditional Duties of Care, 
Skill and Diligence of Directors"', (2001), Kluwer Law International, The Hague/ London/ Boston, 
at p 173; Arsalidou (2003) (above, note 6) at p 232. 
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wrongdoer directors have been the same people and in the case of large companies 
control by government has evidenced to be deficient. 
Lastly, while external control over directors" activities in English corporations is strong, 
it serves very weak in the case of Iranian corporations. As the economy in the former 
rely hugely on market, relevant regulations which encourage competitiveness in the 
market and require higher level of disclose of information are enacted to enable market 
constraints in order to curb mismanagement effectively. By contrast, Iranian economy 
which is greately directed by the government and in part by the market often enjoys 
regulations which discourage competitiveness in the market and which call for sub 
standard disclosure of information requirement. Internal financing makes the threat of 
market for capital trivial and further it, in conjunction with concessions and 
monopolies which are enjoyed by the state-owned corporations, helps to reduce the 
threat of market for products. Also, appointment of management in large corporations 
which constantly occur outside the market negates the threat of market for managerial 
services. 
169 Nolan R. C., "'Indirect Invetors: A Greater Say in The Company? ", (2003), 3 journal of 
Corporate Law Studies, 73, at pp 73-7. 
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Chapter V: Legal constraints on majority rule 
Previous Chapters were dedicated to examining from several aspects the rule of 
majority and its consequences in the majority/ minority relationship in companies. It 
has become clear in this examination that while the rule is generally and both in theory 
and practice appreciated by, and advantageous to, corporations and their shareholders, 
in some circumstances it can generate unjust harm to interests of minority 
shareholders. Such harm can stem not from a mere commercial failure to which every 
shareholder by his contract surrenders but rather from what is called abuse of rights 
that often comprises of certain sinister and vicious attempts of controflers who either 
intentionally or recklessly fail to regard minority interests. The contract, which mainly 
regulates this relationship, is unable to avoid such harm. Contractual safeguards 
simply lack the capability to curb controllers' abuse. General laws which regulate 
corporate activities have also limited capacity to curb such abuse because abuse of 
right often occurs within the ambit of contract and general law. Further, the 
shareholder voting with which the majority rule works can be exercised abusively. It 
bears with it no duty that could dictate majority shareholders once voting to regard 
minority interests and the constraint imposed by the company law that requires 
shareholders to avoid discrimination can only cover clear cases of discrimination. 
Lastly, directors under different circumastances can facilitate either mismanagement or 
majority abuse and disciplines of the market also seem either irrelevant or trivial as to 
addressing the question of majority abuse. An interesting question which is to be 
addressed and which is the subject of my consideration in this Chapter is whether the 
law has been responsive about the issue of abuse of right by majority shareholders and 
if so how has it been successful? The Chapter, therefore, concerns reviewing the rules 
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and mechanisms which are devised by the lawmaker with the intention to protect 
rights and interests of minority shareholders. The Chapter is divided into two parts. 
Part one considers the issue in the English company law and part two relates to the 
Iranian company law. As the legal constraints in English company law comprise of 
common law and statutory constraints, a subdivision is made in part one. Common 
law constraints constitute the first subdivision which specifically targets the 
mechanism of derivative action. As the other common law constraint; i. e. "bona fide 
for the benefit of the company as a whole, ' was fully discussed earlier in Chapter three, 
I avoid repeating that discussion here. Statutory constraints which form the second 
subdivision concern the two statutory remedies of 'winding up' and "unfairly 
prejudicial conduct'. In part two, I review several mechanisms which exist in the 
current Iranian laws and which offer some protection to minority shareholders against 
abuse of right by the majority shareholders. These include the 'no abuse of right' 
principle, right to convene shareholder meeting, cumulative voting, disinterested 
ratification, and the shareholder action. 
As the purpose of this Chapter is to explain intervention of the law in the 
majority/ minority relationship in order to curb the possibility of majority abuse of 
right, two preliminary issues must be addressed before I could commence the 
discussion. The first issue, to be considered, is to see whether or not corporate 
members need the help of the company law at all? To answer this question approaches 
differ. The economic school and new contractarians have taken the view that company 
contract is merely premised on freedom of contract 
for its creation and continuity, as 
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are other private contracts. ' By using the contract system, company law in every 
market economy should aim to reach efficiency and it will not be achieved unless 
parties are allowed to use their freedom to choose any arrangement they wish. 
2 
Companies are totally private organisations that need no support of company law' 
which may only provide some voluntary standard form contracts in order to help 
4 parties avoid costly process of renegotiations and rewriting. Early manifestation of 
this approach can be traced back in the words of Adam Smith, the 18thcentury Scottish 
economist, who viewed 'the object of the public works and institutions [as being] to 
facilitate conunerce in general". More recently, it was reflected in the Company Law 
Review Steering Group's report where it explained the purpose in setting out 
proposals for company law reform as being facilitation of the commerce. 
In this model, minority shareholder's interests are adequately preserved through the 
system of market self-regulation, especially the markets for securities, managerial 
1 Easterbrook Frank H. and Fischel Daniel R., "Voting in Corporate Law", The Journal of Law and 
Economics, (1983), Chicago, University of Chicago Law School, at p 401. 
2 One key factor in the economic analysis is the "rational actor' concept. Economists assume that 
when individuals make choice, they do it rationally. See generally Schwarts Alan and Scott 
Robert E., "'Contract Theory and The Limits of Contract Law", Yale Law journal, (2003), vol. 113, 
New Haven, Conn., Yale Law Journal Co., Yale University, School of Law at pp 3-6. 
3 Jensen C. Michel and Meckling William H. "Corporate Governance and 'Economic 
Democracy': An Attack on Freedom", in Procedures of Corporate Governance: A Definitive 
exploration of The Issues, edited by C. J. Huizenga, UCLA Extension, (1983), at pp 8-9 available at 
Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Electronic Library at: 
http: //papers. ssrn. com/ABSTRACT ID= 321521; Schwarts and Scott (above, note 2) at pp 5,11- 
16; Posner Richard A., "'Economic Analysis of Law"', (1992), Boston, London, Little, Brown, at p 
3; Cheffins Brian R, ""Company Law: Theory Structure and Operation", (1997), Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, at p 41. 
4 Easterbrook and Fischel (above, note 1); Maughan C. W. and Copp S. F., "'Company Law 
Reform and Economic Methodology Revisited", 1999, The Company Lawyer, Vol. 21, No. 1,20, 
London, Oyez Publishing Limited, at pp 20-21; Cheffins (above, note 3) at pp 7,26-31. 
5 Smith Adam, "An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of the Nations", (1776), 
Vol. 2, Book V, Chapter 1, Part III, at p 731, London, Printed for W. Strahan and T. Cadell. 
6 Department of Trade and Indusry, "Modem Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The 
Strategic Framework"', (1999), at 2.4. 
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services and corporate control .7 At the initial public offering (IPO), founders who take 
their firms public, adopt whatever corporate governance arrangements which are most 
efficient. If they do not, the company will be penalised in the capital market through 
being faced with higher production costs and may eventually become insolvent as 
customers buy elsewhere. ' At the midstream stage, too, controllers have generally no 
incentive to use their power in a way which is inefficient. ' In addition, legal constraints 
may simply impose additional cost on contractual parties who may feel better off 
settling their issue privately. 'O After all, the way of exit is always open to small 
shareholders who would be able rationally to choose to disinvest. " 
The theory, however, justifies the use of legal constraints on two limited grounds. One 
is the case of close corporations where a controlling majority is present and an open 
market for shares is absent. 12 The other concerns large corporations where mandatory 
7 Stedman Graham & Jones Janet, "'Shareholders' Agreement"", (1998), 3rd ed., London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, at p 255. Schwarts and Scott (above, note 2) at pp 11-16. Ferran Eilis, "'Company Law 
and Corporate Finance, ", (1999), Oxford, Oxford University Press, at p 244. 
8 Ferran Ibid; Easterbrook Frank H. and Fischel Daniel R., ""The Corporate Contract", Columbia 
Law Review, No. 7, (1989), Vol. 89, New York, Columbia University Press, at pp 1430-5; Black 
Bernard S., "Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis", North-Western 
University Law Review, 1990, Vol. 84, No 2, Chicago, North-western University Law School, at pp 
570-3; Romano Roberta, "'Answering The Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory 
Corporate Laws"', Columbia Law Review, No. 7, (1989), Vol. 89, New York, Columbia University 
Press, at pp 1600-2; Gordon Jeffrey N., "'The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law", Columbia 
Law Review, No. 7, (1989), Vol. 89, New York, Columbia University Press, at pp 1557-8. 
9 Manne Henry, "'Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting in the Economics of Legal 
Relationships", Columbia Law Review, New York, Columbia University Press, 1964, Vol. 64,1427; 
Gilson Ronald J, "A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics 
in Tender Offers"', Stanford Law Review, 1981,33,819 Stanford, Calif., Stanford University, 
School of Law; Fischel Daniel R, "Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate 
Control and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers", (1978), 57, Texas Law Review, 1, Austin, 
Texas Law Review Association Quoted in Mitchell Charles, "'Shareholders' Claims for Reflective 
Loss", (2004), The Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 120,457, London, Stevens and Sons, at 483-4. 
Romano (above, note 10) at pp 1600-2; Black (above, note 10) at pp 566-7. 
10 Easterbrook and Fischel (above, note 10) at pp 1442-4. 
11 Easterbrook and Fischel (above, note 1) at p 420. 
12 Black (above, note 10) at p 573; Miles Lilian and Proctor Giles, "Unresponsive Shareholders 
in Public Companies: Dial "M"' for Motivate? ", The Company Lawyer, (2000), Vol. 21, No. 5, 
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rules may be employed to reduce the risk of externalities" which imposes the costs of 
company operation on third parties or on the society. " 
Some contractarians go one step further and assume some regulatory role for the law 
as to large companies. They take the view that individuals for a number of reasons may 
not always have full knowledge of all relevant facts. The information asymmetry 
which exists in the market can give informational advantages to some individuals over 
others. It prevents investors from calculating the right share price at IPO stage and 
instances of investors being defrauded would discourage investment. " The inefficiency 
threat may not completely discourage abuse of rights by controllers at midstream stage 
too. The law should interfere both to take informational privileges away, thereby to 
make it feasible for businessmen in order to compete fairly" and to prevent controllers 
from any ex post opportunistic alteration of investors" rights. " 
London, Oyez Publishing Limited, at p 142; Cheffins Brian R, "Minority Shareholders and 
Corporate Governance", The Company Lawyer, (2000), Vol. 21, No 2, London, Oyez Publishing 
Limited, at pp 41-42. 
13 Easterbrook and Fischel (above, note 10) at pp 1434,1436-41. 
14 Even in such cases it is suggested that before using mandatory rules it is necessary first to 
determine whether proposed mandatory measures will act better than what market forces can 
offer. [See Easterbrook and Fischel (above, note 10) at pp 1431-2; Romano (above, note 10) at pp 
1616-71. 
15 Bebchuk Lucian Arye, "Asymmetric Information and The Choice of Corporate Governance 
Arrangements", (December 2002), Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper Number 398, at pp 1- 
2 available at Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Electronic Library at 
http: //papers. ssrn. com/abstract id=327842; Bebchuk Lucian Arye, "'The Debate on Contractual 
Freedom in Corporate Law", (1989), Columbia Law Review, No. 7, Vol. 89, New York, Columbia 
University Press, pp 1406-7. 
16 Chef fins (above, note 3) at p 9. 
17 Gordon (above, note 10) at pp 1573-80; Similar views can be found in Bebchuk Lucian Arye, 
"Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter 
Amendments"', Harvard Law Review, (1989), Vol. 102, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Law Review 
Publishing Association, at pp 1827-9; Bebchuk Lucian Arye and Hamdani Assaf, "Optimal 
Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution", (December 2002), Harvard Law School, Discussion 
Paper Number 343, pp 3-9 available at Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Electronic 
Library at http: //papers. ssm. com/abstract id=293585; Brudney Victor, "Corporate 
Governance, Agency Costs, and The Rhetoric of Contract", (1985), Columbia Law Review, No. 7, 
Vol. 85, New York, Columbia University Press, at p 1444; Coffee John C. "The 
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The law matters approach, on the other hand, rejects the economists' view, arguing 
that legal constraints can help contractual parties to achieve optimum efficiency. They 
prevent the constitution to concentrate complete power in the majority" where the 
market fails to discourage the likelihood of abuse of power by the majority. " They are 
also normally designed with the intention to address concerns from the wider society, 
which means they regard not only interests of individual members but also those of the 
very group that can require imposition of constraints in order to curb the possibility of 
majority abuse in corporations. 'O In addition to these, they are not always devised to 
reflect parties' choice if they could have thought about them ex ante. 21 In certain 
circumstances, they are intended to protect one party against abuse of discretional 
power by the other party. This is especially the case as to company contraCtS22 in which 
Mandatory/ Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on The judicial Role"', (1989), 
Columbia Law Review, No. 7, Vol., New York, Columbia University Press, at pp 1622-3 and 
"Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure"', (1999), 
The Journal of Corporation Law, Iowa City, University of Iowa, College of Law, at p 4. 
18 Mayson Stephan, French Derek and Ryan Christopher, "Mayson, French & Ryan on 
Company Law"' (2001), 181h ed., London, Blackstone, at pp 11-12,38. 
19 Parkinson J. E., "'Corporate Power and Responsibility", (1993), Oxford, Clarendon Press; 
New York, Oxford University Press, at p 114; Ayres 1. and Gertner R., "Filling Gaps in 
Incomplete Contracts; An Economic Theory of Default Rules", (1989), 99, Yale Law journal, New 
Haven, Conn., Yale Law journal Co at p 87. 
20 Parkinson (above, note 23) at pp 9,21; MacNeil lain, ""Company Law Rules: An Assessment 
from the Perspective of Incomplete Contract Theory", Journal of Corporate Law Studies, Uune 
2001), Oxford, UK, Hart Pub, at pp 110-117; Ogus A. "'Regulation: Legal Form and Economic 
Theory"', (1944), Oxford, Clarendon Press, New York, Oxford University Press, at pp 29,55; 
Bamford Colin, "Directors' Duties: The Public Dimension", (2000), The Company Lawyer, Vol. 21, 
No. 2, London, Oyez Publishing Limited, at p 38; Corporate Governance: Improving 
Competitiveness and Access to Capital in Global Markets, A report to the OECD by The 
Business Sector Advisory Group on Corporate Governance, (1998), p 67. 
21 Bebchuk (1989) (above, note 15) at p 1410; Easterbrook and Fischel (above, note 8) at p 1433. 
[See Clark Robert C., "'Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law", 
(1989), Columbia Law Review, No. 7, Vol. 89, New York, Columbia University Press, at pp 1718- 
20; Gordon (above, note 8) at p 15851. 
22 Coffee (1989), (above, note 17) at pp 1619-20; Drury R. R., "The Relative Nature of A 
Shareholder's Right to Enforce The Company Contract", (1986), The Cambridge Law journal, 
42(2), 219, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, at p 222. 
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parties with unequally divided discretional powers create, and continue to, a long-tenn 
23 
24 relationship. In such contexts, they function to restrict ex post opportunism. 
The second issue to be addressed is to determine how much and what type of company 
law intervention is justified? Company contracts, no doubt, need the help of the law at 
least because of their incompleteness which cannot be avoided as a consequence of 
25 living a long life in a dynamic ever-changing environment. Incomplete contracts may 
cause party disputes which can waste public budget26 and, therefore, lawmakers have 
incentive to provide legal rules for contingencies that contracts fail either to anticipate 
or to consider thoroughly. Clearly, a substantial part of company law will be designed 
in a default format because it reduces costs of re-contracting, ensure freedom of 
shareholders, and facilitate contractuall efficiency. " However, in certain circumstances, 
it is unable to facilitate achievements of such objectives in their full capacity. " In 
particular, where a case involves abuse of rights by the majority against minority 
shareholders, defaults may simply facilitate abuse. Some level of mandatory 
23 Company contracts fall within the category of relational contracts. Relational contracts can be 
distinguished from discrete contracts in which parties have no expectation of an ongoing 
relationship. [See MacNeil (above, note 20) at p 114]. 
24 Clearly, the case for mandatory rules is wider than what I brought here which were only 
relevant in the relationship between majority and minority shareholders. For other justifications 
see Coffee (1989), (above, note 17) at pp 1624,1676-7; Gordon (above, note 8) at p 1549; MacNeil 
(above, note 20) at pp 121-123. 
25 MacNeil (above, note 20) at p 113; Schwarts and Scott (above, note 2) at p 60; Bebchuk & 
Hamdani (above, note 17) at p 10; Coffee (1989), (above, note 17) at pp 1676; Gordon (above, 
note 8) at p 1573. 
26 See Bebchuk & Hamdani (above, note 17) at pp 3-9. 
27 Bebchuk & Hamdani (above, note 17) at pp 3-4,9; MacNeil (above, note 20) at p 119. 
28 Defaults are not always at the economics of contractual parties. Once they are in operation, 
those who wish to escape from their scope have to suffer cost in doing so. They also apply to the 
parties who may not be aware of such rules ex ante. If defaults are unknown to the parties ex 
ante, ex post opportunistic enforcement can occur. [MacNeil (above, note 20) at p 1191. 
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intervention, however, can ensure that there will be no or little abuse. " Yet, any 
excessive mandatory intervention can reduce the efficiency of the company law too. 
While, they can be used to protect minority rights as against the possibility of majority 
abuse, an unconsidered use of them can encourage opportunism by minority 
shareholders. " A compromise, therefore, is required to reconcile the two contrary 
goals", something which is often difficult, as it requires the lawmakers to understand 
which consideration in what circumstances must be given priority. A further difficulty 
is that different socio-economic backgrounds can require different considerations and 
hence what parameters should be taken into account cannot be formulated in a single 
prescription. 32 Take, for example, the case of a country in which respecting contracts 
and rights of individuals have become a tradition as part of an established culture of a 
nation. In such context, there may be less need to having mandatory minority 
29 Recent empirical research by comparing legal rules across 49 countries has also shown that 
there might be a casual link between good investor protection in corporate law and existing of a 
strong company sector with investors wishing to take the risk of investment in companies. 
[LLSV (above, Chapter one note 82)]. 
30 Sealy L. S., ""Cases and Materials", (2001), Chap 10, at p 477, London, Butterworths; MacNeil 
(above, note 20) at p 125. 
31 MacNeil (above, note 20) at p 120; Coffee (1989), (above, note 17) at p 1618; Gordon (above, 
note 8) at p 1549; Clark (above, note 21) at p 1703; Bebchuk (1989), (above, note 15) at p 1395; 
Bebchuk (1989), (above, note 17) at pp 1820; Brudney (above, note 17) at p 1403; Mayson Et. Al. 
(above, note 18) at p 38; Sealy (above, note 30) at p 477; Sealy Len, '"Shareholders' Remedies in 
the Common Law World", (1997), Company, Financial and Insolvency Law Review, 173, Oxford, 
Mansfield Press. For opponents view see Romano (above, note 8) at p 1599; Black (above, note 
8) at p 543. 
32 Kamba, W. J., "Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework", (1974), International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 23,485, at pp 513-518; Orucu, Esin, "'Law as Transplant", (2002), 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 51,505, at p 207; Bratton W. and McCahery, 
"'Comparative Corporate Governance and The Theory of the Firm: The Case against Global 
Cross Refrence", (1999), 38 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 213; Cheff ins Brian R., 'Current 
Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan via Toronto', Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law, (1999), Vol. 10, No. 5, at pp 7-11; Cheffins Brian R, "Corporate 
Law and Ownership Structure: A Darwinian Link? ", University of Cambridge, (2002), available 
at Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Electronic Library at 
http: //ssrn. com/abstract=317661, p 23; Roe, Mark J., ""The Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Norm and Industrial Organisation"", 'Harvard Law School', (2001), available at Social Science 
Research Network (SSRN), Electronic Library at: http: //papers. ssrn. com/abstractid =282703, at 
p 2. 
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protections. Less mandatory measures in such society command the greatest because 
33 they reflect social values and prevailing moral judgements. Likewise, for nations with 
competitive market lower levels of mandatory measures compared to that of a 
monopolist one may suffice because a competitive economy through market forces, can 
remedy, to a greater extent, the flaws of private ordering. 14 On the other hand, if much 
of a nation-s industry is monopolistically organised and its company sector has a 
concentrated shareholding pattern, pursuing the mere efficiency objective would 
maximise the profit of the monopolist majority. As a result, there may be greater need 
to develop wider levels of mandatory interference. 
33 Mayson Et. Al. (above, note 18) at p 34. 
34 Coffee (1989), (above, note 17) at p 1691; Brudney 
(above, note 17) at p 1444. 
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V. 1. The case of England 
As legal constraints on majority rule in current English corporation law consist of case 
law and statutory law, it would seem better in the interest of simplicity and deep 
understanding to examine each in a separate section. Thus, this part is divided into two 
sections, common law constraints and statutory constraints. 
V. 1.1. Common law constraints 
There are two constraints in common law which have been developed over time by the 
judges primarily to protect rights of minority shareholders against abuse of corporate 
power by a controlling majority. One concerns with the 'bona fide for the benefit of the 
company as a whole' restriction which was created in the Allen case" and which 
constitutes an important constraint on the power of majority shareholders. This 
constraint was discussed elsewhere 36 and, therefore, I reject repeating that discussion 
here. The other relates to the so-called "fraud on a minority shareholder' restriction 
which is known as a major exception to the rule in Foss case and which enables a 
minority shareholder to take corporate claims using the derivative form of action. This 
constraint is the subject of my consideration here. 
V. 1.1.1. Derivative action 
Principally, when corporations are wronged they, rather than their shareholders, 
prosecute wrongdoers. They commence such prosecution normaRy through their 
35 Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa, Limited (1900), 1 Ch. 656 per Lindley M. R. at p 671. 
36 See Chapter three (above, at 111.1.5). 
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representatives. It is, however, very unlikely that a prosecution is commenced where 
corporate representatives and wrongdoers are one and the same. The derivative action 
has been designed by the case law, using rules of equity, to allow shareholders to 
initiate such prosecution where the company, itself, fails to do so. " In continental 
countries that follow civil law system, the court, in case of oppression of a minority by 
the majority, can always fall back, as a remedy of the last resort, on the general "abuse 
of rights"' (abus de droit) rule. Common law system lacks such a general rule. " 
Instead, it has designed equitable rules to remedy the flaw in specific occasions and the 
derivative action is considered one of those. '9 Such action is called 'derivative' because 
the cause of action derives from a right that belongs to the company rather than the 
plaintiff shareholder . 
40 For the same reason, the probable remedy which will be given 
in a successful derivative action is a corporate one rather than personal. 
The derivative action is exceptional which means it is not always open to shareholders 
to initiate derivative actions. A minority plaintiff must show that he has already tried 
37 Atwool v. Merryweather (1867), LIZ 5 Eq 464n; Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph Works (1874), 9 
Ch App 350; Dafn Tinplate Co. Ltd. v. Llanelly Steel Co. (1920) 2 Ch. 124; Edwards v. Halliwell 
(1950), 2 All ER 1064; Daniels v. Daniels, (1978), Ch 406; Prudential Assurance Co Ltd. v. 
Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2), (1981), Ch 257; Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v. Greater 
London Council (1982) 1WLR 2. 
38 Hahlo H. R., Farrar John H., "Hahlo's Cases and Materials on Company Law, ", (1987), 3rd ed 
London, Sweet & Maxwell, at p 477; Cutteridge H. C., "Abuse of Rights"", (1935), 5 The Cambridge 
Law journal, 22; Bolgar Vera, "Abuse of Rights in France, Germany, and Switzerland: Asurvay of 
a Recent Chapter in Legal Doctrine"', (1975), 35 Louisiana Law Review, 1015; Byers Michael, 
"'Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age"", (2002), McGill Law journal, Vol. 47,389. 
39 Hale Christopher, "'What's Right With the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle? ", (1997), Company 
Financial and Insolvency Law Review, Oxford, Mansfield Press, at p 219; Wedderburn K. W., 
"Shareholder's Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle", (1957), Cambridge Law journal, 196, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK at pp 203-206; Hager Mark M., "Bodies Politic: 
The Progressive History of Organizational "Real Entity' Theory"', University of Pittsburgh Law 
Review, (1989), Vol. 50, Pittsburgh, at pp 633-4. 
40 Pettet Ben, "'Company Law", (2001), Harlow, Longman, at p 235; Reisberg Arad, "Indemnity 
Cost Orders Under s 459 Petition? " (2004), The Company Lawyer, vol. 25, No. 4 116, London, 
Ovez Publishing Limited, p 118 at note 4; Hale (above, note 39) at pp 222-4. 
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any other possible internal ways for the purpose of remedying the wrong done to the 
company, but his efforts has been suppressed by the controlling wrongdoers. " As a 
result, if a minority shareholder has yet options other than taking a legal action, his 
derivative action will not be heard. Where his only option is taking a derivative action, 
he must show that the case involves 'fraud on a minority shareholder" - As the case law 
suggests the term 'fraud on a minority shareholder' refers to a situation where a 
wrongful conduct against company amounts to fraud and the wrongdoers who are in 
control of the company do not want to allow an action to proceed . 
4' Thus, two 
prerequisites, those of fraud and wrongdoer control, must be shown before the courts 
in order to allow a derivative action. 
V. 1.1.1.1. Prerequisites of a derivative action 
1) Fraud 
The term 'fraud' is too wide, complex, and indefinite and is capable of covering many 
quite different sorts of failures . 
43 There is not any well-established definition of fraud to 
assist those involved in the process. It has been described in certain cases and by some 
academics, for example, as not just in the traditional common law sense, which was 
41 Wedderburn K. W., ""Shareholder's Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle", (1958), 
Cambridge Law journal, 97, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, at pp 95-7; Griffin Stephen, 
"Company law: Fundamental Principles"', (1996), 2nd ed., London, Pitman, at pp 300-2; Thorne 
James (ed. ), "'Butterworth's Company Law Guide"', (1995), Butterworths, London, UK, at p 187. 
42 As the loss in a 'fraud on a minority' case is always suffered directly by the wronged 
company rather than its shareholders, it seems more pertinent if the mechanism is retermed as 
'fraud on the company'. See Wedderburn (1958), (above, note 41) at p 93; Farrar John H., 
"'Company Law", (1991), London, Butterworths, at p 449; Griffin (above, note 41) at p 302; Sealy 
L. S., "'Cases and Materials in Company Law", (1996), Sixth Edition, London, Butterworths, at 
pp 497-8. 
43 Sealy (2001), (above, note 30) at p 498, para "'Note"; Conway Mark, "Minority Shareholder 
Protection and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle: Increasingly a Foss about Nothing" in Companies in 
thc 1990s, edited by Gary Slapper, (1995), London, Cavendish, at pp 3-6. 
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limited to the cases of appropriation of company assets, but also in the wider equitable 
sense covering an abuse or misuse of power. " Yet such description only provides a 
general picture and hence a discovery of the meaning of fraud will depend the most on 
case law which stretches back over 150 years. The concept of fraud, therefore, can only 
be understood through a case-by-case study. 4' This is in part due to the courts' 
reluctance to theorise the concept of fraud 4' and in part is resulted from the very 
method of the common law system that tends to work without a firm definition" 
believing that any firm definition may prevent the judiciary from tracing new and 
developing forms of fraud. " 
There are two approaches in the case law as to how to identify fraud. One regards 
fraud in the nature of certain wrongdoings rather than the state of mind of the 
wrongdoers . 
4' This approach, which has substantial support among academics t0050' 
often limits the scope of fraud to cases in which directors breach their fiduciary duty to 
the company or fail to exercise proper care and as a result of such failure they get 
unduly enriched. The approach classifies wrongdoings into two categories of ratifiable, 
44 Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v. Greater London Council (1982) IWLR 2 per Megarry VC; See 
also Wedderburn (1958), (above, note 41) at p 96; Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at p 449; Griffin 
(above, note 41) at p 302; Thorne (above, note 41) at p 186; Stedman & Jones (above, note 7) at p 
77. 
45 Pettet (above, note 40) at p 232; Stedman & Jones (above, note 7) at pp 77-8; Conway (above, 
note 43) at pp 4-6. 
46 Pettet (above, note 40) at p 231. 
47 Sealy L. S. and Hooley R. J. A., "'Text and Materials in Commercial Law", (1994), London, 
Butterworths, at pI 
48 Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v. Greater London Council (1982) 1WLR 2 per Megarry V-C. 
49 Atwool v. Merryweather (1867), LR 5 Eq 464 n; Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph Works (1874), 
9 Ch App 350; Burland v. Earl (1902) AC 83; Daniels v. Daniels, (1978), Ch 406. 
50 Wedderburn (1958), (above, note 41) at pp 96-7; Parkinson (above, note 19) at pp 247-254; 
Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at p 449; Griffin (above, note 41) at pp 301-4; Ferran Eilis, 
"'Company Law and Corporate Finance", (1999), Oxford, Oxford University Press, at p 148; 
Pettet (above, note 40), at p 232; Thorne (above, note 41) at p 186; Stedman & Jones (above, note 
7) at pp 77-8. 
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which is not fraud, and non-ratifiable which is fraud and which allows derivative 
action. Well-known instances of fraud according to this approach are mala fide 
deflecting of corporate assets, taking corporate profits and advantages at the expense 
of minority shareholders" and bona fide negligence amounting to a benefit obtained 
by wrongdoers at the company's expense. " Proceedings based on breach of duties and 
mere negligence in which wrongdoers were not benefited personally have been 
expressly excluded from the concept of fraud. " This approach is advantageous in the 
sense that its measure can provide a bottom line from which one can distinguish fraud 
from other wrongdoings which in turn will result, to some extent, in more certainty for 
those involved in such cases. 54 It is also advantageous in that it relieves the courts from 
taking a subjective investigation into the state of mind of the controlling wrongdoers. " 
However, one important difficulty of the approach is that it classifies certain not very 
interrelated conducts in the same category as fraud. Put it simply, it remains unclear, 
after all. that whether the test is deflecting corporate assets or failure to exercise proper 
care and in the latter case why a self-benefiting from the wrongdoing should make a 
difference. 56 Another difficulty is that identification of any fraud requires separate 
examination of every act and, therefore, there may be as many frauds as there are acts. 
51 Atwool v. Merryweather (1867), LR 5 Eq 464 n; Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph Works (1874), 
9 Ch App 350; Burland v. Earl (1902) AC 83. 
52 Daniels v. Daniels, (1978), Ch 406. 
53 Pavlides v. Jensen, (1956), Ch 565; Turquand v. Marshall, (1868-69), (L R), 4 Ch App 376 at p 
386; Bamford v. Bamford, (1970) Ch. 212. 
54 Ferran (above, note 50) at p 150. 
55 Ferran Ibid. 
56 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd. %,. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2), (1981), Ch 257 per Vinelott 
J; See also Hale (above, note 39) at p 224. 
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As a consequence, this approach never settles the difficult issue of separating ratifiable 
and non-ratifiable wrongs. 
57 
The other approach views fraud not in the nature of the wrong but in the motive of the 
wrongdoers and in the manner in which they have used their voting rights to prevent a 
corporate action being taken. It maintains that the courts should be able to interfere in 
the majority/ minority relationship whenever the justice of the case requires, otherwise 
no shareholder decision could ever be a fraud because shareholders are free to vote 
whether they are interested in the transaction in question or not. " Thus, wherever 
justice requires, the courts should disregard votes cast or capable of being cast by 
shareholders who have an interest conflicting with that of the company. As a result, 
only a disinterested majority resolution can be authorised by the courts. 59 
Although this approach tries to avoid conceptual difficulties and practical limits of the 
fraud exception and provides a wide jurisdiction for the courts to hear minority 
57 This also resulted in delivery of inconsistent judgements in case law. See for instance 
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2), (1981), Ch 257; Daniels v. 
Daniels, (1978), Ch 406; Pavlides v. Jensen, (1956), Ch 565; Hogg v. Gramphom Ltd. (1967), 1 Ch 
254; Bamford v. Bamford (1970), Ch 212, (1969), 1 All ER 969; Re a Company (1987) BCLC 82 at 
84 per Hoffman J; Estmanco (killner House) Ltd. v. Greater London Council, (1982), 1 All ER 
437 per Megarry VC; Dafen Tinplate Co Ltd. v. Llanelly steel Co. (1907)LTD, (1920), 2 Ch. 124. 
58 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. LTD. and Others (No. 2) (1981), Ch 
257 per Vinelott J.; Among academics see Beck Stanley M., "An Analysis of Foss v. Harbottle", J. 
S. Ziegel (ed. ) Studies in Canadian Company Law, (1967), Toronto, Butterworths; Beck Stanley M., 
"The Shareholders' Derivative Action"', (1974), The Canadian Bar Review, Vol. LII, No. 2,159, 
Carswell for the Canadian Bar Association, Toronto. 
59 Baxter Colin, "The True Spirit of Foss v Harbottle", Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, (1987), 
Vol. 38, No. 1, Stevens & Sons, Belfast, at pp 6-8,45; This was also recommended by the British 
government in its recent company law reform. [Modem Company Law for a Competitive 
Economy: Final Report, (London, DTI, 2001), URN/942 & URN/943, Para 7.54 at p 168]. 
211 
allegations, its proposed measure seems contrary with the decided cases. 'O It is also 
inconsistent with the traditional approach of the common law that views right to vote 
as a piece of property. " Moreover, it is unworkable especially in large companies 
because most of the times it leaves untouched fraudulent activities of controllers who 
have the support of disinterested but unorganised and uninformed shareholders. " The 
measure of justice of the case further lacks an objective and workable test" and seems 
like a double-edged sword. For, justice requires not only minority rights but also the 
corresponding rights of the majority. Therefore, justice by itself gives nothing. 64 
2) Wrongdoer control 
The wrongdoer control element, which is essential to a derivative action, can be 
defined as an abuse of voting right by one or few shareholders who are the very 
wrongdoers and in control of corporation. Control might simply be de jure which arises 
where a wrongdoer possesses at least fifty one percent of voting shares in the wronged 
company. " The de jure control is often found in small companies where one or few 
shareholders possess over fifty percent shareholdings. In a more complicated case, 
control might be de facto which means the wrongdoer is in a position in the company 
that can influence the results of meetings, though having less than fifty percent 
shareholdings. Such position which is normally created in large companies can be 
60 See cases sited above, notes 60,64; see also Davies, Paul L., "Gower's Principles of Modern 
Company Law", (1997), 6th ed., at p 646, Sweet & Maxwell, London, UK; Ferran (above, note 53) 
at p 149. 
61 Ferran Ibid at pp 149-150; Baxter (above, note 59) at p 8. 
62 Parkinson (above, note 19) at p 256. 
63 Parkinson (above, note 19) at pp 255-6; Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at p 445. 
64 See Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Council (1982) 1WLR 2 per Megarry VC; 
see also Griffin (above, note 41) at pp 301,304-5. 
65 Pavlides v. Jensen, (1956), Ch 565 AT 577 PER Danckwerts J. 
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obtained as a consequence of several factors. 66 In Prudential Assurance Co Ltd. v. 
Newman Industries Ltd (No 2)67 
, the Court of Appeal observed that control embraces a 
broad spectrum extending from an overall absolute majority of votes at one end to a 
majority of votes at the other end made up of those likely to be cast by the delinquent 
himself plus those voting with him as a result of influence or apathy. 
Both types of control have advantages as well as disadvantages. As the de jure control 
is identified with formal ownership of shares, it is capable to offer a definite test to be 
used for the purpose of fraud identification. It, however, fails to cover cases in which a 
wrongdoer has de facto control or through its nominees and dummies controls the 
wronged company. 6' The de facto control, on the other hand, is capable to cover 
shortcomings of the de jure control", however, it fails to provide a bottom line in order 
to define what the control is. It can also require the courts to fall into an uneasy 
investigation in the voters' state of minds in order to determine whether they have 
voted independently, disinterestedly and on an informed basis or not. 'O 
66 Hirt Hans-Christoph, "'In What Circumstances Should Breaches of Directors' Duties Give 
Rise to a Remedy under ss. 459-461 of the Companies Act 1985? "' (2003), The Company Lawyer, 
Vol. 24, No. 4,100, London, Oyez Publishing Limited, at p 107; See Griffin (above, note 41) at p 
305; See also Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at p 578; Parkinson (above, note 19) at p 248. 
67 (1982), Ch 204, CA. 
68 Pavlides v. Jensen, (1956), Ch 565 per Danckwerts J; Millers (Invercargill) Ltd. v. Maddams 
(1938), N. Z. L. R. 490 per Myers C. J.; See also Wedderburn (1958), (above, note 41) at p 94; 
Sterling M. J., "The Theory and Policy of Shareholder Actions in Tort", (1987), The Modern Law 
Review, Vol. 50,468, London, England, Stevens & Sons, at pp 479- 480; Law Commission, 
Consultation paper, No 142, Para 1.7; Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies, (1997), No 246, 
p 2. 
69 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd (No 2), (1982), Ch 204, CA per 
Vinelott J. 
70 Griffin (above, note 41) at p 305. 
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For the purpose of fraud, current company law tends to reject the idea of de facto 
control. " Nonetheless, section 459 which will be discussed in the following section 
now permits a member of a company to bring action in his personal capacity against 
wrongdoers who have defacto control of the company. " 
V. 1.1.1.2. Disinterested majority requirement 
The disinterested majority requirement concerns with a situation in which an alleged 
fraud occurs against a group of minority shareholders who then fall in disagreement in 
respect of whether or not to pursue the wrongdoers. This requirement which was 
introduced by Knox j in the Smith v. Croft case denies a rninority plaintiff any 
derivative remedy where the majority inside the minority do not wish the proceeding 
to continue. 'The usual reason in practice for wanting to abandon such an action is that 
there is far more to lose financially by prosecuting the right to redress than by 
abandoning or not pursuing it'. " Where, for example, the would-be defendants are the 
main providers of the corporate assets, to sue them might result in their exit thus 
jeopardising the company and its shareholders in the whole. 74 
Disinterested majority measure is, however, liable to certain criticisms. It is suggested 
that it can stifle through creating an adapted version of majority rule the use of 
derivative action which was primarily designed to provide minority shareholders 
71 See the arguments of the Court of Appeal in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd. v. Newman 
Industries Ltd. (No 2), [(1982), Ch 204, CA.; See also Wedderburn (1957), (above, note 39) at p 
194; Miles and Proctor, (above, note 12) at p 142; Cheffins (above, note 12) at p 41. 
72 Re RA Noble & Sons (Clothing) Ltd., (1983), BCLC 273 at p 287 per Nourse J. 
73 Smith v. Croft (No 2), (1988), Ch 114 per Knox J; See also Taylor v. National Union of 
Mineworkers, (1985), BCLC 237. 
74 Thorne (above, note 41) at p 187; Ferran (above, note 50) at pp 152-3. 
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some protection against controllers' abuse in corporations. " It is, also, difficult to use 
as it can require the courts to fall into a subjective investigation into the mind of voters 
in order to discover that they were in fact disinterested or not. 
Leaming from the experience of the American courtS76 ,a theory has been developed by 
some English company lawyers of replacing the disinterested majority measure with 
views of other independent corporate organs in appropriate cases. " According to this 
theory, if in a given case an independent sub-committee has already been formed by 
the board of directors to do enquiries about aRegations that institute the substance of 
minority claims, the views of such committee may worth enough to block the 
derivative proceeding. Members of such sub-conu-nittee are often non-executive 
directors with much less likelihood of being involved in the wrongdoing or being 
under the influence of the very board. " However, this theory can worsen the 
circumstances for minority shareholders. The views of a sub-conu-nittee may simply 
serve to block minority claims and further it may signal potential plaintiffs that it is 
better not take wrongdoings in companies seriously and perhaps it is even wise to 
allow them to proceed. 
V. 1.1.1.3. Proposed reform as to the derivative action 
In 1996, the Law Conu-nission was authorised to review and identify shortcomings of 
the shareholder protection mechanisms which already existed in company 
law. One of 
75 Pettet (2001), (above, note 40) at p 240. 
76 See Zapata Corp v. Maldonado in which the Delaware Supreme Court gave regard to the 
views of the sub-committee of the board and as a result struck out 
the action brought by the 
minority shareholder. [430 A 2d 779 (1981) quoted 
in Pettet (above, note 40) at pp 239-240. 
77 Pettet Ibid. 
78 Pettet Ibid. 
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the reviewed mechanisms that focused attention of the Commission was the derivative 
action. The Commission noticed that the scheme of the law relevant to derivative 
action is currently deficient mainly because of its inaccessibility. 79 The law in this area 
is dense and hidden in a labyrinth of over 150-year legal proceedings which are at 
times incoherent. " It fails to cover breach of duties of care and fiduciary and 
negligence and further qualifies commencement of a derivative action to two difficult 
to prove prerequisites. " Inspired by recent developments which occurred in respect of 
derivative action in other commonwealth countries such as Canada" and New 
Zealand", the Law Commission recommended that derivative action should be put in 
a statutory footing and be made available to shareholders under much more certain 
and easily accessible and provable circumstances. In its view, such circ-umstances will 
be created if the government considers a reform of the law which covers the following 
issues: 
79 Law Commission, (above, note 68) at p 71; Department of Trade and Industry"s Consultation 
Paper, "Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy", Summary of Responses Received 
to The DTI, (1998), p 12. 
80 Law Commission, (above, note 68) at p 71; Department of Trade and Industry's Consultation 
Paper Ibid. 
81 See generally Conway (above, note 43); Boyle A. J. "The Derivative Action in Company 
Law", (1969), Journal of Business Law, London, Stevens, at p 120; Poole Jill and Roberts Pauline, 
"'Shareholder Remedies-Corporate Wrongs and the Derivative Action"', (1999), Journal of 
Business Law, London, Stevens, at p 99; Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at p 453. 
82 Statutory derivative action subject of Canada Business Corporation Act (1985), s. 239; For 
further study of the Canadian statutory derivative action see Miles Lilian, "Reforming 
The 
Common Law Derivative Action: A Bird's Eye View", Business Law Review, (July 1999), 180, 
London, Butterworths, at p 181; Cheffins Brian R., "'Reforming the Derivative Action: The 
Canadian Experience and British Prospects", (1997), Company, Financial and Insolvency Law 
Revicw, Vol. 1 (2), 227-260, Oxford, Mansfield Press; MacIntosh Jeffrey G, "Minority Shareholder 
Rights in Canada and England: 1860-1987"", (1989), Osgoode Hall Law journal, vol. 27, No. 3, 
Toronto, Osgoode Hall Law School, at pp 636-640; Beck (1974), (above, note 58). 
83 Companies Act 1993, s. 165 (New Zealand); For further study of the statutory derivative 
action in New Zealand see Watson Susan M., ""A Matter of 
Balance: The Statutory Derivative 
Action in New Zealand", (1998), Company Lawyer, 19 (8), 236; Fitzsimons, Peter, "The 
216 
1) Derivative action should be limited to action against directors and should not cover 
actions against third parties or breach of duties by officers and employees unless 
directors are implicated in the wrongdoing. The rationale was twofold. On the one 
hand, it could avoid excessive shareholder interference and allows directors to deal 
with such actions as matters of management. On the other hand, it could ensure that 
there will be no more confusion and overlap in the use of the unfairly prejudicial and 
the derivative remedies as to addressing the majority /minority conflict, as such 
conflicts should fall only within the jurisdiction of the former remedy. " 
2) Derivative actions should be available to shareholders for breach of director"s duties 
of care and fiduciary and should also extend to negligence cases" where directors were 
not benefited personally because while we accept investors take the risk of mistake by 
managers it does not mean that they have to accept that directors will fail to comply 
with their duties. 
86 
3) Derivative actions should be subject to a 28 days notice given by the plaintiff to the 
wronged company followed by taking action by such plaintiff for a leave of the court 
allowing the plaintiff to continue his action against the alleged wrongdoer director. A 
notice requirement, would allow the company to decide whether to bring the 
Companies Act 1993: A New Approach to Shareholder Litigation in New Zealand"', (1997), 
Company Lawyer, 18 (10), 306; Roberts and Pool (above, note 81). 
84 Section 459 Companies Act 1985. 
85 The same Commission later when reviewing the law relevant to directors' duties in 1999 
implicitly revised this recommendation. [See Chapter Four (above, at IV. 1.1-C-2, para note 1331. 
86 For a similar view see Department of Trade and Industry's Consultation Paper (above, note 
79) at pp 45,46 and Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report (above, 
note 59), para 7.46 at p 165. 
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proceeding itself or else to provide a proper answer hereby to make the use of a 
derivative action unnecessary. 
4) Derivative actions should be subject to the discretion of the courts that, in substitute 
of the management, will make appropriate decision either to allow or to reject a 
derivative action and in doing so they should consider all circumstances including the 
good faith of the plaintiff, the interests of the company, whether the wrong has been 
ratified by the company, whether the company has resolved not to pursue the 
wrongdoer, the views of an independent organ and the availability of alternative 
remedies and the like. 
87 
The Law Commission pronounced its recommendations facilitative to derivative 
actions, as they will remove the common law basis for such an action and relieve a 
minority shareholder from the burden of having to show difficult to prove 
prerequisites of fraud and wrongdoer control. They will also entail certainty, as a 
minority shareholder will be able to identify circumstances in which it is very likely 
that a derivative action will succeed. They also curb opportunistic use of the derivative 
mechanism, as the decision to grant leave falls ultimately within the discretion of the 
courts. 
The Companies Act 2006 has placed, as recommended by the Law Conu-nission, the 
derivative action on a statutory form. " Excluding the 28 days notice requirement, it 
includes all the other recommendations of the Law Conu-nission in this area. 
87 Law Commission (above, note 68) at pp 77-85. 
88 The Companies Act 2006, sections 260-264. 
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Accordingly, the Act restricts the use of derivative action to cases where the cause of 
action arises from directors" breach of duties extending to their negligence and where 
the action is against the wrongdoer director or other persons who hold assets that are 
the subject of the derivative action and confers discretion on the courts to decide 
whether to allow or reject such action after consideration of every relevant 
circumstance. 
Whether a statutory derivative action, as recommended by the Law Commission and 
introduced by the Act, is capable to meet its declared objectives must be seen in the 
light of future court experience and hence cannot be answered with precision at this 
stage. Nonetheless, from a theoretical perspective and in the light of past experience 
one can raise reasonable doubts about the likelihood of reaching those objectives. Take, 
for example, certainty which appears to be the most important argument in the Law 
Commission's theory. The theory can generate uncertainty as to derivative action for a 
number of reasons. For one, it does not require the courts to entertain such actions 
while conferring a wide discretion on them to choose after considering varying factors 
either to allow or to reject a derivative action. " For another, where conflicting factors 
are present, which factor is to be prioritised is not determined. Also, while the courts 
will have discretion to review an authorisation or ratification of the wrong and a 
corporate decision which rejects Pursuing the wrongdoer'O, nonetheless, the law does 
89 Section 263 (3). 
90 Section 263 (2,3). 
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not offer guidelines as to determining when and under what circumstances such 
factors will not bar the continuation of a derivative action. " 
There are also concems about how should the courts make use of or assess some of the 
stated factors. For example, the proposed derivative action requires the courts to 
regard whether the wrong in question could be ratified by the company, while it fails 
to determine what sort of wrongs can be ratified. Another example is where it refers 
the courts to consider views of directors or an independnt organ within the company. 
As to the views of directors, given that such views can be tainted wih bad faith on the 
part of directors, it is not determined how should the courts make a distinction 
between views of directors which are truly genuine and those that are not So. 
92 The 
same criticism can be brought as to the views of an independent organ plus there is no 
guideline to show what can be considered as an independent organ and further how 
such organs perform thir role. " 
In addition to these, discretion of the courts in authorising or rejecting derivative 
actions and in reviewing ratifications could mean to put the power to take corporate 
decisions into the hands of an inappropriate organ. To ask the courts to take such 
decisions is, in fact, to ask them to take the management of companies. " 
91 Garcia John "'The Law Commission's Investigation into Director' Duties", (1998), Company 
Lawyer, 19 (9), 279-281; Roberts and Pool (above, note 81) at p 104; Miles (above, note 82) at pp 
182-3. 
92 Roberts and Pool (above, note 81) at p 108. 
93 Miles (above, note 82) at p 183. 
94 Hale (above, note 39) at p 225. 
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V. 1.2. Statutory constraints 
Substantive and procedural difficulties which associate with taking a derivative action, 
its insufficient jurisdiction and the fact that common law offers no "abuse of rights" 
principle in the model of civil law jurisdictions have contributed to convince the 
Parliament to take statutory steps in order to protect minority shareholders against the 
15 likelihood of abuse of rights by majority shareholders. To this end, the Parliament 
made use of the equity principles and the idea was to enable the courts to remedy 
abusive conducts of majority shareholders which under the traditional common law 
often fell short of the concept of actual illegality. 96 This way of relaxation of rigidity of 
the law is a product of English legal history that has survived the amalgamation of the 
courts of conunon law and equity in order to ensure justice. " While the courts of 
common law had to observe only legal rights, courts of equity could dispense with 
legal rights in the interests of general principles of company law and equity. " The 
equity principles could subject the exercise of legal rights to equitable considerations 
where certain conditions existed" and, accordingly, the Parliament introduced two 
mechanisms of 'just and equitable winding up' and "unfairly prejudicial conduct", 
respectively subjects of sections 122 (1) g Insolvency Act 1986 and 459 Companies Act 
1985 which are the focus of my consideration in this section. 
95 See generally Farrar (above, note 42) at p 454; Maclntosh (above, note 82) at p 615; Clark 
Bryan, "Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct: A Pathway Through the Maze", Company Lawyer, (2001), 
22 (6), 170, London, Oyez Publishing Limited. 
96 Pettet (above, note 40) at p 246 
97 Compared with the way through which the laws of the civil law jurisdictions address the 
issue of majority abuse, this, can be seen as being only a different way of doing the same thing. 
[O'Neill and another v. Phillips and Others, (1999), 2 All ER 961, HL at 969 per Lord Hoffmann]. 
98 Hahlo and Farrar, (above, note 38) at p 477; Hale (above, note 39) at 219. 
99 Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd. (1973), A. C. 360 at 379 per Lord Wilberforce. 
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V. 1.2.1. just and Equitable Winding up 
The purpose of the just and equitable winding up is to enable an oppressed 
shareholder to take action to the courts for a winding up remedy on equitable grounds. 
The remedy originally relied on case law in which earlier judges had created a 
jurisdiction for themselves to wind companies up on equitable grounds, as they did so 
in respect of partnerships. '00 Later, it was put into a statutory footing by the Insolvency 
Act 1986 which offers no definition of it and which gives a wide discretion to the courts 
in the exercise of it. 101 The lawmaker thought that a formal definition not only is 
impossible but also could be wholly undesirable. 'O' Nevertheless, the case law has 
provided some guidelines as to showing under what circumstances an equitable 
winding up remedy can be given. According to it, equitable considerations may come 
to play whenever the relationship between two people is of personal character mainly 
based on verbal trust. 'O' Such relationship is normally found in small companies which 
enjoy a quasi partnership character. In such companies, shareholders' relationship can 
go beyond the written articles of association and include their legitimate 
expectations. 
104 Accordingly, the remedy has been given a very limited scope, being 
most suitable for deadlock situations"' where, for instance, a company is essentially an 
incorporated partnership, involving two partners with equal shareholdings, and thus 
100 Re Yenidje Tobacco Company (1916), 2 Ch 426, Per Lord Cozens Hardy MR; Loch and 
Another Appellants v. John Blackwood, Limited Respondents (1924), A. C. 783; Re Davis and 
Collett, Limited (1935), Ch. 693; See generally Pettet (above, note 40). 
101 See Insolvency Act 1986, Section 122 (1): "'A company may be wound up by the court if- 
(g) The court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound 
up. 
102 Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd. (1973), A. C. 360 at 379 per Lord Wilberforce; see also 
Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at pp 454-457. 
103 Ebrahimi v. Westboume Galleries Ltd. (1973), A. C. 360 at 379 per Lord Wilberforce; 
Clemens v. Clemens, (1976), 2 All ER 268(Ch D). 
104 MacIntosh (above, note 82) at pp 616-617. 
105 Re Yenidje Tobacco Company, (1916), 2 Ch 426, Per Lord Cozens Hardy MR. 
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dependent on mutual confidence, but has ceased to operate properly owing to an 
unsolvable disagreement between the partners. 'O' Yet deadlock is by no means a 
requirement and a mere break of trust may suffice. 
107 A familiar example is the case of 
exclusion from the management in which a member who legitimately expects to 
continue the office might lose his trust owing to an unfair dismissal on the part of those 
in control. 'O' 
One important implication of the case law guidelines is to make it clear that equitable 
remedies such as winding up have little relevance to the large companies because such 
companies often lack a quasi partnership character. "' 
A relevant issue is to determine whether the remedy works on the basis of a no fault 
divorce or a minority plaintiff is required to show a fault of controllers? There are two 
approaches both in case law and between company law scholars. One argues that a 
minority shareholder is required to prove some fault of the defendant majority. "' The 
proponents of this approach seek, by analogy, to extend to the just and equitable 
winding up remedy the principles which are primarily relevant to the unfairly 
106 Re RA Noble & Sons (Clothing) Ltd., (1983), BCLC, p 273. 
107 Loch and Another Appellants v. John Blackwood, Limited Respondents, (1924), A. C. 783; Re 
Davis and Collett, Limited, (1935), Ch. 693; Re RA Noble & Sons Ibid.; See also Farrar (1991), 
(above, note 42) at p 458. 
108 Pettet (above, note 40) at p 246. 
109 Acton Stephen, "Just and Equitable Winding Up: The Strange Case of the Disappearing 
jurisdiction", Company Lawyer, (2001), 22(5), 134, London, Oyez Publishing Limited, at 135. 
110 Clark (2001), (above, note 95) at pp 173-4; Clark Bryan, "Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct", Scots 
Law Time, (1999), 38,321, Edinburgh, W. Green & Son Ltd, at 324; Clark Bryan, "Just and 
Equitable Winding Up: Wound Up", Scots Law Time, (2001), 12,108, Edinburgh, W. Green & Son 
Ltd, at pp 110-111 - 
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prejudicial remedy. "' The Re Guidezone Ltd. case'12 is a common law support for this 
approach. The case involved a break of relationship between company partners and 
Jonathan Parker J. who was asked for an equitable remedy rejected the case taking the 
view that the defendant majority had acted in a manner which equity would not 
regard as a breach of good faith. "' According to him, equitable remedies should not 
enable a member to escape from consequences of a valid bargain; otherwise they will 
produce commercial uncertainty and would fundamentally contradict the sanctity of 
contract principle. "' 
The other approach rejects any extension of some sort of fault requirement to the just 
and equitable winding up remedy and suggests that this remedy has a wide 
jurisdiction which can be resorted on a no fault divorce basis. "' It relies on the Ebrahimi 
v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd. case"' which involved a private corporation with three 
shareholder/ director members. They were entitled to profits of the business which 
were distributed among them in the form of remuneration. Two of them, a father and 
son, who held a majority of shares, removed the plaintiff from the office and Lord 
111 These principles which were announced by Lord Hoffman in the ONeill case (O'Neill and 
Another v. Phillips and Others, (1999), 2 All ER 961), will be later discussed in the following 
section. See below at V. 1.2.2. 
112 Re Guidezone Ltd (2002), 2 BCLC 321. 
113 Re Guidezone Ltd., Ibid. 
114 Law Commission (above, note 68) at 3.66; O'Neill and Another v Phillips and Others, (1999), 
2 All ER HL 961 at 968 per Lord Hoffman J; Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd. (1973), A. C. 
360 at 379 per Lord Wilberforce; See also Clark, (2001), (above, note 110) at p 111. 
115 Acton (2001), (above, note 109) at pp 134-137; Conway (above, note 43) at pp 17-18; Poole Jill 
and Roberts Pauline "Shareholder Remedies-Efficient Litigation and the Unfair Prejudice 
Remedy"', (1999), The Journal of Business Law, London, Stevens, at p 57; Boyle A. J., "Unfair 
Prejudice in the House of Lords"', Company lawyer, (2000), 21(8), London, Oyez Publishing 
Limited, at p 253; Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at pp 455,457. 
116 Ebrahimi x,,. Westbourne Galleries Ltd. (1973), A. C. 360 at 379. 
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Wilberforce who was in charge of the case regarded such removal as an act which is 
legally effective, meanwhile deserving a winding up remedy on equitable grounds. "' 
Which approach reflects the positive law on this issue cannot be answered with 
precision, as the law currently is not sufficiently clear. Nonetheless, for a number of 
reasons, one can accept that the second approach constitutes a more acceptable 
interpretation of the law on this matter. For one, section 122 (1) g Insolvency Act 1986 
does not speak of any fault requirement, while giving wide authority to the courts in 
order to grant remedy. "' For another, the remedy would have seemed redundant, if 
fault had been a requirement for it. A fault based winding up order can always be 
given to a minority plaintiff who petitions for a remedy under section 459 Companies 
Act 1985. Hence, there will be no rationale for section 122 which offers a just and 
equitable winding up remedy, unless we believe that it has a jurisdiction wider than 
that of the section 459 and as a result fault is not a requirement. "9 
V. 1.2.2. Unfairly Prejudicial Remedy 
Where the courts find that the affairs of the company is being conducted in a manner 
which is unfairly prejudicial to interests of its members generally 120 or some parts of its 
117 Ibid. 
118 It must yet be bore in mind that according to the section 125(2) Insolvency Act 1986, the 
winding up is the residual remedy. This means a fair offer to purchase the shares of the 
petitioner, made by the controllers will often disentitle the plaintiff from pursuing the winding 
up proceeding. Also the possibility of an unfair prejudice petition may produce the same result. 
See further in Pettet (above, note 40) at p 247. 
119 Acton (2001), (above, note 109) at p 134-137. 
120 Section 145 Companies Act 1989 has amended section 459 Companies Act 1985 in order to 
enable the new mechanism to cover situations in which all shareholders suffer loss. The 
wording of the section is as follows: 'to the members generally or part of the membership, 
including the petitioner. See Meyer & Another v. Scottish Textile and Manufacturing Co Ltd & 
Another (1954), SC 381 at 392 per Lord Cooper; See also Griffin Stephen, "Negligent 
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members, a grant of the unfairly prejudicial remedy will matter. "' The background of 
the remedy goes back to the section 210 Companies Act 1948 that, in disregard of the 
rule established in Foss v Harbottle 122 , had allowed minority actions to be taken against 
the majority who conducts the affairs of the company oppressively against minority 
interests. As the wording of the section was narrow, it had failed to address the 
possibility of majority abuse effectively. The section had also required a minority 
shareholder to establish a course of oppressive conducts. This was to mean that 
omissions, future conducts or a single conduct were not recognised as oppressive. 
Furthermore, the oppression was required to be suffered in one's capacity qua 
shareholder rather than in any other capacities. Hence, exclusion from management 
could not constitute oppression, though it was one of the most common grounds for a 
complaint under the old section 210. It was a requirement for a conduct to be regarded 
as oppressive that it would have justified an order to wind up the company too. 
123 
Besides, the courts tended to interpret the word oppression in its narrowest meaning 
that could hardly cover cundocts other than those of illegal and unconstitutional. 124 
These deficiencies were identified by the Jenkins Committee that suggested the remedy 
should be amended in order to include a wider sense of abuse of rights by majority 
shareholders. In particular, it highlighted two instances of such abuse, exclusion from 
Mismanagement as Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct, ", (1992), The law Quarterly Review, Vol. 108, 
389, London, Stevens and Sons. 
121 Section 459(l) Companies Act 1985. 
122 Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc (1995), 1 BCLC 14 per Hoffman J at p 18; See also Davies 
(above, note 60) at p 738. 
123 See Clark (above, note 95) at pp 170-1; Clark (1999), (above, note 110) at pp 321-2; Conway 
(above, note 43) at p 13-15. 
124 This tendency was reflected in the House of Lords decision in Scottish Competitive Co- 
operative Wholesale Society Ltd v. Meyer once defining oppressive conducts as something 
'burdensome, harsh and wrong'. [(1958), 3 All E. R. 6, HL] 
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management and cases where minority shareholders suffer indirect loss that most 
importantly needed to be included. "' Accordingly, the Parliament replaced section 210 
with section 75 companies Act 1980 (now subject of sections 459-461 Companies Act 
1985) that introduced the new unfairly prejudicial remedy. The wide wording of the 
new section, which enjoyed the terms 'interests' and 'unfairly prejudicial' in substitute 
of "rights' and 'oppression", its generous relief plus the liberal attitude of the courts 
have largely remedied deficiencies associated with the old section 210 and removed 
obstacles to which minority complains were tied. "' 
The new section, however, has raised uncertainty concern among scholars of company 
law, as it gave no definition of its underlying equity principles. "' It could not offer a 
reasonable level of precision in order to allow the involved persons to predict 
consequences of their acts or omissions. Its vagueness could cause the judges to fall 
into disagreement with the likelihood of litigants and their solicitors become mislead. It 
could even enable oppression of the majority by an opportunist minority. "' One could 
further point to the lengthy proceedings, more complicated case law, inefficiency of the 
statutory remedies, waste of public time and money and increased uncertainty in 
commercial decisions that could ensue from the new section. 
129 
125 Jenkins Committee, Report of the Company Law Committee, Cmnd. 1749, (1962), at 206; See 
also Clark (above, note 95) at pp 170-1; Clark (1999), (above, note 110) at pp 321-2; Conway 
(above, note 43) at pp 13-15; Davies (1997), (above, note 60) at p 737. 
126 Sealy (above, note 31) at 175. 
127 Clark (above, note 95) at p 170; Clark (1999), (above, note 110) at p 322. 
128 Farrar John H., "Company Law, ", (1985), London, Butterworths, at p 474; See also Clark 
(1999), (above, note 110) at 322. 
129 Sealy L. S, "Companý 7 Law and Commercial Reality", (1984), London, Sweet & Maxwell, at 
pp 15,30; Clark (1999), (above, note 110) at p 322. 
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Yet, it is generally accepted that the Parliament has intentionally drafted the section in 
such an uncertain format. "O The idea, it is said, is to confer on the courts unlimited 
jurisdiction to hear unfair prejudice claims because this is the only way with which 
they can deliver maximum justice in each case. "' The uncertainty associated with the 
section frees the courts from technical considerations of legal rights and confers on 
them wide power to do what appears to be just and equitable. 
132 
The Law Commission, too, recommended, in its consultation paper, that the term 
unfairly prejudicial should not be defined in section 459 and it is preferable to keep the 
very general wording of the section as it now stands in order to cover the conducts 
which may fall short of actual illegality hereby to avoid the risk of further limitation to 
the section. "' In its view, uncertainty could be controlled through using several 
techniques including: 1) to empower the courts to exercise effective case management; 
2) to amend the section to cover specific conduct rather than the overall conduct of the 
affairs of the company and; 3) to impose time limit for bringing claims under this 
section. Nonetheless, the proposed techniques have limited capacity to address the 
uncertainty concern, as they only serve as a pain relief rather than cure. The Law 
Commission-'s recommendation also seems inconsistent with its already publicised 
130 Goddard Robert, "'Closing the Categories of Unfair Prejudice", Company Lawyer, (1999), 
20(10), 333 London, Oyez Publishing Limited, at p 334; Clark (above, note 95) at p 171; Davies 
(1997) (above, note 60) at p 735. 
131 Vinelot J., "'Minority shareholders", (1985), Company Lawyer, Vol. 6, London, Oyez 
Publishing Limited, at p 31; Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v. Newman Industries, (1981), Ch, p 
257; for an analysis of the approach see Boyle A. J., ""The Judicial Interpretation of Part xvii of 
the Companies Act 1985" in 'Company Law in Change' (1987), Edited by Pettet B. G., London, 
Stevens, at pp 23,24; Boyle (2000), (above, note 115) at p 253; Mayson Stephan, French Derek 
and Ryan Christopher, "Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law", (2003), 19th ed., Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, at pp 619-620. 
132 Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc (1995), 1 BCLC 14 at 17-20 and O'Neill and Another v. 
Phillips and Others, (1999), 2 All ER HL 961 at 966 both per Hoffman J. 
133 Law Commission (above, note 68) at pp 41-44. 
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objectives that seek for codification of the present law through introduction of clear set 
of rules concerning derivative actions and unfair prejudice remedy with more flexible 
and accessible criteria. 
134 
Unlike the law commission, the company law steering group proposed in the interests 
of greater certainty for making a connection between the unfair prejudice concept and 
cases that involve either a breach of constitution or a breach of directors" duties. 135 The 
government, which seems to have taken side with the Law Commission, did not show 
any intention to amend the current section 459, as its proposed Companies Bill does 
not include a reform of the section. "' 
V. 1.2.2.1. Under what circumstances as 459 remedy can be given 
The common law offers some guidance to shed light on circumstances under which a 
section 459 remedy can be given. Lord Wilberforce"', who by analogy extended 
equitable principles relevant to partnerships to companies, gave the first guidance 
which is the element of personal relationship. "' According to him, equitable principles 
can be used only where the relationship between members relies on personal 
commitments and mutual trust. This was to mean that a member, when his legitimate 
expectations are put at risk, might be allowed to flee from his contractual duties. A 
criticism was that the term "legitimate expectations', as stated by Lord Wilberforce 
134 Ibid., at pp 72,42. 
135 The Company Law Steering Group, "Modem Company Law, "Final report, (2001), Vol. I, p 
33. 
136 The Companies Bill (108-20 Jul 2006) available from the DTI website at the following 
address: http: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/pabills/200506/companies. htm. 
137 Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd. (1973), A. C. 360 
138 Hirt (2003), (above, note 66) at p 101; Clark (1999), (above, note 110) at 322; Poole and 
Roberts (above, note 115) at pp 41-43. 
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could excessively enable escape of parties from contractual duties. Re RA Noble & Sons 
(Clothing) Ltd 139, Re Saul D Harrison & Sons plc"O and particularly O"Neill and another v. 
Phillips and others"' offered further guidance, trying to avoid the criticism. According 
to these authorities, legitimate expectations, which allow escape from contractual 
duties, should not be viewed as something which sits "under a palm tree". 
14' They must 
be taken into account in combination with certain equitable principles that increase 
certainty in law. 141 These principles suggest that the use of the measure of legitimate 
expectations must be exceptional and limited to cases in which some form of mutual 
understanding and informal agreement in excess of the written contract is present. 144 
These have led the case law to view the remedy under section 459 as having a 
145 
contractual nature. The view has been supported by the House of Lords " the 
Company Law Steering Group 146 and the government. 
147 
Several implications can derive from the view. The first implication is that the unfairly 
prejudicial remedy is suitable almost only for small companies where members' 
relationship continues a pre-existed quasi partnership. Although the remedy can in 
theory be used in companies of any size and for unfairness of any kind, it is normally 
relevant in cases where there is a breakdown in relationships between 
139 (1983) B. C. L. C. 273. 
140 (1995) 1 B. C. L. C. 14. 
141 (1999), 2 All ER 961, HL. 
142 Re jE Cade & Sons Ltd. (1992) B. C. L. C. 213 at 227 per Warner J. 
143 ONeill and Another v. Phillips and Others (1999), 2 All ER 961, HL at pp 967-8 per 
Hoffman J. See also Goddard (above, note 133) at pp 334-5. 
144 Re RA Noble & Sons (Clothing) Ltd, (1983) B. C. L. C. 273 at 287 per Nourse J.; Re Saul D 
Harrison & Sons p1c, (1995) 1 B. C. L. C. 14 at pp 17,18 per Hoffmann L. J. 
145 O'Neill and Another v. Phillips and Others (1999), 2 All ER 961, HL per Lord Hoffman. 
146 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report, (London, DTI, 2001), 
URN/942 & URN/943, para 7.41. 
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owner/managers of small private companies. 
14' 
As to large companies, the remedy 
seems irrelevant because the relationship between members of such companies 
commonly rely on company constitutions and the documentation shown to them by 
controllers at the outset. 
149 
The second implication is that the view avoids being interventionist. Relying on such 
view, the courts, when granting a section 459 remedy, would only enforce the contract 
between members. "O As the remedy has a contractual nature, it can be waived by 
private contracting so long as no wider public purpose is at stake. "' A carefully drafted 
articles can make the use of section 459 remedy unnecessary"' and where a reasonable 
offer is made to buy out a dissatisfied minority, he should not be able to ask for such a 
remedy. "' This, however, can be criticised for its contrariety to the regulatory role of 
company law rules 
154 
and especially seems to fall in disagreement with the primary 
objective of the Parliament which wanted to offer some protection to minority 
147 Modernising Company Law: White Paper, (London, DTI, 2002), Cm 5553, Volume 1, para 
3.3. 
148 Law Commission (above, note 68) at pp 24,25; Law Commission, Consultation paper, No 
142, Para 1.7. 
149 Clark, (above, note 95) at p 172; Conway (above, note 43) at pp 19-20; Thomas Katherine 
Reece and Ryan Christopher L., ""Section 459, Public Policy and Freedom of Contract: Part 1", 
Company Lawyer, (2001), 22 (6), 177, London, Oyez Publishing Limited, at pp 180-181; Poole & 
Roberts (above, note 115) at pp 41-43; Hirt (above, note 66) at pp 100,102; Mayson, French & 
Ryan (above, note 131) at p 620. 
150 Boyle (above, note 115) at p 253; Goddard Robert, "'Unfair Prejudice after ONeill: A View 
from Scotland, ", Company Lawyer, (2000), 21 (8), 254, London, Oyez Publishing Limited, at p 255; 
Thomas & Ryan (above, note 149) at pp 179-181; Hirt (above, note 66) at pp 101-2; Pettet (above, 
note 40) at p 250. 
151 Thomas & Ryan (above, note 149) at pp 178-182. 
152 Clark (above, note 95) at p 174; Thomas & Ryan, (above, note 149) at p 181. 
153 "the unfairness does not lie in the exclusion alone but in exclusion without a reasonable 
offer' [ONeill and another v. Phillips and Others [(1999), 2 All ER 961, HL at p 974-5 per 
Hoffman J] See also Thomas & Ryan Ibid. at pp 181-182. 
154 Goddard (above, note 130) at p 335. 
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shareholders. 155 Also, company contracts rarely provide a satisfactory buy-out 
procedure' 56 and this can further evidence that a non-negotiable section 459 is needed. 
The third implication is that it would become possible for the courts, as a result of such 
viewing, to measure the unfair prejudice concept stated in section 459 objectively. "' 
The section requires, a minority plaintiff to show that his prejudice has also been 
unfair. "' This unfairness, according to the authorities, must be assessed objectively 
which means the courts should take the case of a reasonable bystander and ask 
whether the complained conduct is regarded by such person as unfairly prejudicial. "' 
The reasonable bystander test must be used in the light of the context of the 
complained conduct rather than the mere conscience of a particular judge. Context for 
the purpose of section 459 may include the type of company, previous business 
relationship and transactions between corporate members, pre-contract negotiations 
and mutual trust. "O The objective measure relieves a minority plaintiff from having to 
show the element of bad faith on the part of controllers. Prejudicial conducts of 
controllers even shown to have been done with good faith still might qualify for 
155 Cheffins (above, note 3) at p 260-1; Riley Christopher, "Contracting Out of Company Law: 
Section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 and The Role of The Courts", (1992), Modern Law Review, 
782, London, England, Stevens & Sons, at p 797. 
156 Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at p 475. 
157 Hirt (above, note 66) at p 102; Boyle (1987), (above, note 131) at p 24; Thomas & Ryan 
(above,. note 149) at p 181; Goddard (1999), (above, note 130) at pp 334-5; Pettet (above, note 40) 
at p 249; Griffin (above, note 120) at p 389. 
158 Davies (1997), (above, note 60) at p 746. 
159 See Boyle (1987), (above, note 131) at p 24; Leader Sheldon & Dine Janet, "United 
Kingdom"', in 'The Legal Basis of Corporate Governance in Publicly Held Corporations, Edited by 
Arthur R. Pinto and Gustavo Visentini, Kluwer Law International, (1998), 219, The Hague, 
London, at p 229; Pettet (above, note 40) at pp 249-250. 
160 Jenkins Committee (above, note 125) at 204; See also Hirt (above, note 66) at p 102; Clark 
(abox, e, note 95) at p 171. 
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unfairness. 
161 Yet, while a minority plaintiff does not need to show bad faith 
162 
, he must 
prove fault on the part of the defendants. 163 If a case involves no fault in its broad sense 
(covering that of common law and that of equity), no remedy under the section 459 is 
available. This further suggests that the scope of the unfairly prejudicial remedy is 
much narrower than that of the winding up remedy discussed earlier. "' 
The last implication is that the unfairly prejudicial remedy is viewed as exceptional 
rather than being a general principle of the law, as is viewed in the civil law 
jurisdictions. Accordingly, a minority shareholder has no recourse to exceptional ways 
so far as there are no ordinary ways of action. "' Therefore, a section 459 remedy is not 
suitable to an oppressed majority who seeks to pursue wrongdoer directors because he 
often has the power to displace such directors from the office. 
166 A corollary of such 
viewing is that a case must meet certain case-specific conditions to qualify for as 459 
remedy and therefore the courts' judgements in such cases have very limited capacity 
to extend. The courts tend to escape drawing a general principle 
167 
while their 
judgements often share the underlying equity principles. The same or similar 
principles of equity can also be used to address different examples of abuse of rights 
161 Boyle (2000), (above, note 115) at p 253; Boyle (1987), (above, note 131) at p 24; Clark (above, 
note 95) at p 171; Conway (above, note 43) at pp 13-15. 
162 For a different view see Hirt (above, note 66) at pp 106-7. 
163 Boyle (2000), (above, note 115) at p 253; Clark, (above, note 95) at p 173; Conway (above, 
note 43) at pp 13-15; Clark (2001), (above, note 110) at pp 109-111; Thomas & Ryan (above, note 
149) at p 181. 
164 Acton (above, note 109) at p 134; Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at pp 473-4; for a contrary 
view see Clark who suggests that both remedies of unfairly prejudicial and winding up ought 
to operate on a fault based mechanism. [Clark (above, note 95) at pp 173-4 and Clark (2001), 
(above, note 110) at p 111]. 
165 See the Outer House of the Court of Session's argument in Scottish case of Anderson v. 
Hogg, 2000, S. L. T., 634 at 644 per Lord Ordinary. 
166 Clark (above, note 95) at p 171; Pettet (above, note 40) at p 253; Hirt (above, note 66) at p 
107. 
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which fall within the scope of other remedies. Thus, the formula is: the same principles 
in different circumstances can generate different remedies and this has caused 
development of different mechanisms to deal with the question of abuse of right in 
English company law. 168 In the courts' view, a general principle on the model of civil 
law jurisdictions is practically hard, if not impossible, to draw. "' They may also argue 
that there is no need for drawing a general principle, as the existing method is only a 
different way of doing the same thing. "O A criticism is that this way of addressing the 
abuse of rights possibility, though might enable the judges to tailor justice to each case, 
generally suffers from the uncertainty problem. The facts that the courts have extensive 
equitable discretion which might be exercised any time "in a novel and unpredictable 
fashion' 171 and that their judgements have limited capacity to teach other similar cases 
created a blured picture of litigation in this area. 
V. 1.2.2.2. What sort of wrongs fall within the scope of s 459 
Previous to the introduction of s 459, the law in this area had a limited scope covering 
perhaps only conducts which were illegal. "' Since the introduction of the s 459 and 
because of the wide wording of the section which enjoys the term "interest" in 
substitute of 'right', the scope of the section has extended from conducts which violate 
members' legal rights to behaviours which were against their legitimate 
167 Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd. v. Greater London Council (1982), 1 All ER 437 (ChD) 
Megarry VC. 
168 Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd. v. Greater London Council, (1982), 1 All ER 437 (ChD); 
North-west transportation Co Ltd. v. Beatty (1877), 12 App Cas 589; Allen v. Gold Reefs of West 
Africa, Limited, (1900), 1 Ch. 656; Greenhalgh v. Ardern Cinemas Ltd, (1950), 2 All ER 1120; 
Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd (1973), A. C. 360; Clemens v. Clemens Bros Ltd. and 
Another (1976), 2 All ER 268 (Ch D) at 282. 
169 Clemens v. Clemens Bros Ltd. and Another (1976), 2 All ER 268 (Ch D) at 282 per Foster J. 
170 O'Neill and Another v. Phillips and Others, (1999), 2 All ER 961, HL at 969 per Lord 
Hoffmann. 
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expectations. "' This can follow that a minority shareholder is now able to pursue the 
company and its directors not only for breach of constitution which extends to 
irregular matters 174 but also for breach of expectations which equity regards legitimate, 
even though that involves no breach of constitution. "' Also, a shareholder is now able 
to initiate as 459 proceeding in respect of breach of directors" duties. Although, 
directors owe their duties to the company, a shareholder can expect them to act 
without unfairly prejudicing their interest. 176 The concept of prejudice in the wording 
of the section is inclusive of any harm defined in a broad sense to the petitioner's 
interest"' and obviously a wrong to the company can affect interests of its members 
too. "' A shareholder does not need to show that the value of his/her shares has been 
reduced as a consequence of the defendant's unfairly prejudicial conduct and further 
he/she can now use section 459 to take action against persons who exert defacto control 
in companies. "' In summary, any unfair disregard of controHers from members" 
interests can constitute a source of liability under s 459. Some of the more familiar 
examples are: a refusal to pay dividend"O; abusive share issues; excessive managerial 
remuneration; and exclusion from management. 
181 
171 Cheffins (1997) (above, note 3) at pp 260-1. 
172 See above, at V-1.2-2. 
173 Davies (1997), (above, note 60) at p 737. 
174 Davies Ibid. 
175 Clark (above, note 95) at p 172; Hirt (above, note 66) at p 101; Poole & Roberts (above, note 
115) at p 42; Thomas & Ryan (above, note 149) at p 181. 
176 Sterling (above, note 68) at pp 474,484. 
177 Hirt (above, note 66) at p 102. 
178 Davies (1997), (above, note 60) at p 737; Hirt (above, note 66) at p 103. 
179 Re. R. A. Noble & Sons(Clothing) Ltd., (1983), BCLC 273 at p 287 per Nourse J.; For a 
contrary opinion see Leader & Dine (above, note 159) at p 229. 
180 See Sealy (above, note 31) at p 180. 
181 Conway (above, note 43) at pp 13-14; Clark (above, note 95) at pp 170-171; Clark (1999), 
(above, note 110) at pp 321-2; Pettet (above, note 40) at pp 259-260. 
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Whether section 459 can cover mere mismanagement; i. e. wrongs that faH short of a 
breach of directors" duties"'; has been a matter of controversy. For some good reasons, 
the courts are reluctant to review managerial decisions, using their discretion to 
identify unfair prejudicial conducts. "' They may think that they are not informed and 
experienced enough to decide questions of business. Also, they often see hard to find 
the element of unfairness in cases involving questions of mismanagement and often 
concede that business decisions is normally taken in uncertain conditions which make 
them often risky and thus directors must not be blamed for taking such decisions. "' A 
recent example of such reluctance is the Re Elgindata case in which Warner J. held that 
'Short of a breach by director of his duty of skill and care ... there is prima 
facie no 
unfairness to a shareholder in the quality of the management turning out to be poor'. 185 
In addition to matters of judicial reluctance, the use of section 459 to address the issue 
of mere mismanagement can fall in contradiction with certain principles of company 
law. Most commonly the primary victim of mismanagement is the company, itself, 
rather than its shareholders. Shareholders assume loss only reflectively. Recent decided 
cases suggest that when the loss is reflective, 186 a shareholder cannot recover it unless 
the company, itself, is unable to pursue and the wrongdoers owe a separate duty in 
182 See Chapter four (above, at IV-1-1-C). 
183 Davies (1997), (above, note 60) at p 746; Clark (above, note 95) at p 171; Conway (above, 
note 43) at p 16. 
184 See Chapter four (above, at IV. 1.1-C). 
185 Re Elgindata Ltd. (1991), BCLC 959 at 994. 
186 For reflective loss see generally Sterling (above, note 68); Mitchell (above, note 9); 
Bowen 
Andrew, J., "Professional Negligence and the No Reflective Loss Principle"", (2002), Greens 
Business Law Bulletin, 59,2, Edinburgh, W. Green & Son Ltd.; Bowen, Andrew J., "Giles v. 
Rhind", (2003), Greens Business Law Bulletin, 65,1, Edinburgh, W. Green & Son Ltd.; Watts, 
Peter, "The Shareholder as Co-Promisee", (2001), The Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 117,388, 
London, Stevens and Sons; Ferran, Eilis, "Litigation by Shareholders and Reflective Loss", 
(2001), The Cambridge Law journal, 245 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Sagar, David, 
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his/her favour. 187 Exclusion of the shareholder action in such cases is the logical 
consequence of the proper plaintiff limb of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. 1 88 It respects the 
corporate personality'" and avoids unnecessary shareholder actions. '90 Considering 
these principles, the Law Commission also opined that section 459 would not probably 
be suitable for pursuing negligent directors. 9' 
Some commentators have taken the view that the judicial reluctance is concerned with 
mere negligence rather than mismanagement that involves gross negligence. Gross 
negligence is to be distinguished from both mere and serious mismanagement and 
although falling short of breach, it ought to be treated like breach of duty or even 
fraud. With the gross negligence measure it is possible for the courts to extract some 
more disastrous negligence of directors out of the mere mismanagement category 
hereby to hold negligent directors liable. "' 
Despite its attractiveness, the very idea of gross negligence lacks a clear definition and 
is unable to offer a criterion by which one may distinguish gross negligence from the 
two other types of negligence; i. e. that of mere and that of breach of duty. English 
"Reflective Loss", (Feb-2003), Accountancy, London, Society of Incorporated Accountants and 
Auditors. 
187 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v. Newman Industries LTD. and others (No. 2) (1981), Ch 257; 
Gardner v. Parker, (2004), 1 BCLC (Ch D) 417; Giles v. Rhind, (2002), 4 All ER (CA), 977; 
Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co, (2001), 1 All ER (HL), 481; Day v. Cook, (2002), 1 BCLC (CA), 1; 
Stein v. Blake and Others (No 2), (1998), 1 BCLC (CA), 573; George Fischer (Great Britain) Ltd. 
v. Multi Construction Ltd, Dexion Ltd (third party), (1995), 1 BCLC (CA), 260; Gerber Garment 
Technology Inc v. Lectra Systems Ltd. [(1997), RPC 443; Lee v. Sheard (1955), 3 All ER 777; Giles 
v. Rhind, (2002) 4 All ER (CA) 977; Christensen v. Scott, (1996), 1 N. Z. L. R., 273 at 280 (NZCA); 
See also Bowen (2002) (above, note 186); Sterling (above, note 68) at p 474. 
188 Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 2 Hare 46. 
189 Hale (above, note 39) at p 219. 
190 Gray v. Lewis, (1873), 8 Ch App, 1035, p 1051 per James L. J; See also Sagar (above, note 186) 
at p 88; Sterling (above, note 68) at p 485. 
191 Law Commission (above, note 68) at pp 84-85. 
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judges have always had 'a healthy disrespect' for differentiating between mere 
negligence and gross negligence. "' They tend to make the difference between fraud, on 
the one hand, and mere negligence, however gross, on the other hand. The doctrine of 
the common law is that "gross negligence may be evidence of mala fides, but is not the 
same thing' 194 and has often cautiously been employed in a few areas of law such as 
trust, particularly when it involves exemption clause, 
195 
and criminal law when 
negligence causes the death of a victim in manslaughter cases. "' The gross negligence 
measure can be pertinent as to jurisdictions such as US where the courts tend to make 
a distinction between process and substance and hold directors liable for negligence 
made only in relation to the latter. English company law does not know such 
distinction" and consequently, in spite of the breadth of the section 459, it can be 
concluded that the current position of the English company law is to exclude 
mismanagement, however serious, from the scope of section 459 unless it entails a 
breach of duty. 
192 Griffin (above, note 120) at pp 390-392. 
193 Armitage v. Nurse and Others, (1998) Ch 241, (1997) 2 All ER 705; See also Willes i in Grill 
v. General Iron Screw Collier Co (1866) (LR) 1CP 600 observing that gross negligence is 
ordinary negligence with a vituperative epithet; And further in Hinton v. Dibbin (1842) 2 QB 
646,114 ER 253 Lord Denman C. J. doubted whether any intelligible distinction exists. 
194 See Goodman v. Harvey (1836) 4A&E 870 at 876,111 ER 1011 at 1013 per Lord Denman; 
Armitage v. Nurse and others, (1998) Ch 241, (1997) 2 All ER 705 per Millett LJ. 
195 See generally Gerard, McCormack, 'The Liability of Trustees for Gross Negligence', 
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, (1998) Mar/Apr, 100-114, London, Sweet & Maxwell; "'Trustee 
Exemption Clauses", New Law journal, 11 April 2003,153.7075, London, Butterworth; and see 
particularly Armitage v. Nurse and others, (1998) Ch 241, (1997) 2 All ER 705. 
196 See generally Brian, Napier, "Disciplinary Procedure, Unfair Dismissal and the Contract of 
Employment", New Law journal, 25 (March 1988) Vol. 138 No. 6349 p 197, London, Butterworth; 
Rakhi, Talwar and Andrew, Dawson, "Corporate Killing", New Law journal, (13 June 2003), 
153.7084(908), London, Butterworth; "The Zeebrugge Disaster: Crime or Negligence? ", New Law 
journal, 16 October 1987 Vol 137 No. 6327,959, London, Butterworth; "Manslaughter: Corporate 
Liability for Manslaughter-Gross Negligence"', Criminal Law Review, (2000), June, 475-479, 
London, Sweet & Maxwell. 
197 See Chapter four (above, at IV. 1.1. C. 2). 
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V. 1.2.2.3. Nature of the unfairly prejudicial remedy 
The remedy under s 459 is generally seen to be fulfilling part of a shared task between 
the Parliament and the courts to review the exercise of rights by persons either natural 
or legal so far as that exercise may involve unfair consequences for individuals and the 
society. 198 It is a special statutory invention of the common law system functioning 
along with other devices such as "derivative action"99, "bona fide for the benefit of the 
company as a whole , 
200 
and 'just and equitable winding UP/201 to fill a decisive gap in 
laws relating to companies so far as they fail to prevent legal rights being 
instrumentally abused. In creating the remedy, the Parliament made use of equity 
principles in order to extend rules of liability to conducts which fall short of the 
concept of actual illegality but involving some sort of abuse of rights by the majority. "' 
Equity principles enable the courts to intervene, in a discretionary case-by-case basis, 
into the contractual relationship of shareholders'O' so as to stop abusive exercise of 
rights by the majority in companies. 204 This type of intervention constitutes what is 
generally known and represented in usage by using the phrase "supervisory role' of the 
courts. It is a discretionary power acquired by the courts under the law to review 
companies' activities. 
205 
198 Davies Paul L., "'Gower and Davies' Principles of Modem Company Law", (2003), Th ed., 
London, Sweet & Maxwell, at p 517. 
199 Wedderburn (1957), (above, note 39) at p 206. 
200 Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa, Limited (1900), 1 Ch. 656 per Lindley M. R. at p 671. 
201 Insolvency Act 1986, Sec. 122 (1). 
202 Pettet (above, note 40) at p 246. 
203 Goode Roy, "'Commercial Law in the Next Millennium", (1998), London, Sweet & Maxwell 
at pp 16,31- 32; Bradgate Robert, "'Commercial Law", (2000), 3rd ed., London, Butterworths, at 
pp 3-4 and 26-34. 
204 Sealy (above, note 31) at 181. 
205 Baird v. Lees, (1924), S. C. 83,92 per Lord Clyde; See also Sealy Len lbid; Sinclair Michael, 
"Companies and Judicial Review", (1994), Company Lawyer, 15 (8), 235, London, Oyez 
Publishing Limited, at p 239. 
239 
The courts' discretion under section 459 must be distinguished from their other 
discretions. Generally speaking, there are two other discretions. One is the courts' 
discretion to sanction private contracts. In the exercise of this discretion, the courts 
emphasise on legal rights and duties hereby sanctioning a relationship that is already 
recognised under the law. A court's decision here is only important for the involved 
parties, but is not important, at all, in case law terms, as no legal rule is created. This 
function is common to most legal systems which work on the basis of rights and duties 
in order to regulate the relationship between private persons. The exercise of this 
discretion is in fact an example of the law's respect to the party autonomy. 206 The other 
is the courts' discretion to create law in particular cases through delivering judgements 
which are not only important for the parties to a particular case but are also important 
for future similar cases. This discretion constitutes a unique feature of the common law 
courts, as they, unlike their counterparts in civil law jurisdictions, create law in order to 
fill statutory gaps. The discretion is linked with the case law in ten-ns; of binding 
precedent - the idea that, for example, all other courts in the hierarchy must follow the 
view of the House of Lords on a particular issue. Binding precedents commonly 
emerge from those areas of law that are created by the judges. They may also be 
created when a court gives an authoritative opinion as to the proper interpretation of a 
statutory provision. 
207 
Now, while the analysis of the writer is to describe discretion of the courts under 
section 459 as an example of the supervisory discretion, recent case 
law suggests 
206 Goode (above, note 203) at p 31; Bradgate (above, note 203) at pp 4,6,35-36. 
207 For example, see the decision of the House of Lords in O'Neill and Another v. 
Phillips and 
Others, (1999), 2 All ER 961, HL. 10 
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differently. '" According to it, because legitimate expectations do not constitute 
independent excuse the courts in cases of unfairly prejudicial conducts function not to 
interfere but to enforce the contract between members and company. "' A criticism is 
that the courts' functioning in such cases can require imposition of standards of 
fairness to substantive elements of corporate members' contract. "O 
V. 1.2.2.4. Section 459 and the reflective loss recovery 
Although a grant of corporate remedy is a possibility in the list of remedies prescribed 
by section 461 Companies Act 1985, the unfairly prejudicial remedy is generally seen as 
personal. Records of the reported cases proceeded under section 459 evidence that the 
most sought and ordered remedy under this section has been buy out order, which 
benefits the petitioner personally. "' The wide meaning of the word "interest" expressed 
in the section allows a petitioner to apply to the court for a personal remedy in relation 
to any unfair prejudice to his interests either direct or indirect. These features connect 
unfairly prejudicial remedy to the issue of reflective loss. While principally a 
shareholder cannot recover his reflective loss"', section 459 seems to be capable of 
giving way to a likely petitioner in order to recover such loss. Reflective loss 
allegations can now get the form of petitions under section 459 for an exit order. While 
recent decided cases suggest that when reflective loss is at issue, a shareholder cannot 
208 See above, notes 150-3. 
209 Boyle (2000), (above, note 115) at 253; Goddard (2000), (above, note 150) at p 255; Thomas & 
Ryan (above, note 149) at pp 179-181; Hirt (above, note 66) at pp 101-2; Pettet (above, note 40) at 
p 250. 
210 See generally Goode (above, note 203) at pp 16-18; Bradgate (above, note 203) at p 226. 
211 Pettet (above, note 40) at pp 252-3; Hirt (above, note 66) at pp 101-2; Stephen Copp, 
"'Company Law: Individual Shareholder Rights", (2000), "International Company and Commercial 
Lazv Rcz, iezv', 11 (1), N 6-8 London, UK, Sweet & Maxwell, at p 8. 
212 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v. Newman Industries LTD. and others (No. 2) (1981), Ch 257. 
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recover his personal loss"' a grant of the personal remedy under section 459 can fall in 
disagreement with the "no reflective loss' principle. An interesting question is whether 
a shareholder can take a personal action using section 459, while a corporate action by 
the company and in failure of the company a derivative action is available? The 
question becomes particularly important in relation to buy out orders where shares are 
priced at a date prior to the wrongdoing. 214 Several issues are to be addressed before 
we could answer the above question. The following discussion respectively examines 
theseissues. 
V. 1.2.2.4.1. Background 
The "no reflective loss' principle can be traced back in the judgement of the Court of 
Appeal in the Prudential case. "' In this case, two directors of the Newman company, 
Mr B and L, by breaching their fiduciary duty to the company conspired to buy for the 
company a land at an overvalue from another company called TPG in which they have 
had substantial personal interest. When it became aware of directors' tricks, a minority 
shareholder, the Prudential Company, took two actions, (derivative for the recovery of 
loss suffered by the company and personal for the recovery of its personal loss). The 
personal action was successful at first instance 
216 but in appeal judges dismissed it 
taking the view that the claimed loss in situations like this is reflective of the loss 
suffered by the company. It is not personal and consequently cannot be recovered by a 
213 Gardner v. Parker, (2004), 1 BCLC (Ch D) 417; Giles v. Rhind, (2002), 4 All ER (CA), 977; 
Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co, (2001), 1 All ER (HL), 481; Day v. Cook, (2002), 1 BCLC (CA), 1; 
Stein v. Blake and Others (No 2), (1998), 1 BCLC (CA), 573; George Fischer (Great Britain) Ltd. 
v. Multi Construction Ltd, Dexion Ltd (third party), (1995), 1 BCLC (CA), 260. 
214 Hirt (above, note 66) at p 109. 
215 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. and Others (No. 2), (1982) Ch. 
204; (1982) 1 All E. R. 354 (C. A. ). 
216 ibid., at pp 302-3. 
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shareholder. "' The Prudential principle, the principle that no shareholder in his 
personal capacity can recover reflective loss, was later amended by the judgement of 
the House of Lords in Johnson. "' 
V. 1.2.2.4.2. Nature of reflective loss 
Whether reflective loss can be considered personal has been until recently 
controversial. Traditionally, English judges have tended to view it as corporate rather 
than personal. This was mainly because in such cases the direct victim of the loss is 
normally the wronged company rather than its shareholders. Shareholders only suffer 
indirectly and their loss "would be made good if the company had enforced its full 
rights against the party responsible". "' In Prudential case, a diminution in the market 
value of the company's shares and a cut off of the likely dividends which occurred as a 
result of a reduction in the wronged company's assets and profits were sought by the 
plaintiff. However, the judges of the Court of Appeal viewed the claimed loss as 
reflective rather than personal and as a result they rejected the claim. "O In their view, 
because corporations are separate legal persons and corporate shares only grant 
participatory right to shareholders, in cases where reflective loss is at issue only the 
former can take action. 
Similar views have also been taken by some company law scholars. For instance, in 
Leader and Dine's view, a share is only an instrument by which a shareholder 
217 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. and Others (No. 2), (1982) Ch. 204 
at 223. 
218 Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (FIL), 481. 
219 Ibid., at 504 per Lord Bingham. 
220 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. and Others (No. 2), (1982) Ch. 204 
at pp 223-4. 
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participates in determining what forms general interests of the company. A share has a 
contractual nature but does not confer proprietary rights. "' Proponents of the 
economic analysis of the law even go one step further by arguing that shares confer 
neither proprietary nor participatory rights, though having contractual nature. Hence, 
a shareholder cannot take action in respect of any reduction of the value of his shares 
because his role is only to put money at risk in companies to be used by them in 
exchange for financial return and that explains why a share (ordinary share) is named 
equity distinguished from other securities. 
222 
These views, however, sit uneasily with a range of decided cases in English company 
law which suggest a share is a thing which can be owned. "' According to these cases, a 
share is a piece of property giving the holder almost all proprietary rights that an 
owner may enjoy. 
224 Of those rights, one is the right of every owner to take action to 
the courts in order to recover damages to his property caused by a wrongdoer. "' 
English academics, also, have tended to regard shares as having contractual nature and 
conferring property rights which enable shareholders to take action in respect of 
them. "' From a property law perspective, shares are "things in action' which refers to 
rights of one person to certain benefits and privileges that may be enforced through 
actioning in the courts when they are denied. Shares, particularly, and other forms of 
221 See Leader & Dine (above, note 159) at p 230. 
222 See Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at pp 224,318; Easterbrook and Fischel, (above, note 1) at 
p 403. 
223 Burland v. Earle, (1902), A. C. 83; North West Transportation Co. Ltd. v. Beatty, (1887), 12 
App CAS 589; Pender v. Lushington, (1877), 6 Ch. D. 70. 
224 Davies (2003), (above, note 198) at p 618. 
225 Sterling (above, note 68) at p 470. 
226 Birds John Et. Al. (eds. ), "Boyle & Birds" Company Law", (1995), 3rd ed., jordans, Bristol, at 
pp 209,214,368; Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at p 226; Lee Hazen Thomas, "Silencing the 
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investment securities in general are, therefore, personal property capable of being 
owned by persons and when owned they will confer proprietary rights. "' This will not 
cause any overlap between a shareholder's property in the company and the 
company/s own property because the shareholder will not be considered as a joint 
owner of the company's property. "' He/she only owns share represented by share 
certificates... in the companys property"' which is itself separate in the legal sense. "' 
That means while a share confers on its holder personal right of recovery, it represents 
a physically unidentifiable unit of the company's capital, which belongs to the 
company. 232 In Prudential case, only this latter side was given attention, whereas later 
cases have shown that the other side must also be considered. "' In addition to these, 
shares are bought and sold in the market, meaning that they enjoy and represent 
financial value for which interested people are ready to pay money. This financial 
value derives not merely from the participatory aspect but rather from the proprietary 
Shareholders' Voice", North Carolina Law Review, (2002), Vol. 80, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 
Law Review Association, at pp 1900,1910. 
227 See generally MacNeil lain, "An Introduction to the Law on Financial Investment", (2005), 
Oxford, Hart Publishing Ltd. at Ch. Ip7; Mayson, French & Ryan, (2003), (above, note 131) at p 
183. 
228 For the same reasoning see Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co. Ltd. in which the House of 
Lords took the view that a shareholder did not have an insurable interest in the company's 
property. [(1925) AC 619 HL]. 
229 Section 186 Companies Act 1985. 
230 See section 744 Companies Act 1985: ""share means share in the share capital of a company". 
231 Section 182 Companies Act 1985: 
"(1) The shares or other interest of any member in a company- 
(a) are personal estate or, in Scotland, moveable property and are not in the nature of real estate 
or heritage --- "' - 
232 'although a share is an identifiable piece of property, which belongs to the shareholder and 
has an ascertainable value, it also represents a proportionate part of the company's net assets... ' 
[Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (HL), 481 at 528 per Lord Millett]. 
233 Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (HL), 481; Gerber Garment Technology Inc v. 
Lectra Systems Ltd., (1997), RPC 443; George Fischer (Great Britain) Ltd v. Multi Construction 
Ltd, Dexion Ltd (third party), (1995), 1 BCLC 260; Christensen v. Scott (1996), 1 N. Z. L. R., 273 at 
280 (NZCA). See also Bowen (2002), (above, note 186). 
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aspect of shares . 
234 If it was so, non-voting shares should not have had marketable 
value because they do not confer right of participation. As Farwell J. observed in 
Borland's Trustees v. Steel Bros. Ltd, 'a share is the interest of a shareholder in the 
company measured by a sum of money, for the purpose of liability in the first place, 
and of interest in the second, but also consisting of a series of mutual covenants 
entered into by all shareholders inter se /. 
235 
V. 1.2.2.4.3. What justifies the 'no reflective loss' principle? 
Although, in principle, an individual shareholder ought to be able to recover reflective 
loss, he might be debarred from taking action to the courts if the case involves some 
important considerations of policy that are ranked prior to protection of property 
rights. As the case law reveals, there are certain policies which should be considered 
before the courts could allow a claim of reflective loss to proceed. These policies will be 
examined below. 
1) Where a reflective loss case involves the risk of double recovery by individual 
shareholders, it must be rejected. "' Suppose, for example, a company with three 
shareholders of equal shareholdings. Due to some wrongdoing, the company suffers 
E1500 loss and each of its shareholders initiate a separate personal action for the 
recovery of his share of E500 loss, which is reflected to him in the form of diminution in 
the value of the shares, and gets a judgement in his personal favour. Then the company 
itself pursue the wrongdoer for the recovery of E1500 loss caused by the defendant and 
234 Sterling (above, note 68) at 470; Mitchell (above, note 9) at 459. 
235 Borland's Trustees v. Steel Bros. Ltd., (1901), 1 Ch 288. 
246 
the court holds the defendant responsible for the recovery of the demanded loss. While 
the entire damage to the company and its shareholders caused by the defendant is only 
one : E1500, at the end of the two trails he may be held liable for that E1500 twice. The 
question of double recovery has root in English restitution law particularly in cases 
that involve actions by two co-promisees who seek to recover damages caused by a 
promisor in respect of the same property or activity. 23' The traditional example is 
found in a baihnent case where both the bailor and the bailee are given right to recover 
damages caused by a third party to the thing bailed. "' In such cases, there will be no 
risk of double recovery because the courts allow both actions to proceed but as soon as 
one first obtains full recovery they preclude the other. "9 This solution was clearly 
rejected by the House of Lords in the Johnson case that chose to bar the personal claim 
in favour of the corporate one. Members of the House thought "protection of the 
interests of the company's creditors requires that it is the company which is allowed to 
recover to the exclusion of the shareholder. *240 
The view of the House, however, does not simply seem, for a number of reasons, good 
enough to deprive a shareholder from the benefits of his cause of action. For one, it 
fails to work where the wronged company is not insolvent and possesses good 
236 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. and Others (No. 2), (1982) Ch. 204 
at 223; Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (HL), 481 at p 528 per Lord Millett; see also 
Bowen (2003), (above, note 186) at p 2. 
237 McMeel Gerald, "Complex Entitlements: The Albazero Principle and Restitution", (1999), 
Restitution Law Review, 21, London, Mansfield; Mitchell (above, note 9) at pp 463-4; Watts 
(above, note 186) at p 390. 
238 Palmer Norman E, "Bailment", (1991), 2nd ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, at pp 308-380; See 
also Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd (1995) 2 A. C. 145. 
239 McMeel (above, note 237) at pp 24-28,49; at 463-4; Mitchell (above, note 9) at pp 463-41 
Watts (above, note 186) at pp 390-2. 
240 Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (HL), 481 at p 528 per Lord Millett; see also 
Ibid, per Lord Bingham at p 503; Ferran (2001), (above, note 186) at p 246. 
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financial position to meet its creditors' likely claims. 241 For another, while interests of 
creditors can bar personal claim of an individual shareholder, it is not very certain why 
the same consideration fails to prevent the very wronged company from failing to 
pursue the wrongdoer or from compromising the claim at an undervalue with him. 
Further, the double recovery argument ceases to be forceful where the company 
chooses not to enforce its right of action against the defendant, or settles its claim at 
undervalue, or cannot recover because the defendant has a good defence. "' In such 
cases, permission of a personal action would not seem inconsistent with creditors" 
interests because it is the wronged company's inaction rather than the shareholder 
action that may harm such creditors. 
2) According to the analysis of the House of Lords either the wronged company sues 
successfully to recover the loss with the effect that all its shareholders would be fully 
and equally compensated, or the company decides not to pursue and settles its claim. 
In either case, the company's decision will bind the individual shareholders because in 
the first contingency there remain no reflective loss to be recovered and in the second 
the loss to individual shareholders is caused by the company's decision. "' This is, 
however, misconceived. There seems no causal link between the company"s decision 
and a shareholder's reflective loss. When the company refuses to pursue or settles at 
undervalue, this only means that the reflective loss to the shareholder is not going to be 
241 Watts (above, note 186) at pp 391-2. 
242 Mitchell (above, note 9) at 464; See also Thomas J. in Christensen v. Scott arguing that the 
problem of double recovery does not arise where the company had settled its claim [(1996), 1 
N. Z. L. R., 273 at 280 (NZCA)] Also see Day v. Cook (2002), 1 B. C. L. C. 1 Para 38 per Ardern L. J. 
243 Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (HL), 481 at p 532 per Lord Millett. 
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compensated through the company"s action. It does not mean that the company has 
caused loss to the shareholder. " 
3) To allow shareholder action is to mean to outflank the company"s autonomy which 
can result in undermining the company's compromises . 
24' However, the argument fails 
to explain why a shareholder action which seeks to recover a loss that is not yet 
compensated through the company can form damage to the autonomy of the wronged 
company. Difficulties of establishing a successful negligence case against directorS246 
and of derivative actions plus time and costs of such proceedings... suggest that 
permission of personal action in reflective loss cases can 'ensure that the party who 
has, in fact, suffered loss is not arbitrarily denied fair compensation" - 
248 
4) Permission of a shareholder action can put corporate directors in a position where 
249 
their interests conflict with their duties . Clearly, this can occur in small companies 
where shareholders and directors are one and the same, as were the case in Johnson v. 
Gore Wood. However, that will not always be the case because many companies now 
use non-shareholder directors. 250 Moreover, directors' conflict of interests is principally 
244 For a similar line of argument see Mitchell (above, note 9) at pp 468-9. 
245 Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (HL), 481 at p 532 per Lord Millett; see also 
Ferran (2001), (above, note 186) at p 247. 
246 For further study see Sterling (above, note 68) at pp 483,486-7; Davies (1997), (above, note 
60) at p 746; Clark (2001), (above, note 95) at p 171; Conway (above, note 43) at p 16; Sealy 
(above, note 129); Deakin Simon, Ferran Ellis and Nolan Richard, "'Shareholders' Rights and 
Remedies: An Overview", (1997), Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review, 163, Oxford, 
Mansfield Press, at 163. 
247 Sterling (above, note 68) at 485; Deakin, Ferran and Nolan (above, note 246) at p 163; Hale 
(above, note 39) at p 219. 
248 Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (HL), 481 at p 503 per Lord Bingham. 
249 Ibid. at p 532 per Lord Millett. 
250 Watts (above, note 186) at p 392; See also Mitchell (above, note 9) at p 470. 
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curbed in law through the mechanism of fiduciary duty and, thus, there is no need to 
create extra devices; i. e. to exclude shareholder action. 
251 
The choice between shareholder and corporate action is a difficult one. It is possible to 
disallow the corporate claim in favour of shareholder action. This way opens the gate 
for an individual shareholder to recover reflective loss. It requires every shareholder to 
sue individually and in the end he will be given his share in the loss and nothing more. 
However, certain drawbacks associate with this method. To begin with, the prospect of 
too many individual shareholders who take personal actions to the courts can make the 
proposition impractical. "' Furthe=ore, in large companies where shareholders often 
passively choose not to take actions this can encourage extensive escape of wrongdoers 
from liability. In addition, it can discourage investors who will find corporations 
unsafe and troublesome for financing. Alternatively, It is possible to disallow 
shareholder action in favour of the corporate one because otherwise shareholder action 
can give some extra benefit to the person who initiates the action at the expense of 
253 
other shareholders in the wronged company. Moreover, corporate action is not only 
for the benefit of shareholders and creditors but also is for the benefit of other 
interested groups such as employees and consumers who might be prejudiced due to 
exclusion of the corporate recovery. 
254 
251 Watts (above, note 186) at 392; Mitchell (above, note 9) at p 470. 
252 Gray v. Lewis, (1873), 8 Ch App, 1035, p 1051 per James L. J; Sagar (above, note 186) at p 
88; 
Sterling (above, note 68) at p 485. 
253 Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (HL), 481 at p 528 per Lord Millett; see also 
Ferran (2001), (above, note 186) at p 246. 
254 Sterling (above, note 68) at pp 488-9. 
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One way to make optimal use of positive points in both actions is to view them as 
supplement devices. This does not follow that they are retained and permitted to be 
used by corporations and their shareholders simultaneously. That, as Lord Millett 
suggested, might cause either the problem of double recovery or a shareholder might 
recover at the expense of the company's creditors and other shareholders. It is only to 
mean that where the rationale for a corporate action is absent shareholders" personal 
action ought to be allowed. 
V. 1.2.2.4.4. What sort of loss is considered reflective? 
Reflective loss is normally taken to its quite clear examples of diminution in the market 
value of shares and the likely diminution in dividend. "' Whether it is limited to these 
two instances or it can extend to all other types of payments which a shareholder might 
have received from the company should the company was not deprived of its money 
due to the wrongdoing, is not determined. "' Clearly, reflective loss differs and must be 
distinguished from distinct loss which is considered recoverable. "' An example of the 
latter was provided in the Prudential case where the Court of Appeal considered as 
distinct expenses of attendance in a fraudulently called meeting. 258 The distinct loss 
aside, it is not very clear whether the reflective loss can include some more the 
complicated examples of loss such as where a shareholder's deprivation of the 
255 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. and Others (No. 2), (1982) Ch. 204 
at 223. 
256 Hirt Hans-Christoph, "Companies In General", (Jul-2003), Journal of Business 1, aw, 420-429, 
London, Stevens, at pp 422-3,428. 
257 Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (HL), 481 at p 530-1 per Lord Millett, and at p 
503 per Lord Bingham. 
258 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. and others (No. 2), (1982) Ch. 204 
at 223. 
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opportunity to accept the higher offer in a take-over bid case... and where a reduction 
in the saleability of the plaintiff-s shares in the market"' were at stake. According to the 
Lord Millett for the same policy reasons "the same applies to other payments which the 
company would have made if it had had the necessary funds even if the plaintiff 
would have received them qua employee and not qua shareholder and even if he 
would have had a legal claim to be paid-. "' This view was later interpreted differently 
in the Humberclyde Finance Group Ltd Hicks case where 262 Neuberger J. observed that 
only where the plaintiff shareholder is the sole owner of the company, these types of 
loss can be considered reflective. His reading, however, can fall in contradiction with 
corporations' separate corporate personality and further fails to explain why should 
the amount of a shareholders shareholding in the company play any role in 
determining what loss is and what loss is not reflective? 26' As Lord Millett pointed out 
the test is to see whether the alleged loss primarily relates to the claims of a plaintiff 
over the company's assets or not, no matter the plaintiff is a shareholder or is an 
employee in the company and no matter if he owns the company or not. More recently, 
in the Giles v. Rhind case Waller L. J. opined that a shareholder/ employee's capacity to 
recover his loss of salary would not be hurt simply because he is also a shareholder in 
the company. "' This view seems to have been inspired from the Lord Bingham's 
259 Heron International Ltd v. Lord Grade (1983), BCLC 244. 
260 R. P. Howard Ltd and Others v. Woodman Matthews and Co (1983) BCLC 117. 
261 Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (FIL), 481 at pp 532-3 per Lord Millett; See also 
Crisp Morris Ashurst, "'Shareholders' Recovery"', (2001), Practical Law Companies, 12 (9), 59-60, 
London, Sweet & Maxwell; "'Shareholders Cannot Recover Loss That Company Is Not 
Pursuing", (2001), Insolvency Intelligence, 14 (8), 63, London, Sweet & Maxwell; Mitchell (above, 
note 9) at pp 473-5; Bowen (2002), (above, note 186) at p 3; Alistair Alcock, "Some Temporary 
Relief for Auditors", (2002), Company Lawyer, 23 (7), 217, London, Oyez Publishing Limited, at p 
219. 
262 (2001) All E. R. (D) 202 (Nov). 
263 See Blackburn J's argument in Gardner v. Parker, (2004), 1 BCLC Ch D 417 at pp 437-438. 
264 Giles v. Rhind, (2002) 4 All ER (CA), 977 per Waller LJ at p 991. See also Hirt (above, note 
256) at p 428. 
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statement in the Johnson case in that loss of dividend and a diminution in the value of a 
shareholding are clear instances beyond them 'a finer judgement will be called 
for ... (and) any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favour of the claimant". "' 
5) When a shareholder may recover reflective loss? 
As authorities suggest, two requirements must be met when a shareholder seeks to 
recover his reflective loss. "' One is that the plaintiff needs to have a separate duty in 
his favour made by the wrongdoer. "' Thus, where a company suffers loss due to a 
breach of duty on the part of defendant who owes no duty to any individual 
shareholder in that company, only the company can take action against the wrongdoer 
simply because the cause of action belongs to the company and shareholders hold no 
cause of action. 26' Nonetheless, if conditions are met, a shareholder may only initiate a 
derivative action. The other is the plaintiff must show that the wronged company no 
longer has a cause of action. A shareholder action is only heard where the company 
suffers loss without having a cause of action. In such a case, the plaintiff cannot initiate 
a derivative action simply because the wronged company itself has no cause of 
action. "9 One question which must be addressed is to determine circumstances within 
265 Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (HL), 481 at p 504 per Lord Bingham; See 
Mitchell (above, note 9) at pp 473-5; Hirt (above, note 256) at pp 427-8. 
266 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. and others (No. 2), (1982) Ch. 204 
at 223; Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (HL), 481 at p 528 per Lord Millett and at p 
503 per Lord Bingham; Giles v. Rhind, (2002) 4 All ER (CA), 977 at p 988-990 per Waller LJ; Stein 
v Blake and Others (No 2), (1998), 1 BCLC (CA) 573; Gardner v. Parker, (2004), 1 BCLC Ch D 
417; See also Hirt (above, note 256) at pp 421-2; Bowen (2002), (above, note 186); Crisp (above, 
note 261); Hale (above, note 39) at p 219. 
267 Bowen (2002), (above, note 186); Sterling (above, note 69) at p 474. 
268 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. and others (No. 2), (1982) Ch. 204; 
Stein v. Blake and Others (No 2), (1998), 1 BCLC (CA) 573; Gardner v. Parker, (2004), 1 BCLC Ch 
D 417. 
269 Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. and Others (No. 2), (1982) Ch. 204 
at 223; Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (HL), 481; Giles v. Rhind, (2002) 4 All ER 
(CA), 977; Lee v- Sheard (1955), 3 All ER 777; George Fischer (Great Britain) Ltd v. Multi 
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which a company may suffer loss without having a cause of action for it. Authorities 
suggest that such circurnstances could be found where there is neither a contractual 
nor a tort-based cause of action between the company and the wrongdoer. "O These 
authorities, however, are silent where a case involves a company which has a cause of 
action but the cause is simply not good enough to allow a successful corporate action 
against the wrongdoer. For instance, where a case involves directors' mere 
negligence"' or when the corporate cause of action becomes procedurally time 
212 barred , the wronged company cannot take action. Whether a shareholder action in 
such cases can be authorised is not clear. "' Recently, the Giles case took the view that 
term 'cause of action' should be taken to mean a good cause of action so as to enable a 
shareholder action. 274 The rationale of the Giles case can perhaps be used to extend a 
shareholder's right of action to cases where the company simply decides not to pursue 
its cause of action, or where its action is rejected due to a good defence by the 
wrongdoer, and where it compromises its action at undervalue. The permission of a 
shareholder action in such cases is justified on the principle that there will be no wrong 
without a remed Y2" and that the law should provide remedy to a person who suffers 
Construction Ltd, Dexion Ltd (third party), (1995), 1 BCLC (CA) 260; Gerber Garment 
Technology Inc v. Lectra Systems Ltd. [(1997), RPC 443. 
270 Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. (2001), 1 All ER (FIL), 481 at p 503 per Lord Bingham and at p 
528 per Lord Millett; George Fischer (Great Britain) Ltd v. Multi Construction Ltd, Dexion Ltd 
(third party), (1995), 1 BCLC (CA) 260; Gerber Garment Technology Inc v. Lectra Systems Ltd. 
[(1997), RPC 443; Lee v. Sheard (1955), 3 All ER 777. 
271 In Galoo Ltd. v. Bright Grahame Murray, for example, the alleged negligence of the 
accountants in auditing the accounts caused the company to carry on trading at accumulating 
losses, for which the auditors could not be held liable. [(1994), 1 W. L. R. 13601; See Alistair 
(above, note 261) at p 219. 
272 John v. Price Waterhouse, (2001), EWHC 438 (Ch). 
273 Mitchell (above, note 9) at p 473. 
274 Giles v. Rhind, (2002) 4 All ER (CA) 977 at No. (34) p 990 per Waller Lj; For analysis of the 
Giles case see Bowen (2003), (above, note 186) at p 2; Mitchell (above, note 9) at pp 468-473. 
275 Mitchell (above note 9) at pp 468-479; Hirt (above, note 256) at pp 428-9; Crisp Morris 
Ashurst, "Reflective Loss", (2002), Practical Law Companies, 13 (11), 59, London, Sweet & 
25 4 
unfair loss. "' This interpretation can also be of very help to extinguish any likely 
conflict with section 459 petitions. According to this analysis, a shareholder cannot use 
section 459 to outflank the 'no reflective loss" principle if the company itself has a good 
cause of action. However, if the company has no cause of action, or in the light of the 
Giles case, if it is not going to exercise its cause for any reason excluding the 
observation of the company's best interest, a shareholder may initiate his own action, 
either in the form of a personal action for the recovery of his reflective loss or in the 
form of a petition under section 459, for a court order to oblige other shareholders or 
the company to buy his shares at a compensating rate. 
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V. 1.2.2.5. Section 459 and the derivative action 
Whether or not section 459, since its introduction, has taken over the derivative action 
has been controversial in English company law. Technically seen, although they are 
possible to be sought interchangeably, they importantly differ. The former is mostly 
classified as personal. This means that a section 459 petitioner normally seeks to 
preserve his personal interests and the total benefit of his action, if any, goes directly to 
his pocket. But, the latter is corporate in the sense that the plaintiff seeks on behalf of 
the wronged company to make good any wrong done to the company and for the 
benefit of the company. If the classification was that simple, there might arise no or 
little confusion because one could assure that while derivative is only corporate, 
unfairly prejudicial remedy is absolutely personal. However, the issue is more 
Maxwell; Crisp Morris Ashurst, "'Reflective Loss", (2003), Practical Law Companies, 14, (7), 49, 
London, Sweet & Maxwell. 
276 Giles v. Rhind (2002) 4 All ER 977 (CA) at 989 per Waller L. J.; See also Sagar (above, note 
186) at p 87; Hirt (above, note 256) at p 427; Bowen (2003), (above, note 186) at p 3; Crisp (2002 
and 2003), (above, note 275); Mitchell (above, note 9) at pp 468-479. 
277 Section 461 (2d) Companies Act 1985. 
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complicated, as a section 459 action might also be considered corporate because of its 
contentS278 and of the remedy sought. 279 The complication can become worse where a 
case involves a breach of duty by directors, as the very same breach may constitute 
under the section 459 a wrong both to the company and to its shareholders. In such 
cases, a minority plaintiff can petition for either a personal or a corporate remedy, no 
matter what majority shareholders choose. "O This can cause some overlap between 
corporate and personal rights of actions and further can immeasurably harm the rule in 
Foss v. Harbottale case. An interesting question, which must be addressed, is whether a 
shareholder can petition using section 459 while a corporate action is available? 
Generally speaking, there are two differing lines of arguments. One argues that 
although the same set of facts may constitute fraud and unfairly prejudicial conduct, it 
is not possible to choose between taking a derivative action and petitioning under 
section 459 interchangeably. There are distinguishable limits on the use of each action. 
Proponents of this argument, however, have diverged in proposing what constitutes 
the dividing element. In Hirt"s view, when the alleged wrong constitutes fraud, a 
shareholder may only use the derivative form of action. 281 The touchstone argument 
for this view, which seems to be inspired by the views of the Jenkins Committee"', is 
278 As Millett J. observed the same set of facts may give rise to a complaint both of breach of 
duty owed to the company which is prosecuted by the company or by a minority shareholder 
derivatively, and of unfair prejudice, which is prosecuted by a petitioning shareholder. [Re 
Charnley v. Davies Ltd. (No. 2), 1990, B. C. L. C. 7601. 
279 Sec. 461 (2c) Companies Act 1985. 
280 See Re Charnley v. Davies Ltd. (No. 2), 1990, B. C. L. C. 760 per Millett J. 
281 Hirt (above, note 66) at pp 106-7. 
282 The Jenkins Committee's proposition was that company law should provide relief for those 
corporate wrongs the relevant decision makers of which fail to pursue wrongdoers in 
circumstances where the very wrong does not constitute fraud. [Jenkins Committee"s Report 
(above, note 125) at 2061; See also Hirt (above, note 66) at pp 104-5; For a different interpretation 
of the Jenkins Committee's proposition see Davies (above, note 60) at p 737. 
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the one suggesting that so far as a minority shareholder has ordinary ways of action in 
hand, no turn goes to exceptional ways. "' The essence of a complaint under section 459 
is unfairness while in a derivative action the essence is unlawfulness. Claims of 
unfairness if not involving any unlawfulness have always been exceptional and only 
available where no legal ways remain. 
284 There is, however, some drawback with such 
view. First, the wide wording of the very section 459 implies that any unfair disregard 
from a member"s interest may trigger a section 459 petition. Second, it would seem 
unreasonable, if we require a plaintiff to use a much easier way of action under section 
459 for less serious cases while he is required to use the difficult way of derivative for 
fraudulent behaviours. Third, the proposition ties the prospect of petitions under 
section 459 to the difficult concept of fraud in the sense that a likely petitioner will be 
asked to show that his case does not involve fraud. Finally, and most importantly, this 
view seems to be inconsistent with a number of decided cases. "' In fact, the courts 
have tended to hear allegations of unfairly prejudice on the basis of conducts which 
were or could have been wrongs to the company and consequently eligible for a 
derivative action. 
286 
283 Gardner v. Parker, (2004), 1 BCLC Ch D 417; Re Charnley v. Davies Ltd. (No. 2), 1990, 
B. C. L. C. 760; See also Crisp (2002 and 2003) (above note 275). 
284 See the Outer House of the Court of Session's argument in Scottish case of Anderson v. 
Hogg, (2000), S. L. T., 634 at 644 per Lord Ordinary. 
285 Anderson v. Hogg, (2002), S. L. T., 354 (Inner House); Lowe v. Fahey (1996), 1 B. C. L. C., 262; 
Re Charnley v. Davies Ltd. (No. 2), 1990, B. C. L. C. 760; Re A Company (No. 00370), 1988,1 
W. L. R 1068; Re London School of Electronics Ltd. (1986) Ch. 211; Re A Company (No 005278 of 
1985), (1986) 1WLR 281. 
286 Davies (above, note 60) at pp 737-9; Pettet (above, note 40) at pp 261-2; Hirt (above note 66) 
at p 103; Gray Joanna, "'A Derivative Action by Way of s. 459"', (1997), Company Lawyer, 18 (4), 
121-2, London, Oyez Publishing Limited; Reisberg (above, note 43); Hale (above, note 39) at pp 
221-2. 
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Leader and Dine proposed another dividing element. In their view, the use of section 
459 should be restricted to cases where there is a chain of unfair policies that target a 
particular shareholder. "' If controllers act to prejudice interests of a shareholder, but 
their acts does not contribute to form any policy, no action under the s 459 would be 
allowed. The proposition, however, seems to fall largely in contradiction with the very 
wording of the section where it expressly states that a single and a future act or 
omission might constitute ground for the unfairly prejudicial petitions. "' It also falls in 
contradiction with a number of decided cases which did not require the petitioners to 
show the course of unfair conducts. "' 
The judgement of Millett J. in the Re Charnley v. Davies Ltd. (No. 2) case 290 offers another 
dividing element. According to it, although the very same facts may trigger either a 
derivative action or a section 459 petition, but they differ at nature and relevant 
remedies. The essence of a section 459 petition should be a disregard by controllers of 
the petitioner's interests when conducting company affairs rather than pursuing a 
breach of duty by directors. 291 It is personal in nature and must be accompanied by a 
personal remedy while derivative actions are considered corporate in nature and can 
only be granted a corporate remedy. Although this view has attracted considerable 
support"', it 'sits rather oddly with the fact that one of the remedies which the 
287 Leader & Dine (above, note 159) at p 229. 
288 Sec. 459(l) Companies Act 1985. 
289 See above note 285. Also see Clark (above, note 95) at p 171; Conway (above, note 43) at pp 
13-15; Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at p 470. 
290 Charnley v. Davies Ltd. (No. 2), 1990, B. C. L. C. 760. 
291 Ibid. at 783-4. 
292 For support of this view, see Hirt (above, note 66) at pp 104-5; Reisberg (above, note 40) at p 
118; Hale (above, note 39) at p 222. 
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statute 293 expressly empowers the courts to grant is to authorise civil proceedings to be 
brought in the name and on behalf of the company". 
294 
The other line of argument states that it is a matter of choice between two absolutely 
interchangeable procedures, as there is no identifiable limit on the use of section 459.295 
A plaintiff shareholder has option to choose between taking a derivative action or a 
section 459 petition especially where he seeks a corporate remedy. 296 The argument is 
consistent with the general wording of the very section 459 and is further beneficial to 
minority shareholders because it allows them to choose between alternatives the one 
which is more advantageous. Section 459 facilitates taking action by minority 
shareholders, as it no longer requires complainants to establish difficult elements of 
fraud and control'9' and that explains why there have been relatively few derivative 
actions since the introduction of the unfairly prejudicial remedy. '9' 
293 Section 461 Companies Act 1985. 
294 Davies (above, note 60) at p 739. 
295 Pettet (above, note 40) at pp 262-4; Davies (above, note 60) at pp 737-9; Gray (above, note 
286) at pp 121-2; Hale (above, note 39) at pp 219,221-2; Reisberg (above, note 40) at p 116. 
296 Lowe v. Fahey (1996), 1 B. C. L. C., 262 (Ch D) at 268 per Aldous Q-C.; See also Re Elgindata 
Ltd in which Warner J. considered an alleged diversion of company's assets by those in control 
to their own benefit or that of their associates as an example of unfairly prejudicial conduct. 
[(1991), BCLC 959 at 1004. 
297 Reisberg (above, note 40) at p 118. 
298 See Poole and Roberts (1999), (above, note 81) at p 100; Reisberg (above, note 40) at p 117. 
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V. 2. The case of Iran 
This part concerns the rules and mechanisms which have been devised by the Iranian 
lawmaker either to prevent abuse of rights generally or in particular to protect 
minority shareholders against the possibility of abuse of rights by majority 
shareholders in corporations. These mechanisms, thus, fall into two categories. One 
includes the "no abuse of rights' which is a general principle of law and the other 
comprises of four corporate law mechanisms which are meant to protect minority 
shareholders specifically. 
V. 2.1. The "no abuse of right' principle 
The 'no abuse of right' which is a general principle in the Iranian law requires persons 
to take care when exercising rights in certain circumstances. The principle which is 
stated in the Art 40 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (CIRI) provides 
that 'no one is entitled to exercise his rights in a way injurious to others or detrimental 
to public interests. While the Art recognises abuse of rights as a general principle, it 
provides no definition of circumstances within which an exercise of right could 
constitute abuse. A proper understanding of the abuse of right would then require 
interpretation of the principle and any such interpretation will inevitably be dependant 
on understanding the issue in the light of both the Islamic law and the European law 
which were sources of learning for the Iranian lawmaker. On the one hand, 
codification of the Iranian law on the European model which occurred in the early 
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twentieth century99 and which required proclaiming rights in general terms could 
generate the same problem of abuse of right as existed in the European countries and 
hence the experience of the European countries could help the Iranian law to address 
abuse of right cases effectively. On the other hand, as the reliance on the European 
model as to drafting of the Civil Code was mainly in form rather than contents, Islamic 
law remained decisively relevant as to defining the concept of abuse of right. '00 Hence, 
I shall briefly review these two sources in order to discover how they have played a 
part in the development of the "no abuse of right" principle in the Iranian private law. 
Islamic law knows no "abuse of right" principle, though it offers a 'no harm" principle 
which has been relevant. Historically, development of the 'no harm' principle goes 
back to a very famous incident which occurred between two persons in the lifetime of 
the prophet Mohammad. The incident, which is known as the "incident of the Somarat- 
ebn-jandab 'or-' Hadis-e-Somarat-ebn-jandab, was quoted by a Zorareh named person 
who was one of the students of the Imam Mohammad-ebn-Bagher (the Prophets 
grand child) who told the story after the Prophet's death. 'O' The incident involved a 
person who had bought a property for the living of his family and a person (Somarat- 
ebn-jandab) who owned a date tree in the property bought by the former. A dispute 
rose when Somarat repeatedly and without a prior notice entered in the said property 
299 See Chapter one (above, at 1.2). 
300 fbid. 
301 Alsheikh Mohamad-ebn-al-Hasan-al-Toosi, ""Altahzib", Vol. 7, p 146 at Hadis no. 36, Dar-ol- 
Kotob-ol-Islamieh Publication, Tehran, Iran; Mohammad-ebn-al-Yakgoob-al-Koleini, "Al- 
Kaafi"', Vol. 5, p 292 at Hadis no. 2, Dar-ol-Ketab-ol-Eslamieh Publications, Tehran, Iran; Sheikh 
Mohammad-ebn-al-Hassan-ebn-al-Yoosof-ebn-al-Motahhar-al-Helli (Known as Fakhr-ol- 
Mohagheghin), "'Al-Eizah (Eizah-ol-Favaed)", Vol. 2, p 48, para Ketab-ol-Din at Fasl-ol-Tanazo, 
111 edition, Ghom, Iran; Al-Akhoond Sheikh Mohammad Kazem-ol- Khorasani, "Kefayat-ol- 
Aosool, Al-Maghsad-ol-Sabe, Al-Osool-ol-Amalie, at pp 380-1, Moas-sa-sat Al-ol-Beit, Ghom, 
Iran; Shikh Morteza Ansari, "Makaseb", 1997, Ghom, Iran, Daroleslam Publications, at p 372. 
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in order to take care of his tree, whereas by doing so he could see the owner of the 
property's family who were unlawful for him to see. The dispute was taken to the 
Prophet and his lordship held that 'Islam authorises neither injury nor intention to 
injure people. That ruling later became one of the key principles in the Islamic 
jurisprudence which commands Muslims to avoid injuring their fellow Muslims 
generally. 302 It, however, could clash in certain circumstances with another principle 
that recognises for people full dominion over property. The latter which is termed as 
"Taslit" or "AnNas Mosalatoon-a Ala Amvalehem" also relies on a famous saying 
(hadis) from the Prophet Mohammad"' and was capable of authorising in general 
terms every owner to do any activity in his property even injurious to others. "' 
Traditionally, Islamic law jurists have tended to resolve the said clash by prioritising 
the 'Taslit' principle. "' In their view, private property must be respected in every 
contingency and there is hardly a limitation on it. They were reluctant to rely on the 
'no harm' principle in order to hold a person liable for the exercise of his rights. The 
question for them was how an action exercised within the limits of a legally stated 
right could be construed as abuse. As a result, the "no harm" principle was often taken 
302 The 'no harm" principle is most manifested in sections 328-335 of the Iranian Civil Code 
1925 which concern civil liability. 
303 Mohamad-ebn-Ali-ebn-al-Hossein-al- Ghomi, "Man La Yahzar-al-Faghih", Dar-ol-Kotob-ol- 
Eslamieh Publications, Tehran, Iran; Ayatollah Al-seied Al-Boroojerdi, "'Jame-o-al-Ahadis-al- 
Shia", Dar-ol-Ketab-ol-Eslamieh Publications, Ghom, Iran; Mohammad-ebn-al-Hassan-al-Hor-aI 
Ameli, "Vasael-ol-Shia", Edited by Abdolrahim-al-Shirazi-al-Rabani, Dar-ol-Ehia-ol-Toras-ol- 
Arabi Publication, Beirut, Lebanon. 
304 The 'Taslit' principle is reflected in Section 30 of the Iranian Civil Code 1929. 
305 This is the traditional view taken by the Hanbali, Shafeai, Hanafi Schools of Thoughts and 
by a minority of jurists in the Shia Jafari School. See Fitzgerald Seymour Vesey, "An 
Abridgement of Muhammadan Law", (1931), Oxford University Press, London at 188-195; 
Mohamad-ebn-al-Hasan-al-Toosi, ""Al-Mabsoot", 1351 (Persian calander year), Al-Maktabat-ol- 
Mortazavieh Publication, Tehran, Iran; Mohaghegh-ol-Sani, "Al-jame-ol-Maghased", 1408 
(Arabic calander year), Al-ol-Beit Publication, Ghom, Iran; Mohamad-ebn-al-Edris-al-Helli, "Al- 
Saraer", 1408 (Arabic calander year), Moasasat-ol-Nashr-ol-Eslami Publication, Ghom, Iran. 
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to be used as a source of civil liability in areas of the private relationship which 
involved no exercise of rights (Al-javaz-al-Shariea Yonafi-ol-Zeman). 
Over time, other jurists who thought that the traditional view could cause imposition 
of disproportionate damage on other persons' property started to extend the use of the 
/no harm" principle to cases involving exercise of rights in certain circumstances. Their 
view, which reflects the prevailing approach among contemporary jurists, holds that if 
a person who exercises his right could not reasonably be taken to have considerable 
and legitimate interest in a disputed exercise, he will be held liable to restore the 
wronged person"s situation. To put it simply, the harm to the plaintiff must outweigh 
the benefits which go to the defendant as a result of an exercise of right by the latter 
(Dora"-al-Mafased-Aola Men Jalb-el-Manfa-at). 306 They, however, viewed the whole 
issue from the angle of preventing damage to rights of anyone rather than of restricting 
the exercise of rights'O' and as a result they have restricted the use of the "no harm' 
principle in this area only to resolve disputes between owners of neighbouring 
properties. In summary, the respect for private property in Islamic law has prevented 
evolution of a general theory of the "no abuse of right' that requires limiting individual 
rights. 
306 Mohammad-ebn-al-Maki Ameli (known as Shahid Avval), "Al-Ghavaed Va-l-Favaed", 
Ketab-forooshi Mofid Publication, 784 (Arabic calander year), Ghom, Iran; Zein-ol-Din Ameli 
(known as Shahid Sani), "'Tan-ihid-ol-Ghavaed-ol-Osoolieh va-al-Arabieah Letafrio Ghavaed-ol- 
Ahkam-al-Sharia, Daftar-e-Tablighat-e- Islami Publication, 1416 (Arabic calander year), Ghom, 
Iran; Sheikh Mohammad-ebn-al-Hassan-ebn-al-Yoosof-ebn-al-Motahhar-al-Helli (Known as 
Fakhr-ol-Mohagheghin), "Al-Eizah (Eizah-ol-Favaed)", Vol. 2, para Ketab-ol-Din at Fasl-ol- 
Tanazo, 1st edition, Ghom, Iran; Roohollah Khomeini (known as Imam Khomeini), "'Al-Rasael", 
Esmailian Publication, 1385 (Arabic calander year), Ghom, Iran. 
307 Schacht, Joseph, "Islamic Law in Contemporary States", The American Journal of Comparative 
LaW, 133 at p 143. 
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Islamic law aside, another source of law, which has been influential on the Iranian 
lawmaker as to drafting the 'no abuse of right" principle, has been the laws of the 
continental Europe countries which recognise the 'no abuse of right' as a general 
principle . 
30' A common feature of these countries, which all fan in the civil law camp, is 
to proclaim rights in general terms and where this is the case abuse of right is likely to 
occur because rights are not initially hedged with qualifications . 
309 A general principle 
of "no abuse of right' could prevent this. The development of the principle owes 
especially to the late 191hcentury French scholarship and in particular to the writings of 
Louis josserand who thought rights should no longer be considered absolute. In his 
view, an exercise of right must be compatible with its social function. His view which 
was in fact a revision of the traditional philosophy was subsequently put to use by the 
French courts in order to develop a general principle of "no abuse of right. Hence, the 
courts liberally construed sections 1382 and 1383 of the French Code Civil, which fix 
liability on the author of any harm, in order to cover abusive exercise of rights where 
they involve intention to harm. It was at this point that abuse of right became a source 
of civil liability subject to fault. Nevertheless, fault for the purpose of abuse of right 
had a narrow scope. While in other torts every act or omission which causes damage 
could be a source of liability, in an abuse of right case such act or omission could 
generate liability only where certain extra conditions existed. In a case of normal tort, 
the tortitious activity is never legal while in an abuse of right case an activity which is 
otherwise legal can be a tort when certain conditions are present. These conditions 
were surnmarised by the courts within one formula which stated: to be an abuse of 
right, the person who exercise right must have intention to harm which is ascertained 
308 See generally Cutteridge (above, note 38); Bolgar (above, note 38); Byers (above, note 38). 
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objectively; i. e. the enquiry is whether the defendant can reasonably be taken to have 
had any serious and legitimate interest in what he was doing. 
The French initiative was later followed by other European countries which gradually 
accommodated the principle in their Codes of laws in one form or another. In 
German Y3 '0 Austria 31 1 and Italy 
312 
, intention to harm was chosen as the test with which 
an abuse of right is identified. For Russia 313 and Czechoslovakia 
314 
, the test is whether 
an exercise is contrary to its social and economic purpose. Spain gives regard to both 
intention to harm and the circumstances of the harm caused. "' In Netherlands, a 
number of elements (intention to harm, purpose of the right, and whether the harm has 
been disproportionate) are considered' 16 while the Swiss law of the abuse of rights 
relies on the element of good faith. "' 
As we have seen earlier, the Iranian version of the "no abuse of right' principle which is 
reflected in Art 40 is too wide with no precise definition and hence is capable to 
seriously defunct individual rights. It currently makes no distinction between harms, 
which are allowed to be borne by other persons and the society, and harms, which are 
not so allowed. In certain conditions, harms may ensue not from one"s action but rather 
309 Catala P. and Weir J-A., "'Delict and Torts: A Study in Parallel, Part Il", (1964), 38 Tul. L. 
Rev., 221 at pp 237-8; Byers (above, note 38) at p 396. 
310 Section 226 of the German Civil Code of 1900. 
311 Section 1295 (2) of the Austrian Civil Code of 1811. 
312 Section 833 of the Italian Civil Code of 1939. 
313 Soviet Code 1923, para Preface. 
314 Section 7 of the Czechoslovak Civil Code of 1964. 
315 Section 7 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1898. 
316 Section 13 (2) of the 1992 Civil Code. 
317 Section 2 of the Swiss Civil Code of 1907 
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from some exogenous risks. "' For example, when a person builds a dam in his 
property to avoid the risk of an imminent flood, he will not be held liable if the flood 
destroys his neighbour's property. "' In such case, the harm to the said neighbour is 
attributed to exogenous events. Also, the enjoyment of one from the exercise of his 
rights may sometimes require some harm to be bome by other persons. Thus, it is 
lawful, for example, for a man to open air holes and windows on his walls for purposes 
of light, even if by so doing he can see his neighbour"s family who are unlawful for him 
to see. "O Everyone can deal with his own property in any manner that would not 
damage his neighbour's property, although it might harm him by opening such 
windows. These considerations were taken by the Iranian Civil Code which is in 
contents based on Islamic law... and which defines the general principle stated in Art 
40. It holds in section 132 that: 
"'No owner is allowed to do in his property an activity which requires one's neighbour 
to incur harm unless to the extent that it is exercised reasonably for meeting one's 
necessary need or for saving him from the risk of damage". 
The section determines circumstances within which an act or omission can be assessed 
as constituting abuse of right. As it suggests, the "abuse of right' occurs where a person 
exercises his right unnecessarily and carelessly which entails injury to other persons' 
property or rights. Accordingly, not every harm to other persons or to the public 
interest, which might arise from the exercise of one's right, could trigger the 
318 Riley CA, "The Company Directors Duty of care and Skill: The Case for an Onerous But 
Subjective Standard", (Sep-1999), The Modern Law Review, vol. 62,697, London, England, 
Stevens & Sons, at p 706. 
319 Al-Akhoond Sheikh Mohammad Kazem-ol- Khorasani, "'Kefayat-ol-Aosool", AI-Maghsad- 
ol-Sabe, Al-Osool-ol-Amalie, at p 383, Moas-sa-sat Al-ol-Beit, Ghom, Iran. 
320 Section 133 Civil Code 1929. 
321 See Chapter one (above, at 1.2, para note 119). 
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mechanism of abuse of right. Only harms, which are not bome as stated, can generate 
liability for a person who acts within the stated frame of his rights. To put it simply, the 
abuse of right is subject to fault which is construed more narrowly than it is done 
under the general law relevant to the civil liability. "' Although, the section concerns 
property law and specifically disputes between owners of neighbouring properties, its 
rationale in the light of the very Art 40 can be extended to other areas such as labour 
law, contracts including companies, and legal proceeding, though a judicial 
willingness to include these areas will have to be forthcoming. 
Currently, Iranian company law gives no specific regard to the issue of majority abuse 
of rights. In the absence of any such specific regard, company law scholars have 
approached differently. Some recognises no possibility for any extension of the 
rationale from section 132 to companies because shareholders are absolutely free to 
exercise their voting rights in any manner they like. The only exception is where a 
motion to be voted constitutes a crime and shareholders knowingly vote for its 
adoption. "' Others draw analogy between the existing 'no abuse of right' principle, 
and the issue of majority abuse of rights and state resolutions of meetings can be set 
aside, if it becomes evident that the majority once exercising their voting rights in 
meetings was pursuing interests other than that of the company. "' 
322 See Chapter four (above, at IV. 2). 
323 Sotoodeh Tehrani Hasan, "'Trade Law", (1997), Tehran, Dehkhoda Publication, vol. 2, pp 
175-6. 
324 Erfani Mahmood, "Trade Law", (1999), Vol. 2, Tehran, jehade Daneshgahi Institute 
Publication (Majed), at p 180; Erfani Mahmood, "Abuse of Position and Power in the Law of 
Iran"', 'Comparative Law Institution Monthly', (1981), No 7, University of Tehran Publication, 
Tehran, at pp 148-231. 
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V. 2.2. Minority protection mechanisms 
Generally speaking, there are four statutory mechanisms to protect minority rights in 
Iranian company law. These mechanisms are: convention of meetings by 
shareholders ... ; cumulative voting systeM326 ; disinterested majority32'; and corporate 
action by shareholders... which will be discussed respectively below. 
V. 2.2.1. Right to convene shareholder meetings 
As a minority protection measure, company law allows shareholders to convene 
shareholder meetings were certain conditions exist"', though the right to convene such 
meetings is considered corporate and hence falls principally within the power of 
directors. 330 This statutory right can be utilised where shareholders who possess one 
fifth of a corporation's issued shares choose to have a shareholder meeting convened. 
The exercise of the right is also subject to observation of certain procedural steps to be 
taken by minority shareholders. They must demand corporate directors and upon such 
demand it will become the duty of the directors to convene the requested meeting 
within 20 days. If directors refuse to do so, demanders can ask inspectors to convene 
the meeting within 10 days and in a likely failure of inspectors case, demanders will 
have the right to convene the attempted meeting personaHy. These requirements are 
intended to guard against any likely opportunistic use by minority shareholders of the 
statutory right. 331 
325 Section 95 JSCA. 
326 Section 88 JSCA. 
327 Section 129-131 JSCA. 
328 Section 276 JSCA. 
329 Section 95 JSCA. 
330 Sections 89 and 138 JSCA. 
331 Sotoodeh (above, note 323) at p 175. 
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The right offers some protection to minority shareholders against controllers in Iranian 
companies. 332 As the power to call a shareholder meeting and to determine its agenda 
fall within the authority of corporate management and because most Iranian 
corporations are dominated by one or few shareholders who can control corporate 
management333, it would become very likely that controllers do not allow a matter of 
minority concern is raised at meetings. 334 This is particularly problematic when 
minority shareholders are trying to bring up issues to which controllers are not 
interested; for instance, where minority shareholders seek to restrict management's 
power or want to dismiss them from the office. The right allows minority shareholders 
to have the purported meeting convened and "in such meetings, only issues which are 
determined by demanders are discussed. "' Nonetheless, the statutory right is 
considered not very important because, while it allows minority shareholders to 
convene a meeting and raise matters, at the end of such meeting issues will be resolved 
by a simple majority resolution. 
Minority protection aside, the right can constitute effective protection for shareholders 
generally which guards them against management's abuse of corporate powers. Such 
abuse could mainly occur in companies that have no controlling shareholders. 
Collective action problem in such companies allows wayward management to continue 
with impunity the office and therefore a statutory right which is exercised despite such 
332 Erfani Mahmood, "Trade Law", (1999), 
Publication (Majed), at p 96. 
333 See Chapter one (above, at 1.2). 
334 Sotoodeh (above, note 323) at pp 160-162. 
335 Section 96 JSCA. 
Vol. 2, Tehran, Jehade Daneshgahi Institute 
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problem could ensure that shareholders are always able to exert effective control on 
management. 
V. 2.2.2. Cumulative voting 
Cumulative voting is a method of voting through which directors are appointed at 
shareholder meetings. According to it, when the matter to be decided at a shareholder 
meeting is appointment of directors, the number of votes owned by a shareholder is 
multiplied to the number of directors to be appointed. If, for example, five directors are 
to be appointed in a company, according to the corporate articles and corporate law, 
and a shareholder of the company holds five shares each of which bear one vote then 
he will have twenty five votes to give to one candidate or to distribute them among 
candidates. This is exceptional to the principle of majority rule which requires 
shareholders to take resolutions by a simple majority vote on the basis of 'one share, 
one vote-. It is stated in section 88 JSCA and is a mandatory rule of company law 
especially designed to enable minority shareholders to organise their dispersed votes 
and send one or two representatives to the board. "' It is not applied where the 
attempted appointment concerns the first company directors. In the latter case, the 
336 "In Ordinary general meetings decisions must be taken by a simple majority vote of 
attendees in a formally valid meeting except in relation to appointing directors and inspectors 
for which a relative majority vote suffices. In the latter case, the number of votes of every 
member are multiplied to the numbers of directors to be appointed. Shareholders can allocate 
their votes to one nominee or spread them among nominees. A shareholder contract cannot 
displace this mechanism. [Section 88 JSCA]. 
337 Erfani (above, note 332) at pp 105-107; Rastiin Mansoor, "Commercial Law", (1975), 3rded., 
Tehran, University of Tehran Publications, at p 115; Meshki Siroos, "'Legal Organization of 
Management in joint Stock Companies", Ph. D. Thesis, (1979), Tehran, University of Tehran, 
Faculty of Law and Politics, Guiding Code 86, at p 39. 
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authority to appoint the first corporate directors falls within the power of a founders' 
meeting which follows different rules. 338 
One important weakness of the cumulative voting is that it simply concerns with 
choosing directors and has no application when a removal of directors is to be decided. 
The latter still remains within the realm of the general rule of 'one share, one vote' and 
as a result, majority shareholders will always be able to remove and replace a minority- 
selected director. In other words, current company law allows the cumulative voting 
which was enacted to protect minority shareholders to be outflanked by controllers. "' 
In addition to this, its effectiveness will depend on the actual conunitment of minority 
shareholders who might not want to, or could not, coordinate. 
V-2.2.3. Disinterested ratification 
The disinterested ratification which is stated in sections 129-131 JSCA concerns with 
ratification of directors' intentional faults in companies. The company law drafters 
enacted it with the intention to ensure that shareholders always respond such faults 
effectively. According to it, any self-interested transaction of a corporate director, 
which causes damage to company, is a source of liability that can be exonerated only 
by effective shareholder ratification. For the purposes of the sections 129-131, 
ratification is effective when it is adopted by a shareholder resolution which does not 
comprise of votes cast by directors who were interested in the very objected 
transaction. As directors, according to the Iranian company law, are appointed among 
338 See Chapter two (above, at 11.2-1). 
339 Meshki (above, note 337) at p 50. 
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shareholders , they normally enjoy voting rights which could be used as a self-help 
device in shareholder meetings. This could potentially cause problems for minority 
shareholders given that Iranian corporations tend to have one or few shareholders who 
can either seize or control the corporate management. To exclude wrongdoer directors' 
votes from being cast in meetings could mean to exclude interested majority vote in 
certain circumstances. However, directors may conu-nit faults in which they are not 
personally interested and there are also situations in which not the very wrongdoer 
directors but interested shareholders may want to support wrongdoer directors, using 
their votes. On the one hand, a shareholder resolution which concerns directors" 
negligence can yet be affected by the very wrongdoer directors' self-help. On the other 
hand, directors can fix some private benefits not for themselves but rather for the 
controlling shareholders who will support them in hard times. Current company law, 
thus, permits fraud to occur in companies. Sections 129-131 do not address these issues. 
Whether the rationale of the sections 129-131 could be used to impose as a general rule 
a limitation on shareholders in meetings which excludes not only directors' votes but 
also interested shareholders' votes from being cast in meetings as to ratification of 
directors" faults (which broadly interpreted covers both self-interested and negligent 
activities) cannot be answered with comfort. Perhaps, if sections 129-131 were the only 
source of reference, the answer would become negative, as the formal scope of the 
above sections are expressly limited to directors" votes as to their self-interested 
transactions. However, in addition to specific statutory provisions, the spirit of the law 
in this area can be taken into account, as the general law authorises the courts to 
consider such spirit in the case of obscurity or silence of the specific provisions. In the 
340 Section 107 JSCA. 
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light of such consideration one can notice in the current company law a number of 
sections whose purpose of provision are to regulate the relationship between 
shareholders so as to prevent some shareholders from taking extra advantages. For 
example, section 93 JSCA requires a special ratification to be given by affected 
shareholders as to an ordinary resolution which seeks to change rights attached to a 
particular set of shares. Likewise, where a shareholder meeting considers granting of 
certain advantages to one or few corporate members, the votes of such members must 
be excluded. 341 Similarly, when a shareholder meeting intends to resolve to exclude 
certain shareholders" pre emption right as to buying new shares in the interest of one 
or few other shareholders, its resolution must not reflect the votes cast by those who 
are allocated new shares. "' Therefore, it does not seem very odd to suggest on the 
basis of such consideration that not only directors vote but also interested 
shareholders' vote can be excluded when directors" fault in its wide meaning is the 
subject of a shareholder meeting-s resolution. 
V. 2.2.4. Commencing corporate claims by shareholders 
Company law permits shareholders to take corporate claims against directors in certain 
343 344 
circumstances. According to section 276 JSCA, which is mandatory , shareholders 
may raise claims of liability against corPorate directors when the latter conu-nits fault in 
connection with managing affairs and business of companies. This is often known as 
341 Section 77 JSCA. 
342 Sections 166-168 JSCA. 
343 Erfani (above, note 332) at P 177; Meshki (above, note 337) at pp 205-207. 
344 Section 277 JSCA states that a resolution of shareholder meeting and a clause in the 
corporate constitution which fall in contradiction with the statutory right offered by the section 
276 is inoperative. 
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corporate claims initiated by shareholders 345 and is exceptional to the principle which 
exist in general law of procedure 
346 
and suggests such claims must be commenced by 
the company itself14' rather than by its shareholders . 
34' As companies enjoy legal 
personality, they can have property and rights of their own 
34' 
and further can 
prosecute persons who commit wrong to them. This is normally done through an 
appropriate corporate decision taken by directors. "O Directors represent the company 
and as agents of the company exercise the company's power to pursue wrongdoers. 
This includes the circumstances where directors are themselves wrongdoers. In cases 
where one or two of directors, for example, commit wrongdoing, it is the responsibility 
of other directors to make a proper decision to pursue or not to pursue wrongdoer 
directors and even if every director in the board is involved in the wrongdoing the 
responsibility will rest on the new board who will make such decision. "' In any case, a 
shareholder is not allowed to initiate a corporate action unless there is a special 
permission either in the corporate constitution or in laws to that effect. While 
constitutions rarely authorise shareholders to take corporate actions, company law 
exceptionally allows such actions to be commenced by shareholders. The rationale for 
this is to deter corporate management from committing of fault. To this end, company 
345 Meshki (above., note 337) at pp 205-6. 
346 See Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Act 2000 (Hereafter is cited CPA): 
"No court can hear a claim unless a person or persons having proprietary interest or a person 
or persons who are their agents (lawyer), successors or legal representatives initiate action and 
demand judicial trial according to the law. '"; Also see Section 84 (10) of the same Act: "In 
following issues defendant when responds in substance can make a procedural objection to the 
claim initiated against him/her ... (10) 
Plaintiff is not of interest in the claim". 
347 Sections 142 and 276 JSCA- 
348 Unlike English company law which offers a common law rule of proper plaintiff, Iranian 
company law provides no such rule. Instead, that corporate claims are to 
be commenced by the 
company itself is an instance of the general rule of procedure which regulates taking actions 
by 
persons as to their property and rights. [See Sections 2 and 
84 (10) CPA (above, note 346)]. 
349 See section 583 TC which provides that "All types of commercial companies prescribed in 
the Code own separate legal personality". 
350 Principally, legal persons take decisions and act through their incumbents. [Section 589 TC] 
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law imposes civil liability, which can be enforced by shareholders, on negligent 
directors. "' Where directors are personally involved in the wrongdoing against the 
company, they are unlikely to pursue themselves and hence a statutory permission 
which authorises shareholder action against wrongdoer directors can ensure that such 
directors are always liable to prosecution. To prevent any potential abuse of the 
statutory right, a check was put on the exercise of it which requires a shareholder 
plaintiff to qualify as to owning of at least one fifth of the corporate shares. "' 
The shareholder action stated in section 276 has similarities and differences with the 
English derivative action. They both are exceptional devices and principally target 
mismanagement. These aside, they differ in a number of aspects. They diverge in the 
sort of wrong which can be addressed. While only wrongs which qualify as fraud fall 
within the scope of derivative action, a section 276 action can cover any wrong which 
involves directors" fault, in its wide meaning. A further difference is that an English 
shareholder is allowed to take derivative action against third parties who were 
involved in the fraudulent transaction. An Iranian shareholder can prosecute only the 
wrongdoer director even if a third party was involved in the fraudulent transaction. 
Under the derivative mechanism, even a tiny shareholder can initiate the action 
whereas according to the section 276 the one-fifth-shareholding requirement must be 
met. 
351 Section 118 JSCA. 
352 Erfani (above, note 332) at p 177; Meshki (above, note 337) at pp 205-207. 
353 Section 276 JSCA provides that "'a person or persons who own at least one fifth of the total 
shares in a company can in case of commission of fault by board members and 'director general' 
initiate legal proceedings in the name and for the benefit of the company but at their personal 
expense, against them and ask for recovery of any damages suffered 
by the company. When 
directors found liable, the courts' judgement will be executed for the benefit of the company 
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Whether the statutory right has been of any assistance as to protecting minority 
shareholders against abuse of power by majority shareholders can be answered in 
negative. It only concerns with directors' faults and can-not be used to address wrongs 
which are caused by the majority shareholders or other persons. 
354 
Also current 
company law allows directors' fault to be ratified by an ordinary resolution of 
shareholder meeting. Given that in Iranian corporations often the same persons hold 
majority of shares and control management, this could mean the statutory right really 
serves no or little function. In addition to these, the section 276 which offers the 
statutory right is uncertain. It is not clear whether a minority plaintiff is required to 
take the issue first to the shareholder meeting or he is free to take action at his expense 
when it is liable to ratification by majority shareholders. Lastly, section 276 requires a 
plaintiff minority to come up with the money for the costs of a purported litigation. 
This can constitute a major disincentive for a likely plaintiff given that normally 
minority shareholders have not resource enough to fund such claims and even where 
they do, the prospect of a refund order at the end of a successful action is lost at the 
outset where the fate of the very action is quite gloomy. It is hard for a minority 
shareholder to show directors' fault and lack of adequate information often makes any 
purported action risky and unpredictable and hence a minority shareholder is very 
except in relation to the costs of such action to which the judgement will be executed for the 
benefit of the plaintiff who initiated the action... " 
354 By making analogy Sotoodeh suggested a contrary opinion where he argues that it is 
possible to extend the rule provided by Section 276 to the situations where wrongdoers are the 
majority of shareholders. His argument rests on a general understanding from various sections 
in joint Stock Companies Act that impose civil liability on promoters, directors and inspectors 
when they commit fault in certain situations wich for example involve 
formation and 
registration of company (Sec. 23), issuing share certificate when the company 
has not been 
registered (Sec. 28). [Sotoodeh (above, note 323) at p191] However, the argument 
falls in 
276 
likely to see him/herself better off to exit from the company rather than to stay and 
take action. 
contradiction with the wording of the very section 
276. [See Meshki (above, note 337) at pp 205- 
2071. 
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V-3. Conclusion 
In Chapter five, my intention was to see what and how company laws in England and 
Iran have done as to preventing the possibility of abuse of righ by majority 
shareholders and whether the law in each system has been any successful to facilitate 
formation of a just and efficient reconciliation between the majority/ minority interests 
in companies. examined three major minority protection mechanisms; i. e. derivative 
action, just and equitable winding up, and unfairly prejudicial conduct; as to the 
English company law. All three mechanisms rely on equity principles and serve, in one 
way or another, to protect minority shareholders against a likely abuse of rights by 
majority shareholders. They are meant to offer tailored solutions to different cases of 
majority abuse and such solutions are often considered as case specific rather than 
being a general principle. Derivative actions concern a corporate wrong in 
circumstances where wrongdoers and corporate controllers are one and the same. They 
often involve some sort of unjust enrichment on the part of controllers who try to ratify 
such enrichment, using their voting rights. When successful, they are normally given 
remedies like damages or compensation, restitution of the companys property and 
account of the profits taken. They are beneficial as to protecting rights and interests of 
minority shareholders, as they require controllers /wrongdoers to make good any 
damages inhered by the wronged company whereby prevent majority rule form 
working M cases which clearly involve fraud. Quite the different, the just and equitable 
winding up cases often involve no question of wrong in its common law sense and 
hence there is no unjust enrichment at issue. Instead, such cases normally concern 
circumstances within which certain activities of controllers are regarded by the equity 
as involving abuse in the exercise of rights. As a result, a suitable remedy for such 
278 
cases is winding up which ensures that there will be no more damages to shareholders" 
interests. The unfairly prejudicial conduct, on the other hand, concern any unfair 
disregard of minority interests by controllers which results in breach by the company 
of the contract between the company and its wronged minorities. The breadth of it 
enables the mechanism to be inclusive of abuse of rights and powers against minority 
interests which can occur in various shapes and ways in corporations. By providing a 
number of reliefs which are not conclusive and which can fall to the minority plaintiff 
either directly or indirectly, it can respond each abuse of right and power case 
appropriately. "' 
Although the first two mechanisms offer some advantages, they have shown in 
practice to be short of ability to address majority abuse sufficiently. The derivative 
action fails to cover cases which involve directors' negligence and breach of duties of 
care and fiduciary. Its elements of fraud and control can hinder any commencement of 
derivative actions by minority shareholders"' and further factors like disinterested 
majority vote and independent sub-committees view which are regarded by the courts 
could function as barrier rather than being a simple check. 
357 Too, the Law 
Commission's proposed derivative action in its current format can increase uncertainty 
associated with such actions and can further require a shift of authority from 
corporations (put it precisely, a shift of authority from corporate organs; i. e. 
management and meetings) to the courts. The just and equitable winding up remedy, 
too, is sometimes rigid and prejudicial because it simply winds the company up, 
355 Companies Act 1985, Section 461 (1 and 2). 
356 Law Commission (above note 68) at p 71; Department of Trade and Industry's Consultation 
Paper (above note 79) at p 12. 
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whereas ideally neither the plaintiff minority nor the defendant majority would have 
wished to have the company wound up. Instead of solving the problem, it simply 
dissolves the company, killing the patient instead of curing the cause of his illness. This 
particularly seems disastrous when the company prospers. "' The break-up value of the 
corporate assets could worth less per share than its going-concern value and this 
would follow that every shareholder may lose some of their investment. 359 Although, 
viewed by the courts as being exceptional and the last resort remedy, it has proved in 
practice to be widely open to every sinisiter shareholder who can cause corporations to 
get involved in time consuming, tiresome and disruptive winding up proceedings. 360 
In addition to these, both mechanisms have little relevance to large companies. A 
successful derivative action requires plaintiff to show control of the wrongdoers and 
clearly it is very unlikely for a plaintiff to be able to show such control, as large 
companies tend to have dispersed shareholders. Also, since large companies tend not 
to accommodate any personal relationship which is a requirement for a grant of the 
just and equitable winding up remedy, it will be very unlikely that that remedy is 
given as to such companies. When entrusting his money to a company, an investor 
trusts to the documents that were shown to him and not to the people who control the 
357 Conway (above, note 43); Boyle (1969), (above, note 81) at p 120; Poole and Roberts (above 
note 81) at p 99; Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at p 453. 
358 Pettet (above, note 40) at p 247. 
359 Pettet (above, note 40) at p 247; Instone Ralph " Unfair Prejudice to Shareholders", New 
Law journal, (1981), London, Butterworths, p 1316; Bastin N. A., "Minority Protection: A Plea 
for Reform", New Law journal, (1977), London, Butterworths, p 230. 
360 Law Commission recognised this problem and proposed that bringing action in winding up 
cases should become subject to a leave of the court. [Law Commission (above, note 68) at p 461. 
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company. Besides, no deadlock might occur in large companies because the general 
meeting resolves any deadlock. "' 
In contrast, the third mechanism remedies, as intended by its drafters, most 
shortcomings of the first two mechanisms. Many issues that were considered in the 
past as internal matters could now be reviwed by the courts and a minority plaintiff is 
no longer required to face difficulties of standing. 
36' The mechanism also avoids the 
rigidity of the winding up remedy. It puts strong check on corporate controllers and 
helps minorities to bring such controllers to the negotiation table . 
36'An 
aggregate of the 
above properties have helped the unfairly prejudicial remedy to leave behind the 
derivative and winding up forms of actions. Nonetheless, the mechanism, which is 
64 
sometimes described as being an English innovation' , suffers from some deficiencies. 
For a start, it is liable to abuse, as it enables minority shareholders to make opportunist 
use of the statutory right. "' This is because under the current unfairly prejudicial 
conduct a minority shareholder will become able to demand a remedy for almost any 
act of the company which might seem inconsistent with their interests. It thus 
disconnects the link between the majority rule and the logic that minority claims 
should sensibly be curbed. 366 Likewise, every dissatisfied shareholder can now use the 
mechanism to expose the company and its shareholders to some fallacious and 
361 Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at p 458. 
362 Davies (above, note 60) at pp 735-6; Pettet (above, note 40) at p 249; Hirt (above, note 66) at 
p 101. 
363 Pettet (above, note 40) at p 249; Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at p 474. 
364 Sealy (above, note 31) at p 172. 
365 Clark (2001), (above, note 96) at p 171; Clark (1999), (above, note 110) at p 322; Sealy (above, 
note 31) at 173. 
366 Clark (2001), (above, note 95) at pp 174-5; Clark (1999), (above, note 110) at pp 321-2; Farrar 
(1991), (above, note 42) at p 474; Davies (above, note 60) at pp 737-9. 
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disruptive litigation in order to extract some extera advantages for themselves. "' That 
can explain why litigation in this area has tended to become notorious. "' Further, there 
are some uncertainties with the mechanism. As Cheffins observed, "because of its 
broad scope, the possibility always exists that a judge wiR apply section 459 in a novel 
and unpredictable fashion' . 
169As 
the choice of a suitable remedy is always one for the 
courts to make, litigants can hardly predict consequences that their action may 
generate. Such uncertainties can further generate unwanted costs to be borne by 
shareholders, as they "will either have to pay legal fees in order to try to clarify matters 
or carry on without being sure whether they are acting in a legally valid manner. 370 in 
addition to the costs, the mechanism can sometimes be tiresome. Its equitable nature 
can cause any claim of unfairly prejudicial conduct to require historical investigations 
and evidential discovery in the affairs of companies. "' Above all, the mechanism can 
serve inefficiently in relation to small companies and be a mismatch for large 
companies. As to small companies, it may discourage financing. This is the context 
where normally those who wish to have both voting and managerial control provide 
the large part of finance required for corporations" business and they would feel 
uncomfortable if the company law lays too much attention to the protection of 
minorities. "' In large companies, on the other hand, it offers little use for two reasons. 
367 O'Neill and Another v. Phillips and Others, (1999), 2 All ER 961, HL per Lord Hoffman J.; 
See also Farrar (1991), (above, note 42) at p 319; Clark (1999), (above, note 110) at p 322; Clark 
(2001), (above, note 95) at pp 174-5. 
368 Re Unisoft Group Ltd. (No 3), (1994), 1 BCLC 609 at p 611 per Harman J. 
369 Cheffins (above, note 3) at pp 260-1. 
370 Cheffins Ibid. 
371 Clark (1999), (above note 110) at p 322; Clark (2001), (above, note 95) at pp 174-5. 
372 Posner (above, note 3) at pp 91-6; Cheffins (above, note 3) at pp 18-19; Farrar (1991), (above, 
note 42) at p 319; Jensen and Meckling (above, note 3) at p 6; MacNeil (above, note 20) at p 117; 
To study contrary opinion see Copp who argued that not a narrowly interpreted but a broadly 
construed section 459 would encourage financial investment in small companies. 
Otherwise, 
substantial investors may be deterred from investing in a small company out of a 
fear of being 
locked in. [Copp (above, note 211) at p 81. 
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One is that the courts have construed the unfairly prejudical conduct in order to apply 
only in cases where the relationship between corporate members is built on some 
personal connections. Such connections are non-nally found in small companies. The 
other is that the availability of market for shares which normally provides an adequate 
exit procedure for shareholders of large companies, makes the use of the mechanism in 
that area unnecessary and redundant. "' 
As to the Iranian company law, I considered five mechanisms; i. e. the "no abuse of 
right", right to convene shareholder meeting, cumulative voting, disinterested 
ratification, and shareholder action; which provide, in different ways, some protection 
to minority shareholders. The first mechanism; i. e. the 'no abuse of right'; has a high 
potential to curb abuse of rights by majority shareholders. Using its measure and 
without requiring a separate and specific law, the courts can identify and stop many 
instances of majority abuse in corporations. For example, the principle can be used to 
stop abuse by controHers where corporations are dominated by one or few 
shareholders who attempt, using their statutory and constitutional right and without 
having a good excuse, to remove a minority shareholder/ director from the office. 
Likewise, the principle can be used to avoid a resolution of meeting which implicitly 
involves some discrimination against minority shareholders. Nonetheless, as the courts 
are often under the influence of the Islamic law which limits application of the 
principle to the relationship between neighbouring owners, they seem reluctant to 
utilise this high potential in its full capacity. 
373 Deakin, Ferran and Nolan (above note 246) at 163; Leader & Dine (above, note 159) at p 243; 
Ferran (above, note 50) at p 339. 
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The second mechanism; i. e. right to convene shareholder meeting; was designed to 
provide shareholders with the opportunity to convene a shareholder meeting in 
default of corporate directors" action. It serves more as a protection for shareholders in 
a shareholder/ management dispute rather than being a protection for minority 
shareholders against majority shareholders. Where directors are, in one way or 
another, involved in the wrongdoing against their corporations, the right allows 
shareholders to control and stop such directors. Directors" involvement in the 
wrongdoing often occurs where one or few shareholders do not dominate a 
corporation. It can also occur in corporations that have a controlling shareholder who 
excert weak control on directors. The latter is normally the case for most Iranian public 
industrial and financial enterprises that are dominated by the government and its 
dependant organisations. Dominant shareholders in such corporations monitor 
directors weakly as a consequence of their control mechanisms which have hierarchic, 
bureaucratic, and administrative nature and because those who represent the 
government normally have no or little incentive to exert control effectively. The right is 
of little use where directors have ownership control, because even if a meeting is 
convened at minority shareholders' demand, it is very unlikely to result in anything 
favourable to the demander. Considering that private corporations in Iran tend to have 
one or few controlling shareholders who control the management, the right does little 
as to protecting minority shareholders in such corporations too. 
The third mechanism; i. e. cumulative voting; was intended to empower minority 
shareholders to have one or few representatives in corporate boards, which take most 
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corporate decisions. It, however, concerns only with appointing directors rather than 
their removal from the office. The latter is resolved through a normal majority decision 
based on 'one share, one vote'. The result is there is always a possibity that a minority 
elected director is removed from the office by a simple resolution of majority 
shareholders. 
The fourth mechanism; i. e. disinterested ratification; is a mechanism through which 
exerting effective shareholder control over directors' activities in corporations is 
facilitated. It seeks to prevent wrongdoer directors from having the ability to ratify 
their wrongdoings. It, however, seems to be specific to small private corporations 
where wrongdoer directors often have ownership control too. As to large corporations, 
it is irrelevant because persons other than the very wrongdoer directors often control 
such corporations. It is also deficient in the sense that it concerns only wrongs which 
involve directors' self-interested transactions rather than their faults in a wider sense. 
The fifth mechanism; i. e.; shareholder action; allows shareholders to pursue as a 
matter of exception and on behalf of the wronged companies directors who commit 
fault. Being mainly a mechanism for protection of shareholders generally as against 
abuse of power by directors, it is relevant and can be utilised in cases in which 
different persons manage corporations and hold ownership control. It does not concern 
wrongs which are caused by the majority shareholders and since directors' faults are 
considered ratifiable the protection serves little use to minority shareholders where the 
same persons hold management and ownership control. 
In summary, English company law seems to be dynamicly responsive to the possibility 
of the majority abuse of rights. While corporations, excluding private corporations, in 
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England tend not to have a controlling shareholder and consequently are less liable to 
the problem of majority abuse and need as a result less legal protections for minority 
shareholders, company law has provided a number of mechanisms that provide 
various effective and appropriate remedies which can sensibly curb the possibility of 
majority abuse. They provide fucussed solutions that target majority abuse of rights 
which occurs in different ways and shapes in corporations. 
In contrast, company law in Iran seems to be under developed as to the 
majority/ minority conflict in corporations. It provides some weak and at times 
irrelevant mechanisms as to preventing abuse of rights by majority shareholders, 
whereas most Iranian corporations are dominated by one or few controlling 
shareholders and are inevitably liable to abuse by the controlling shareholders. Four of 
the five considered mechanisms that exist in Iranian company law mainly concern 
preventing abuse of power by corporate directors and hence are pertinent to the 
shareholders/ directors conflict rather than being minority protections. This aside, the 
only mechanism; i. e. the "no abuse of right"; which is relevant to the majority/ minority 
conflict has lost its potentials because of a lack of statutory definition which authorises 
the use of principle in company law and determines its circumstances, concequences 
and available remedies plus an unwillingness on the part of judiciary in extending the 
mechanism from disputes between neighbouring owners to the majority/ minority 
conflict in corporations. 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis, I studied, from English and Iranian company law viewpoints, the 
principle of majority rule and its likely clash with rights and interests of minority 
shareholders. Given that majority /minority shareholder conflict commonly occurs in 
both English and Iranian corporations, the study concerned examination of that 
conflict and the response of the company laws in the two mentioned systems. As a 
matter of principle, accepted by corporate members and company laws, shareholder 
conflicts in corporations are to be resolved intemally, using the rule of majority. in 
some occasions, however, the way the rule is used could itself generate conflicts 
between majority and minority shareholders. The governing majority shareholders can 
use it as an instrument in order to extract some private benefits. Majority shareholders 
may also adopt or authorise, through directors, policies that are considered, in the view 
of a minority shareholder, poor and harmful to companies and their shareholders' 
interests. The implication is that while the rule of majority can have unfair 
consequences as to the rights and interests of minority shareholders, it allows no 
recourse to be taken by a wronged minority and this can generate conflicts between 
majority and minority shareholders. 
As shareholder conflicts, if not resolved fairly, could damage corporations thereby 
undermine their service to the society, I intended to discover why and how such 
conflict could occur in corporations of each system. I also wanted to determine what 
and how company law in each system has done to resolve such conflict plus providing 
an explanation for the question of why each system did the way it did. Finally, I 
intended to take some lessons from the results of the research which could improve the 
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quality of the law in this matter. To reach these objectives, I had to examine, from 
varying aspects, the very rule of majority and the mechanisms that the two corporate 
laws have introduced in order to curb abuse of majority rights against minority 
shareholders. The examination was therefore twofold. One concemed direct and 
indirect factors which allow majority rule to be used opportunistically against minority 
shareholders. Here, I emphasise on four factors which are considered respectively in 
Chapters one, two, three and four. In Chapter one, in addition to considering the 
question of why the rule is justified, I showed also how such justifications could be 
used by the majority shareholders in order to ignore appropriate minority complaints. 
Chapter two considered the relevance of general laws and constitutions, as they draw 
the field within which the rule of majority can work, and showed that the two 
mentioned factors, although restricting the rule of majority and thereby providing 
some safeguards for minority rights, are unable to address a great part of majority 
abuses which occur in corporations. In Chapter three, which was about demonstrating 
and examining the voting mechanism, I explained how majority shareholders could 
make opportunistic use of their voting rights in order to take private benefits or hurt 
minority shareholders. Chapter four concerned the role of corporate directors. It 
cautiously accepted the idea that corporate directors can offer some solution to the 
majority/ minority conflict in corporations. In varying degrees, they are liable to 
mismanagement and further they can sometimes serve to empower majority 
shareholders hereby to facilitate majority abuse of rights. In summary, Chapters one to 
four made it clear why and how the rule of majority can be abused. They also showed 
that contractual and market mechanisms plus general laws have limited capacity to 
prevent such abuse. They, thus, urge intervention by the law for protection of minority 
shareholders. 
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The other, which was the subject of my consideration in Chapter five, concerned 
examination of the existing mechanisms in company laws of the two countries that 
seek to protect minority shareholders against the possibility of abuse of rights by 
majority shareholders. The examination showed that although minority shareholder 
protection mechanisms in both company laws have some weaknesses, the English 
company law mechanisms seem to be more focussed and more responsive on the 
majority/n-dnority conflict compared to its Iranian counterparts. 
Chapter one demonstrated and examined justifications which are used in order to 
support application of the principle of majority rule in corporations. It considered three 
approaches, political, economic, and doctrinal, which originally evolved in England 
and other western economies and which were later adopted as part of the imported 
pakage of corporation by the Iranian law. While they agree to support the majority rule 
generally, they use different reasoning for its application. For the political approach, it 
matters because corporate directors who are liable to abuse should be controlled and 
majority rule by solving the collective action problem can facilitate such control. The 
economic approach, on the other hand, regards shareholder control as irrelevant. In its 
view, majority rule facilitates the collective action and this is something desirable not 
because it enables shareholder control but rather because it allows shareholders to 
react to unpredicted events quickly and appropriately when the contract is incomplete. 
Besides, by placing governance in the hands of those who have more shares, it 
facilitates and encourages risk taking and financing in companies and, thus, it is 
efficient too. The doctrinal approach which accommodates the rule within the 
corporate laws, justifies the rule of majority, using certain legal reasoning and policy 
considerations. In its view, the rule of majority saves companies" and the judiciary's 
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resources, respects the corporate autonomy, and frees management of companies from 
noxious allegations. 
There are some advantages and disadvantages with each of the three approaches. The 
political approach recognises shareholder control which is desirable and necessary as 
to preventing mismanagement. At the same time, it can be inefficient as individual 
shareholders rather than their capital are given weight. The approach, thus, offers 
excessive safeguards for minority rights. The economic approach, on the other hand, 
respects corporate capitalism, which is efficient generally, but at the same time it can be 
injurious, unjust and perhaps sometimes even inefficient by rejecting any idea that 
relies on shareholder control or supports protection for minority shareholders. The 
doctrinal approach avoids criticisms that are made to the two mentined approaches. In 
its view, the majority rule facilitates both shareholder control and financing. Yet, on the 
issue of minority rights, it seems deficient too, as it rigidly ignores minority 
shareholders" rights. 
The Chapter went on to explain why Iranian lawmaker adopted company law on the 
model of Europe, as distinguished from the Anglo-American model. It was made clear 
that, unlike the latter, the former model could successfully penetrate into the Iranian 
society and could fit effectively with the existing business vehicles and laws, 
considering the political, economic, religious and legal backgrounds. This divergence 
between the two systems on their corporate governance structures can further mean 
that the rule of majority in English corporations will not be as strong as is in its Iranian 
counterparts. While corporations in the former tend not to have one or few controlling 
shareholders who could utilise the rule effectively, their counterparts in the latter rely 
on the presence of such shareholders. A corollary could be the majority/ minority 
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conflict and hence protection of minority shareholders could matter less in the former 
than in the latter. 
In summary, it is possible to conclude that the way in which the rule of majority is 
justified can affect the majority/ minority conflict sharply. While a justification which 
supports absolute governance of capital majority in corporations can be risky for 
minority shareholders, the one that justifies majority rule, relying on personality of 
shareholders, can be risky towards majority shareholders. Meanwhile, both can be 
inefficient when they are put to use in inappropriate context. In countries like Iran 
where corporations take finance internally and shareholder control dominates, a relax 
majority rule plus excessive emphasise on protection of minority rights could 
discourage corporate initiatives. In contrast, such rule could serve efficient for English 
companies, as they tend to attract finance externally and have no controlling 
shareholder. The conclusion is that an acceptable justification is the one that is able to 
accommodate an appropriate balance of majority /minority rights, considering the 
context within which the rule works. 
Chapter two considered two important factors, general laws and constitutions, which 
contribute to shape the framework within which the rule of majority works. The 
former concerned rules that limit companies and their majority shareholders' power as 
a matter of public order and regulation rather than being a matter of minority 
protection. The latter concerned with rules that regulate corporate members" 
relationship through private contracting. These rules can address some of the 
majority/ minority conflicts deriving from abusive exercise of rights by majority 
shareholders. They generally prevent an unlawful or unconstitutional decision of the 
majority from being binding on minority shareholders. It must, however, be bome in 
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mind that they can do so effectively only if they clearly state the framework. Unclear 
rules can be construed, in the light of the courts' unwillingness to interfere with 
corporations' internal affairs, in favour of majority shareholders. This aside, general 
laws and constitutions cannot avoid an abuse of right that may occur where the 
majority act both lawfully and constitutionally. This inability explains the need for 
intervention of the law in the majority/ minority relationship for the protection of 
minority shareholders. 
Chapter three considered the mechanism of voting through which the rule of majority 
works. It meant to examine the mechanism in order to show how opportunistic 
majority shareholders could exert control against minority interests while relying on 
the majority rule. it was made clear that shareholder control depends on, and can be 
exerted by, voting which itself relies on share ownership. As the rule is 'one share, one 
vote', every shareholder will have and exert some degree of control, but principally 
only those who own majority of shares will be in control of corporations. That means 
majority shareholders can take decisions that affect minority shareholders and further 
their judgement will resolve any majority/ minority dispute. As a matter of principle, 
majority control is desirable and necessary, even seen by minority shareholders. It 
offers some ease to collective action, resolves internI disputes, enables shareholder 
control over management, encourages financing, and saves corporate as well as public 
resources. These explain why it is often accepted by contract parties and supported by 
company laws. It can, however, be risky as to minority shareholders" interests where 
those in control use the rule of majority opportunistically. By voting to discriminatory 
resolutions at shareholder meeings, majority shareholders can use it in order to take 
some private benefits. This can occur in the majority/ minority relationship mainly 
because voting is regarded as right which enables shareholders to exercise it freely. 
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Majority shareholders while voting can constflt with their personal interests with no 
obligation to accommodate minority interests. The result is that they can simply pass a 
shareholder resolution which is binding upon minority shareholders and which offers 
discriminatory benefits to the controlling majority. In summary, the gist of my 
argument here is to evidence that the mechanism of voting through which the rule of 
majority works is liable to abuse and such abuse occurs in the light of the element of 
majority control plus controllers'absolute freedom in exercise of it. 
Having observed how the mechanism of voting can be abused, the Chapter also raised 
the question of how such abuse could be curbed. It considered relevance of company 
law and other factors which could function, or could have functioned, in order to curb 
the abuse. The first factor, which was considered, was private contracting. It was 
explained that the mechanism of majority rule is only a default rule that can be 
displaced by private contracting. Thus, private contracting can shift away control from 
majority shareholders. Private contracting is often put in the form of limitations in 
corporate constitution or shares, which allow deviation from the 'one share, one vote' 
rule. Nonetheless, such private contracting often only affects the very element of 
control which means instead of curing abuse of majority control, it simply displaces it. 
As such displacement can have disproportionate disadvantages, contract parties 
normally do not want it and as a consequence the use of it is uncommon. The second 
factor concerned variability of the majority rule. The argument was that it could offer 
some guarantee to minority shareholders because it prevents the same group from 
being able to compose the majority rule all the times. Nevertheless, any such guarantee 
can only be relevant as to corporations that lack a controlling majority. Where one or 
few shareholders dominate corporations, the factor fails to work. Furthen-nore, even in 
the former corporations, dispersion of shareholdings can sometimes serve only to 
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reduce the degree of control, which means in the light of shareholder apathy and 
collective action problem some relatively small but active shareholders may be able to 
exert control constantly. The third factor, which was considered, concerned company 
law. I explained that company law in both England and Iran are aware of and have 
been responsive to the possibility of abuse in the exercise of voting right and as a result 
they both imposed some limitation on majority shareholders which require them to 
avoid discrimination when voting at shareholder meetings. Nonetheless, as I further 
explained such limitation could prohibit only clear discriminations while informal 
discriminations will escape a review. Lastly, the Chapter considered the relevance of 
institutional shareholders and concluded that they do nothing remarkable as to the 
majority/ minority conflict while they can be relevant as to preventing mismanagement 
in English large corporations which tend to suffer from weak internal control over 
corporate management. 
Chapter four examined the role of directors as to the majority/ minority conflict. It 
meant to challenge the idea already refered briefly in Chpter two' that directors can 
serve greatly to reduce the likelihood of abuse of rights by majority shareholders. The 
gist of the idea was to argue that because a great deal of corporate power falls within 
the discretion of corporate directors who are under duties to exercise power carefully, 
disinterestedly and impartially, and who are disciplined through market constraints, 
and whose duties can be enforced by shareholders, there will be a remarkable 
reduction in the size of any likely abusive exercise of rights by majority shareholders. I 
generally accepted the idea, but made two comments on it. The first comment 
1 See Chapter two (above, at 11.2.1). 
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concerned mismanagement which can occur in different ways and varying degrees in 
both English and Iranian corporations. The gist of my comment here was to argue that 
a concentration of power in the hands of directors should only be allowed where 
company law, shareholders and the market are able to curb mismanagement 
effectively otherwise majority abuse can be substituted by managerial abuse whose 
harms outweights, those of the former. My second comment concerned corporations 
that are dominated by one or few controlling shareholders. In such corporations, 
empowering corporate directors can simply serve to facilitate control by majority 
shareholders. In such corporations, normally the same people hold a majority of shares 
and managerial positions. Even if different persons hold them, majority shareholders 
can exert indirect control over management, using the majority rule. 
Chapter five considered legal constraints on the majority rule. It concerned 
examination of limitations and mechanisms in English and Iranian laws that either 
were designed as a minority shareholder protection or can be used for such purpose. 
The intention was to see how they respond to the possibility of majority abuse of rights 
and what are their weaknesses and strengths. Four mechanisms, two common law 
made and two statutory, were identified as to the English company law. Of them, one 
mechanism i. e. constraint on voting had already been examined in Chapter three 
where I showed that the constraint which is a general principle of company law 
concerns majority abuse of rights which is put in the form of discriminatory resolutions 
of meetings. While advantegous for addressing formal discriminations, it cannot, 
however, avoid discriminations which occur informally. The other three were 
mechanisms devised to target special cases of majority abuse. The first mechanism, the 
derivative action, concerns obvious cases of fraud; i. e. cases that often involve direct or 
indirect stealing of the corporate assets or profits by directors who possess shares 
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enough to hold ownership control of the corporation. Derivative actions cannot cover 
cases that simply involve negligence or a breach of duties by directors, though they can 
be used to address a breach of fiduciary duty and negligence which benefits the 
wrongdoer director. As they are corporate claims, they always require the plaintiff to 
show the element of wrongdoer control and because the element of control is required, 
they are often specific to small corporations where a controlling shareholder is 
normally present. The second mechanism, 'just and equitable winding up" remedy, 
concerns an abuse of rights by majority shareholders which involves no stealing but is 
instead so against legitimate expectations of minority shareholders which hurts the 
core basis of the corporate contract. This is so, even if the controlling shareholder exerts 
his right lawfully which means a plaintiff is not required to show controllers' fault. 
Cases that commonly fall within the ambit of the remedy include, but are not limited 
to, breach of mutual trust, exclusion from management and deadlock situations. The 
remedy is only suitable for small corporations where shareholders" relationship relies 
on not only corporate constitution but also mutual trust and legitimate expectations. 
As a personal remedy, it can sometimes be severe because it dissolves the corporation 
while nobody wants it so dissolved. The third mechanism, 'unfairly prejudicial 
conduct' remedy, concerns any unfair disregard of controllers, majority shareholders 
or directors, from minority interests. It allows minority shareholders to take either 
corporate or personal claim in respect of any violation done by controllers to 
constitution and laws as well as their legitimate expectations in the company. Unlike 
the two other remedies, it has a considerably wider scope. It covers breach of directors' 
duties without requiring the plaintiff to show the elements of fraud and control. It also 
covers any unconstitutional acts of controllers that were categorised under the 
common law as simply an irregular issue. The remedy can also be used as a substitute 
to the just and equitable winding up remedy for cases like breach of mutual trust, 
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exclusion from management and deadlock situations which previously fell within the 
conclusive ambit of the latter. ' Yet, like the two other remedies, it is suitable mainly for 
addressing abuse of rights by majority shareholders in small corporations. 
An imporatnat advantage of these various remedies that all focus on preventing and 
responding abuse of rights by majority shareholders has been provision of adequate, 
relevant and tailored safeguards for protection of rights and interests of minority 
shareholders in English company law. They generally recognise the link between 
ownership control and abuse of rights by controllers, which can be direct and indirect 
and which can occur in various ways and shapes, and hence they provide solutions to 
prevent such abuse. Their solutions are tailored which means each focusses on specific 
type or types of abuse and provides relevant solution. As tailored solutions, they are 
specific to small corporations because large corporations often lack presence of a 
controlling shareholder and hence they are very unlikely to be liable to abuse of rights 
by majority shareholders. At the same time, they are inclusive because they provide 
solutions which are wide enough to cover new forms of abuse. Nonetheless, a criticism, 
which concerns the most the third mechanism, is that troublesome minorities could 
now opportunistically outflank the majority rule, as a result of uncertainty which is 
incurred by the remedy. 
2 Conway Mark, "'Minority Shareholder Protection and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle: 
Increasingly a Foss about Nothing" in 'Companies in the 1990s' edited by Gary Slapper, 1995, 
London, Cavendish, at pp 13-14; Clark Bryan, "Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct: A Pathway 
Through the Maze", Company Lawyer, (2001), 22 (6), 170, London, Oyez Publishing Limited, at 
pp 170-171; Clark Bryan, "Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct", Scots Law Time (S. L. T. ), (1999), 38, 
321, Edinburgh, W. Green & Son Ltd, at pp 321-2. 
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Majority/ minority conflict aside, English company law does not seem very successful 
at handling shareholder/ management conflicts, which dominate English large 
corporations. It was made clear in Chapters one and four that such corporations tend 
to have weak internal control which could follow they are more likely to incur 
mismanagement. Market forces fail to sufficiently discipline negligent managers and 
company law, by providing impunity for managers who conu-nit mere 
mismanagement, is too friendly towards them. The reviewed remedies, while good at 
addressing abuse of rights by majority shareholders in small corporations, are basically 
irrelevant as to mismanagement that occurs in large companies. 
As to the Iranian company law, five mechanisms were examined. The first mechanism, 
the 'no abuse of right" that is a general principle of law, is potentially capable to cover 
abuse in the exrcise of righs that can occur in various forms and ways in any 
relationship including the one between majority and minority shareholders in 
corporations. In practice, however, because of the Islamic law background which limits 
the scope of it to owners of neighbouring properties" realationships and because the 
existing Iranian Codes of laws (The Civil Code) define the principle only in such 
relationship and in the light of an absence of a specific and separate definition in laws 
relevant to corporations including JSCA, the courts have been reluctant to utilise the 
principle in its full capacity. The other four mechanisms; i. e. right to convene 
shareholder meeting, cumulative voting, disinterested ratification, and shareholder 
action; mainly concern preventing abuse of power by corporate directors and hence are 
pertinent to the shareholders /directors conflict rather than being minority protections. 
In summary, Iranian company law, unlike its English counterpart, seems to be less 
responsive to the possibility of majority abuse of rights, while laying emphasis on 
preventing abuse of power by directors. It provides some weak and at times lrrelevant 
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mechanisms as to preventing abuse of rights by majority shareholders, whereas most 
Iranian corporations are dominated by one or few controlling shareholders and should, 
therefore, inevitably be liable to abuse by the controlling shareholders. At a glance, 
such low responsiveness of the Iranian company law can seem odd. However, when 
viewed in its cultural, political and economic backgrounds, as considered in Chapter 
one, the method of company law can be explained. Attention to minority shareholders' 
rights could reduce control of the dominating shareholder (the government) over the 
private sector and could further discourage majority financing. Furthermore, because 
the government as the dominating shareholder was represented in corporations by its 
human agents who could generate agency costs, it wanted, through rules of 
directors'liability, to make sure its agents will stay in line. After all, the very concept of 
abuse of right (in the sense of imposing a general limitation on the exercise of rights by 
owners and other persons) was relatively unknown to the Iranian lawmaker who was 
influenced by the Islamic law teachings. Instead of 'abuse of rights, the question that 
mattered much for the lawmaker was -abuse of power' which is found in the 
relationship between agents and principal and which was well known to the Iranian 
lawmaker and the Islamic law. 
These explanations are no longer forceful. Art 40 of the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (CIRI) has already offered the potential that 'abuse of rights' which is 
a modem law concept is recognised. Also Islamic law seems on the move towards 
recogniation of the "no abuse of right" in a wider sense. Furthermore, the govenu-nent 
has recently decided on efficiency reasons, which was considered in Chapters one and 
four, to reduce its control over the economy and to empower the private sector through 
adopting and implementing a number of privatization programs. If privatization is 
that urgent and desirable, then providing political as well as economic securities for 
299 
private sector and regulating of shareholders' relationship and in particular provision 
of adequate minority shareholder protection will become inevitable and forthcoming. 
Now that we have learned why and how majority rule is liable to abuse against 
minority shareholders" rights and interests and further how company laws in England 
and Iran have responded to such abuse plus what have been their weaknesses and 
strengths, my intention is to suggest as a conclusion that minority protection 
mechanisms which exist in the English model and which reflect more than a century 
experience and achievements of that model on the issue of majority/ minority conflict 
can be worth learning by the Iranian lawmaker. No doubt, such learning does not 
require the Iranian lawmaker to facilitate a shift in corporate governance structure 
from its current model to that of the Anglo-American. That is undesirable and 
unnecessary, though privatization programs are pursued. Any such shift can require 
massive changes in cultural, socio-economic, political and legal elements, which are 
very unlikely to occur and which can be inefficient. Comparative research has also 
shown that none of the models are ideal and the choice for a country is only one of 
cultural, socio-economic, and political. Also, the fact that the minority protection 
mechanisms in the English model rely on equity principles which are unknown to the 
Iranian laws does not thwart the very leaming. The gist of these mechanisms is to 
prevent majority rights being instrumentally abused against minority shareholders and 
such idea is common to the Iranian laws which use only a different method; i. e. 'no 
abuse of right' principle; of doing the same thing. In addition to these, such learning 
relies on elemens that are shared between the two systems; i. e. the fact that 
majority /minority conflict occurs in corporations that are dominated by one or two 
shareholders and that both systems commonly need to address such conflict. As a 
result, the reviewed English company law mechanisms which are largely specific to 
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small companies where dominating shareholders are present can be inspirational to the 
Iranian company law as to addressing the issue of abuse of rights by majority 
shareholders in Iranian corporations. They identify actual examples of abuse of rights 
by majority shareholders and define circumstances under which such abuse can occur. 
They provide a range of suitable remedies for protection of minority rights in such 
circumstances and allow the courts to tailor such remedies so as to make them fit with 
the circumstances of each case whereby to make considered balance between majority 
rule and minority rights in each given case. They are not, at the same time, exhaustive 
which means they allow new examples of abuse which the future unfolds to be 
covered by the existing mechanisms. 
Iranian company law is deficient as to the protection of minority shareholders. In 
summary, it allows directors' faults, however serious, to be ratified by majority 
shareholders. While excluding a wrongdoer director from voting at shareholder 
meeting, it only concerns fault that involves self-dealing. It permits shareholders to 
take corporate actions against negligent directors while failing to avoid ratification of 
the very cause of action by majority shareholders. Moreover, it fails to prevent informal 
discriminations that can occur against minority shareholders in corporations and 
further falls short of capability to avoid unfair exclusion of directors who either hold 
minority shareholding or represent such shareholdings. Lastly, it fails to offer personal 
remedies in the form of winding up or buy out orders which can be used by wronged 
minorities in circumstances where the company is unfairly conducted against minority 
interests. These deficiencies can be remedied, using the experience of the English 
company law on minority protection. Inspired by the derivative mechanism, company 
law can help minority shareholders to avoid ratification of some of more serious faults 
of directors by majoritry shareholders. The winding up and unfairly prejudicial 
301 
remedies can also be inspirational to the Iranian lawmaker as to providing suitable 
personal remedies for minority shareholders in certain circumstances. The latter 
remedy can further be used to allow the lawmaker to define the existing 'no abuse of 
right' principle in the light of company law and particularly as relevant to solve 
majority/ minority conflicts. Any such definition can generally cover abuse of rights by 
majority shareholders and faults of directors and can further address the informal 
discrimination and exclusion from management problems. 
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